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Abstract 
 This thesis analyses the implementation and impact of a succession 
of reform policies in a reasonably typical county in central China between 
1978 and 2013. Three phases in the recent history of Li County – a fairly 
representative microcosm – are examined.  These phases emerged as China 
witnessed transitions across three generations of the central leadership. This 
study pays special attention to certain key reforms: the allocation of lands to 
households, the development of Township and Village Enterprises, and self-
governance for villagers in the 1980s; the decentralisation of fiscal authority, 
and the tax sharing system in the 1990s; and the reforms of taxes and fees, 
reforms beneficial to agriculture, and other supporting reforms from 2000 to 
2013. By assessing the implementation of these policies in one 
predominantly agrarian county in central China – in which 81.5% of the 
population was rural in 2010 - the thesis attempts to present a vivid picture 
of what has been happening in China, and to explain why China became 
what it is now.  It also seeks to contribute to an understanding of the diverse 
political and social impacts of the reforms. 
        The methodology which the current study employs is mainly 
qualitative. The findings in the thesis are based in part on secondary sources, 
but it mainly relies on two types of primary sources, which were examined 
during several phases of fieldwork between 2011 and 2013. First, 
documentary materials archived by many government departments at 
different levels within the county were consulted.  Second, oral evidence 
was collected through recorded interviews with local party cadres and 
peasants in 53 villages in thirty townships within the county. The 
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quantitative data set out in the thesis is drawn either from official statistics 
or from personal testimonies. The two sets of evidence complement each 
other, enable cross checking, and lend credibility to this analysis. They help 
us to understand conflicts that arose amid reform between different groups, 
and between traditional customs and modern values – and the strategies that 
have been adopted by a diversity of actors to ease those conflicts and to 
stabilise society. They also yield insights into the economic, social and 
environmental impediments which confronted the reform process, and into 
both the hardships and opportunities which ordinary people encountered.  
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
1.1 The Research Question 
 
Between 1979 and 2013, government policies changed markedly in China 
and its economy underwent fundamental changes.  Economic growth soared 
and proved remarkably sustainable throughout that period. Many state 
controls over the economy were relaxed or removed, vast numbers of people 
were lifted out of poverty, many individuals prospered so that a new middle 
class emerged. But economic inequality also increased markedly, and 
enormous numbers of peasants were enticed or forced off the land to seek 
work in urban centres.  As a result, China in 2013 was very different from 
its former self in 1979.   
 
      And yet, despite the magnitude of these changes, two things which 
occurred in numerous other Communist systems in that period did not 
happen in China.  Sometimes what does not happen is as important as what 
does, and both of these non-occurrences were immensely important.  They 
cry out for analysis.  This thesis provides a response. 
 
     First, despite mounting inequalities, and massive social dislocation – and 
what one social scientist has called “social change in fast forward”1 -- the 
social order at the local level did not break down.  Social relations within 
local communities did not degenerate into serious conflict or chaos.  
Chinese society was able to absorb monumental changes and (at times) 
acute stresses. Inequalities have seldom produced crass injustices, 
exploitation or severe internecine violence.  The social order has proved 
resilient.  It has bent without breaking.       
 
     Second, the political order has not been undone by these changes – by 
rising inequalities, by the emergence of a middle class, by social change and 
                                                 
1   This phrase comes from Anne Booth of the School of Oriental and African Studies, in a 
seminar during the mid-1990s.  She was referring to Indonesia, but her words can be 
applied to China as well. 
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tensions, or by unrest.  Collective protests have become very widespread 
over the last two decades.  But even though China has a long history of 
revolts from below, and even though some other Communist systems have 
given way to multi-party pluralism, these protests have neither overturned 
the prevailing order or led to the abandonment of the one-party system.  The 
Chinese Communist Party has diluted or discarded many of the core 
principles upon which it operated before 1979.  But despite this – or in some 
cases, because of this – it has retained its position as the dominant political 
force.    
 
      Nor have the great changes that have occurred loosened the tight inter-
penetration of the party and the state.  It remains appropriate to speak, as 
social scientists often do, of the ‘party-state’.  The roles played by cadres at 
lower levels in the system and by the party-state have changed, but the 
authority of the latter has not been seriously eroded.  Indeed, in some ways, 
it has been strengthened – despite or in some cases because of changes in 
the sources of its claims to legitimacy.  The party-state controls less than it 
did in earlier years, but retains its overall control of events.  The sources of 
its authority have also changed, but its authority has remained largely intact.  
Like the social order, the political order has proved resilient not because it is 
unchanging, but because it has adjusted to -- and introduced – changes.   
 
      This thesis seeks to enrich our understanding of China’s recent history 
by examining, in great detail, evidence from a fairly typical county in 
central China during three successive phases. These phases emerged as 
China witnessed transitions across three generations of the central 
leadership. Chapter two focuses on the period between 1979 and 1989, in 
which the peasants were released from unified labour after allocating the 
land to the peasants and became the main force to stimulate the first 
generation of rural industry – Township and Village Enterprises. Chapter 
three examines the period between 1990 and 1999 when the financial 
burdens on the shoulders of the peasants had become unmanageable and 
thus not only caused the deteriorated relationship between the local 
authority and the peasants, but also unintentionally led to the emergence of 
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migrant workers. Chapter four deals with the period between 2000 and 2013 
which is welcomed by the peasants as the central governments released 
several policies benefited the rural society in order to relieve the burdens on 
the peasants and ease the tension between the local authority and the 
peasants in the 1990s.   
  
     By proceeding in this way, the thesis seeks to answer two principal 
research questions.  How has the social order proved so resilient?  And how 
has the political order proved so resilient?  By addressing these two 
questions, the thesis seeks to deepen our understanding of the evolution of 
state-society relations in China during a period of extraordinary change.    
 
     Several subordinate research questions emerge from the two principal 
questions noted just above.  Each of the three core chapters explains what 
changes occurred, how they were introduced, what they implied for 
different groups of citizens, and citizens’ responses to them.  At the end of 
each of the three core chapters, answers are provided to the following 
subordinate questions, which follow on from the principal questions. 
1.  Did changes in government policy and/or the economy in that 
period create: 
a. stronger social bonds among citizens, or 
b. stresses within society or 
c. conflict between social groups, or other forms of unrest/disorder 
within society?  
2. Did changes in government policy and/or the economy in that period 
weaken or strengthen: 
a. the roles played by lower-level Communist Party cadres and 
government institutions, 
b. cadres’ interactions and relationships with citizens, 
c. the influence of cadres and the party-state, and      
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d. the authority and legitimacy of cadres and of the party-state? 
3. At any point in that period did it appear that (a) the social order, or 
(b) the influence/authority of cadres and the party-state might be at 
risk of breakdown?  If either answer is in the affirmative, details of 
the problem will be provided along with information on any steps 
(coercive or accommodative) that were taken to reduce the risk of 
breakdown -- and their impact.  
     As we shall see, the picture changes as we move through the three broad 
phases analysed in the three core chapters of this thesis.  Therefore, the 
answers to the questions set out above also change over time.   
 
     In certain periods, changes in government policy and the economy 
produced stresses and even conflicts within society.  In every instance, 
however, these proved to be manageable – either through amelioration and 
the renegotiation (or mere acceptance) of new realities, or through threat or 
actual use of coercion.  In other periods, changes in government policy and 
in the economy were (for the most part) welcomed by many social groups -- 
because they made immediate gains from them or at least saw the possibility 
of future gains.  When that occurred, tensions within society became less 
acute.  Once a picture emerges of the changing dynamics across the three 
periods covered in the core chapters below, our understanding of the 
resilience of the social order should be enhanced.    
 
     In certain periods, changes in government policy and the economy 
produced tensions between lower-level party cadres and citizens.  They 
sometimes imposed new, difficult tasks upon cadres which threatened their 
congenial relations with citizens.  At times, cadres were required to threaten 
or to use coercion in their dealings with citizens, and that naturally made 
citizens antagonistic towards both the cadres and the party-state.  In every 
instance, however, these tensions eventually proved to be manageable -- 
sometimes because government policies changed to ease antagonisms, and 
sometimes because cadres and citizens found informal ways to negotiate 
understandings.  Once a picture emerges of the changing dynamics across 
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the three periods covered in the core chapters below, our understanding of 
the resilience of the political order should be enhanced as well. 
 
      By examining these changing dynamics over time – first within society, 
and then between social groups on the one hand and cadres and the party-
state on the other, this thesis seeks to enhance our understanding of the 
evolution of state-society relations in China during these years of 
extraordinary change.  Its relevance will be commented on at the end of 
each chapter. 
          
1.2 Literature Review – The Authoritarian Resilience of China 
 
The resilient authoritarian regime in China has been puzzling many social 
scientists for the past two and a half decades. After 1989, many China 
specialists and democratic theorists expected this regime to fall to 
democratization’s “third wave” (Linz, 2000; Nathan, 2003). However, this 
most populous Communist country has not only survived its Tiananmen 
Square Incident in 1989, but the dominant Communist party also led the 
country through a period of remarkable economic success which has 
brought about tremendous changes in economic and social structures since 
then. These phenomena challenged the traditional view that market-oriented 
economic reform and development cannot be realised in a rigid Leninist-
style Communist country (Shirk, 1993) and draw abundant attention from 
scholars. Over the past twenty-odd years, more and more experts joined a 
debate around the questions of how the regime has maintained its rule since 
1979, and how likely it is to overcome the challenges that it faces today in 
order to maintain its upward resilience in the foreseeable future. 
(Shambaugh, 2000, 2008; Nathan, 2003, 2006, 2013; Pei, 2012, 2014). 
 
       Generally speaking, there are two dominant perspectives on the CCP’s 
capacity to maintain its political monopoly – authoritarian collapse/decay vs. 
authoritarian resilience. However, the debates between these two 
perspectives are not static. As China is still in transition, changes happen 
from time to time. The debate between these two competing perspectives 
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thus has never been completely resolved, although one might be more 
dominant than the other at difference times. Opinions from scholars in the 
two schools are reflections of what has been happening in China and 
sometimes their theories evolve over time.  
 
1.2.1 The Traditional View of Communist Regimes’ Collapse 
 
       Just after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern 
Europe, the survival and the transition of Communist regimes became one 
of the key topics in the comparative politics (Jowitt, 1992; Scalapino, 1992; 
Linz and Stepan, 1996). One widespread view in traditional western studies 
of Communism is that Leninist-style polities are relatively rigid systems and 
cannot adapt to the market economy and the complicated social environment 
that attends it. Such systems rely on coercion to deal with discontent, to 
such a degree that the citizens cannot tolerate it and the systems were bound 
to collapse (Jowitt, 1992; Shirk, 1993; Fukuyama, 2002). This argument 
makes sense for the people who are familiar with the history of East 
Germany and the Soviet Union. The Stasi and the KGB’s role in the East 
German dictatorship and the Soviet Union, and later their collapse, 
reminded us of Communist regimes’ tragic fate (Dimitrov, 2012).  
 
      The mainstream arguments on China’s Communist regime in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s followed the above-mentioned traditional theory 
and applied it to predictions about China, arguing that China would follow 
in the footsteps of other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. The regime in China would - gradually be eroded by 
economic development and would ultimately change from a Leninist-style 
political structure to a modern western democratic structure (Walder, 1991, 
1995; Shambaugh, 1996; Winckler, 1999; Chang, 2001; Pei 2006). This 
argument is basically an application of an existing western theory to the 
China case and holds that the Communist regime is fragile due to “weak 
legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, overcentralisation of decision making, 
and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms”. (Nathan, 
2003)  
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1.2.2 Authoritarian Resilience 
 
However, what has been happening in China in the 1990s and early 2000s 
did not conform to the expectations of these scholars. Political/institutional 
adjustments and changes in economic policy have enabled China to 
reconsolidate – by achieving massive economic progress and lifting millions 
out of poverty (Nathan, 1998, 2003). The political and social order proved 
relatively stable and economic development proved sustainable -- in a 
striking contrast to the predictions. Against this background, many scholars 
began to rethink their arguments and asked why the realities diverged so 
much from their theories? This led to more emphasis on empirical analyses 
of the CCP and the regime. The concepts of authoritarian resilience and the 
party-state’s adaptations attracted more attention.  
 
       Andrew Nathan is the leading figure in this school. With the focus on 
political institutions, his paper “Authoritarian Resilience” summed up the 
causes of regime resilience in China “in the concept of institutionalization” 
(Nathan, 2003). This school attributes the resilience of the party-state to its 
capacity to adapt via institutionalisation (Li, 2012), and scholars fleshed out 
this argument by deploying their specialised knowledge to provide the 
concepts of institutionalisation and adaptation with detailed content. In brief, 
the following argument are used to explain the regime’s resilience, 
 
①  Ideological adaptation 
 
The easing of controls over society and the development of market reforms 
since 1978, has persuaded many scholars that ideology based on Marxism 
has become obsolete in contemporary China, and that the Chinese people 
are indifferent to it (Misra, 1998; Bakken, 2000, 2002). However, after 
studying the evolution of ideology and rhetoric from Jiang Zemin’s era to 
Hu Jintao’s era, other scholars have concluded that the CCP’s ideology is 
not as rigid as they thought before, but has been updating its content and 
functions in tune with the times (Dickson, 2003; Holbig, 2009; Dimitrov, 
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2012; Zeng, 2015). For example, Dickson and Zeng argued that Jiang’s 
“Three Represents” justified the regime’s rule by expanding the mass base 
of the CCP. In the Hu Jintao era, ideological rhetoric has focused more on 
harmony, balance and human-orientation -- in response to increasing social 
conflicts and unbalanced regional development. Holbig argued that the idea 
of “building a harmonious society” in Hu’s era emphases the social justice. 
He and Zeng both think Hu’s “Scientific Outlook of Development” justified 
CCP rule and give guidance to sustainable development of the society 
(Holbig, 2009; Zeng, 2015).  
 
       Dimitrov also found that the rhetorical commitment to building a “well-
off society” and Hu’s enactment of policies -- to “provide health insurance, 
pensions, unemployment benefits, and low-income housing” -- reveal “the 
importance the regime attaches to maintaining social policies with broad 
popular appeal” (Dimitrov, 2012). In addition, many western scholars have 
noted that the CCP’s ideological changes have involved the promotion of 
patriotism, nationalism, historical-cultural elements, etc. to justify its 
legitimacy (Weatherley, 2006; Dimitrov, 2012). For example, Ian Buruma 
wrote a comment in the New York Review of Books on 4 June 2015 and said, 
“Patriotic ideology replaced Maoism as the justification for the continuing 
monopoly of power of the Chinese Communist Party. Only the party can 
make Chinese strong enough to ensure that the nation will never be 
humiliated by foreign powers again…” 
 
       Against this background, Zeng went further and pointed out the 
conceptual weaknesses from which the ideologically obsolescence 
supporters actually suffer: (1) they equated ideology to communism; and (2) 
they equated ideology to a belief system (Zeng, 2015). He followed Schull’s 
approach and used his definition of ideology – a form of discourse (i.e. 
political language) that “includes, but is not limited to, a belief system”.  He 
linked that to empirical validations to argue that ideological adaption in 
contemporary China, over time, has not only been as relevant as before the 
reform era, but that it still plays an important part in maintaining the 
legitimacy of the CCP (Zeng, 2015).  
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② The institutionalisation of leadership succession and meritocracy 
 
Conventional regime theory ascribed the fragility of authoritarian systems to 
“weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, over-centralisation of decision 
making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms” 
(Nathan, 2003). This is also the theoretical foundation for many China 
specialists and democracy theorists who expected authoritarian China to 
collapse after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis. The economic and social 
development of the regime in the next 20-odd years, however, has proven its 
resilience. While economic growth is still regarded as a key factor to 
support authoritarian resilience, Hu Jintao’s smooth succession to power in 
2002-2003 and his consolidation of power thereafter convinced scholars of 
the adaptive capacity of the CCP in terms of the institutionalisation of 
succession politics and meritocracy. Nathan thus was the first scholar who 
came up with the concept of institutionalisation, based on Hu’s succession, 
to lend support to his theory of authoritarian resilience (Nathan, 2003; 2006).  
 
          In detail, Nathan focused his argument that institutionalisation 
enabled resilience on four aspects of the CCP – (1) its leadership succession 
has increasingly become norm-bound; (2) its elite politics has growly been 
meritocratic rather than factional; (3) the institutions within the regime have 
been differentiated and specialised; and (4) institutions have been 
established for political participation which strengthen the CCP’s legitimacy 
among the public to a large degree. Similarly, Li and White (2003) argued 
that one of the reasons for the CCP’s ability to maintain its authority is the 
role of adaptive elites. In a broad-based analysis of data about China’s 
Central Committee, Politburo, and Standing Committee in the sixteenth 
Congress of the CCP -- e.g., turnover rates, generations, birthplaces, 
educations, occupations, ethnicities, gender, experiences, and factions -- Li 
and White found evidence to prove not only that elite selection is norm-
bound, but also that cooperation existed among factions and swift 
promotions of province administrators. Shambaugh (2008) observed that 
elite politics, especially in Hu’s era, tended to lead to co-existence and 
cooperation, in contrast to the eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping 
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which were characterised by factional strife and leadership charisma. He 
thus concluded that the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao “appears to 
be very stable”. Zeng (2015) also argued that fear of elite divisions and 
brutal power struggles forced the CCP to make “great efforts to 
institutionalise its power-succession system” and proposed a concept of “a 
power-succession system with Chinese characteristics”, which turned out to 
be crucial to the maintenance of the CCP and of regime stability and 
governing capacity.          
 
③ The inclusion within the party organisation of emerging social class 
actors 
 
     Samuel P. Huntington argued that one of the strategies political parties 
use to maintain their survival is to adapt their political agendas and 
organisational structures to social changes (Huntington, 1970). This theory 
applies to the CCP. Andrew G. Walder (2004) in analysing the composition 
of party cadres and members, discovered that, contrary to all other state 
socialist regimes, higher education in China was expanded, and as a result 
party recruitment shifted radically towards those with educational 
attainments. This trend revitalised the CCP and led to a quiet transformation 
of China’s elite, which helped to make the government more stable and 
resilient. Dickson (2003) compared China with other countries, primarily in 
East Asia and Eastern Europe, as well as with pre-1949 China by using 
primary materials on contemporary China and original survey data to study 
the relationship between emerging social class actors (private entrepreneurs) 
and the CCP. He argued the CCP ensured the stability of the regime by 
absorbing the private entrepreneurs, or what he called “red capitalists”. In 
addition, some scholars noted the inclusion of graduates into the Party as an 
important trend. Guo (2005) observed that since the 1990s, the CCP has 
been recruiting recent graduates on a large scale -- so as to broaden and 
strengthen the membership base. As Dimitrov (2012) argued, the inclusion 
of new social class actors (entrepreneurs and NGO leaders) into the CCP 
through “access to positions of privilege” – such as seats in the legislature or 
on the Central Committee of the CCP – strategically reduced the potential 
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threat of organised groups opposed to the CCP.  The party coopted potential 
alternative power centres.  This helped to avoid the collapse of the regime, 
in contrast to other cases where opposition forces such as Solidarity in 
Poland brought down communist governments.                 
 
④ Non-democratic institutions of accountability 
 
Finally, scholars are starting to pay more attention to new institutions that 
are intended to make officials accountable. Dimitrov (2012) discovered that 
in addition to the institutions inherited from Mao’s era – such as the letters 
and visits systems,2 -- two new types of institutions have been gradually 
established. One is grassroots elections, which began in 1988 in rural areas 
and have gradually matured over more than 20 years. As this thesis will 
show, this institution evolved from being chaotic and ineffective into a well-
organised and accountable institution. The other new institution emerged 
with the spread of social media. Microblogging sites, such as weibo have 
served as an effective platform for netizens to air their grievances against 
party policies and officials so that the government is called to account 
(Dimitrov, 2012).         
 
 
Many analysts also look beyond the political system, to economic 
performance which also helps to explain China’s authoritarian resilience 
(Dimitrov, 2012, 2013; Leong and Chen, 2015). Their theoretical source is 
Samuel Huntington (1991) who argued that economic performance is a 
crucial source of legitimacy for authoritarian regimes which seek to survive. 
In practice, rapid economic growth in China has been able to create stable 
demand for labour (lowering the risk of discontent caused by 
unemployment), to generate enough funds for central and local governments 
to provide public goods (thus increasing the trust and contentment of 
                                                 
2 For more information regarding the letter and visits system, see Zhang, Taisu, "The 
Xinfang Phenomenon: Why the Chinese Prefer Administrative Petitioning over Litigation" 
(2008). Student Scholarship Papers. Paper 68. Carl F. Minzner, “Xinfang: An Alternative 
to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions”, 42 Stan. J. Int'l L. 103 (2006) 
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citizens). But it has also produced “a class of private entrepreneurs” who 
prospered thanks to economic reform and therefore became strong 
supporters of current economic policies (Dimitrov, 2012).      
 
       To supplement this interpretation of economic performance, and the 
institutionalisation and adaptation of the CCP, a second explanation for 
regime durability rule in China has gone beyond the institutions of the 
ruling party and tends to have a “sociological inclination” (Tong, 2013). 
Many researchers in this sub-group have gradually shifted their attention 
from topics such as the internal dynamics of the leadership, the 
institutionalisation of leadership succession and elite politics, and the 
evolution of the party organisation to a concern with the emerging social 
forces and actors and their effect on the policy process. These emerging 
social actors include labour unions (Deng and Kennedy, 2010; Kennedy, 
2005), policy entrepreneurs (Mertha, 2009; Zhu, 2008), and NGOs (Mertha, 
2008; Schuwartz, 2004; Xu et al., 2005) etc.  
 
       These analyses originally emerged out of the framework of “fragmented 
authoritarianism” (FA), first proposed in 1992 by Lieberthal (Lieberthal, 
1992). Similar to what Shirk argued (Shirk, 1993), this framework asserts 
that policy made by the central government “becomes increasingly 
malleable to the parochial organisational and political goals of various 
vertical agencies and spatial regions charged with enforcing that policy” 
(Mertha, 2010). “Bureaucratic bargaining” becomes the channel through 
which the policy process is governed (Mertha, 2010).    
 
      Mertha pushed this framework further, beyond political institutions. By 
analysing three cases of hydropower policy outcomes, she argued that with 
the continuous changes in the social and economic spectrum, and despite no 
change in policy-making process, the implementation process has become 
increasingly pluralised by lowering barriers to entry for certain actors. In her 
case, they are peripheral officials, non-governmental organisations and the 
media. The entry point is “the fragmentation and agency slack that result 
from institutions unable to adapt sufficiently to rapid socioeconomic change, 
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aggressive lobbying of interest groups, or the changing expectations of the 
citizenry” (Mertha, 2010). She thus updated the original FA as FA 2.0 
(Mertha, 2009).  
 
       From a similar sociological perspective, instead of examining emerging 
social actors and their effects, another sub-group assessed the functions of 
informal institutions for the effective governance in Chinese rural society 
(Wu and Wu, 2003; Xu and Xu, 2003; Chang, 2009; Cai, 2010; Li and 
O’Brien, 2006). These informal institutions include temple commissions 
and lineage groups (Tsai, 2007); village trusts and rotating savings and 
credit associations, inter-relations (guanxi) within communities, and 
‘integrating village with company’ governance (Hu, 2007). These informal 
institutions work mostly in the provision of public goods and governance in 
local rural communities in which they assist the formal institutions to ensure 
the implementation of the policies by alleviating the discontent caused by 
new policies -- so as to lower risks and transactions costs. In addition, 
collective resistance, such as social protest, can also be seen to serve as a 
precautionary mechanism outside institutions, to signal social discontent and 
to tell those in power to adapt policies in order to alleviate it (O’Brien and 
Li, 2006; Cai, 2010; Xie, 2014).  
 
      Mertha and others working in this vein acquaint us with the influences 
which new social and economic changes have brought to the policy process 
and provide us new insights into China’s authoritarian resilience. Since this 
kind of research is mainly conducted through case studies, it is likely to be 
challenged in terms of case selection bias, as we see in Gilley’s (2011) 
challenge to Mertha’s argument. There is the further problem of the 
boundary between the spheres in which social forces and state actors are 
respectively active – and whether or not the penetration of social forces 
(emerging social actors and informal institutions) into the policy process is a 
strategic response of the state (Giugni, 1999; Gilley, 2011).  
 
     There is also the argument that causal attribution in these case studies is 
unrealistic. Li (2006) argued in defence of an interactive approach to study 
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the outcomes of political contention politics: “… most consequences of 
contention are the result of an ongoing give-and-take between forces in 
society and in the state….Too much interest in apportioning credit 
inevitably lends a defensive cast to analysis of the effects of protest, as 
attention falls on whether contention has an impact rather than how it has an 
impact”.  
 
1.2.3 The Revival of Authoritarian Decay Theory since 2012  
   
Another strand in recent studies raises questions about the literature on 
authoritarian resilience and adaption which has been fashionable and 
influential since the 1990s. The perception of CCP’s strength has been 
challenged dramatically since 2012 (Pei, 2014). As a result, many leading 
sinologists, including both constant pessimists and former optimists, began 
to predict the decay/collapse of China. Gordon Chang, who published a 
book giving the Chinese system five years of life in 2001 (Chang, 2001) 
remained convinced of the coming apocalypse and predicted that the CCP 
would fall in 2012 after he admitted that his previous prediction was wrong 
(Chang, 2012). David Shambaugh, a well-respected China scholar who used 
to regard China as stable and the CCP as adaptive and resilient (2008), 
wrote that “the endgame of communist rule in China has begun” and 
portrayed the Chinese party-state as “struggling for its last breath” in a Wall 
Street Journal article in March, 2015 (Shambaugh, 2015). Even Andrew 
Nathan, who first came up with the concept of “authoritarian resilience”, 
began to acknowledge in 2015 that the resilience of Chinese party-state “is 
approaching its limits” (Pei, 2014; Nathan, 2015).  
  
       So why does the world look at China differently now? If we read their 
arguments carefully, it is not hard to discover that many of authoritarian 
decayists are deeply worried about regime legitimacy caused by the 
economic slowdown in recent years (Li, 2012; Pei, 2014; Shambaugh, 2015). 
If performance, especially economic performance, is a principal source of 
legitimacy in China as the conventional wisdom argued (Shambaugh, 2001; 
Perry, 2008; Zhao, 2009), the economic slowdown that started in 2010 is 
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enough to shake many scholars’ belief in regime legitimacy and then 
resilience. As Pei (2014) observed, 2010 was the last time China recorded 
double-digit growth and in the next two years (2011 and 2012), its growth 
rate fell from 10 to 8 percent per annum.  
 
       Decayists explained this deceleration of growth as a result of factors 
inherent “in a statist autocratic regime”. For example, Shambaugh (2015) 
claims that China’s economy is now “struck in systemic traps” and Pei 
(2014) thinks that “a combination of excess capacity” caused by 
overinvestment, persistent economic weakness in China’s main export 
markets, eroding competitiveness, and continuing macroeconomic 
imbalances contributed to the deceleration. In addition, other challenges 
were citied: in particular demographic ageing, cultural shifts, environmental 
pollution, high inequality, and other forces (Pei, 2014).   
 
       Another common factor for decay argument is the Bo Xilai affair in 
2012. While the institutionalisation of leadership succession – which was 
clear from the peaceful transition from the leadership of Jiang Zemin to that 
of Hu Jintao in 2003 – lent support to the theory of authoritarian resilience 
(Nathan 2003), the Bo incident seemed to have “devastated the image and 
credibility of the CCP” and recalled the “ruthless power struggle” in the 
Maoist era (Pei, 2014). Some scholars went further to explore the flaws in 
China’s political systems, including nepotism and patron-client ties in the 
selection of leaders, rampant corruption, elites’ contempt for the law, etc. 
(Li, 2012; Pei, 2014). 
 
       Some of the challenges which decayists raise are not new. As early as 
the 1990s, scholars raised doubts about China’s economic, social and 
political stability. Shambaugh (1996) in his article pointed “system fragility” 
as consequence of unemployment caused by an excessive focus on 
inefficient state-owned enterprises; “social instability and the political 
system’s incapacity to address growing public needs” due to repressed civil 
society and protests; eroding party legitimacy caused by a discredited party 
image and communist ideology and “rampant official corruption”; a fraying 
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social fabric resulting from increasing crimes, drug use, smuggling, 
prostitution and other vices, and secret societies and criminal triads, etc.; a 
rising divorces rate and a crisis of morality. Despite his optimistic opinions 
about regime resilience in 2008, Shambaugh’s 2015 article turned 
pessimistic about China’s future. However, this time, in addition to 
repeatedly using corruption and an unbalanced economic system to support 
his points, his other reasons - increasing discontent among the economic 
elite, the defence of socialist ideology and against western constitutionalism, 
and formalism in official circles – lack strong supporting evidence (Khoo, 
2015; Tong ad Hao, 2016). 
 
        In the arguments of other scholars, it is also not hard to see that the old 
factors - systemic traps, doubts on the competitiveness of China’s state-
capitalism, corruption, loss of ideology, and the alienation between the state 
and the society – are used to support the decay theory (Pei, 2014; Li, 2012). 
However, this time, these analysts pointed another important factor which is 
necessary to threaten the survival of an authoritarian regime – the 
intensification of tensions between the problematic ruling elites and the 
majority of the people victimised by systemic problems inherent in the 
political system (Pei, 2014). But corruption, nepotism and patron-client ties, 
and the loss of ideology, etc., would not subvert the Chinese regime unless a 
crisis of effectiveness, such as an economic slowdown, rising inequality, 
etc., occurred (Tao, 2015). 
 
         This revival of authoritarian decay theory spurred further disputation 
in academia. Modern China Studies organised a roundtable discussion in 
2014 with leading scholars debating whether the Chinese political order is 
characterised by resilience or decay (Pei, 2014b). This debate attached 
practical significance to the next ten years under Xi Jinping who assumed 
the leadership in 2012. After all, as the aura of an economic miracle fades, 
the magnified effects of inherent weaknesses and social problems will pose 
increasing challenges to the regime. The solution many analysts prescribed 
is an evolution towards western-style democracy through political reform 
(Li, 2012; Pei, 2014; Shambaugh, 2015). An alternative of course is the 
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pursuit of something like the status quo, attended by innovations to alleviate 
social conflict. It is still early to evaluate the Xi government but at least, an 
anti-corruption drive – his first big initiative after he came to power – seeks 
to boosts the popularity of the CCP and Xi (Khoo, 2015).        
 
1.2.4 Communist Authoritarian Resilience during Reform in Comparative 
Perspective 
 
The fate of the Communist countries’ reform has been one of the hot topics 
in the social sciences (Chirot, 1991; Brown, 2009; Ren, 2012; Wu, 2014). 
Despite subtle differences, these countries operated on a set of principles, 
summarised by Ren: ideologically, they followed Marxism-Leninism; 
politically, they were authoritarian; economically, a planned economy was 
the main form; in terms of management, they were characterised by state 
control of society and the market (Ren, 2012). The countries in this category 
include the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, 
Vietnam, Laos and Cuba.   
 
        The collapse, in and after 1989, of the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European Communist regimes inspired triumphalism among some in the 
West, with Francis Fukuyama announcing “the end of the history”. We can 
now see, however, several Communist regimes survived the crisis. 
Communist parties still exercise authoritarian rule in China, Vietnam, Laos, 
Cuba and North Korea. Some of them, especially China, have progressively 
pursued economic reforms and have achieved massive economic success. 
And, even the collapse of Communist rule in other countries did not bring 
about democracy – especially in the former Soviet republics of central Asia 
and in Belarus. The comparison between them can help us further to 
understand Communist authoritarian resilience.   
 
① What happened in the Soviet Bloc between 1989 and 1991? 
 
36 
 
It is not news now that the seemingly formidable Soviet bloc collapsed 
quickly in a period as short as three years between 1989 and 1991, which 
astonished many social scientists. They have done a lot of research to 
explain why the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allied Eastern 
European countries happened. Despite different focuses, many of them think 
that the collapse was the result of an accumulation of factors which 
interacted with each other (Gao, 2003). 
 
      First, economic and social factors appear to provide the most visible and 
fundamental reasons for the collapse of Eastern European communism 
(Chirot, 1991; Lu and Jiang, 1999; Brown, 2009; Guo, 2010; Ren, 2012). 
From as early as the 1950s, with reformist leadership, Eastern European 
communist countries and the Soviet Union initiated reforms in the hope of 
rectifying their institutional problems and to ease or solve their economic 
problems.  For example, Yugoslavia under the leadership of Josip Broz-Tito 
introduced political reforms focusing on people’s self-government, 
established factory committees and management committees at the 
grassroots, and changed the cadre appointment system to democratic 
elections and regular rotations. In Poland, reformist Wladyslaw Gomulka 
came to power after 1956 and pushed the establishment of a Labour 
Committee. The Hungarian leadership – headed first by Imre Nagy and later 
Janos Kadar -- also sought to change the absolute power of the ruling 
communist party, separated the party and the government, and strengthened 
the legal system. Other Eastern European countries including 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany also carried out similar reforms 
(Li, Xu and Wei, 1988; Kong, 2010). Unfortunately, these initial reforms 
ended in failure.  
 
      Between the 1960s and 1970s, most Eastern European countries suffered 
economic crises, which led them to undertake a second round of reform 
trials. However, these trials did not far better than the first round. 
Czechoslovakia’s “Prague Spring” was quashed by five Warsaw pact 
countries. On 12 December 1970, the decision of the Polish government to 
raise the prices of more than forty types of consumer goods caused mass 
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demonstrations by labourers and urban residents in many cities. Although 
the demonstrations were finally repressed by the authorities, Poland later 
fell into serious economic and political crisis. Bulgaria and Romania also 
had similar failed trials. These reforms not only failed to solve domestic 
economic problems, but also wore down the people’s belief in the 
communist governments. The gulf between the people’s expectations and 
the governments’ promises of reform had widened. By the 1980s, the people 
did not trust the reformism any more (Kornai, 1992). The combination of 
worsening economies and growing disappointment had gradually eroded the 
support of the people for the governments and even caused rebellions by 
some social groups. The Solidarity crisis in Poland in 1980s was a potent 
example although it led to martial law and was forced underground (Senser, 
1989; Kozlowski, 2011).    
         
       After the 1970s, with reforms going further in some Eastern European 
countries, especially in Hungary and Poland, the size of the private economy 
increased and gradually posed a challenge to the central planned economy.3 
For example, by the mid-1980s, the output value of the private economy in 
Hungary accounted for more than 1/3 of GDP (Berend, 1996). While this 
part of economy relieved commodity shortages, the new economic class 
emerging from the private and half-private economy – entrepreneurs – had 
grown strong enough to change the social structure. Although the Hungarian 
authorities made concessions and agreed to legalise private ownership, 
people were still not satisfied with the status quo and organised their own 
groups to confront the authorities (Seleny, 2006).  
 
        Meanwhile, as people lost faith in Communist governments, their 
belief in Communism as an ideology had faded too. This space was slowly 
filled by various non-mainstream cultures which were greatly affected by 
the western media and ideas (Guo, 2010). These non-mainstream cultures 
                                                 
3 Gbor called the private economy in Hungary “second economy”. For more details about 
the second economy in Hungary, see Gbor, Istvan R., “Second Economy and Socialism: 
The Hungarian Experience”, in Feige, Edgar L., ed, The Underground Economies Tax 
Evasion and Information Distortion, (Madison: University of Wisconsion, 1989),  p. 339 – 
361. 
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deviated from and spurred rebellion against the mainstream ideology. In 
many Eastern European countries, such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Poland and Hungary, the non-mainstream cultures had grown so fast that the 
authorities felt increased pressure. 4  During the 1980s, other ideological 
trends – religiosity, nationalism and liberalism – also gained ground in the 
Eastern European countries (Fowkes, 1993).  
 
        With the development of a private economy and non-mainstream 
culture, civil society had quickly grown up too since the end of 1970s.5 This 
included all kinds of associations, clubs and NGOs. Some of them were 
environmental, some were ethnic/cultural (such as Ukraine Culture Club in 
the Ukraine), some pursued members’ benefits (such as various trade unions 
– the most typical one was Solidarity in Poland), while others were actively 
engaged in politics including the associations organised by dissidents (Jin, 
2005). The role which these civic organisations played in the course of the 
collapse of the Eastern European Communist regimes has attracted much 
attention from scholars. One of the most famous is Timothy Garton Ash. As 
a historian and journalist, he offered some of the most convincing articles 
assessing dissents’ roles in Poland and in Central Europe in his collection 
The Magic Lantern.6 Among these civic organisations, with the help of The 
Helsinki Final Act in 1975, oppositions to Communist regimes became quite 
active. Significant ones included Solidarity in Poland, the Democracy 
Forum in Hungary and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, which called for 
fundamental human rights protections.    
 
                                                 
4 For more details about music as a non-mainstream culture, see Ryback, Timothy W., Rock 
around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990).  
5 Hungarian sociologist Elemr Hankiss coined a concept “second society” to describe civil 
society in Hungary. For more details, see Hankiss, Elemr, “The ‘Second Society’: Is There 
an Alternative Social Model Emerging in Contemporary Hungary?”, Social Research: 
Spring/Summer 1988 Part I, Vol. 55, p. 13.  
6  See Ash, Timothy Garton, The Magic Lantern:The Revolutions of ’89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). Adam Roberts 
even examined the role played by “people power” in the collapse in his book Civil 
Resistance in the East European and Soviet Revolutions, (The Albert Einstein Institution, 
1991), Monograph Series Vol 4.  
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       However, it is worth noting that the roles which the dissidents played in 
the collapse of the Eastern European countries varied from case to case. As 
Chirot pointed out, although Poland had “a prolonged period of protest 
marked by open explosions in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and of course 1980 -
1981” and Hungary had “much open mobilisation of protest in the late 
1980s”, only limited open dissent emerged in the other countries (Chirot, 
1991). He continued that, at most, in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, only a 
few isolated intellectuals organised themselves and were unable to mobilise 
other followers. In Romania, only some isolated strikes broke out in the 
1970s, and although there was a major riot in Brasov in 1987, the 
intellectual protest had “rarely went beyond very limited literary activities”.7  
 
       In the early 1980s, the situation became even worse. Poland fell into 
frequent bouts of social turbulence and in 1981, when Wojeiech Jaruzelski 
came to power, martial law was implemented and Solidarity was banned. 
The Soviet economy had been in stagnation and reached a point at which 
steps towards economic reform were very difficult. Against this background, 
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. As a reformer, he brought a few 
reform-minded high-ranking officials into his circle of advisors – such as, 
Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and Chernyaev. With their support, he had 
launched his innovative foreign policy and reforms of the political system. 
These radical policies relaxed the control of the Soviet Union on Eastern 
Europe, which was encouraged towards reform. 
 
        Nationalism is also viewed by some scholars as another factor which 
contributed to the destruction of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, although the degree varied (Chirot, 1991; Brown, 
2010; Ren, 2012). In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and 
Bulgaria, ruling Communist parties were imposed by the Soviet Union and 
Communism had always lacked nationalist legitimacy (Chirot, 1991). In 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, nationalisms were always a potential 
                                                 
7 For more details about the dissent, see Tismaneanu, Vladimir, The Crisis of Marxist 
Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 166. 
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threat to the regime. The relaxation of control by the Soviet Union over 
these Communist countries opened the way to nationalism.  
 
       All of these economic, social and political factors combined with 
nationalism in most Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union itself  
reached a peak at the end of 1980s causing the collapse of the Soviet bloc. 
One after another, the communist eras ended peacefully in these countries -- 
except for Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania. Poland became the first 
country where the ruling Communist Party gave up absolute power via 
peaceful negotiation between the ruling party and Solidarity in December 
1988 and January 1989. Then in 1990, Hungary transformed itself into a 
democratic country in March; Czechoslovakia completed its polity 
transition in June through parliament elections; and East Germany merged 
with West Germany in November. Shortly thereafter, Ceausescu’s regime in 
Romania ended in violence and Todor Zhivkov was ousted in Bulgaria by 
pro-democracy demonstrations outside the National Assembly building. 
Yugoslavia fell into the civil war and was finally divided into five 
independent countries. Albania was the last in Eastern Europe to abandon its 
Communist regime in 1992.   
 
        The Soviet Union itself could not escape the same fate. By the end of 
the 1980s, Soviet Communist Party faced a combination of serious 
economic problems, diverse nationalisms and a split within the party elite 
(Ren, 2012). In 1989, a competitive election was introduced and for the first 
time delegates to the National People’s Congress were elected. This helped 
opposition forces access to the political stage and the absolute power of the 
Communist Party was seriously challenged. By 1990 during the presidential 
election, various crises had deepened. Russia was the first republic to assert 
its independence by convening the first session of Russian National 
People’s Congress. Amid deep conflicts within and beyond the party, 
conservatives planned a coup on 19 August, 1991. Although it failed, it 
greatly weakened the Soviet Union and its ruling party. Between 1990 and 
1991, the Baltic States -- Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – also declared 
independence and were even admitted to membership in the United Nations 
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in September 1991 (Roberts, 1991). Other republics followed suit. On 25 
December 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union was officially 
dissolved into eleven independent countries.          
 
② Diverse, sometimes arduous transitions after 1991  
 
With the collapse of communism after 1991, the history of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet republics entered a new phase as these former 
communist countries adopted Western democratic and economic institutions. 
The transition entailed a process in which multi-party democratic systems 
and market-oriented economies were established and strengthened, with 
some countries seeking admission to the European Union (Wu, 2014; Guo, 
2010).  The transition has taken place very quickly.  Most Central and 
Eastern European countries established multi-party systems with 
competitive elections and parliamentary systems, and underwent the 
economic transition within the first ten years after 1991.  Many of them 
were admitted into the EU within 15 years.  But they still have a long way to 
go before these political and economic systems mature (Wu, 2014).  Since 
economic, political and historical-cultural conditions within them differ, 
there was considerable diversity in the transition process in the different 
countries. Over the past twenty-odd years, some of these processes have 
been far from smooth, and some of these countries have faced arduous times. 
 
       The transitions in Eastern Europe were relatively smooth, thanks to 
their democratic traditions. Most post-communist countries in this area took 
short time to move to multi-party politics and to end the dominance of 
Communist parties. As early as January 1989, Poland became the first 
country which began to this transition. From then until April 1991 when 
Albania’s parliament adopted a new constitution and permitted a multi-party 
politics, one-party systems were abolished in all Eastern European countries’ 
constitutions. During the past twenty-odd years, most Eastern European 
countries have had four to five presidential terms, and five to seven 
parliamentary elections. Guo summarised the whole period and divided it 
into several phrases.  In the initial years after the collapse, many centrist or 
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right wing opposition parties won free elections and were able form 
governments as a result of strong anti-communist sentiments.  Between 
1993 and 1995, serious economic recessions helped the left wing parties to 
make gains among voters who were not satisfied with the living standards 
after transitions to the leadership of the rightists.  Around 1997, the right 
wing turned the tables and regained power.  Two or three years later, left 
wing restorations happened again in Eastern Europe – left wing parties in 
Romania, Albania, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic won 
parliamentary elections and took power.  After 2005, another round of 
alternations occurred (Guo, 2010).8  Changes happened frequently in the 
1990s, but in the early 21st century, the process tended to be more stable. 
 
        Despite certain shortcomings, democratic progress in Eastern Europe at 
least tended to be positive. However, greater uncertainties are found in some 
former Soviet republics. The Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – 
joined other Eastern European post-communist countries and hoped to shed 
the control of the Soviet Union and integrate into Europe. They thus sought 
admission to the EU and actively reformed their political and economic 
institutions according to EU’s standards (Pan, 2014). More troubling is the 
case of post-Soviet Russia which finally chose a political system centred on 
presidential power under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, leading to a 
gradual consolidation of authoritarian rule (Dimitrov, 2012; Pan, 2014; Wu, 
2014). In the former Soviet republics of central Asia – Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - and in Belarus, 
Communist parties used (a) coercive power and (b) some enticements 
distributed among citizens to prevent alternative parties from emerging. 
Communist parties on those places also took strong hostile action against 
alternative power centres to maintain their dominance and to prevent multi-
party, pluralist politics from developing. The most important alternative 
power centres were civil society organisations and independent media.   
                                                 
8 Valerine and Sharon have done a lot of fieldwork and analysed the dynamics of elections 
from 1998 to 2005 in post-communist Europe and Eurasia. For more details, see Bunce, 
Valerie J. and Wolchik, Sharon L., Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist 
Countries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
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③ Comparing the trajectories in transformation routes between the post-
communist countries in the former Soviet bloc and other surviving 
communist countries 
 
It is obvious that while they all started their transitions under somewhat 
similar systems of socialist public ownership, the post-communist countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe took different routes from countries in East 
Asia such as China, Vietnam and Laos where communist systems survive.  
While Eastern European countries moved somewhat abruptly into their 
transitions -- which embraced political, economic and cultural changes at 
the same time -- in China, Vietnam and Laos reforms were implemented 
more gradually (Wu, 2014; Dimitrov, 2012). In the latter cases, the pre-
existing political institutions were maintained, economic reforms were 
implemented first, social reforms came next, and political reform occurred 
last. But how have these countries managed the social conflicts which 
emerged from the economic and social reforms which mainly caused the 
collapse of the Eastern European countries? In Dimitrov’s words, the 
Communist parties in these countries maintained their authoritarian power 
“through a combination of market reforms, ideological reorientation, the 
inclusion of rivals in the party and the legislature, and the introduction of 
some limited accountability”. In the next three chapters of this thesis, we see 
in detail how the Chinese Communist Party’s strategies played out in one 
representative county.  
 
        We shall see in these chapters that China’s reforms started with 
agriculture, and from 1978 to 2002, focused heavily on the economy. Since 
2002 when the 16th Party Congress was convened, social reform received 
greater emphasis. However, so far, China has not yet entered a phrase in 
which the focus shifts to the political sphere or to democratic elections. Like 
China, Vietnam started its economic reform in 1986 and has achieved great 
progress in areas such as reforms of agriculture and state-owned enterprises 
(Wu, 2014). Lao is a similar case. Two other communist countries – Cuba 
and North Korea – have followed the Chinese path less closely. Cuba 
changed its approach from resisting to emulating the Chinese model and 
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began market reforms in 2011.  But in North Korea, it remains to be seen 
whether its young leader, Kim Jong Un, will make substantial changes.  In 
the eyes of North Koreans, Kim may be more liberal than his father in social 
matters – after many years of maintaining its authoritarian rule “through 
brutal repression and militant xenophobic nationalism” (Dimitrov, 2012).     
 
1.3 The Design and the Significance of the Study 
 
Bearing in mind the question of why China’s Communist regime has been 
able to survive and stay in power for so long after experiencing so many 
challenges, this thesis attempts to seek answers from a historical perspective 
and within a framework of state-society relations by explaining the stories 
that emerge from a county in central China. The span of the time covered by 
the current study is more than thirty years -- the whole reform period from 
1978 to 2013 – and the focus here is on change over time. The analysis is 
divided into three phrases, each of which covers a span of years. The phases 
are presented as three chapters after this introduction. Each of those chapters 
deals with a separate generation of leadership at the national level. This 
arrangement of chapters is logical and well nigh unavoidable because 
changes in the leadership at the central level are crucial to the general 
direction of politics and public policy in China, and bring changes on both 
fronts. Since events at county level are the main concern of the present study, 
this analysis examines how the changes over these phases impinged at that 
level, over the past three decades.  
 
1.3.1 Historical Perspective 
       
        So this is an assessment of China’s trajectory between 1978 and 2013. 
It does not predict what will happen in the future. Unexpected events can 
throw any country off whatever track it used to be/is on, as what Andrew 
Nathan (2006) has argued.  However, an analysis of what has happened in 
China may suggest what is likely to happen in the foreseeable future, based 
on the facts that are already visible. Is China’s political system likely to 
collapse due to the challenges it has been facing or as a result of their 
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cumulative effects? As many who stress authoritarian decay argue (Li, 2012; 
Pei, 2014; Shambaugh, 2015), is the system unable to provide solutions to 
those challenges so that democratisation is the only way out?  
 
       Many problems often take time to reach the point at which they become 
severe challenges. But, it also takes time for solutions and counter-forces to 
be put in place, so a historical perspective will help us to trace the complex 
interactions process between problems and solutions. The arguments set out 
here resonate with Nathan’s observation (2006): “Change will happen, but 
the only way to say anything specific about the probable nature of that 
change is to look at the forces that are now in existence.” China is still in 
transition. Tracing its trajectory over the past thirty-odd years can present us 
with a vivid picture of what it has failed and what it has been 
solved/achieved, which contributes to an evaluation of the governing ability 
of the CCP.  
 
1.3.2 A Framework of State-Society Relation  
 
Following the example of authoritarian resilience studies, this thesis also 
reaches beyond the institutions of the CCP and to assess the interactions 
between the state and society since 1978. The academic literature is not 
short of analyses of the CCP in terms of its institutionalisation and adaption, 
as we noted in section 1.2 above. But the emerging social forces amid 
economic reform are immensely important, so that their interactions with 
party and state actors need more attention.  
 
      This is because, amid economic reform, Chinese society has undergone 
dynamic changes and has subtly stratified so much that relations between it 
and the state have changed substantially over time. Although many scholars 
have studied this, further research is needed to keep up with changes on the 
ground. This is especially true of rural areas where 50.32% of the Chinese 
population are still living, according to the 2014 statistical yearbook of the 
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PRC on national economic and social development. 9  First, a series of 
economic policies in rural society have brought great changes to the 
peasants and the peasants, as one single class before the reform, now are 
stratified. Some scholars discovered, as family farming replaced collective 
farming and the lifestyles of rural residents were diversified, that peasants 
can be sub-categorised. They have been disaggregated into one group 
separated from the land (migrant peasant workers); another group engaging 
part-time in agriculture and part-time as workers; another doing part-time 
agriculture and part-time works as craftsmen; and the rural poor.10 
 
     Second, with the shift of the political wind in the central government, 
political attitudes and available resources, responses to specific events, and 
the interests of different sub-categories vary as well. Thus, their interactions 
with the state vary over time. 11  It is no longer reasonable to describe 
relations between the state and rural society a dichotomy dominant state – 
submissive peasants. The governance strategy of the state varies depending 
on which sub-categories it deals with – for example, dealing with petitioners 
for profit, dealing with “nailed households” refusing relocations, dealing 
with rural economic elites, etc.12     
 
      Third, stratification among the peasants may not play a crucial role in 
relations between state and society in the absence of another change – the 
revival of “two-track politics” in reforming rural society. The theory that 
traditionally Chinese rural society was largely self-regulating and that 
Chinese political institutions rest on a “two-track” system was first put 
                                                 
9 National Bureau of Statistics of China, The 2014 Statistical Yearbook of the PRC on the 
National Economic and Social Development, available on Xinhua Net on 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/18/content_695553_2.htm  (accessed on 16, 
January 2016). 
10 Liu, Rui, “An Investigation on Village J of Jing Shan Township of Hubei Province: Land 
transfer, Class stratification, and the transition on the village governance”, Journal of 
Nanjing Agricultural University (Social Science), No. 2 2013, p. 92-100. 
11 Ibid. 
12 He, Haibo, Governance of Different Sequence: The Stratified Interaction between State 
and the Rural Society – a Case Study of Flower Township, 2014, Doctoral Thesis of Central 
China Normal University, available on China Academic Journal Full-text Database on 
www.cnki.net (accessed on 8 January 2016). 
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forward by Professor Fei Xiaotong, a well-respected sociologist, in 1948.13 
This theory argued that China developed historically a two-track political 
system – one track goes from the top down by which the orders from the 
central authorities (the emperor in imperial times) were carried out by the 
official bureaucracy “in a variety of ways and with various degrees of 
success”, while the other track goes from the bottom up whereby local 
networks headed by local social forces (the gentry in imperial times) run 
local affairs so thoroughly that the local level is largely autonomous from 
the state system and tries to exercise influence on higher-level officials – 
they could even petition the emperor as a last resort to protect local interests 
in the worst times.14  
 
       The county, as an administrative institution, originated as early as the 
Spring and Autumn Period, and after gains in the Warring States Period, 
pushed ahead further throughout the country under the Qin Dynasty after the 
Qin unified other vassal states. 15  Historically, the county “was an 
administrative unit consisting of a commercial town surrounded by an 
agricultural region linked by economic, political, military, social, and 
cultural ties.”16 This definition continues to be used till today. No matter 
how the local administrative system has changed through various historical 
periods, the county, as an administrative unit, always survived, although its 
size and administrative subordination varied in different periods.17 It was 
located at the bottom of the formal administrative system and was the 
furthest level to which the state control penetrated for thousands years until 
1949 when the PRC was established.18  Below it, rural society was self-
                                                 
13 Hamilton, Gary G. and Zheng, Wang, From the soil, the foundations of Chinese society: 
a translation of Fei Xiaotong’s Xiangtu Zhongguo, with an introduction and epilogue, 
(California: University of California Press, 1992), p. 143. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Zhou, Zhenghe, A History of Local Administrative System in China, (Shanghai: Shanghai 
People Press, 2005) p. 14. 
16 Schumann, Franz, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China, (California: UCP, 
1968) p. 407. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Schumann (1968), pp 407; and also see Kuhn, Philip A., Origins of the Modern Chinese 
State, (Stanford: SUP, 2002 ) pp 21 – 24, quoted in Wang, Jianxun (2006), “Village 
Governance in Chinese History”, Y673 Mini-Conference Paper, 2006, available  on 
http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/publications/materials/conference_papers/wang.pdf  
(accessed on 2 September 2014). 
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organised centring on the lineage system and gradually developed 
community organisations – villages.19 The size of villages varied throughout 
China. Some in the South were mono-lineage and named after the lineage, 
whereas others in North were multi-lineage.20 
 
       While magistrates – the county’s heads – were appointed by the 
government for a fixed short term of service – for instance, it was 1.7 to 9 
years in the Qing Dynasty, village governance mostly relied on informal 
local elites, clan heads and gentry, to implement lineage rules (jiagui) to 
supervise and monitor their members.21 These rules mostly coincided with 
the moral values in the Confucian tradition, including respecting elders and 
superiors22, mutual help, working hard, etc.23  For thousands of years, the 
gentry acted as a bridge, in administrative terms, linking the state and self-
governing rural communities. Depending on their respective interests, 
sometimes the gentry and the local magistrate cooperated when their 
interests coincided, while at other times, they conflicted with each other 
when their interests diverged.24 In this sense, it is not surprising to see that 
T’ung-tsu Ch’u argued that the interplay between the gentry and the local 
magistrate was characteristic of coordination, cooperation, and conflict.25  
 
                                                 
19  Schurmann (1968) p.407. For more details on how villages originated and were 
established, see Freedman, Maurice , Lineage Organisation in South-eastern China, 
(London: The Athlong Press, 1958); Freedman, Maurice, Chinese Lineage and Society: 
Fukien and Kwangtung, (London: The Athlong Press, 1966); Huang, Philip C.C. (1985), 
The Peasant Economy and Social Chang in North China, (Standford: SUP, 1985) p. 233-
237; Duara, Prasenjit, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900 – 1942, 
(Standford: SUP, 1988) pp86; Spence, Jonathan D., The Search for a Modern China, 2nd ed, 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999)  p. 13- 14. 
20 Wang, Jianxun (2006), “Village Governance in Chinese History”, Y673 Mini-Conference 
Paper, 2006, available on 
http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/publications/materials/conference_papers/wang.pdf  
(accessed on 2 September 2014); also see Hsiao, Kung-Chuan (1960), Rural China: 
Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1960). 
21 Wang, Jianxun (2006), p.4-5 
22 Traditional China had followed a strict patriarchal hierarchy to supervise the conduct and 
behaviour of people. The key order in this hierarchy was Sky – Earth – Emperor – Parents – 
Teachers. Connotatively, it extended to show a respect for elders and superiors.     
23 Schurmann (1968) etc. 
24 Wang (2006) ,p. 6. 
25 Ch’u, T’ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the Ch’ing, (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 
1962), p. 168. 
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          This two-track political system had been in use in traditional China 
for a long time till the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when an 
active, powerful central government had to deal with complex political and 
economic problems. 26 Actually before 1949, especially in the late imperial 
period, there were a few attempts by either imperial court or central 
government of the Republic of China to impose administrative control over 
rural society and the peasants.27 The most influential examples were the 
systems of baojia and lijia. These two systems have their respective 
evolution processes.28 Schurmann compared the lijia system of the Ming 
Dynasty and the baojia system of the Qing Dynasty, and argued that “both 
systems were (actually) forms of organisation imposed by the state on the 
villages for the maintenance of order, the collection of taxes, and 
registration of population.”29 By quoting the Japanese sociologist, Shimizu 
Morimitsu, he added that they differed not only in the fact that the former 
was mainly civil in form while the latter was military, but also inasmuch as 
the unit of the lijia system was the “natural village” whereas under baojia, it 
was an “administrative village”.30   
 
      While comparing and analysing the lijia and baojia are beyond the 
current research, it is commonly argued that effective penetration of state 
authority into villages had never succeeded until when the CCP took power 
in 1949. 31  Starting from 1950, in order to strengthen its regime, the 
Communist government transformed rural society through land reform and 
the agricultural cooperative movement on the one hand and, on the other, by 
gradually making its authority penetrate to the village level by setting up 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 144. 
27 For a short introduction of this kind of attempts, see Schumann (1968), p. 407 – 408. 
28 Originated in Song Dynasty, the baojia system was a sub-administrative police system in 
rural society and had also experienced some changes in the following period. As to the lijia 
system, it had its origin in the Yuan Dynasty and mainly was used for civil control such as 
the registration of rural inhabitants and the tax collection etc.  For more details on the 
common and differences of these two systems , see Wang (2006) p. 7-8; also see Schumann 
(1968), p. 409 - 412 .  
29 Schumann (1968) p. 409. 
30 Ibid., p. 410. 
31 Ibid., p. 412. 
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administrative and party organisations. 32  A highly centralised structure 
linking the state and the rural society had gradually been established.33  
 
      First, the institution of the People’s Communes incorporated the 
scattered peasants into a three-level system (People’s communes – brigades 
– production teams). This system governed and managed almost everything 
about the peasants’ lives so that peasants had little autonomy. Second, the 
cadres in this system were appointed by the state so that the previous three-
level state-society relations (state – gentry - peasants) were replaced by a 
two-level structure (state - peasants). As a result, the second track which had 
gone bottom up, cushioned by the gentry in the old system was greatly 
weakened and the social order completed relied on state control.34 With this 
highly centralised structure, the whole of rural society and its life were 
politicised and incorporated into state institutions so much that society had 
no autonomy.35 
 
       Our story could have stopped here if this dichotomous relationship 
(dominant state – submissive peasants) had never been changed. But the 
introduction of economic reform and the shift of the political wind in the 
central government after 1978 altered relations between state and society. 
With the shift of the political wind in response to internal and external 
challenges, state-society relations evolved further over the three successions 
of the central leadership. Family farming first replaced the three-level 
ownership institution pattern and broke the dependence of the peasants on 
the production teams in various ways. The gradual opening up of the market 
allowed the peasants to make their livings in diverse ways, as a result of 
which, peasants society has become stratified. The introduction of direct 
elections at village level gave the peasants a degree of ‘say’. The state still 
                                                 
32 Chen, Junfeng and Li, Yuanxing, “The Transition on the Foundation of the Village 
Governance and the Reorganisation of the Farmers”, Agricultural History of China, No.1 
2007, p.130-134. 
33 Ibid. 
34 He, Haibo, Governance of Different Sequence: The Stratified Interaction between State 
and the Rural Society – a Case Study of Flower Township, 2014, Doctoral Thesis of Central 
China Normal University, available on China Academic Journal Full-text Database on 
www.cnki.net (accessed on 8 January 2016), p. 17. 
35 Ibid. 
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reserves some power to it and could execute it if it wished. However, as 
abundant evidence shows, the state has retreated from many aspects of rural 
life, and rural society has obtained a degree of autonomous space.36 Against 
this background, an interpreting of authoritarian resilience, within the 
framework of state-society relations, becomes possible.      
        
1.3.3 A Microcosm of a Rural County in Central China 
 
This thesis presents a rural county in central China as a microcosm. It 
proceeds from the enunciation of policies (which change over time) through 
their implementation in one county, and then considers the implications for 
the county’s economy, politics and society. We might ask why – since there 
are plenty of macro- and micro- studies of state-society relations in China -- 
there is a need for another microcosmic study of Li County. There are 
several reasons. First, as noted above, the county, as an administrative unit, 
remained for thousands of years, no matter how the local administrative 
system changed over time. Its significance exists in the fact that it is the 
most stable administrative unit while the other units below it, such as 
districts, townships, villages and villagers’ groups, have changed frequently. 
By choosing a county as a case to study, this research seeks to interpret the 
variations in policy implementation and their consequences -- economic, 
political and social -- in several different parts of what is a fairly typical 
county. By analysing in detail the varied stories that emerge from Li County, 
the present study seeks to give readers a broader and more representative set 
of insights on what has been happening as rural China undergoes transition 
than single-village studies can do.   
 
       Second, Li County 37  is fairly typical of large areas of China. It 
resembles other parts of Hunan province, and Hunan is quite similar in its 
favourable climatic and geographical conditions to Hubei, Sichuan, and 
Shandong provinces which have long been major grain producing areas.  It 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37  For important details, see Li County People’s Government and Hunan Cartographic 
Publishing House, Maps of Li County of Hunan 2010, (Changsha: Hunan Cartographic 
Publishing House, 2010) , p.1. 
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is also similar in historical experiences and economic conditions to Hubei, 
Sichuan, Jiangxi and other regions.  Unlike studies of a few areas which led 
the reform process -- such as Guangdong, Jiangsu or Fujian Provinces 
which are not representative - the story in Li County can be regarded as 
reasonably typical, in many ways, of most of rural and small town China. 
 
         As early as 1997, led by the Central China Normal University in 
Wuhan of Hubei Province, many prominent scholars started to apply 
empirical approaches to research on rural governance of China amid reform. 
The areas that they studied include some regions in Hubei, Hunan, Henan, 
Sichuan, etc. 38  With a focus on power dynamics and rural governance 
within village communities, they not only chose a single village to be the 
main context for their analyses, but they also focus on the political 
consequences of social changes. Considering that China’s reform initially 
started in the economic sphere, by contrast, the present assessment of Li 
County traces economic, social and political changes on the understanding 
that they all interact with each other. Unlike some pioneering areas like 
Anhui, where bottom-up spontaneous initiatives by the peasants started 
before the official policies were announced, these changes in Li County 
resulted from the top-down implementation of the new land policy. So in 
discussing Li County, that is where we must start.  
 
         It will also be seen that the present study goes into great detail to 
illustrate the methods and strategies which the local cadres have used to 
implement policies during the three phrases. One might find some of them 
ridiculous and unbelievable by the standards of modern political institutions, 
but they were probably reasonable in the specific context of rural China. By 
explaining these things, this study seeks to enable readers to understand 
rural China on its own terms. Unlike other studies of single villages noted 
above, this study is based on fieldwork conducted in fifty-six villages of 
thirty townships under the administration of Li County. This approach gives 
readers access to variations in policy implementation and its impacts within 
                                                 
38 This is not a comprehensive survey of the literature in the field. Some examples of 
relevant works are given in select bibliography.  
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a sub-region. Finally, there is no evidence to show that Li County or nearby 
areas have been studied before -- in Chinese or English.  
 
1.4 Data Collection39 
 
The primary sources used in this thesis, which yielded a large amount of 
information, were consulted during several spells of fieldwork in Li County 
in between 2011 to 2013. In the spring of 2011, I went there to conduct a 
pilot exercise, during which I connected with the staff of the Li County 
group of the Rural Socio-Economic Survey Team (RSEST) of Hunan.  The 
discussion with them helped me to design a detailed plan for intensive 
fieldwork thereafter. The main field study was conducted from late 2011 
until March of 2012. It was composed of two parts. The first month was 
spent in painstaking documentary studies, examining the archives of the Li 
County group of RSEST, the Archive Bureau of Li County, the Statistics 
Bureau of Li County, and the County Library. Archived documents included 
the yearbooks of Li County from 1978 to 2009, the Annals of Li County40, 
Li County News (county official newspapers covering 1980-1989), Hunan 
Daily, Changde Daily, and a series of internal policy documents, work 
summaries, memos of meetings, etc. issued by the government agencies at 
sub-county levels. 
 
          The documentary studies helped to reconstruct the long evolution of 
policies and their impacts, some of which might have been forgotten over 
time. Based on these reliable written materials, I drafted interview protocols. 
Those were semi-structured, considering that there might be discrepancies 
between the personal experiences of the peasants/local cadres and the 
official records. With the outlines in hand, I started to conduct interviews in 
                                                 
39 For the distribution of the interviewees in details, please refer to Appendix I; for the 
administrative division of Li County, please refer to Appendix II. 
40 Li County Government so far has published various annals. The general ones which were 
made available to me include the annals from 555 to 1989, the annals from 1978 to 2002, 
the annals 2007, the annals 2008, the annals 2009, and the annals 2010. The ones in specific 
subjects include the annals of Township and Village Enterprises and the annals of the 
commodity price which were compiled by the relevant governmental departments and 
archived for the internal uses. The details of these annals can be found in bibliography. 
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December of 2012. Depending on the position of my contacts, the 
interviews were conducted in two forms – one to one, or in groups. If my 
contacts played a role as leaders, I normally asked them to organise group 
discussions, to include multiple members of their administrations.  If the 
contacts were peasants or retired cadres, one to one interviews normally 
were arranged. During all of the interviews, I made brief handwritten notes 
which highlighted some points which went beyond the official records. The 
handwritten notes were complemented by tape recordings, in order to reduce 
the neglect of the important details. 
 
        As Li County is a typical agricultural county, most of the interviews 
took place in rural areas and the rest in small towns.41 So this study is 
primarily about reform implementation and social changes in rural 
communities. Those who are interested in learning more about the policy 
implementation and its outcomes in major metropolitan areas will need to 
look elsewhere. Although I tried to visit all thirty-two townships under the 
administration of Li County, two are left out: Jinluo Township and 
Yangjiafang Township. That happened because I could not find contacts to 
introduce me to the local communities. Since the Communist legacy has 
made peasants sensitive and cautious in discussing political and social 
issues, getting into small rural communities through internal contacts is 
usually necessary to persuade people to open up to interviewers. However, 
the conditions in these two townships were quite similar to their 
neighbouring townships, all of which were visited.  
 
        In terms of village selection, I at first took the advice of the Li County 
group of RSEST and decided to follow their steps by visiting their ten 
sentinel villages.42  As an agency of the Statistics Bureau of the State, the Li 
County group of RSEST has been conducting the 100-household surveys 
which the Statistics Bureau assigns each year within the County.  This 
                                                 
41  For more details about the degree of urbanisation of Li County, see the section of 
Overview of the County. 
42 Sentinel villages are the villages which are selected by Li County group of Rural Socio-
Economic Survey Team to carry out the inspection and investigation of the implementation 
of governmental policies. This is a translation of the government word. 
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annual survey aims to monitor the various social-economic policies and 
their implementation at county and sub-county level. For this purpose, ten 
sentinel villages are chosen. They vary.  For example, some of them are 
forest conservation areas and are therefore chosen to evaluate the 
implementation of subsidy for returning arable land back to woodland.  
Some of them are bread basket areas, so they become good observation 
stations to investigate the implementation of grain production policy and its 
related subsidies on grain seeds.  Others were chosen, because they are good 
for checking the subsidy on irrigation construction. In each sentinel village, 
ten households are chosen randomly and are paid a small amount by RSEST 
to fill in survey forms each month. The accountants in these ten sentinel 
villages are employed by RSEST as their investigators and are responsible 
for distributing and collecting survey forms each month.  
 
        Taking these ten sentinel village sites for visits had several benefits. 
One is that the criteria to choose these sentinel villages is based on the 
policy implementation, which coincides with the research question of the 
present study. Second, as noted above, despite gradually opening, rural 
communities in China are still rather closed. With the help of the Li County 
group of RSEST, I obtained access to their investigators, and then they 
introduced me to their fellow villagers. In addition, as an internal 
department of the County Government, working with the provincial group 
of RSEST of Hunan, the County RSEST personnel have established long-
term work relationships with other governmental departments and sub-
county government agencies in townships and villages. Through their 
introductions, I obtained the support of several sub-county government 
agencies, which is vital for conducting social science field research in China. 
With their help, I managed to extend the sites for field work beyond the ten 
sentinel villages in ten townships to other villages covering thirty townships. 
It is worth noting that although I have received much help from RSEST, all 
the work and the findings in this thesis are carried out by me.  
 
       I used different methods to recruit subjects from each of three groups: 
retired cadres, present cadres, and peasants. For retired cadres and present 
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cadres, I used referrals from the staff of RSEST and from township 
governments in order to reach people who understood and have personally 
experienced the implementation of various policies. For peasants, I made 
direct contact by knocking on their doors randomly and explaining my 
project. I have been benefited from being Hunanese, since I speak the local 
dialect. None of the subjects were paid to participate. To protect sources, all 
informants were guaranteed anonymity.  
               
       Because Li County has never been carefully studied by an academic, 
there is little previous research available, apart from the working summaries 
and memos from local governments. To some degree, biases existed in these 
official records. Fortunately, a great deal of valuable information on reform 
implementation emerged from interviews with those who had experienced it.  
Also, because most of the reforms over the last 30 years have worked quite 
well, most interviewees were happy and proud to share their information 
and insights. These first-hand materials have vastly contributed to the 
present study, and make it convincing and vivid.   
 
1.5 An Overview of Li County43 
 
Li County is located on the north-western border of Hunan Province. To the 
east is its neighbouring county of Anxiang and Jinshi – a county-level city44; 
to the south is Linli County; and to the west is Shimen County.45 All these 
counties and Li County are under the administration of Changde prefecture 
city, which, shortened as Changde City, is the superior administrative unit 
                                                 
43 The data and statistics on Li County in this section are from the Annual Statistical 
Yearbooks of Li County from 1978 to 2010 edited by the Statistical Bureau of Li County on 
a yearly basis; Annals of Li County 555 – 1989, Li County Yearbook 1990 – 1996 and 
Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002 compiled by the Compilation Committee for Chronicles 
of Li County respectively in 1993, in 1999 and in 2010; and Maps of Li County of Hunan 
2010 edited by Li County Government in 2010. 
44 The current administrative system in China generally follows a hierarchy of central – 
provinces – prefecture cities – counties – townships – villages. The character of shi literally 
means city in Chinese. In terms of administrative level, it sometimes means municipalities 
directly under the central government, such as Beijing Shi and in other times, means 
prefectural cities, such as Changde Shi, with the former administratively higher than the 
latter. In addition, another exception exists, in which a unit is named ‘city’, but 
administratively it ranks the same as a county level. And Jinshi is just this case.  
45 Li County People’s Government and Hunan Cartographic Publishing House, Maps of Li 
County of Hunan 2010, (Changsha: Hunan Cartographic Publishing House, 2010), p.1. 
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above County level. To the north is Gong’an County, under the 
administration of Hubei Province. Li County is named after River Li which 
runs through the County.  It was established downstream on the river’s 
alluvial plain. Liyang Township is the political, economic and cultural 
centre of the County, located in the south-eastern corner of the County and 
is the seat of the County government. In 2009, Liyang Township had a 
population of 156,688, of which the non-rural population was 112,439 and 
Li County had 333,534 households with a population of 927,807, of which 
172,954 were non-rural.46 The size of the County is 2,075 square kilometres. 
The per capita disposable income of urban residents was 13121.7 yuan 
($1921) while the per capita net income for the peasants was 5010.9 yuan 
($ 733.9). 47 
 
         Currently Li County is under the administration of Changde 
prefectural-city, which covers Wulin and Dingcheng of two municipal 
districts, six counties and one county-level city. 48  The prefectural-city 
government is located in Wulin municipal district, which is 115 kilometres 
away to the south. Under the administration of Li County, there are 32 
townships (15 Zhen and 17 Xiang) governing 427 villages and 51 residential 
communities.49 In this thesis, the localities normally mean three levels of 
county, township and villages, unless stated otherwise. A township is a low-
level administrative unit with officials appointed and paid by the 
government. Its size is similar to that of a commune in Mao’s China.50 A 
village committee is “the lowest administrative unit in rural China and its 
size is roughly the same as that of a production brigade in the commune 
                                                 
46  The Statistical Bureau of Li County, The Statistical Yearbook of Li County 2010, 
(Xiantao of Hubei: Jiangxia Publishing Company, 2010), p.11 and p.80.  
47 Ibid. 
48 In practice, these two municipal districts are commonly called Changde City. In this 
sense, City is a term to signify the degree of urbanisation.  
49 For more details on administrative division of Li County, please refer to Appendix II. 
Administratively, Xiang and Zhen in China are equivalent to townships in English. They 
differ in terms of the degree of urbanisation with Zhen more urbanised than Xiang. 
Similarly, village committees and residential communities are same rank of administrative 
units with the latter more urbanised than the former. 
50 Gao, Mobo C.F, Gao Village: A Portrait of Rural Life in Modern China, (London: Hurst 
& Company, 1999), p. 4-5. 
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system in Mao’s China”.51 All officials working in village committees used 
to be elected from local villages and paid by levies on the villagers. After 
2005 when the Agriculture Tax was eliminated, the salaries of the officials 
in village committees have therefore been integrated into township budgets 
and are taken on by the state finance. According to the interviews during 
field research, in 2011, the salary level for the heads of village committees 
in Li County is around 4,000 yuan ($619) per year.52 The salary level for 
other officials is less than this.   
 
       In terms of topography, the lands in the County’s north-west are high, 
but then decline gradually towards the south-east, establishing four natural 
zones: mountainous areas, hilly areas, plains and lake areas. Their ratios are 
around 1:1:3:4. There are four rivers running through the County: River Li, 
River Ceng, River Dan and River Dao. River Li is one of the four main river 
systems in Hunan and its nine branches converge in Li County. Therefore 
the County has benefited from rich river traffics since long ago. There are 
also land transportation assets. The Jiao-Niu Railway goes through the 
County and has a station in Jinluo Township. The distance covered by roads 
is about 300 kilometres. The No. 207 national-level road, and the No. 302 
and 304 provincial-level roads network with county-level and township-
level roads so that the County has very convenient connections to all sides. 
Also, located on the border between Hunan and Hubei, Li County lies in the 
centre of four medium-size cities53: Jinzhou City to the north, Changde City 
to the south, Yueyang City to the east, and Zhangjiajie City to the west. It is 
also in the overlapping zones between two emerging city clusters - Wuhan 
and Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan. 54  These good transport links and its 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Interview 2011/12/30. 
53 See footnote no. 44, ‘city’ here means the municipal districts of four prefectural-cities. 
54 Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan city cluster is composed of three prefectural level cities of 
Changsha, Xiangtan and Zhuzhou, and is the heavily urbanised region of Hunan. The 
concept of two city clusters of Wuhan and Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan was firstly 
proposed by China National Development and Reform Commission (CNDRC) on 
December 14, 2007 and issued as comprehensive supporting reform trial areas to explore 
how to build a resource-conserving and environmental-friendly society, and how to boost a 
coordinated and balanced development between urban and rural areas. On April, 16, 2015, 
CNDRC approved a development plan for city clusters along middle Yangtzi River, which 
extended the city clusters from Wuhan and Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan to Dongting Lake 
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favourable location have helped people living here to promote their 
livelihoods for long time, and during the reform era, have contributed to an 
economic take-off and speedy development in Li County. 
 
      Li County’s connections, radiating outwards in all directions, imply that 
it has never been closed. When the transportation links bring people from 
outside to the County, new information, ideas and knowledge come too. 
This partly explains the open-minded attitude of the County’s people. They 
have never been satisfied with the status quo and tend to take chances to 
move forward when conditions are ready. Many left the County and settled 
in bigger cities. They worked hard and many have achieved success in their 
respective career fields: politics, business, intellectual pursuits, etc. Thus, in 
government agencies at the provincial and prefectural city levels, many 
officials originally from Li County and have assumed important roles. Many 
entrepreneurs and businessmen are successful in the coastal cities like 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai. The connections of those high-ranking officials and 
businessmen to their home County are a very significant resource, and 
sometimes play a key part in local politics. When Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) were first developing, County officials took advantage 
of this resource to stimulate the boom in rural industry, as Chapter Two 
shows. Between 2003 and 2012, when central government financial 
allocations became an important funding source, these human resources and 
connections were also used by the three levels of government in Li County 
to obtain funds to support their ambitions – both for the public good and 
their private advantages – as we shall see in Chapter Four.    
 
          Agricultural production has long been an economic mainstay in Li 
County. Crops have been planted there for 9,000 years. In the 1990s, 
archaeologists excavated a pre-historic cave site called “Yuchan Cave” in 
Daping Township, where they discovered the oldest piece of terracotta in 
                                                                                                                            
Economic Circle and Boyang Lake Economic Circle, and further advanced China’s 
regional development strategy. Following the logic of the economic reform in China, this 
means that these areas will be enjoying more favourable development policy in a few years 
to come and Li County is just within it.       
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the world, and two and a half pieces of paddy, which were radiocarbon 
dated as 14,000 years old. In 1997, archaeologists again in Bashidang site in 
Wufu Village of Mengxi Township excavated 15,000 pieces of ancient 
cultivated rice which were as early as 8,000 years old. For centuries, and 
especially after the establishment of the PRC, Li County has been one of the 
important grain production bases of China. One reason is its climate. The 
County is subtropical and monsoon humid. It has four clear-cut seasons: 
warm and mild in spring and autumn, hot and humid in summer, and cold 
with occasional snow in winter; sufficient rainfall and enough light. The 
average temperature is 16.5℃. The coldest weather recorded was 13.5℃ 
below zero and the hottest 40.5℃. The average annual rainfall is about 1,213 
millimetres. The plentiful rainfall and fertile land from the alluvium of the 
River Li make the County an ideal place for agricultural production, 
especially the rice planting. The Liyang Plain, established from the alluvium 
of the River Li, is the biggest plain in Hunan Province and most of it lies 
within Li County -- the so-called granary of the lower valley of the Yangtze 
River.  
 
       The favourable soil and climate conditions mean the County is entirely 
self-sufficient. The main grain crops in Li County include rice, wheat, 
barley, buckwheat, horse beans, peas, soybeans, mung beans, sweet potatoes, 
potatoes, sweet corns, broomcorn, and millet. Among these, the rice is most 
important. After the PRC was established, because of the introduction of 
some advanced new technology and new varieties, grain production greatly 
increased. In the 1950s, average production was 241,873 tons. In the 1960s, 
because the single cropping of rice shifted to double cropping, and long-
stalked crops gave ways to short-stalked, average production increased to 
264,335 tons. In the 1970s, irrigation was improved, the size of the farming 
lands was increased, and most importantly, Li County was in the lead in 
adopting the hybridisation of the late rice varieties. Average production was 
419,809 tons and the amount of the rice handed to the state ranked the third 
in Hunan Province. In the 1980s, the implementation of family farming and 
the widespread of hybrid rice contributed an increase of 91,616 tons in 
annual average production. Production in 1985 was recorded as the highest, 
61 
 
with a total amount of 631,796 tons. It is obvious from these figures that Li 
County has never been a place which is starving. The abundant grain 
production not only feeds its own people, but also helps to feed those from 
other regions. This situation did not change much after 1982 when the 
family farming was implemented. This is one of the reasons why the policy 
of family farming was not taken up as quickly as in provinces like Anhui. A 
detailed discussion of this can be found in Chapter Two. 
 
          In addition to grain, other crops are also important in the agricultural 
economy. They include cotton, rapeseed, raising silkworms and mulberry, 
and a variety of vegetables, fruits, tea leaves, castor bean, tobacco, sugar 
cane, sesame seeds, and peanuts. Furthermore, the varied topography -- 
including mountainous areas, hilly areas, and lake areas – has enabled Li 
County to develop other industries too such as forestry, animal husbandry, 
side-line production and fisheries. In Mao’s era, these four industries were 
not allowed to be run by individuals or households. From 1956 to1978, the 
ownership of forest and water resources often shifted back and forth 
between People’s Communes and brigades. Since 1980, an experiment of 
“confirming the ownership of mountains and forests with issuing a 
certificate” was carried out in Jianshan Commune’s Wuyi Brigade and 
Dongmen Commune. Up to 1984 when the family farming was completely 
established, a double-level management responsibility system for mountains 
and forests was also established.  Households managed hilly lands allocated 
for private use, and that was supplemented by village tree farms run 
collectively.  The right to manage forest and mountain lands has since then 
begun to be privatised. Water resources also experienced a change in 
ownership and management -- from collectivisation to household contract 
responsibility, by which households obtained management rights. In 1981, 
Li County began to implement the contract responsibility system for water 
resources. Households were also permitted to pursue animal husbandry and 
side-line production.  This led to looser controls over the economic lives of 
peasants than Mao’s era, and this system greatly improved peasants’ 
incomes. Chapter Two will discuss this topic in detail.  
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 Li County also has plentiful mineral resources. These minerals 
include bituminous coal, stone coal, oil shale, iron ore, mirabilite, salt mine, 
barite, gypsum, cement limestone, bentonite, and tile clays. Among these 
resources, the reserves of gypsum, salt and mirabilite rank second in Hunan, 
and the reserves of mirabilite without water and bentonite first. Early on, 
these mineral resources were used to develop industries like mining and 
smelting, which Li County can be traced back to the Tang and Ming 
Dynasties. Another type of industry, based on mineral resources, is 
construction materials. As early as the Tang and Song Dynasties, clay brick 
production existed. Up to Qing Dynasty, the production of grey tiles, single 
bricks, and lime developed -- mainly fired by peasants in slack farming 
seasons. Between 1951 and 1978, the scale of these industries was not large. 
In the 1950s, the number of mining enterprises was seven. In the 1970s, it 
increased to 14. In early 1951, the County government established the first 
state-owned brick factory. In September of that year, a gypsum mine was 
established. In the 1970s, a series of state-owned construction material 
enterprises were also established to produce bricks, cement and salt. 
However, due to the poor quality of the products, some of those factories 
were either closed or merged with others. Up to 1978, only two factories – 
the Li County cement factory and the Li County scope bricks factory – 
existed.  
 
          In the early 1980s, economic reforms, starting from family farming, 
also stimulated another cycle of development for rural industries. By 
making full use of its mineral resources, Li County greatly improved its 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). By 1985, the number of mining 
enterprises had increased to 24 and the annual output increased from 7.576 
million yuan ($2.6 million) in 1980 to 9.497 million yuan ($3.23 million). 
By 1989, the number increased to 155 with 9,528 employees. Among these, 
the county-owned and the township-owned enterprises numbered 31 with 
4,478 employees, and the village-owned 124 with 5,050 employees. The 
annual output was 36.08 million yuan ($12.29 million) accounting for 7.2 % 
of the gross output of industry. The construction materials industry also 
developed rapidly after 1978. Up to 1989, the number of such enterprises 
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was 540, including 10 cement factories, 33 brick and tile factories, 11 lime 
factories, 446 cement products factories, 9 aggregate plants, 12 paint 
factories, 6 plastic product plants and another 13 factories. There were 
16,719 employees and the output was 82.74 million yuan ($ 22.0 million), 
accounting for 16.6% of the gross output of industry in Li County. 
Economic development has greatly increased the incomes of ordinary 
people. In 2009, the per capita income of urban employees was 23,807 yuan 
($3485.1) and the per capita income of rural residents was 5010.9 yuan 
($733.6). Chapter Two discusses in detail the factors that caused the boom 
of the TVEs, and its influence on the incomes of ordinary people.    
 
         Li County can function economically as an independent entity. Yet it 
is not a closed and completely self-reliant society. In spite of its self-
sufficiency in grain and other crops, the development of rural industry relies 
heavily on connections to the outside world, including human resources and 
new technologies from outside. The open-minded attitudes of Li County’s 
people enable them to reach out and make use of external resources and 
human relations to pursue further development. At the same time, the 
increase in the wealth of ordinary people gradually changed the balance of 
power between the government and the people from an authoritative-
submissive model to a model marked by negotiation and relative 
independence. This change can be seen in the implementation of many 
policies. Chapters Two, Three and Four all provide evidence to demonstrate 
this. Economic liberalisation has also triggered a degree of liberalisation on 
the ideological front. The retreat of communist ideology left a vacuum in 
spiritual belief which has been filled either by religions or by traditional 
Chinese cultural practices. On condition that the CCP’s regime would not be 
challenged, the government actually welcomes the return of religions and 
traditional culture because to some extent they help to stabilise society by 
soothing people amid striking social changes.  But this diverse, complex and 
relatively free society in turn raises many challenges for  governance. This 
case study of Li County will also shed a light on how new strategies for 
governance embrace these challenges.   
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1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Readers may already have some knowledge of the extraordinary transition 
through which China has passed since 1978. It is commonly divided into 
three broad phases and three generations of leadership – Deng Xiaoping’s 
initiation of reforms from 1979 to 1989, Jiang Zemin-Li Peng/Zhu Rongji’s 
development of manufacturing in coastal cities from 1989 to 2002, and Hu 
Jintao-Wen Jiaobao’s comprehensive reform in rural areas aimed at 
achieving a harmonious society from 2002 to 2012. This thesis thus follows 
this logic and is organised as follows. 
 
          Chapter 2 assesses the period from 1978 to 1989. It first shows how a 
campaign of allocating lands to households was initiated from the central 
level to the locality and then was implemented in practice. We will also see 
how rural industry was introduced under the leadership of local cadres. 
Variations of the implementation of these two policies are explained. This 
chapter also discusses the introduction of direct elections at village level, 
and how they worked in practice, in a case of a villager’s story. Through an 
analysis of the changes in the lifestyle of the peasants, the chapter argues 
that allocating lands to households and allowing the coexistence of two 
types of economic management (private and collective) provided rural 
residents with opportunities to achieve greater prosperity, and with more 
personal space and freedom in the economic sphere. These policies thus 
obtained widespread support.    
 
          As reforms proceeded, in the 1900s, the state shifted its focus from 
the rural sector to the coastal cities. Furthermore, the government 
reconstructed relationships with its subordinate agencies by introducing a 
tax sharing system and decentralising power to lower-level authorities over 
personnel, fiscal and resource management. Chapter 3 analyses the 
consequences in rural areas which this series of policies brought about. 
These consequences vary, depending on the specifics of implementation in 
different places. As we shall see, the coercive work methods which some 
local cadres used, and the soaring financial burdens aggravated social 
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conflicts and the grievances of rural dwellers. This chapter also explains 
how these social problems were prevented from escalating into organised 
opposition to the CCP. 
 
          The period from 2000 to 2013 which Chapter 4 covers is actually 
complex since this is the era in which the state began its comprehensive 
social reform. Due to the limits on thesis length, and because some reforms 
are still developing, this chapter focuses on only a few key policies, 
including: the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas, the introduction of an 
agricultural subsidies system, follow up policies including legalising the 
land rights of peasants, reforming the fiscal system at township and village 
levels, and improving the programme of “one project one discussion”. 
Implementation and its consequences are examined. The chapter argues that 
although there are some problems with the implementation process, rural 
residents’ lives have undergone major changes when compared to 30 years 
ago. Diversity in the living conditions of different households has emerged 
due to family structure and the possession of various resources. The great 
improvement in the living standards of rural dwellers and the increasing 
freedom they enjoy in daily life have massively assisted the CCP in winning 
back rural support.     
 
        As noted above, many scholars have provided explanations for China’s 
resilience – ideology adaption, institutionalisation of leadership succession 
and meritocracy, the party recruitment of members of emergent social 
classes, the non-democratic institution of accountability etc. These 
arguments may make sense at the top level and within party institutions. 
However, questions arise about views which often fix upon grand themes 
such as patriotism, nationalism, etc. Did this sort of thing have much 
influence in the minds of ordinary Chinese? How have they reacted to these 
grand themes adopted by the CCP? Or were those ordinary people thinking 
mostly about everyday concerns – their livelihoods, incomes and assets, the 
taxes that they must pay, concrete opportunities to better themselves, and 
barriers to betterment? Were the grand themes in Buruma’s comment, noted 
above, and in other social scientists’ analyses, mostly quite far from the 
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minds of ordinary people/citizens? This thesis seeks to provide readers with 
an understanding of rural dwellers’ more mundane concerns, to test the 
plausibility of these theories of authoritarian resilience.         
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Chapter Two:  Adventurism, Opportunism and Dynamics 
from 1978 to 1989 
 
When we look back after more than 30 years, the year 1978 and a Party 
Congress -- the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party (TPSECCCP) – which was convened in that 
year are commonly regarded to have ground-breaking and far-reaching 
influence in the history of the PRC. Their landmark significance is multi-
faceted and there is no shortage of literature to evaluate this year and this 
Party Congress. While evaluating them systematically is beyond the purpose 
of this thesis, our stories of Li County still uses that year as its starting point. 
This is because this Party Congress introduced a household responsibility 
system (jiating zeren zhi), centring on allocating lands to households 
(fentian daohu), 55  which ushered in a markedly new era in agrarian Li 
County. Strictly speaking, that Party Congress did not call for the allocation 
of lands in a clear and straightforward manner. Instead, by re-endorsing the 
document ‘sixty articles’,56 it confirmed again that the people’s communes 
were the fundamental institution in the countryside, which implied no 
changes in the organisation of labourers or in the distribution of resources 
within the communes.57 It was the decisions in this Party Congress to shift 
the policy orientation from class struggle to economic development, and to 
encourage ideological emancipation, that opened the door for the nationwide 
implementation of the household responsibility system.  
 
                                                 
55 Jiang, Ailin, “The Evolutions and Developments of Land Policies in China during the 
Reform between 1978 and 2002”, Journal of Suihua Teachers College, Vol. 24, 2004, No. 
1, p. 12.  
56 The document of ‘sixty articles’, under the full title ‘the regulations of the People’s 
Commune’, was drafted by Mao Zedong in February 1961 and later was approved in the 
Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP in September 1962. 
This document confirmed a three-level collective ownership of land in the rural areas, with 
the production teams being basic units. This institutional arrangement had remained since 
then until the launch of the household responsibility system in the early 1980s in which 
some changes in the right to land use were made -- although ownership remained in the 
hands of the collective organisations in rural areas. For more details about the evolution of 
land policies, see Wang, Weiguo, The Study on the Land Rights in China, (Beijing: The 
China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1996), p.95-96.  
57 Li, Huaiyin, Village China under Socialism and Reform: A Micro-History, 1948-2008, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 269. 
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        The truth is that at that initial stage, when the household responsibility 
system began gradually to be implemented across the country in many 
forms from 1978 to 1983, there were many arguments about it, inside and 
outside the party. The implementation of the policy was not actually 
completely new in many areas such as Hubei, Henan, Shannxi and Sichuan, 
where some peasants managed to attempt it voluntarily and sporadically as 
early as 1950s.58 Even just before the TPSECCCP in December of 1978, in 
the summer and autumn of the same year when Anhui province suffered a 
severe drought, in order to survive the disaster, the provincial party 
committee decided to lend the lands to the households. In that case, the 
lands of production teams that lacked enough labourers to undertake 
ploughing could be lent to the peasants to grow wheat -- and meanwhile, in 
order to stimulate output, they even decided temporarily to cancel 
compulsory grain submissions. 59  These decisions greatly stimulated 
peasants’ interest in contracting out lands and working on their own.  Some 
well-known examples of this in places such as Shannan Commune of Feixi 
County and the Xiaogang production team of Liyuan Commune of 
Fengyang County took the lead and bravely tried contracting out.60 However, 
while this practice proceeded in full swing in some places, arguments about 
the approach were also quite furious. They mainly centred on the ideological 
implications of allocating lands to the peasants.  Was this socialism or 
capitalism? It is obvious that the long history of political campaigns and 
ideological propaganda had instilled in people a legacy of caution, which 
turned out to be an obstacle to the implementation any reform policies.  
 
       In January of 1979, the People’s Daily continuously reported news that 
this practice was being carried out in Anhui, Sichuan, Yunnan and 
Guangdong. This triggered further arguments between pro- and anti-reforms 
groups. Then, Deng Xiaoping, the then deputy Party secretary of the Central 
Committee of the CCP, showed his support for the household responsibility 
                                                 
58 For a brief history of the voluntary practices of this policy in some places in the Mao’s 
era, see Han, Jun (ed.), The 30 years of China’s Economic Reform: the Volume of Rural 
Economy 1978-2008, (Chongqing: Chongqing University Press, 2008), p.30. 
59 Kang, Junjuan, “A three-level ownership system with the production teams as basis”, 
Archives World, 2009 (4), p.17 – 21. 
60 Ibid. 
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system by lavishly praising the voluntary experiments of Feixi Commune 
and Fengyang County. 61 The significant achievements of peasants’ brave 
experiments convinced some senior cadres in the Central Committee and the 
Central Government, and led them to approve the spread of this practice. 62  
Thereafter, more and more cadres joined the pro-reform group and the 
household responsibility system spread very quickly throughout the country.    
  
      From 14 to 22 September 1980, the Central Committee summoned the 
secretaries of all provinces, prefecture cities and self-governing 
municipalities, and convened a meeting to discuss how to strengthen and to 
accelerate the agricultural production responsibility system. A meeting 
summary was published afterwards. This was the first time that the policy of 
“contracting out the lands to the households and distributing on a 
contracted-output-basis” (baochan daohu) appeared in central documents.63 
At an ideological level, this document clarified that, with the predominance 
of socialist industry, socialist commerce and collective agriculture, the 
practice of contracting out under the leadership of the production teams 
would not diverge from path of socialism and was not a restoration of 
capitalism.64  This document relieved some peasants’ worries and further 
accelerated the spread of this policy throughout the country. Up to early 
November of 1980, the production teams which had begun to implement 
this practice in various forms accounted for 15% of the total. 65  This 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 The logic of “voluntarily sporadic experiments – obtaining the support of the Central 
Government – deciding to push through the country” actually applies to the implementation 
of many policies in the reform era in China. By tracing the origins and development of the 
three policies of family farming; marketing and privatisation in land tenure, credit, and 
labour; and entrepreneurship, and by looking at the numerical strength of the peasantry, 
Daniel Kelliher demonstrated this pattern of policy-implementation in the reform era in 
China, and argued that “peasants did indeed create China’s reforms”. This interestingly 
challenged Bruce Cumming’s argument in which he regarded peasant politics as “pre-
political, apolitical, or extra-political”. For more details, see Daniel Kelliher, Peasant 
Power in China: the Era of Rural Reform, 1979-1989, (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1992) p. 40-69, and p.251.  
63 Han, Jun (ed.), The 30 years of China’s Economic Reform: the Volume of Rural Economy 
1978- 2008, (Chongqing: Chongqing University Press, 2008), p.32. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
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percentage increased to 32% by July 1981 and then quickly rose as high as 
45.1% by October of that year. 66 
 
        In 1982, the Central Committee and the Central Government further 
confirmed the legitimate status of the practice of “contracting the lands to 
the peasants and distributing on a contracted-output-basis” in a series of 
meetings and central documents, such as the report of Hu Yaobang, the then 
General Secretary of the CCP, to the Twelfth Party Congress in September 
1982. In November of that year, the Central Committee convened several 
working meetings on rural ideology and politics, and meetings with 
secretaries in charge of agriculture, and issued a document entitled “a series 
of problems on the current rural economic policies”. Being officially issued 
as “the No.1 Central Committee document” on 2 January 1983, this 
document strongly praised the practice. That it was named “the No.1 Central 
Committee document” showed the importance of the practice and provided 
still more reassurance to the peasants about the strong backing for the 
implementation of this policy. By the end of 1983, 175 million rural 
households took part in the implementation, accounting for 94.5% of all 
rural households.67 
 
2.1 Establishing the Institution of Family Farming, 1978 to 1984 
 
2.1.1 The Beginning of the Agriculture Production Responsibility System 
 
Given that the policy of the household responsibility system was initiated 
sporadically by the peasants and was then pursued all over the country, 
some scholars have argued that it is actually the peasants that created the 
reform policies.68 This argument might be true in such places as Anhui, 
Sichuan or Henan where the peasants took the initiative. However, the 
actual process of de-collectivisation in Li County was rather conservative. 
There are no official or informal records to show that the practice of 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 For more details, see footnote no. 62. 
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allocating the lands to the smaller teams below the production teams or even 
to individual peasants, either voluntarily or with permission, occurred in Li 
County before 1978 or even during the period from 1978 to 1981 when 
there were quite a lot of discussions and experiments taking place in the 
Central Government and in other parts of the country. It was not until after 
February of 1981 when Hu Yaobang, the then secretary of the CCP, came to 
inspect Hunan Province and encouraged the leaders of the Provincial Party 
Committee there to carry out the practice that some production teams in Li 
County began voluntarily to try it in the second half of that year.69 There 
were, however, a few experiments with how to distribute agricultural 
products among members of a production team, such as changing from a 
work-points-based system to a system related to output from March of 1979 
to September of 1980.70  It is thus reasonable to say that Li County adopted 
gradual and conservative attitude towards this unprecedented policy.     
 
       So if the policy of family farming is really as productive as was claimed 
later by the official media, why were peasants in Li County not as 
pioneering as their counterparts in other parts of the country? Was it because 
that the cadres here were so tough that the peasants did not dare to take risks? 
This does not ring true. I have often asked informants about agricultural 
output before and after the implementation of the household responsibility 
system. One told me that while a lot of production teams had been short of 
grain every year after submitting the compulsory grain quota during the 
collective era, one team he knew had a large surplus of grain. He explained 
that one reason was that the then team leadership (one leader is his uncle) 
combined advanced technology -- such as, excellent seeds like cross-
fertilised paddy seeds No.154 -- with rich practical experiences.71 Since high 
                                                 
69  Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 98.  
70 Ibid., p.419. 
71  Interview 2012/02/22b. One may ask that if advanced technologies are good for 
improving the agriculture productivity, why there were still a lot of brigades which were 
short of grain? One reason was that the cross-fertilised paddy rice seeds which later fed 
most of the Chinese population only started experimental growing in the early 1980s and it 
required demanding technologies. By the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the lack of both 
qualified agricultural technicians and sophisticated peasants were problems for many places. 
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productivity is not necessarily a result which only family farming could 
produce72, and furthermore, since Li County is a favourable location for 
agricultural production, most peasants here did not suffer starvation as many 
of their counterparts did in places like Anhui where grain production 
normally fell short.  So reforming agricultural production was not a high 
priority in Li County. 
 
       Although the peasants here do not fall into the “pioneering” category73 
it is worth noting that once top-down approval became very clear, the 
peasants here were able to take the opportunity immediately to pursue a 
better life. Some production teams’ voluntary practices in the second half of 
1981 are good examples, as we have seen above. For example, the same 
informant in the above paragraph, who was a former sent-down youth and 
then came back to his rural hometown, was later elected as the leader of the 
production team. With his knowledge of agriculture, he led his team to take 
the initiative and allocated the lands to the households to grow rapeseeds in 
1981 when his superior brigade leader only permitted him to allocate lands 
to the smaller team below the production team.74 Another production team 
leader in his brigade reported him to the brigade leader, but the latter 
tolerated it.75 This reply makes sense considering that top-down approvals 
from a series of central meetings and documents during this period were 
                                                                                                                            
But Li County, as one of historical grain producing areas, was among the batch of 
experimental sites to try this new rice seed ahead of other parts of China. 
72 This argument is also proven by other scholars’ study. For more details, see, for example, 
Li, Huaiyin, Village China under Socialism and Reform: A Micro-History, 1948-2008, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 268. 
73  The term “pioneering” category was borrowed from Chung, Jae Ho’s categorisation 
when he analysed the relations between the central government and the governments at 
provincial level. He divided three provinces which he studied into three categories: Anhui 
as ‘Pioneering’, Shangdong as ‘Bandwagoning’ and Heilongjiang as ‘Resistance’. While he 
used this categorisation to illustrate the relationship between the provincial leaderships and 
the central government, here I am discussing the reaction of the peasants to the new policy. 
For more details about his categorisation, see Chung, Jae Ho, Central Control and Local 
Discretion in China: Leadership and Implementation during Post-Mao De-collectivisation, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
74  The terms “allocating land to the smaller teams below the production team” and 
“allocating land to the households” actually signified two successive stages in which the 
practice of family farming was implemented gradually. More details will be provided in a 
later section of this Chapter. 
75 Interview 2012/02/22b. 
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already clear, especially Hu Yaobang’s encouragement to the provincial 
leaders.  
 
       The next year after his team allocated land to the households, this team 
harvested much more abundant rapeseeds than before. He thinks that the 
biggest benefit from allocating the lands to the households is not the high 
productivity which can be also obtained by using advanced technologies and 
sophisticated experiences, but improvements in the efficiency of labourers 
by re-arranging them to work based on their different capacities. Instead of 
assigning everyone the same task in the field, he, as a former sent-down 
youth,76  took the lead in arranging for male labourers to do hard tasks 
outside while women stayed at home doing chores. One of the reasons that 
he could make this kind of arrangement was that the number of the 
labourers in his team normally exceeded the amount required to perform 
tasks in the fields. Organising labourers in a collectivised way ignored the 
different capabilities of men and women, and thus did not make full use of 
them. The other reason was that some work in the fields is not suitable for 
females. He stated that, based on his understanding of these things, he 
supported the policy of family farming because it conformed to the 
conditions in the countryside and was therefore a suitable policy. As early as 
1981 when other fellow production teams were still slowly trying the 
practice of “contracting the land to the smaller teams below the production 
teams and distributing on a contracted-output-basis”, he had already gone a 
bit ahead of them to allocate the land to the households, which marked him 
out as of the pioneer type, since the county government did not then have 
clear instructions to implement family farming. 
 
                                                 
76 His status of being a sent-down youth is quite relevant here. The term “sent-down youth” 
refers to the policy of sending educated youths in urban areas down to the countryside in 
the 1960s in order to support the development of the rural areas and to relieve the problem 
of a population boom in the urban areas at that time. And gradually it has been developed 
as a term standing for a group of persons who were educated and sacrificed their youth and 
knowledge to the development of the country. My informant was very proud of being called 
as a “sent-down youth” because he thinks his knowledge helped him to lead his team to get 
high output in the early stage of the family farming.  It also distinguishes him from his 
fellow team leaders in his brigades.  
74 
 
        From 1979 to 1981, while tolerating some voluntary experiments at the 
production team level, the focus of the County Government was to convey 
the contents of a series of meetings and the documents of the Central 
Government and the Central Committee of the CCP within its 
administration. This was realised by convening meetings of cadres at four 
administrative levels – county, district, commune, and production team – 
and principal secretaries at district and commune level. Such documents 
included “a resolution on several problems of accelerating the agricultural 
development” of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the CCP in September, 1979 and “Regarding some problems 
of further strengthening and improving the agriculture production 
responsibility system” promulgated by the Central Committee of the CCP in 
September, 1980. Since the attitude of the provincial government was 
already clear after Hu Yaobang’s tour in Hunan in February 1981, based on 
the ideological foundation which was laid by a series of meetings, the Party 
Committee of the County decided to push through the so-called “two 
transforming experiments” (lianggai) -- experiments to transform the 
economic structure of agriculture and to transform the management of 
agricultural production. These experiments started in Liyang Commune in 
September 1981 and ended on 25 December 1981. 77  On the basis of 
experiences obtained in these experiments, in the spring of 1982, the 
agricultural responsibility system was implemented throughout the 
County. 78  By the spring of 1984, lands were allocated to almost all 
households and the agricultural production responsibility system was 
established in all 6,742 village groups of the County. 79 
 
  
                                                 
77  Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 419. 
78 Ibid.,p. 98. 
79 Ibid., p.419. 
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2.1.2 Allocating the Lands to the Households 
 
 The forms of the household responsibility system  
In general, the household responsibility system in Li County evolved in 
many forms during the early stage. Depending on different contractors, it 
included contractual agreements between the smaller teams and the 
production teams (ASP), and agreements between member households and 
the production teams (AHP). Although these two forms both bore the label 
of “distributing on an agreed-output basis” (lianchan jichou) (DAOB), there 
were still some differences between them. First, the former were agreed 
between the production teams and the smaller teams below them while the 
latter regarded the households as individual contractors to take 
responsibility. Second, by allowing member households to keep the surplus 
grain produced on the top of an agreed grain submission, the latter entitled 
the households more freedom to dispose of their output and to arrange their 
agricultural schedules. With the former form, although the units were 
downsized from production teams to smaller teams, the households still 
worked and received distributions within collective units.  
 
       In this sense, it is reasonable to say that the latter form was more 
pioneering than the former. In addition, individual households in the latter 
form not only took responsibility for their own agricultural production 
processes including expenses, they also bore the responsibility for the output, 
no matter if it entailed profits or losses. Compared to ASP, AHP was 
actually closer to the eventual policy of family farming. The only difference 
between the AHP and the eventual family farming system was the fact that 
the distribution method on a work-point basis was still used in the AHP.  
This will be explained in more detail below.80 The AHP sometimes emerged 
sequentially, after the AHP, while in other cases, they co-existed. Please 
refer to the cases discussed below. 
 
                                                 
80  The information in this paragraph is from the interviews 2012/01/06, 2012/02/15, 
2012/02/16c, 2012/02/17b, 2012/02/17d. 
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        Depending on different contents of contracts, the household 
responsibility system included grain contracting and speciality contracting. 
The former mainly refers to peasants’ agreements to submit a fixed amount 
of grain at the end of a production year, agreed before contracting. Lands in 
other agricultural areas, for forestry, animal husbandry, side-line production 
and fisheries, could also be contracted to households and let the peasants to 
arrange their production on their own. This way, many households 
specialising in some certain products emerged. These speciality households 
instead had to submit a fixed amount of their products. For example, in 1983, 
T Yezhi from Guanyuan Commune became the first household specialising 
in chicken breeding in Li County. 
 
 The Transition from the DAOB to Allocating Lands to Households 
 
During the period from 1979 to the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984 
when the lands began to be allocated to the households, many production 
teams experienced a period of transition. This occurred as early as 1979 in 
some teams but it could also happen as late as 1983 in others. For most 
production teams which were interviewed during field research, although it 
was not until 1982 that the County Party Committee and Government began 
actively to push through allocations of lands to households, several 
experiments with DAOB had already begun. This followed on from the 
Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in 
September 1979, in which a document entitled “A resolution on several 
problems of accelerating agricultural development” was approved.  It clearly 
stated that communes’ production teams were allowed to contract their lands 
to the smaller teams below them and calculate their income with the 
submission of an agreed share of outputs.81 The early change which some 
production teams made was mainly to divide production teams into smaller 
teams.  The old methods used to organise labourers and to record work 
points remained, but between the smaller teams and the production teams, 
there was a contract on the grain submission quota. This contracted output 
                                                 
81  Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 98. 
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provided the basis on which production team issued work points to the 
smaller teams. 
   
        Then with the clear encouragement for contracting lands to household 
from Hu Yaobang on his tour to Hunan in February 1981, some production 
teams began voluntarily to follow his call, but still retained a distribution 
method whereby work points were distributed according to the contracted 
amounts of grain to be submitted. It was not until the spring of 1982 that the 
County Party Committee and Government realised that the moment was ripe 
to promote the allocation of lands to households, but the times at which 
various production teams started to adopt this practice actually varied. 
Actually, when to implement, in which form, and each form for how long 
depended on the different production teams.  In the discussion below, we 
illustrate these variations by examining the cases of several production 
teams. 
 
Case A82: Dividing the production teams into smaller teams 
 
Locations: the 1st and the 9th group of Qilimiao Village of Cengnan 
Township (The present name as ‘group’ was named as ‘production team’ 
back then.) 
The informants: Mr. C in the 3rd group; Mr P in the 9th group 
 
Locations: the 3rd group and the 8th group of Juhualing Village of Yiwan 
Township  
The informants: Mr Y in the 3rd group; Mr Y in the 8th group 
 
Mr P stated that his production team began to allocate lands to households 
in the second half of 1982. It took a couple of steps before that. First, in 
1981 the production team was divided into four smaller teams, each of 
which included three to seven households. The lands were then allocated to 
these smaller teams. Because the smaller teams varied in size, the amounts 
                                                 
82 Interviews 2012/01/06, 2011/12/29, 2011/12/30, 2012/02/11, 2012/02/16b, 2012/02/16d, 
2012/02/16f, 2012/02/17, 2012/02/17b, 2012/02/17c, 2012/02/17f, 2012/02/18, 
2012/02/18b, 2012/02/18c, 2012/02/18d, 2012/02/18e, 2012/02/19, 2012/02/19b, 
2012/02/19c,  2012/02/19d,  2012/02/19e,  2012/02/22,  2012/02/24.  
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of lands allocated to them varied as well. A leader was appointed for each 
smaller team by the production team.  This kind of smaller team therefore 
replaced the production team to be units to organise work. However, after 
the harvest, agricultural produce still had to be submitted to the over-arching 
production for distribution.  
 
      How should it be distributed? Before allocating lands to the smaller 
teams, the smaller teams and the production teams had agreed on the ratio 
between a fixed amount of grain to be submitted and the proportioned 
amount of work points to be earned. At the end of a production year, based 
on the actual amount of grain which the smaller teams submitted to the 
production teams and that agreement, the production teams awarded the 
relevant work points to the smaller teams. Decisions on how much grain 
each smaller team should submit and how many work points it should 
receive were reached in the meetings of the party branches of the production 
teams. For example, 5000 kilograms of grain was equivalent to 1000 points. 
If a smaller team harvested 5,500 kilograms, it could choose either to hand it 
all in and earn extra points for the extra grain or to keep this extra 500 
kilogram and to distribute it within the smaller team in the form of a 
“bonus”. If the harvest was less than 5,000 kilograms, the smaller team 
would have to hand in all it produced, but in return, they would receive 
fewer than the 1,000 points that had been agreed at the beginning.  
 
     Then how to distribute work points within the smaller teams? Mr Y from 
Juhualing Village explained that in 1981, his production team was also 
divided into four smaller teams. The smaller team that he was in had three 
households. If he worked for the whole day today, he would get 10 points 
but if he only worked for half day today, only 5 points could be earned. The 
leader of the smaller team decided who would do what type of work. 
Different types of work would earn different numbers of points. For 
example, ditch digging was worth 8 points; picking up cotton flowers was 
worth 5. For each capable labourer, there was a basis point – a male labourer 
working for the whole day would get 10 basis points while a female got 8 
basis points. Each smaller team had a recorder to keep track of everyone’s 
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work points. All the collective property, assets, income and expenses of the 
smaller teams were also noted by the recorder and then reported to the 
accountant of the production team, who was in charge of distributions 
within a production team. Mr P, who was 15 years old at that time, was 
made the recorder for work points within his smaller team. At the end of a 
production year, the recorder would add up all the work points of the 
various peasants and this determined their original work point totals. Then 
by comparing those totals with the amount of points which the production 
team gave to the smaller team, based on the actual amount of submitted 
grain, a ratio would be obtained. On the basis of this ratio, the original work 
points of each peasant would be converted to their actual points which were 
used to determine the amounts of grain eventually distributed within the 
production team instead of the smaller team.  
  
       Mr Y’s group and Mr P’s group – which had been production teams 
before 1984 – also used the method described above. However, Mr Y’s 
group, after using it from 1980 to 1982, decided in 1983 to begin to 
allocating lands to households, while in Mr P’s group, this method was used 
only for one year, 1981. Then in 1982, the group moved from four smaller 
teams to six even smaller groups. The method of distribution was the same 
as in 1981. This approach was used until December 1982 when the lands 
began to be allocated to the households. Mr C’s group, within the same 
brigade as Mr P’s, yet had some differences. First, the number of the smaller 
teams were three not as four as in Mr P’s case. Second, Mr C’s acted one 
year earlier to divide into smaller teams than Mr P’s, but a few months later 
in allocating the lands to households. Among all of the interviewed 
production teams, 23 out of 49 initiated this process – first dividing the 
production team into smaller teams, and then after a couple of years when 
the conditions were ripe, they began to allocate lands to households.  
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Case B 83 : Merging several production teams into bigger teams; also 
allocating 0.15 mu of land to each person for house building  
Location: Hucheng Residents’ Committee of Liyang Township  
The Informant: Mr Z in the 5th group 
 
Mr Z’s production team was located in Liyang Township where the County 
Government sits. As the economic, political and cultural centre of the 
County, Liyang Township is the most urbanised area within the County. The 
Hucheng Residents’ Committee (formerly Hucheng Village) and was in a 
suburb of Liyang Township. With further urbanisation, Hucheng Village 
became more urban – hence the change in its name to a residents’ 
committee. Compared to other more rural villages, Hucheng Village had 
less arable land, and so did its production teams. Given these conditions, 
unlike the production teams discussed above which divided into smaller 
teams, Mr Z’s production team chose to merge with two other production 
teams into a bigger team.  
   
       The distribution method was similar to the one in Case A. It was used 
until 1983 when the Hucheng Residents’ Committee began to allocate its 
lands to households. Land was allocated on the basis of population. This 
applied to every production team in this village. As a result, for some 
production teams who had extensive land but small populations, the size of 
the land allotted per person was large, while for ones who had less land and 
larger populations, the allocation per person was small. In addition to fields 
for cultivation, every person in the village was allocated 0.15 mu of land on 
which to build a house. Among all the interviewed production teams, only 
Hucheng Village adopted this approach.  
 
  
                                                 
83 Interview 2012/01/12. 
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Case C84:  Contracting out Lands to Households but using an agreed 
grain submission formula      
Locations: Huangxi Village of Huolianpo Township; Yuntai Village of 
Dongshi Township 
The Informants: Mr S in the 5th group of Huangxi Village; Mr W in the 
4th group of Yuntai Village  
 
Compared to other methods, this one should be regarded as the most 
pioneering because it was not only adopted before the County Government 
clearly promoted allocations of lands to households, but also because lands 
were contracted out to households at once, without first allocating them to 
smaller teams. Here, production teams reached agreements with individual 
households in which the ratio between a fixed amount of grain submission 
and the amount of work points was decided. At the end of a production year, 
based on the actual amount of grain which households submitted and 
formula agreed in the contract, the production teams gave relevant work 
points to the households.  
  
       In this way, the income (I) of the households was composed of the basic 
grain ration (R) which was normally 180 kilogram of grain per person per 
production year, plus what was left of the output (L) after fulfilling the 
agreed provision to the production teams, and what was then distributed (D) 
by the production teams on a work-point basis. This can be represented in 
an equation as I = R + L + D.  Although D represents work-points, this 
method actually differed from the collective era in that instead of being 
awarded on the basis of the amount of the work households completed, the 
points now were counted and given to the households based on the ratio 
between the contracted amount of grain to be produced and the amount of 
grain actually submitted.  
 
        Mr S provided an example. His production team decided to contract 2 
mu85out to his households and both parties reached an agreement that the 
                                                 
84 Interviews 2012/02/16d, 2012/02/16e, 2012/02/16c, 2012/02/16, 2012/02/15. 
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amount of contracted grain submission was to be 250 kilograms per mu.  In 
Mr S’s case, the contracted amount would be 500 kilograms in total. If this 
task was finished, he would be issued 3,600 points. At the end of a 
production year, no matter how well his harvest had gone, he had to submit 
500 kilograms of grain in which a basic grain ration of 180 kilogram per 
person per production year was included. If he harvested more than 500 
kilograms, for example, 600 kilogram, he could keep the surplus and the 
basic grain ration of 180 kilograms and then submit the rest (600-100-180 = 
320). In return he would get 3,600 points, with which, he was able to take 
part in the distribution which would take place within the production-team 
unit. If he only harvested, say, 400 kilograms, he would only submit 400 – 
180 = 220 kilograms, but in return he would only get the amount of points 
corresponding to his grain submission, less than 3,600 points. Before the 
production team distributed among its member households, firstly it had to 
fulfil the obligations of the compulsory grain submission to the state, and 
then reserved some income for the Public Accumulation Funds (PAF) and 
the Public Welfare Funds (PWF). Finally the rest of the grain would be 
distributed based on the amount of the work points which each household 
had earned.    
 
       Although both the distribution in both Case A and Case C was related 
to the agreed amount of the grain submission, Case C left out the step of 
allocating lands to the smaller teams. Although the distribution in Case C 
was still based on the work points that every households earned, the method 
of calculating the points was different from the collective era. According to 
Mr S, during that time, the households normally were able to provide the 
agreed grain submissions – partly because the contracting out of lands to 
household encouraged peasants to work hard.  The other reason was that the 
weather during that period was good for farming. Among all the interviewed 
production teams, 5 out of 49 used this method.     
  
                                                                                                                            
85 Mu is a Chinese measurement unit. One acre = 4046.86 square meters = 6.07 mu. 1mu = 
666.6 square metres. 
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Case D86: The dry-land was allocated to households to grow cotton or 
rapeseeds while the paddy rice fields were still planted in the same way as 
in the collective era; the distribution was still based on work points 
Locations: Shuisi Village of Dayandang Township; Shuanghe Village of 
Linan Township 
The Informants: Mr H in the 4th group of Shuisi Village; Mr H in the 1st 
group of Shuanghe Village    
 
Compared to the methods discussed above, this approach entailed a 
combination of Case A and Case C. Mr Hu explained that from 1979 to 
1980, his production team dealt differently with paddy fields and dry-lands. 
For paddy fields, the production team was still the unit used to organise the 
work and to distribute based on the work points which the peasants earned 
based on the amount of work they completed. But dry-lands were allocated 
to households on a per capita basis to grow cotton or rapeseeds. Similar to 
Case C, before allocating the dry-lands, the production team and the 
households reached agreements on the amounts of produce to be submitted. 
After harvesting, the households handed in their cotton and rapeseeds to the 
production team and, based on the amounts they submitted, the team would 
give them relevant numbers of work points. If the harvest exceeded the 
agreed task amount, a household was able to keep the surplus. If a 
household could not fulfil its quota, it then could not obtain the maximum 
points which were agreed with the production team. In the end, the 
accountant of the production team added up all work points based on the 
grain and based on the other products of dry-lands, with which, the 
households took part in the annual distribution within their production team. 
 
       This method was used for two years from 1979 to 1980. Then from 
1981 to 1983, Mr H’s production team put paddy fields and dry-lands 
together, and like Case A, divided the production team into three smaller 
teams. All the lands including the paddy rice fields and the dry-lands were 
allocated to these three smaller teams. After that, the methods used to 
                                                 
86 Interviews 2012/02/17d,  2012/02/22b. 
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organise labour and to distribute rewards were the same as Case A.  This 
approach continued to be used until the second half of 1983 when the lands 
were allocated to the households and family farming began.  
 
       The method that Mr H’s production team of Shuanghe Village used was 
similar to that of Mr H’s production team. The only difference was that 
instead of dividing the production team into the smaller teams, Mr H’s team 
directly allocated lands to the households from the first stage in which the 
paddy rice fields and the dry-lands were treated differently. Among all the 
interviewed production teams, only these two used this approach.     
 
 The Principle and the Rules for Allocating Lands to Households 
The Principle of Fairness 
 
In 1982 and 1983, after a couple of years of transition, with the clear 
encouragement of the County Party Committee and County Government, 
most production teams began to carry out the last step towards family 
farming – allocating lands to the households. This was not as easy as it 
looked. The biggest challenge was how to guarantee fairness. The early 
stage of the reform inherited the high transparency between rural households 
of the collective era, which strictly demanded that cadres on production 
teams consider the principle of fairness as they did their work. Otherwise, 
dissatisfaction or even violent conflict would be triggered, which might 
affect the political achievements of the cadres. But lands varied in type and 
quality, and this posed problems in achieving fairness. As we saw in 
Chapter One, the geography of Li County includes four types of topography: 
mountainous, hilly, plains and lake areas. The plains are relatively fertile; 
mountainous lands were dry and barren; hilly lands might receive only 
limited sunshine; and lake areas risked flooding and droughts. For the 
peasants who relied on the lands to survive, how to allocate different types 
of lands fairly was crucial. 
 
①  The Rule for Evaluating and Ranking Lands 
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       So the first rule to guarantee the fairness principle was to evaluate and 
rank lands publicly. For many production teams, the work of allocating 
lands to households was not carried out by a production-team unit. As we 
saw above, since most production teams had already divided into smaller 
teams at the last stage of the transition period, it was proper and easy to 
allocate the lands within smaller-team units. Some production teams, which 
either were not divided into smaller teams or did not wish to allocate lands 
to the smaller team units, could carry out this exercise as production team 
units. The first thing the leader, either of the smaller teams or of the 
production teams, did was to summon the member households to survey in 
their entirety the lands within their units, either smaller teams or production 
teams, to decide on the grading and ranking of the lands.  How to classify 
the lands and to decide on their size? This was not measured from scratch. 
As early as in 1951, in order to decide the rate of agriculture taxes and the 
amounts of grain to be submitted by each area, the Finance Ministry of the 
Central Government issued a document entitled “The instruction on carrying 
on the work of surveying land and confirming the production quota” and 
required the areas newly taken over by the CCP to be surveyed for size, to 
be classify into types, to be ranked, in order to estimate the output of the 
lands.87 Following this instruction, Hunan Province first experimented in 
some places with surveys and evaluations from 1951 to 1952. Then in 1952 
when land reform was completed in Hunan, the province finished the 
process throughout the province.88       
 
      The survey was mainly done by measuring all lands which could 
produce agricultural income, no matter whether it came from grain or other 
cash crops.  Various types of lands were included: fields (plain fields, 
terraced fields, mountainous fields, embankment fields, dry fields, paddy 
rice fields), garden land (dry gardens, young plant gardens, herb gardens, 
                                                 
87 The research team specialising in agriculture tax reform and the financial burdens on 
peasants in Hunan,  A Research on Agriculture Tax Reform and the Issue of the Financial 
Burdens on Peasants, printed by The Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan for 
internal use, 1998, p.5. 
88 Ibid., p.6. 
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and flower gardens), mountainous lands (for forestry, bamboo, tea, etc.), and 
lakes (fish lakes, lotus lakes, and so on). Taking mu as a measurement unit, 
the sizes of the lands were recorded and inventoried. The output was 
evaluated and classified first by the townships themselves, and then it was 
selectively checked by the districts, and in the end was finalised by the 
county. Normally the lands were classified into six grades of three ranks or 
twelve grades of four ranks. 89 The final projected annual outputs would be 
discussed and confirmed by the People’s Congresses of various counties. 
Hunan finished work by 1954. Based on these data, agriculture taxes and the 
quotas of compulsory grain submissions were confirmed as well.  
 
        However, up to 1961, due to the campaign of the Great Leap Forward, 
the projected amounts of grain outputs and their corresponding submission 
quotas were exaggerated artificially, in reports to political superiors by 
many local cadres, which placed heavy burdens on the production teams and 
their member peasants. In this situation, the sixty articles of regulation on 
agriculture came up90, following which, Li County’s Party Committee and 
Government imposed a practice of five contract-based confirmations 
(wuding dabaogan). 91  Its purpose was to adjust the annual outputs, the 
corresponding agriculture taxes and grain submissions from exaggerated to 
actual numbers. In order to avoid deceptive exaggerations by local cadres, 
the County and its subordinate government agencies at commune and 
production team level discussed and reached agreements on the annual 
projected outputs, the amount of grain submissions, and the rate of 
agriculture tax, based on a constant rate of output. Once contracted and 
recorded from 1963 to 1965, no matter how the sizes of land holdings or 
outputs expected from them were changed, the data in the official record 
books have never been correspondingly changed until today, although there 
were sometimes some small adjustments.92  
 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 For more details about the ‘sixty articles’, see footnote no. 56.  
91 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County, (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press, 1989), p. 434. 
92 Ibid. 
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       This practice later had a far-reaching influence on rural areas. Since 
these five items were confirmed and agreed during the period of 1963 to 
1965, they were not allowed to change arbitrarily. So on the one hand, this 
practice indeed helped to stabilise rural society back then, and the economy 
in rural areas recovered accordingly from exaggerations. But on the other 
hand, it led to unfairness over time. As they could not be changed easily, 
when the land conditions later changed, especially with the movement of 
farmland capital construction in 1977 in which many barren hills and lakes 
were reclaimed by ploughing up or filling up so as to enlarge the size of 
actual arable land, the state still only regarded the old records to be the basis 
despite the introduction of new agriculture policies.93  
 
       Therefore when it came to allocating lands to households, the data on 
record again became the starting point to evaluate the ranking of lands for 
each unit. This situation remains till today. In the 2000s when various 
beneficial policies were introduced, it caused dissatisfaction to emerge 
among peasants. Back then, based on the constant annual outputs and quotas 
of grain submission for each patch of land, after on site investigations by 
member households, a ranking plan was created. Then several meetings 
were convened to which each household sent representatives to discuss and 
agree the drafted plan. Each patch of land was numbered and ranked. For 
example, in the above case of Mr W’s production team in Yuntai Village of 
Dongshi Township, the lands were ranked as I, II, III, IV, and V -- I was the 
best while V was the worst.94 If member households disagreed, they sought 
to reach other agreements on the evaluations in the meetings. For instance, 
in Mr Li’s production team in Ganxi Village of Ganxitan Township, a slight 
change was made: instead of being based on constant outputs, the lands 
were ranked based on the output in the previous year.95    
 
  
                                                 
93 Interview 2012/01/06.  
94 Interview 2012/02/16. 
95 Interview 2012/02/16b. 
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② The Rule of Mix and Match; The Rule of Drawing Lots 
 
After the rankings of all patches of land were determined, the next thing the 
leaders needed to decide was how to distribute the differently ranked lands. 
This was also discussed and agreed in the meetings of the member 
households. In practice in Li County, three methods were used for 
distribution – on a per labourer basis, on a per capita basis, and on a 50/50 
combination of the two. One might ask whether a per capita basis was not 
the best way to guarantee fairness.  Mr H of the 5th group of Wanxing 
Village of Chexi Township answered this question by telling his story. His 
household contained six people – three children, two competent adults and 
one elderly person. If a per capita basis was used, each person could be able 
to get over 1.5 mu so that his household would get 8 to 9 mu of lands. 
However, since there were only two competent labourers in his household, 8 
to 9 mu were a bit too much for them. On the other hand, around that time, 
the policy of family planning was pushed through as well, so for some 
families, there were only two labourers and one child. Their households 
could only get half of the size of Mr H’s.  This was against the principle of 
fairness. In this situation, after discussions and agreements in meetings of 
the member households, Mr H’s production team chose to allocate the lands 
on a combination of 50% on per labourer basis and 50% on per capita basis, 
so as to reduce the gaps among such households.     
 
        Sometimes, even within the same brigade and the same production 
team, the methods of distribution varied. For example, in the above cases of 
Mr P of the 9th group and Mr C of the 1st group in Qilimiao Village of 
Cengnan Township, Mr P’s smaller team below the production team 
operated on a per labourer basis while Mr C’s on a per capita basis. Take Mr 
P’s household as an example. His household was composed of four 
labourers – Mr P, his sister and his parents. His household was allocated 
more than eleven mu, on average more than three mu per person. If it had 
been on a per capita basis, then each person only could get 1.1 mu and his 
household would therefore get 4.4 mu – which was not only was much less 
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than the 11 mu they got eventually, but was also not enough for four 
competent labourers to work. My informants indicated that in most cases, 
sometimes even within the same production team, different smaller teams 
used different methods.  
 
        Generally speaking, production teams or smaller teams that had larger 
lands but smaller populations were likely to allocate on a per capita basis, 
while units with smaller lands but more labourers tended to allocate on a per 
labourer basis, or to use a combination of methods. Then the third thing to 
decide was how to connect the rankings of lands to the distribution method. 
Here a rule of mix and match applied. In order to illustrate how this rule was 
applied, let us separate allocations on a per capita basis and on a per labour 
basis, and consider several actual examples. 
 
On a per capita basis 
 
Case A96: First identifying class I lands, then class II, class III, etc.  
 
Mr Li of Ganxi Village of Ganxitan Township stated that, instead of basing 
decisions on the constant output in official record books, his production 
team classified lands according to the output in 1982.  Lands with 400 
kilograms of output were placed in class I, 300 kilograms in class II, 200 
kilograms in III, and so on in descending order. The second step was to 
calculate the total areas covered by each class. Lands were then allocated 
equally according to classes.   
 
Case B97: Classifying lands by discounting their poor quality -- the rule of 
drawing lots 
 
Mr H of Shuisi Village of Dayandang Township told the story of his smaller 
team. There were around 300 mu of land for his team and around 40 
households altogether. It took a few months to allocate the lands. First, the 
                                                 
96 Interview 2012/02/16b. 
97 Interview 2012/02/17d. 
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leader called all member households to have a look at the lands, as a result 
of which the ranking of the lands were classified and numbered. Then the 
size of various plots was measured. It is worth noting that to measure sizes 
anew was not a popular practice, and many smaller teams chose to rely on 
the sizes set out in the official record book. But Mr C’s group in Cengnan 
Township undertook fresh measurements. The third step was to calculate 
which patches of poor land should be discounted – and how. For example, 
one mu of bad quality land might be counted as 0.7 mu. The method for 
discounting would be discussed and agreed at the meetings of member 
households. After adding up all of the calculations, the lands would be 
divided into numbered plots. Finally, lots were drawn to determine which 
lands should be received by each household.  In this way, the household that 
took good quality lands might get a smaller area, and vice versa.   
 
Case C98:  Relating the amounts of output to the households -- a mix and 
match rule 
 
Mr W of Yuntai Village of Dongshi Township and Mr T of Laomu Village 
of Zhakou Township explained that their smaller teams used this method to 
allocate the lands. As we saw above, Mr W’s smaller teams firstly 
partitioned the land into five classes: I, II, III, IV, and V, with I having the 
greatest output and V having the lowest. Then a total of the expected output 
was calculated, which came to around 7,000 kilograms of grain. Since the 
total population of his smaller team was 127, this gave an output of 55.12 
kilograms per capita. Next, they calculated the amount of output assigned to 
each household. Plots were assigned to each household following a mix and 
match rule by combining I with V, and II with IV, leaving III on its own. 
This meant that for most households, the plots allocated to them would 
consist of mixtures of good and less good land.  Thus the differences among 
households in the expected outputs of lands would be less than 100 
kilograms – in the interests of fairness. 
 
  
                                                 
98 Interviews 2012/02/16, 2012/02/16d. 
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On a per labourer basis99 
 
Allocations on a per labourer basis did not simply entail dividing the whole 
area of the land by the total number of labourers in smaller teams. Instead, 
the work points system was used. Take the case of Mr G of Qunle Village of 
Daping Township. First, his smaller team graded the lands and numbered 
them. Then the basic work points of each household were calculated 
according to a standard in which a competent male labourer would be given 
10 points; a competent female labourer 8 points; a person over 60 but still 
able to work, 6 or 7 points. Next, they added up all the basic points for each 
household. Then the total points of the team would be calculated by 
aggregating the points of all member households. After that, the area of the 
land per point was calculated by dividing the total area of the land by the 
total basic points of all the households. Finally, through drawing lots, each 
household obtained its share of different grades of land. 
 
      In Mr G’s household, there were 8 people – two grandparents, parents, 
him, two sisters and one brother. His and his father’s basic points were 10 
per person; mother and two sisters were 8 per person; the grandfather 8; the 
brother was too young to be a competent labourer; the grandmother was not 
able to be a labourer. Altogether his household got 52 points and was 
allocated 17 mu of fields. Mr G’s explanation for the use of a per labourer 
calculation was that in his smaller team, the area of the land per capita was 
quite small because the population was large. So it was fairest to allocate 
land on a per labourer basis.     
 
③ The Proximity Rule  
 
This rule was used in order to avoid conflicts between rural neighbours 
involved in poultry breeding. In rural China, many peasants breed chickens, 
ducks, geese, etc., in their yards. If the yard of household A was allocated to 
household B, the chickens of household A were likely to eat crops grown in 
                                                 
99 Interview 2012/02/18b. 
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the yard of household B. This would trigger conflicts. To avoid this, the 
land around each household’s residence would be included in the allocation 
to it.      
 
④ The Rule of Equality Within the Production Team 
 
For most production teams, land was allocated to smaller team units.  But 
the populations and the areas of the land available to each smaller team 
could be different, and thus the areas of land per capita could vary between 
smaller teams within the same production team. So after lands were 
allocated to households within a smaller team, the production team would 
compare this smaller team with others and the average allocations within the 
production team. If the rate in the smaller team was less than the average 
rate within the production team, the production team would reduce the gap 
between the smaller team rate and the average.  
 
       For example, Mr Y was in the 3rd group of Juhualing Village of Yiwan 
Township. The smaller team he was in contracted 30 mu of fields, while 
other smaller teams contracted 40 or even 80. After the land was allocated, 
the per capita rate in Mr Y’s smaller team was 0.8 mu, which was 0.2 mu 
less than the average rate of the production team. His production team 
therefore transferred some parts of fields in other smaller team to Mr Y’s 
team to reduce the gap between the smaller team rate and the average rate in 
the production team. On the contrary, if the rate of a smaller team was 
higher than the average rate of the production team, this smaller team had to 
give some lands back to the production team to compensate the smaller 
teams with less land. In this way, it is said that essentially the amount of the 
land per person within one production team -- the current village group -- 
was equal while between different production team within one village, the 
amount of the lands per person could be different. 
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 Summary  
It will be apparent from the above discussion that the actual implementation 
of land policy varied at the smaller team level below the production teams. 
This was a result of variations in the attitudes of local cadres and in 
democratic discussions in the meetings of all member households in 
individual smaller teams. There were three types of approaches used – being 
pioneering, being submissive, and being reluctant. Some smaller teams 
started voluntary as early as 1979 while others only followed the 
instructions from the County Government to start around 1982. Completion 
times also varied – with lake areas normally taking longer than the others. 
Fenghuang Village of Guanyuan Township, the former Chenjia Village, was 
the last one to finish allocations among all interviewed villages -- in 1988. 
The explanation of their former secretary of the party branch was that they 
were still not brave enough to try it, so they adopted a wait and see attitude. 
By contrast, in explaining why his group had taken a relatively pioneering 
approach, Mr W of Yuntai Village of Dongshi Township stated that it was 
because he was young at that time and wanted to score political 
achievements in order to climb up the career ladder.  
 
        These three types of attitudes actually coincided with the three 
categories of pioneering, band-wagoning, and resistance which Jae Ho 
Chunag used in his study of relations between the Central Government and 
the Government at Provincial level.100 Being pioneering entailed some risks, 
although sometimes risks also meant opportunities. Mr S of Huangxi 
Village of Huolianpo Township provided some examples. When the 
situation was not clear, Mr C, the then Party Secretary of the Township had 
a very conservative attitude towards allocating the land to the household - 
saying that no one would allocate land to households unless the sun rose 
from the west. Mr Ji Shan, secretary of Mr C’s subordinate village party 
branch, was pioneering and decided to allocate dry-lands to households a bit 
earlier than the instruction from the County Government. Therefore he was 
                                                 
100 For more details about Jae Ho Chung’s categorisation and his argument, see footnote no. 
73. 
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expelled from the party and placed on probation. However Mr ZF, a peasant 
in another township, was brave enough to contract some land before 1983 
and therefore became rich before fellow peasants.101  
 
         Among interviewees, the young and educated cadres were more likely 
to take an pioneering attitude than older cadres. Mr H of Shuanghe Village 
of Linan Township, the sent-down youth cadre mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter, corroborated this point. He led his team to skip the transition 
time of the DAOB and started to allocate lands to the individual households 
at one go. He explained that this was because, as a former sent-down youth, 
he was confident about achieving a good crop output by combining his 
theoretical knowledge and real agricultural experiences. His success was 
also due to the open-minded attitude of his superior. When he was reported 
and exposed, the party secretary of his brigade adopted an attitude of “let it 
be”.                
 
       To summarise, by 1984, except in a very few areas, most production 
teams finished the work of allocating the lands to the households and 
roughly established the institution of family farming. Among interviewed 
villages, the area of the land per capita ranged from 0.55 mu in the 7th group 
of Zongyang Village of Fangshiping Township to around 2.3 mu in Gutang 
Village of Shuanglong Township. As we saw above, the area of the lands 
distributed within single production teams were essentially equal, but 
between production teams, it varied. From the various methods used to 
allocate different types of land, we can see the wisdom of local cadres and 
peasants at work in their efforts to conform to the principle of fairness. After 
the lands were eventually allocated to households, all the records, property 
and assets of the production teams became almost irrelevant because with 
the allocations, all property and assets were transferred to the households, 
including production team buildings, draught animals and so on. The 
following table provides a brief overview of the allocations to the 
households.  
                                                 
101 Interview 2012/02/16c. 
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Table 2.1 A Statistic Overview of Allocations the Lands to the 
Households* 
 
Current Village 
Name 
Time 
to start 
DAOB 
Time to 
start 
allocating 
the 
lands to 
the 
households 
Methods to allocating the 
lands 
Size of 
the 
lands 
per 
capita 
(mu) 
Time to 
finish 
allocating 
the lands 
Previous 
Name** 
Group 
No. 
On a 
per 
capita 
basis 
On a 
per 
labou
rer 
basis 
A mix of 
the other 
two (50% 
+50%) 
Zongyang Middle 
of 
1983 
1984    0.55 1984 
 7th 
Shuanghe 
  
 
1981    
No 
data 
1981 
 
No 
data 
Yingxi 
1982 1983 
 
 
  1.5 1983 
 4th 
Dongfeng 
No 
data 
No data 
No 
data 
  1.87 1986 
Honghu 
No 
data 
Bichen 
1982-
1983 
1983 
No 
data 
  
1.6-
1.7 
1985-
1986  
No 
data 
Chimagang 
1981 1982    1.3 1982 
 
No 
data 
Dazhou 
1980-
1981 
1983    
No 
data 
1983  
 
No 
data 
Shuangyan 
1981-
1982 
1982    
No 
data 
1983 
 
No 
data 
Gutang 
1980 
December, 
1982 
   0.9 1983 
 1st 
 8th 
No 
data 
No data 
No 
data 
  2.3 1983 
Yanggu 
No 
data 
No data    0.5 No data 
 
No 
data 
Guanshantu 
1980 1983    < 2.0 1983 
 
No 
data 
Wanxing 
1981 1982    >1.5 1982 
 5th 
Qunle 
1982 1983    1.5 1983 
 
No 
data 
Wuai 
1980-
1981 
1983    1.5 1983 
Xiantao 
No 
data 
Yucheng 
1982 1983    
No 
data 
1983 
 
No 
data 
Xindu 
1982 1983    
No 
data 
1983 
 10th 
Shuisi 
1979 1982    
No 
data 
Second 
half 
Of 1983 
 
No 
data 
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Notes: * The data in this table are based on my interviews. 
            ** In 2005, Li County carried out the practice of merging villages and groups. After 
that, some small-sized villages were merged into other bigger ones, and their names 
therefore were changed as well. 
 
  
Caoyan 
1979 1982    
No 
data 
1982 
 
No 
data 
Juhualing 
1981 1982    2.1 1983  
 
3rd 
Baihelin 
1982 1983    2.0 1984 
 5th 
Banqiaorong 
1981-
1982 
1983    
No 
data 
1983 
 
No 
data 
Shuili 
1982 1983    <1.0 1983  
 
No 
data 
Laomu  
 
n/a 
1980    
No 
data 
1983  
 
No 
data 
Huangxi 
1980 1982    2.0 1983 
Songzhu 
No 
data 
Ganxi 
1981 1983    1.0 1983 
Ganxi 
No 
data 
Yuntai 
1983 1984    1.28 1984 
 
No 
data 
Zhangshuyan 
1982 
Second 
half 
Of 1982 
   2.0 1983 
Jinhe 5th 
Fenghuang 
No 
data 
1983    
No 
data 
1988 
Zhaojia 
No 
data 
Hongxing 
1982 - 
1983 
1983    
No 
data 
1984  
 
No 
data 
Lianhua 
1981 1982    1.2 1983 
 7th 
Hucheng 
1981 1983    <1.0 1983  
 
No 
data 
Qilimiao 
 
 
      
 3rd 1980 1983 
 
 
  1.34 1983 
 9th 1981 1982    1.1 1983 
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2.1.3 Initially Institutionalising the Household Use of Land in 1984 
 
After a few chaotic but furious years, by the spring of 1984, most 
production teams in Li County had finished laying the institutional 
foundations for the family farming. Frequent changes in policies from 1979 
to 1984 left some scepticism among peasants on how long this policy would 
last. Mr Y of Juhualing Village of Yiwan Township stated that when the 
Central Government called for the start of the DAOB, it said that the policy 
would “remain at least 30 years”, but this lasted only for three years. After 
allocating the lands to the households, there was still no clear document to 
clarify how long this practice would last.102 Because of this, many peasants 
would be reluctant to invest in their lands since they were worried about 
further policy changes.  
 
        In this situation, in order to reassure rural communities and to 
encourage agriculture, the Central Government issued a document entitled 
“A Notice on the Work in the Rural Areas in 1984” on the 1 January of 
1984 as “the No. 1 document” -- which stipulated that the length of land 
contracts would normally be extended to 15 years. Following this, the 
County Party Committee convened a working meeting on agricultural 
production to study this document and decided to issue peasants with 
permits for land use.103 In practice, not every peasant in Li County received 
this permit. Among all the interviewed villages, Lianhua Village 
implemented this practice best. Households there received permits as early 
as in 1985. The permit is displayed below.  
 
                                                 
102 Interview 2012/02/17b. 
103 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County,  (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press, 1989), p. 133. 
98 
 
    
Picture 2.1 a & b The Permit for Land Use (taken on 18 September 2014) 
 
     From the cover and the official stamp above, we can see that it was 
issued by the County People’s Government in January of 1985. Pages one to 
four lay out the rules on the land use as follows. 104 
- The ownership of rural land belongs to the collective. The household is 
entitled to manage its contracted land within the contract period. This right 
should not to be infringed by any organisations and individuals. For the 
purpose of infrastructure construction, the state and the collective are 
entitled to requisition land.    
- The household’s right to use the land stands at one level within the 
collective economy and is subject to management by the collective 
organisations. The contracted land (including any private plot) is not 
permitted to be sold or rented and also cannot be used for purposes other 
than agriculture. If the quality of the land is increased due to the active 
investment of the household when the land is sub-contracted, the original 
household is to be compensated. Otherwise, the collective has the right to 
interfere, to impose economic penalties, or even to take the land back.   
- The household must be responsible for the agriculture tax, social burdens 
and the collective reserves being fully fulfilled on time. 
- Within the contract period, if the household has requested to reduce its 
contract burden or to withdraw from the contract because it is not capable of 
cultivating or because of changes to other careers, it is allowed to give the 
                                                 
104 This section is translated by the author from the original permit. 
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land back to the collective to dispose of with the consent of the collective. 
The household is also able to subcontract its land to other households 
without making changes to the content of the contract. 
- In the case of a subcontract, the land will be re-graded. If the land is 
upgraded, the household will be compensated as xxx yuan/mu/grade. If the 
land is downgraded, the household will have to pay the maintenance fee of 
the land as xxx yuan /mu/grade. 
When land is given back, if it is upgraded, the collective will compensate 
the household. If the land is downgraded, the household should pay the 
maintenance fee for the land. 
In the case of subcontracting between peasants, the household taking over 
the contract will be responsible for compensation to the original household 
if the land is upgraded. Otherwise, the original household should pay the 
maintenance fee of the land to the household taking over the contract. 
 
      Page five was the information page including the name of the head of 
the household, the residence address, and the reference number. Under that 
was an overview of the contracted land including the contracted time, the 
type of land, and, the area of the land. Pages six to eleven contained tables 
for detailed information on the contracted land, including the name of each 
patch, the number of patches, the types of the lands, areas and grades, their 
locations, the length of contract, and any changes, with reasons for them. 
The final page was for notes.   
 
       From a legal perspective, the appearance of this permit indicated that a 
contract now marked relations between the state and the peasants. However, 
as this is a primitive form of contract, some concepts and definitions are still 
quite ambiguous, and state power is given priority. First, it emphases the 
collective ownership of the land – and this is actually the case till today. 105 
Second, the right to use the land of the households was conditioned by the 
authority of the state and the collective to make land requisitions. The 
                                                 
105 For more details on the evolution of the collective ownership of land in China, see Wang, 
Weiguo, The Study on the Land Rights in China, (Beijing: The China University of Political 
Science and Law Press, 1996), p.95-96. 
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document does not spell out how compensation will be provided in the case 
of a requisition.  Since it was issued, a series of relevant laws and 
regulations, such as the 1988 and the 2004 amendments to the Land 
Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China, have made 
prescriptions about the compensation for a requisition, but no such 
regulations appeared here in this early version of the permit.106 Third, the 
definition and the reach of the collective organisations were not clear in this 
permit. Again, although later land regulations have some prescriptions on 
that, in reality, the ambiguity on this front caused numerous conflicts, 
especially when it involved financial compensations for a requisition. 
Finally, as we have seen, during this early stage, the land could not be 
rented or sold privately, although with the consent of the collective, it could 
be subcontracted. This rule became highly significant after 2000, when the 
agriculture tax was eliminated, and subcontracting and the sub-letting of 
land became even more popular.  
 
2.1.4 Changing Communes and Establishing Townships between 1983 
and 1984    
 
After land was allocated to the households, the ways to organise labour, to 
render accounts, and to distribute benefits were also correspondingly 
changed. Agricultural production started to be carried out on household-
based units. Without the collectivised and militarised management in Mao’s 
era, peasants now were able to plan their schedules depending on their own 
preferences. They did not need to get up very early at the same time and go 
to the fields together to work. With land allocated to the households, so 
were compulsory obligations. These obligations included ones to the state 
(agricultural taxes and the grain compulsory submissions) and ones to the 
production teams (the Public Accumulation Fund and the Public Welfare 
Fund).107 They used to be fulfilled by the production teams, but now were 
divided and assigned to each household. As a result, the rural collectives -- 
                                                 
106 The Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China was initially enacted in 
1986 and later has experienced two times of amendment in 1988 and 2004. The present 
Land Administration Law of the PR.C in use is the 2004 amendment. 
107 Interview 2012/01/06. 
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the people’s communes, brigades, and the production team -- which had 
played comprehensive administrative and economic roles in Mao’s era, now 
lost many of their functions. In this situation, on 12 October, 1983, the 
Central Party Committee and the State Council issued a document entitled 
“An Announcement to separate the Political and Economic Administration 
and to establish the Government at Township Level”, to establish the 
government institutions and party organisations at township level, and to 
elect the corresponding peoples’ congress.  
 
       The experiments with establishing township governments in Li County 
took place a bit earlier than the issue date of the central document. Although 
there was no clear explanation of the reasons, the record showed that as 
early as June of 1983, the work team of the County Party Committee led by 
the deputy secretary, W Zhi, began the experiment of changing communes 
to townships. After two months, in August, the previous Lidan People’s 
Commune was renamed as the People’s Government of Lidan Township.108 
Below the township level, twenty-one village committees were set up where 
the previous brigades sat and administered 180 village groups where the 
previous production teams sat.109 With the experiences collected from the 
experiment, the next year, i.e. in March of 1984, this practice was promoted 
throughout the County.  As a result, the other forty-two commune 
administrative committees have one after another been renamed as township 
governments; brigades as village committees; and production teams as 
village groups.110 The township governments set up roles such as the head, 
the deputy head, and several special cadres respectively in charge of civil 
affairs, law and justice, enterprises, finance and grain, family planning, 
statistics, agriculture, and forestry and so on. The village committees were 
elected by the villagers – this will be discussed later in this Chapter – and 
set up roles such as the director, the deputy director, the director of security, 
the director of women, and accountant etc.111  
                                                 
108 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County,  (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press, 1989), p. 55. 
109 Ibid., p.55 and p.476. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., p.476. 
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      Up to this time, the County administered seven districts, forty-seven 
townships (thirty-five xiang and twelve zheng), 705 villages administering 
6,721 village groups, and twenty-five residents’ committees with 144 
residents’ groups. 112 In October of 1985, the provincial government decided 
to cancel the Baiyi district and gave its administering townships to Jinshi 
county-level city. By the end of 1985, the number of the districts therefore 
reduced to six; thirty-five xiang to thirty; twelve zheng to nine; 705 villages 
to 596 with 6721 village groups to 5,621; and the number of residents’ 
committees reduced to twenty-three with 121 residents’ groups.113  By this 
time, an administrative system of County People’s Governments – District 
public offices – Township People’ Governments – Village Committees – 
Village Groups had been completed established. Except for some small 
changes in the size and the names of some districts and townships, this 
framework of five levels within Li County territory continued to be in use 
until 1994.   
 
       Although from a structural perspective, the three-level administrative 
system of townships – village committees – village groups is very similar to 
the previous system of communes – brigades – production teams, actually 
the shift is significant because this means separation between the 
administrative functions of the communes and its economic functions. After 
this new system centring on governments at county, township and village 
levels has been established, the Party Committees at various levels have 
gradually transferred the governing and economic work to the hands of 
corresponding governments while they themselves focused on the 
implementation of Party policy, ideology, cadres’ appointment and 
discipline inspection. 114  In this sense, it is reasonable to say that the 
governments are the governing organs in charge of administration and 
management while the party committees are in charge of the general 
                                                 
112  Ibid., p.476 and p.55.The residents’ committees and the residents’ groups are the 
organisations with the same administrative rank as the village committees and the village 
groups. The former are set up in urban areas while the latter rural areas.   
113 Ibid., p. 55. 
114 Ibid., p.437. 
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direction of various works within the County by holding the authority of 
cadres’ appointments and ideology. At the same time, the political 
institutions have been gradually democratised and institutionalised, which 
will be discussed in detail later in this Chapter. Since then, with the 
ideological leadership of the Party Committees, the governments at various 
levels began to lead their administered areas towards an acceleration of 
economic development, and later towards other comprehensive social and 
political reforms as well.    
 
2.2 The boom of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) from 1985 to 
1989 
 
2.2.1 The formulation of a development model of “dual tracks and four 
wheels” 
 
As the secretary of a village suggested above, the biggest benefit which 
family farming brought to the peasants was probably not the improvement 
in agricultural production, but efficacy in the use of labour. Without 
identical requirements of assigned work for every production team, many 
labourers have been released from farms. They had much more free time 
and energy, and were eager to make use of it to improve their living 
conditions. Reflecting what was happening in rural areas, the central 
government issued the second and timely “No.1 central policy” on 2 
January 1983, in which it encouraged: 1, the comprehensive development of 
farming, forestry, animal husbandry, side-line production and fisheries; 2, 
the integrative development of agriculture, industry and commerce; and 3, 
the development of all kinds of joint businesses to meet the needs of the 
commercial economy. These clauses confirmed the legitimate status of 
running businesses other than agriculture and explicitly noted the potential 
for peasants to develop other forms of ownership than collective ownership 
-- “all kinds of joint businesses”.115   
                                                 
115 In the Qing Dynasty and the time of Republic of China, industry in Li County only 
covered household businesses and private businesses. Statistics on the 18th year of the 
Republic of China showed that there were 31categories of industry such as sewing, 
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        However, what happened later throughout the whole of China revealed 
many variations in industrial development. Of the development models of 
the 1980s 116 , the most renowned were probably the so-called “Sunan 
model” 117  and “Wenzhou model” 118 . The former makes full use of the 
dominance of local government and the strength of the collective to develop 
TVEs, as Oi shows in her study on Zouping County -- while the latter shows 
the flexibility and great potential of private enterprises. What needs to be 
noted here is that if one is not familiar with the history of the collective era 
in China, it is easy to separate TVEs from that era and regard them as a new 
creation in the reform era. However, TVEs were closely related to commune 
and brigade enterprises (CBEs)119 in the collective era. This was clear from 
                                                                                                                            
carpentry, fireworks, etc. within Li County. They employed 2,209 people in total. By the 
38th Year of the Republic of China, the number of employees had grown to 5,600. Early in 
the time of the People’s Republic of China, by 1953, the category of ‘businesses’ included 
more than 50 types and had 11,300 employees, of which 3,200 were in towns and 8,100 in 
rural areas. From 1953 to 1956, private industries and household handicraft industries had 
experienced socialist transformation and were replaced by the state-owned and collectively-
owned industries. For most of the collective era, economic enterprises in Li County, like 
other places in China, only included those under state ownership and collective ownership. 
Apart from collective organisations such as production teams, brigades and communes 
which, following central instructions, were allowed to run businesses other than agriculture, 
no other organisations or individuals were permitted to run businesses in the rural areas. 
The enterprises run by the brigades and communes were normally called commune and 
brigade enterprises (CBEs). For more details about the evolution of the industry in Li 
County since the Qing Dynasty, see Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals 
of Li County 1978 – 2002, (Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 242 - 245. 
116 Into 1990s, Guangdong model became the famous one, in which the foreign investment 
played an important role. And this model is also criticised as “urban bias”. 
117 The Sunan model was first proposed by Dr. Fei Xiaotong in the early 1980s. It is named 
after a practice found in Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou of Jiangsu Province in which the 
township governments led the development of township and village enterprises and the 
ownership lay mainly in the collectively owned economy. Its important feature is the local 
state’s strong intervention. Oi called this model “Local State Corporatism”, in her series of 
studies of the development of rural industry. See Jean Oi., “Fiscal Reform and the 
Economic Foundations of Local Sate Corporatism,” World Politics 45 (1992): 99-122, “The 
Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy,” China Quarterly 144 (1995): 
1132-49 and chapter 2 the Evolution of Local State Corporatism in Andrew G. Walder (ed.), 
Zouping in Transition: The process of Reform in Rural North China, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1998). Detailed case studies can be found in John 
Wong, Rong Ma, and Mu Yang, eds., China’s Rural Entrepreneurs: Ten Case Studies 
(Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995).  
118 The Wenzhou model, also called a “puppy economy”, appeared for the first time in 
Liberation Daily in 1985. The correspondents were Zhang Yeping and Sang Jinquan. 
Unlike the Sunan model noted above, its characteristics are small-sized enterprises, 
household workshops owned by individuals and households, and flexible private capital all 
over Wenzhou.  The role of local governments is non-interventionist, which also become a 
factor to be criticised later due to the low quality of products and fake products. 
119 See footnote no. 115. 
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a 1984 announcement from the central party committee and the state council. 
Responding to the reform of the political system in rural areas -- from 
communes and brigades to townships and villages, the announcement 
decreed that the term CBEs should be changed to TVEs. The coverage 
extended from collectively-owned only, that is township and village owned 
enterprises, to “joint enterprises by communes’ members, other types of 
joint industry and private enterprises.”120 The concept of TVEs, from its 
appearance, was likely to be understood as enterprises only owned by 
townships and villages. But in fact, it was a very dynamic term, and it 
referred to a constantly evolving process. At that time, it was a definition 
which covered collective, joint and private enterprises. And into the 1990s 
and even 2000s, there were more new additions to it, as will be shown later 
in this section. 
  
        In the light of successful developments in other places, how could Li 
County proceed to develop rural industries and thus improve its people’s 
living conditions? This became the main topic for discussion among leaders 
of the party committee and government of the county between 1984 and 
1987.121  The central government had signalled a set of goals for developing 
industry, but it did not design a ready-made route for provinces, cities and 
counties. The Li County leadership had to find its own way.  
 
          On 1 March 1984, the party committee and government of the county 
issued a document entitled “a specific regulation on developing various 
businesses to improve commercial production”. It stated that “TVEs are the 
main support for rural economy. Based on local resources and using our 
own advantages, we need to tailor measures to suit local conditions and to 
                                                 
120 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, 
p.6. 
121 As for why the leaders of the party committee and government of the county were so 
enthusiastic in developing rural industry that they even proposed to struggle to compete 
with Wuxi, Zhou Li’an, in his book The Local Governments in Transition, provides a series 
of concepts such as “the administrative contracting, the tournaments and the assessment 
system” to explain the competitive state of mind of local governments and how the central 
government makes use of this state of mind to inspire and manage local government in 
order to achieve its aim of economic development. For more details, see Zhou Li’an, The 
Local Governments in Transition, (Shanghai: Shanghai People Press 2008). 
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increase development opportunities. Specifically speaking, we have four 
advantages which should receive most of our focus: to develop mining by 
using underground resources; to develop construction and its materials by 
using over-ground resources; to develop planting, crop raising and 
processing businesses by responding to the market and the daily needs of 
the ordinary people; and to develop conveyances on waterways and land 
way to import raw materials and to export the products.”122 The document 
also states that “the form of contracted responsibility of TVEs depends on 
the size, features and the situations for production. Generally speaking, 
larger enterprises take the form of being contracted to a collective; middle-
sized enterprises take the form of managers’ contracted responsibility; and 
the smaller size were either fully contracted to individual or contracting 
fixed output quotas to individuals. The general rules are to do independent 
accounting, to make their own management decisions and therefore take full 
responsibility for their own profits and losses. No matter which form is 
adopted, leaders at township and village levels need to strengthen guidance 
and to help the enterprises to serve agriculture production and citizens’ 
living standards.”123 Although this document pointed to certain principles 
such as “tailor measures to suit local conditions” which was proven later to 
be the main principle to shape the development, it still did not give a clear 
roadmap for Li County at that time.  
 
       Then on 8 May 1984, the principal leaders of the party committee, 
government, People’s Congress and the committee of People’s Political 
Consultative of the county organised a visit to Hubei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and 
Guangdong and in January 1985, they also went to Tianmen and Honghu of 
Hubei Province to study their experiences of TVEs. 124  Based on these 
practical experiences, in July 1986, the leadership team on township and 
village industry in Li County was established. The vice secretary of the 
                                                 
122 See the archives of the documents of the party committee of Li County, A specific 
regulation on developing various businesses to improve the commercial production [No.4 
(1984) Liyin]. 
123 Ibid.  
124 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, 
p. 14. 
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party committee of Li County, Pan Weidong, became the team leader, and 
Xie Daixiang and Song Shu’er were vice team leaders. The persons in 
charge in the economic committee, the planning committee, the science and 
technology commission, the office of finance, the agricultural bank, the 
bureau of taxes, and the bureau of TVEs were the members of the team. It 
included the office, the project team, the technology team, the management 
team, the purchase and sale team, to take charge of the design and 
implementation of the development plan for township and village industry. 
125 On 7 September, the secretary of the county, Mo Daohong, summoned a 
meeting of township and village industries of the county and called on it “to 
learn from Wuxi’s experience and struggle to emulate Wuxi. The party 
secretaries of each township should be in full charge of the TVEs and make 
it a priority of their work.”126 Then the county governor, Hong Mingxiang, 
led a team of party secretaries from districts and townships to visit Wuxi.  
 
        After much field research and many working meetings with cadres at 
grassroots level, on 18 January 1987, the vice secretary of the county, Pan 
Weidong, on behalf of the party committee and the government, proposed to 
a meeting of cadres at four administrative levels127 that “we need to walk a 
new path to develop the township and village industry. It can be generalised 
as ‘the backbone projects to struggle for achieving high quality; the small 
size businesses can be scattered into households to develop; four wheels 
(townships, villages, joint undertakings and households) are working 
together on dual tracks (collectively and privately owned); speed and profits 
are to be improved at the same time.’” By then, a specific route of industrial 
development in Li County had been established. The process in which it 
came up actually still shows the dominance of the party committee and the 
government of the county, which can be seen even more clearly in the 
discussion below of the growth of the TVEs. However it was set out not by 
the empty imaginations of a few members of the leadership group of the 
                                                 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127  The four administrative levels were: County Government, District Public Officers, 
Township Government and Village Committees. This system was completely established in 
Li County in 1984. For more details, see this Chapter p.100 -103. 
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party and government. Based on local resources, it was built by combining 
the strong heritage of the CBEs with successful experiences from other 
places. And with the strong support of local government, rural industry in Li 
County has achieved substantial development. 
 
2.2.2 The history of commune and brigade enterprises  
 
Li County has a long history of collective enterprises. The emergence of the 
collective enterprises here can be traced back to between 1953 and 1957 
when agriculture production co-ops were established across the rural areas 
of the county. In order to improve production and to increase income, the 
co-ops organised their members to run some businesses which served 
agricultural production and peasants’ well-being in areas  like rice milling, 
cotton seeds ginning, oil milling, lime burning, bamboo processing etc. 
After the county was communised, the co-ops’ businesses were 
correspondingly transferred to the people’s communes and became the 
commune enterprises in October 1958. The labourers in those enterprises 
then accounted for 20% of the whole rural labour force of the county.128 In 
the 1960s, the central party committee issued an instruction “to adjust, to 
strengthen, to enrich and to improve” -- and the sizes of communes were 
reduced. After 1962 when 60 articles129  pointed out that the communes 
began to implement the management system in which “a three-level 
ownership is applied and the brigades are the basic unit to account, to 
manage and to distribute (sanjisuoyou, duiweijichu)”, the commune 
enterprises were compressed by the way of either stopping, merging, or 
decentralising to the brigades, or by co-management of them by the 
communes and brigades. By 1962, the number of the commune enterprises 
in Li County had been reduced from 1449 to 25. 130 The political situation 
                                                 
128 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, 
p. 6. 
129 For sixty articles, please see footnote no. 56. 
130 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, 
p. 6. 
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and three years of natural disasters after that made that the worst period for 
commune and brigade enterprises. 
 
        The revival of the commune and brigade enterprises started from 1966 
when Mao published an instruction known as the “5•7 instruction”, calling 
on communes “to run some factories collectively”. Despite the Cultural 
Revolution during this period, with the support of the party committee of the 
county, there were still some communes and brigades running some small-
size enterprises like planting, raising and processing crops, etc. In the 1970s 
came the instruction from the Northern area’s working meeting of the state 
council to encourage the communes “to develop ‘five small’ industries 
(small steel factories, small coal mines, small agricultural tools factories, 
small fertiliser factories and small cement factories)”.  The party committee 
of Li County called on some communes, if possible, to run soil brick fields, 
cement factories, tool building and repairing factories and fisheries.  For 
some brigades, they could run small processing businesses, small tea 
gardens, forestry fields; and production teams could run pig raising 
businesses. 131 From then on, with the leadership of the party committee of 
the county, the commune and brigade enterprises began to pursue this work 
on a large scale. Businesses extended from only covering the planting, 
raising and processing of crops before 1970s to covering industry, transport 
and conveyance, and so on. In terms of distribution, labourers worked in the 
factories and brought with them the rice they need to cook for themselves 
while the production teams to which they belonged would award work 
points according to the nature and the time spent on their work, and then 
distributed income and subsidies by way of work points. 
 
         The whole of the 1970s turned out to be the heyday for the 
development of the CBEs. As table 2.2 shows, up to 1984 when CBEs 
changed their names to TVEs, CBEs in Li County had grown rapidly. In 
1974, the number of CBEs reached 1619, their employees reached 14,522, 
and the gross income of the enterprises was 102.2 million yuan ($46.44), 
                                                 
131 Ibid. 
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accounting for 6.6% of the total income (1537 million yuan – equal $ 698.4) 
of the communes, brigades and production teams of the county. In 1975, 
after the office of the leadership team for CBEs of the revolutionary 
committee of Li County (established in 1973) changed its name to the 
bureau of CBEs of the Li County Revolutionary Committee, 36 handicraft 
industry co-ops in the county had been decentralised again from the county 
to the communes. By 1978, 2,300 CBEs were already in operation, an 
average of 53 per commune (although variations among communes existed), 
an improvement of 42% since 1974. The CBEs had 29,665 employees, 1.04 
times the total of 1974; and the gross income reached 345.5 million yuan 
($200.9), 2.02 times more than in 1974 - accounting for 18.6% of 1859.5 
million yuan ($1081) of the total income of the communes, brigades and 
production teams of the county. Of all CBEs, there were 732 agricultural 
enterprises, 972 industries, 90 construction enterprises, 205 dealing with 
transport and conveyance, and 301 commerce, food and service businesses.  
 
Table 2.2 Commune and brigade enterprises in Li County, 1974 – 1984 
Year 
Total number 
of 
Enterprises/ 
number of 
Commune 
Enterprises 
Number of 
employees 
Gross output value/ 
of which 
industry output 
value 
(million yuan) 
Gross Income 
/Net profit 
(million yuan) 
1974 1619 / 273 14,522 n.a / 66.6 102.2 / 23.7 
1975 2320 / 433 29,075 n.a /105.5 224.5 / 50.1 
1976 2628 / 484 37,118 n.a / 251.7 334.2 / 84.1 
1977 2513 / 533 34,635 n.a / n.a 363.0 / 76.3 
1978 2300 / 477 29,665 n.a / 196.7 345.5 / 76.8 
1979 2906 / 558 35,737 n.a / 245.7 504.0 / 128.7 
1980 3181 / 572 33,813 n.a / 227.5 525.8 / 108.2 
1981 2756 / 518 29,041 n.a / 317. 2 600.1/ 105.7 
1982 2314 / 502 27,718 n.a / 472.2 700.5 / 118.7 
1983 2332 / 504 25,635 n.a /424.9 807.6 / 124.9 
1984 7210 / 570 41,796 1318.2 / 655.3 1117.5/ 111.6 
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Sources:  
1. The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises printed by The Bureau of Township and 
Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County.               
2. Statistical Yearbook of Li County 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984.  
  
The considerable strength of CBEs saved much time and energy when Li 
County began to adopt a new approach to rural industry in the early 1980s. 
Meanwhile CBEs provided some technicians and management staff for new 
enterprises that were owned by collectives, jointly owned, or owned by 
individuals and households, although they were not as professional as they 
are today. Support from the government also played an indispensable role in 
the booming growth of rural industry in the late 1980s. 
 
2.2.3 Substantial support from the government 
 
The boom of the TVEs in late 1980s in Li County was greatly facilitated by 
support from the government agencies and cadres at county, township and 
even village levels. Leaders at all three levels were working together with 
other government departments such as the bureau of taxes, the office of 
finance, the agricultural banks, rural credit co-ops, etc., to provide much 
substantial help to the TVEs. They raised the initial capital for new 
enterprises, and closely supervised and assisted in their subsequent growth. 
With their political authority and human resource networks, they collected 
capital for investment, lobbied for loans and credits, and provided market 
information and technical expertise when needed. Unlike in some places 
using the Sunan model, however, this help was not only available to 
collectively owned firms but also to private enterprises. Local government 
was the enterprises’ ally, and they jointly assumed political and economic 
burdens. The support from the local government can be categorised as 
follows. 
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① Raising capital  
 
In addition to raising money themselves, TVEs obtained considerable 
capital from the local government. In terms of fiscal support, after 1978, the 
county’s party committee and government, following a succession of 
policies from the central government, mobilised all relevant departments to 
support the TVEs. Between 1980 and 1988, the fiscal departments at county 
and township levels issued the TVEs with 3.28 million yuan in total as 
floating capital. They provided crucial aid to projects in Ganxi Township, 
Zhakou Township and Zhongwu Township - another 0.35 million yuan of 
floating capital.132In terms of financial support, as table 2.3 shows, between 
1979 and 1989, the total accumulated loans from the Li County branch of 
the agricultural bank and the rural credit co-op reached 273.10 million yuan, 
of which the agricultural bank provided 88.09 million yuan and the co-op 
185.01 million yuan. The total loans of 273.10 million yuan accounted for 
10.24% of the total loans (2.664 billion yuan) of the financial institutions in 
Li County from 1979 to 1989. Notably, in 1986 and 1987, the financial 
support from these sources was almost 7-9 times that of 1979. According to 
the 1986 statistical yearbook, 1986 was the year when rural industry grew 
most quickly -- the value of which reached 210.05 million yuan, an 
improvement of 83.6% over 1985. Rural industry provided 61.2% of the 
whole value of the county’s industry,133 as table 2.4 shows.  
 
  
                                                 
132 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, 
p. 128. 
133 Statistical Bureau of Li County, The Statistical Yearbook of Li County 1986, (Yichun: 
Document Publishing Factory of Yichun of Jiangxi, 1987), p.3. 
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Table 2.3 The Statistical Data of Loans for TVEs in Li County from 1979-
1989 
 
 
 
Source: The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of 
Township and Village Enterprise of Li   County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of 
Li County.               
Note: * These data are extrapolated from the data that the Annals of Township and Village 
Enterprises and Li County Annals 1978 – 2002 provide. In fact, in addition to rural credit 
co-ops and the agricultural bank, there were also other institutions that issued loans to the 
TVEs. However this part of the data is not available. Considering that in 1980, the 
agricultural bank was separated from the People’s Bank and that since then, the agricultural 
bank and rural credit co-ops have been the main financial institutions which provided CBEs’ 
loans134, the absence of the amounts of loans from other institutions does not make much 
difference for the present study, in terms of financial support from the local government.   
                                                 
134 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 397. 
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Table 2.4 The Data of the Final Value of Industry in Li County 1986 
 
 
The Real 
Final Value 
(million yuan) 
Final 
Percentage 
of the Yearly 
Plan 
Growth 
Percentage than 
1985 
The Gross Value of Industry 
(County) 
343.04 122.4 50.2 
1. County owned 100.99 103.9 8.3 
2. Urban Town owned 
(residential communities 
Included) 
32.00 128.0 54.9 
3. Rural Industry 210.05 132.9 83.6 
3i. Township owned 75.85 118.5 60.2 
3ii. Village owned 100.91 146.3 73.8 
3iii. Joint and Private Owned 33.29 133.2 268.8 
 
Source: Statistical Bureau of Li County, The Statistical Yearbook of Li County 1986, 
(Yichun: Document Publishing Factory of Yichun of Jiangxi, 1987). 
 
② Taxes Exemptions 
 
From 1975 on, the central government and governments at lower levels 
promulgated a series of policies and regulations on the tax exemptions of 
CBEs. Following their instructions, on 22 May 1984, the Bureau of 
Taxation of Li County issued a document entitled “Some Ideas on Relaxing 
the Tax Policy in Rural Areas (draft)” to give numerous favours and 
considerations to TVEs. Between 1985 and 1989, there were 775 TVEs in 
total which enjoyed exemptions from taxes worth 18.14 million yuan.135  
 
According to this document, the enterprises enjoying complete exemptions 
from industrial and commercial tax and income tax included township 
enterprises which served agriculture production by producing fertilisers, 
                                                 
135 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County,  
p.130 
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pesticides, veterinary medicines, lime for agricultural use, agricultural tools, 
vehicle and boat repairing for agricultural use; village enterprises which 
provided residents’ daily needs such as tofu workshops, rice noodle 
workshops, vinegar workshops and other grain, cotton, oil and agricultural 
product processing workshops; small and big hydro-electric power stations 
and other businesses for the public welfare or with charitable status such as 
schools, hospitals, culture communities, cinemas, bookstores, post offices 
no matter whether they were owned by townships or individuals; veterinary 
stations, livestock breeding stations, seedling grounds owned by the 
collective or individuals; township enterprises and individuals who ran 
businesses in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, gardening, 
orchards, incubation rooms, duck ponds, poultry farms, livestock farms, 
apiaries, silkworm raising; township enterprises and individuals who made 
profits by doing scientific research or providing technical assistance; and 
township, joint and private enterprises which ran animal-feed plants.136 In 
addition, still other enterprises were exempted from either the industrial or 
commercial taxes – or both -- for a fixed period.137 
 
③ Professional Personnel Training and Technical Assistance 
 
Most employees in the TVEs used to be peasants. They had little education 
and lacked knowledge of science and technology, and of how to plan their 
own businesses according to the fleeting changes of market information. In 
response to this situation, the county government in 1985 prioritised 
professional personnel education and training in order to strengthen the 
development of TVEs. This project included two elements: professional 
personnel training and assistance in importing specialist trainer.138 
 
                                                 
136 “Some Ideas on Relaxing the Tax Policy in Rural Areas (draft)”, Li Shui Zheng Yi Zi (84) 
No.1, archived by the Bureau of Tax of Li County.  
137 Ibid. 
138 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, 
p143. 
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Professional Personnel Training: The county government required the 
management department for TVEs to spend three to five years completing 
systematic training exercises for cadres and employees in rural industries 
and enterprises. A specific department for science and education was 
established in the Bureau of TVEs, and many cadres were transferred from 
the organisation department of the party committee of the county, to that 
Bureau to organise a team to take charge of this.  Training partly entailed 
direct instruction by the training team for enterprises’ directors, key 
technical personnel and township governors. But it also included evening 
schools organised by every individual TVE. Key personnel were also sent 
outside of the county for training. Altogether, 387 personnel were sent either 
to colleges and universities inside and outside of Hunan Province, or to the 
China’s Ministry of Agriculture, or to the training centre of the Bureau of 
TVEs of Hunan Province to study. Specialists were also invited in to teach 
on site. From 1985 to 1988, the county government invited 193 specialists 
from colleges, universities, research institutes and state-owned factories, and 
17,500 persons attending such training. 139 
 
Assistance in importing specialist trainers: Also after 1985, many 
enterprises, either independently or with the help of the county government, 
imported 131 professional personnel to help to promote technology 
improvement and transformation. These enterprises included an electronic 
components plant of Xiangyang village, Chengguan Township; a gunnybag 
plant of Liyang Township; a standard components plant of Yujiatai 
Township; a cement factory of Matoupu Township; a potassium 
permanganate plant owned by the County; a pearl china plant of Liyang 
Township; a textile equipment plant of Lidan Township, a brewery; and an 
oil plant of Wangjiachang Township. The oil plant imported two technicians 
and one assistant technician in 1987 from Changsha to help it improve 
technology, and it had seven kinds of oil products which later obtained 
                                                 
139 Ibid. 
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quality certificates issued by the Bureau of Petroleum and Chemicals of 
Hunan Province.140  
 
④ Marketing Assistance 
 
From 1986 on, after officials from the party committee and the government 
of the county came back from field research in Wuxi, they broadened their 
horizon and decided to adopt a new approach to break out of the closely 
local market and to strengthen networks, horizontally and hierarchically. 
They began to get in touch with personnel outside of the county and even 
the province to take advantage of specialist knowledge, technology, 
equipment, capital and information.  Their aim was to increase development 
opportunities for the TVEs and make them go outside the county, prefecture 
city, province or even the country. By introducing investment and 
opportunities from abroad and establishing lateral ties with enterprises at 
home, TVEs in Li County established cooperative relationships with ten 
provinces (including cities), 41 counties (including county-level cities), and 
eleven higher education colleges, universities and research institutes. They 
also imported 127 personnel, sent 414 staff out for training, imported the 
174 pieces of equipment, produced 17 technicians, and helped to train 31 
technicians for other organisations.141  
 
To obtain resources,142 through agreements with other jurisdictions, they 
imported 3,051 tons of steel, 2,500 cubic meters of wood, and exported 
50,000 tons of bituminous coal, 10,000 tons of cement, and various 
agricultural products. Meanwhile, 95 projects for importation were 
developed, 63 of them within China, and two international.143 They also 
made investments of 23.868 million yuan, of which 5.4 million yuan were 
from other organisations’ funds, 12.398 million yuan were obtained through 
                                                 
140 Ibid., p.128. 
141 Ibid.  
142 In the early stage of the reform, there were still many products which were in the 
economic plan of Country. Enterprises or individuals were not allowed to buy these 
products.  
143 Ibid. 
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bank loans, and 6.07 million yuan were mustered locally. The purchase of 
raw material and the sale of products under state plan were basically 
cancelled after 1985, so TVEs then had to be responsible for obtaining their 
own raw materials supplies and sales of products. To manage this, the 
County Bureau of TVEs established a mineral resource company and a 
supply and sales company. TVEs sold products themselves after 
establishing sales outlets in big cities, but they could also ask for help from 
these two companies.  
 
Of the projects which were developed, 36 entailed technology transfers; 4 
imported material for processing; 4 were cooperatively run, and 16 
economic associations were formed.144 TVEs greatly benefited from these 
connections. For example, the Cement Plant of Matoupu Township invited a 
technician from the Building Material Academy of Hunan Province to teach 
technology and improved its productivity from an annual 30,000 tons to 
50,000 tons - and quality improved 100%. Notably, this is a private business 
and its director, Mr Pan Shifeng, grew to be a well-known peasant 
entrepreneur in the County. By 1989, 80 products from Li County had 
entered the market of Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, etc., and eight 
products were exported to Europe, the Americas, Japan, Southeast Asia, 
Hongkong, the former Soviet Union, etc.  
 
  
                                                 
144 Ibid. 
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Table 2.5 The export of products of TVEs from Li County from 1987-1989 
 
 
Source: The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of 
Township and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of 
Li County. 
 
  
Year 
Exporting 
TVEs 
(number) 
Exported 
Products 
(no.) 
Export Value 
(million yuan) Names of the 
export products 
Total 
Direct 
export 
Indirect 
export 
1987 11 8 5.41 2.57 2.84 
Iced eels, frog, 
Chinese soft 
shell turtle, 
dehydrated 
vegetable, bean 
stick, 
pumping 
embroidery, 
lithopone, barium 
sulphate 
1988 8 7 8.43 4.60 3.83 
Frog, dehydrated 
vegetable, 
pickles, bean stick, 
carton 
box, lithopone, zine 
oxide 
1989 6 7 11.79 n/a n/a 
Dehydrated 
Chinese leaves, 
pickles, carton box, 
zinc slab, lithopone, 
zine oxide, 
potassium 
permanganate 
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⑤ Other favourable policies  
 
In addition, other steps were taken to facilitate economic development. 
These included a policy permitting payments on loans to be made before tax 
for newly established enterprises and products; the non-levying of tax on 
bonuses from the TVEs; encouraging personnel associated with TVEs to go 
into urban areas or even out of the province to work; and supporting 
peasants in developing mining.145  
 
2.2.4 The complementary development of private enterprises 
 
Without the support of local government, it would have been hard for TVEs 
in Li County to boom. But on the other hand, what is notable about that 
boom is the significant role played by private enterprises – and in that, Li 
County differs from the Sunan model.  As early as 1982, peasants in Li 
County were permitted to run businesses, although sole proprietors did not 
appear until 1984.146 The top-down instructions on private businesses that 
emerged in 1982-1983 finally confirmed permission to specialising 
households to hire labourers and to run businesses involved in long-distance 
transportation.  That removed historical limits whereby only communes and 
brigades were allowed to run businesses.147 
 
In the initial stage, a gradual approach was adopted, so that private 
enterprises in the county started to develop with links to state actors, as joint 
enterprises.148 After 1982 when the limits were removed, some individuals 
or households began sporadically to run some very small conveyance and 
repair shops. The jointly run businesses between collectives and peasants 
appeared after that as well. In 1984-85, private industries also began to 
                                                 
145 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County,  
p 26. 
146 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 253. 
147 Du, Runsheng, Self-account: The policy-making institution in China’s rural reform, 
(Beijing: Renmin Press, 2005), p.265. 
148 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 253. 
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appear.149  With support and favours from the government, noted above, 
private enterprises developed rapidly in late 1980s. As table 2.6 shows, in 
1985, the number of the enterprises in the private sector reached 4,209, 52.1% 
of the total number of enterprises in the county. Together, jointly-run and 
individually owned businesses accounted for 16% of the total employees. 
But just a year later, their share of employees had grown to 30.6%. Up to 
1989, the gross income of the individual businesses was almost equal to that 
of the township-owned businesses: 170.61 million yuan as against 178.12 
million yuan. 150 
 
  
                                                 
149 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, 
p. 36; Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 253. 
150 The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, 
p. 39. 
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Table 2.6 The Statistical Data on TVEs in Li County in 1985 and 1986 by 
Different Types 
 
 
Source:  
1. Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012); 
2.  The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of Township 
and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County. 
Brackets indicate the percentage by which private owned enterprises accounted for the 
county as a whole. 
Note: The blank part in this table means data are not available. 
 
The county government gave equal weight to collectively owned and private 
businesses (including joint and individual enterprises). This was apparent 
from the speech which Pan Weidong, the then vice secretary of the county, 
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gave to a meeting of cadres at four administrative levels on 18 January 1987. 
He said “we must grasp two things: one is collective enterprises and the 
other is the joint and individual enterprises. As to the collective projects 
which have been approved, it was necessary to organise a specific working 
team in order to guarantee capital flow as soon as possible to shorten the 
establishment cycle. In these circumstances - rigid capital management, 
absent energy, weak foundations and undeveloped markets, the focus of our 
work should be on joint and individual enterprises. Compared to those 
collectively owned, these private businesses are related more firmly to the 
economic benefit of peasants so businessmen are more enthusiastic. In 
addition, private businesses require less start-up capital than the collectively 
owned. Normally, transferring a labourer when running a collectively 
owned enterprise costs at least a fixed asset investment of 2,000 yuan and 
then transferring 200,000 labourers would need an investment of 400 
million yuan. Considering present conditions, depending on the collective 
enterprises cannot solve this problem. Only by relying on joint and 
individual enterprises could labourers be transferred quickly and peasants be 
getting rich.” 
 
He also stated that, “Not long ago, because we did not realise the 
significance of the development of the joint and individual businesses, our 
work showed some reluctance. Since we now recognise its nature and 
importance, we need to mobilise our power to carry on the work…Starting 
from specific planning, we should insist on the principle of ‘numbers first, 
specialists later’ -- that is, developments at multiple levels, benefits from 
multiple projects, cooperation among multiple industries, added value at 
multiple times, running businesses in multiple channels, and providing 
services in multiple ways. Once the number has reached a fixed amount, it 
will be easier to organise them to become specialising households and 
specialising villages. ‘Small first, big later’ -- that is, starting with producing 
small products, trying to develop small commodities and small components, 
and by taking advantage of the gap left by big industries, to attempt to make 
profits. ” 
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This quotation obviously sets out several principles on which the county 
government was trying to develop its private enterprises. One was practical. 
Based on the actual conditions in rural areas which were undeveloped, and 
beset by a lack knowledge and capital, the county decided to start with 
producing small products in terms of size, and simple components in terms 
of technology, then attempting to let the experiences at one small unit to 
lead at bigger undertakings embracing whole or even multiple villages. Mao 
said, “Little chips light great fires”. This might also apply the development 
approach to private enterprises in Li County. The second was pragmatic. As 
Pan said later in his speech, “industrial development requires state-owned, 
collectively owned and privately owned businesses working together. 
Whichever level can work best, let it proceed.” Bearing in mind the very 
rigid restrictions on private enterprises in the collective era when they were 
even scorned ideologically, the pragmatic principle could be regarded as a 
significant liberating idea in the reform era.  As a result, many brave 
innovations and variations emerged. The third principle was focusing on the 
improvement of peasants’ living conditions. The development of private 
businesses in secondary and tertiary industries greatly increased their 
incomes. This is discussed in more detail in the following section.  
 
2.3 What happened after allocating lands to households and the boom of 
the TVEs?   
 
After 1984 when the institution of family farming was established, all the 
lands, property, and assets which used to belong to the production team 
were allocated to the households. The production teams were no longer the 
units that organised labourers, that accounted for the amounts of work, and 
then distributed income at the end of a production year. Instead, agricultural 
work was organised by household units. This not only entailed freedom for 
each household to arrange its own work schedules based on their needs.  It 
also allowed them, after they finished their work, the freedom to manage 
their remaining time as they wished. Their lifestyles as households were 
quite different now from during the collective era.  
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        However, at the same time that rural households were benefiting from 
increased incomes, compulsory obligations were correspondingly 
transferred to them from the production teams. They had to provide 
compulsory grain submissions and agricultural taxes which each production 
team used to deliver to the state. In addition, the public accumulation fund 
and the public welfare fund were reserved by the production team for the 
provision of public goods within the team before distributing income among 
peasants, but now required peasants to fulfil. Meanwhile, with the gradual 
marketisation of agricultural production and materials, the peasants and their 
households, who had earlier followed the orders from above had to 
familiarise themselves with the patterns of the market economy.  It took 
time to get used to arranging their work based on frequently changing 
information from the market. As a result, rural communities often appeared 
quite chaotic, but there were always some people who were able to seize 
opportunities and change their lives.  
 
2.3.1 Changes in Lifestyles in the Rural Areas -- from United to separate 
labour 
 
 Working and Distribution in Production Team Units 151 
 
From 1966 to 1981, Mr Y of Juhualing Village of Yiwan Township was the 
leader of the then Xinmin brigade; then from 1982 to 1984 when brigades 
were changed into villages, he was the accountant of Xinmin Village; and 
after that, from 1984 to 1988, he assumed the role of deputy head of the 
village committee before retiring in 1988. In 2005 when the practice of 
merging villages and groups were implemented, Xinmin Village merged 
with Taibei Village and Yiwan Village to become the new Juhualing Village. 
As a leader first of the old brigade and then later the village, he experienced 
the entire transition through to the early stage of family farming, which gave 
him an authoritative understanding.    
 
                                                 
151 This section is based on the information in the interviews 2012/02/17b, 2012/01/06, and 
2012/02/11.  
126 
 
       He said that in the initial period, there were around 900 persons and 223 
households in his brigade. The area of the paddy fields was 1,394 mu, the 
dry land covered 346 mu, and the mountainous, forested land covered 1,127 
mu. His brigade was divided into 10 production teams to organise 
agricultural tasks collectively -- including growing, tending, harvesting, and 
distributing. At that time, the land was allocated to each production team, 
but the legally responsible person was not the head of the production team, 
but of the (higher level) brigade. Each production team was headed by an 
instructor, a leader, an accountant, a cashier, and a warehouse keeper. 
Normally it was the instructor and the leader who enjoined all peasants of 
the production team to work together. Each day, the leader would assign the 
work to each peasant in advance. At the end of a working day, the cadres of 
the production teams, which were mainly the instructor, the leader, the 
accountant etc., would check on everyone’s work and evaluate the points 
earned by each peasant. As the amount of work points was closely related to 
the grain and the income that a household would get, theoretically, the 
leader and the instructor had immense powers in the collective era. In reality, 
according to the feedback from interviewees, the exercise of power by the 
cadres would be monitored either by their superiors or by the public 
meetings of the peasants. Working together in the fields enabled peasants to 
monitor each other and their cadres.  
 
        At the end of a working day, the point recorder wrote down the work 
points that each peasant had earned. Each peasant received the basic amount 
of points – for an able bodied male adult, a day’s work was worth 10 points 
while a fully able adult female labourer got 8 points. This rate was the same 
for each production team that was interviewed. Additional points depended 
on the amount and the type of the work: ditch digging earned 8 points, 
picking cotton 6 points, etc. Evaluations of different types of work were 
discussed and agreed in meetings of the peasants. These criteria were for 
fully able adults. Other people without the full ability to work such as 
youngsters, the elderly or the sick gained some points, depending on the 
work they were able to do.  This would be discussed in the meetings of the 
peasants as well.    
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       Every day, under the supervision of the leader and the instructor, all 
peasants went out to work together at the same time and came back home at 
the same time as well. The points were first written down by the recorder 
and would then be evaluated, normally once every three days - or sometimes, 
if there was some dissatisfaction among the peasants, once a day – in the 
meetings of all peasants. The peasants would go to the warehouse each 
month to obtain grain as payment. A production year would be from 1 
August to the end of July the next year. However, as the year-end closing 
was in December, for the months of August, September, October, and 
November -- based on a standard normally of 125–150 kilograms of grain 
per capita per year, each household could get grain in advance. This was the 
basic amount of grain and enabled the peasants to survive. By the time of 
the year-end closing, the accountant of the production team would calculate 
the actual amount of the grains which the household should get, based on 
the points they earned for the whole year, and the grain that had been 
provided in advance would be deducted from it. Then, for the following 
eight months, the peasants would get amounts of grain based on their earned 
points.  
 
    How much grain, in practice, could one household get annually in the 
collective era? This was composed two parts: one is the basic amount of 
grain to enable peasants to survive which was the same for every one and 
the other is the amount of grain earned based on work points. As we 
explained above, the basic amount of grain per capita was normally 125–
150 kilograms per year. The ratio which these two components accounted 
for the total grain a peasant could get varied among different production 
teams, and the party secretary of the brigade had the discretion to adjust the 
rate. For example, the 8th group of Zhangshuyan Village of Leigongta 
Township awarded 50% as the basic amount + 50% based on work points. 
Sometimes, in order to stimulate efficiency, the production team could 
discretionally increase the percentage based on the work points.  The 7th 
group of Lianhua Village of Matoupu Township and the 1st & 9th groups of 
Qilimiao Village of Cengnan Township awarded 40% as the basic amount + 
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60% based on work points. An extreme case was Fenghuang Village of 
Guanyuan Township, which did not take the basic amount of grain into 
account at all and based everything on work points.   
 
   There were few days off during a year. Even around Chinese New Year, 
instead of following a traditional holiday of 15 days, the peasants normally 
needed to go back to work as early as the third day of the holiday. They 
worked collectively almost for 365 days a year. If you did not work one day, 
you would not get work points for that day and accordingly, you would get 
less grain. In that era, marked by severe shortages of grain, this usually 
meant starving. So individual peasants were fully drawn into the massive 
machine of the state, with very little freedom.   
 
 Working in a Household unit; The Distribution of Labour within a 
Household 
 
     The most obvious change from working in a production team to 
working in a household unit was the release of labourers from unified 
collective work. By respecting the seasonal patterns of the agricultural work, 
the peasant households had much more freedom to arrange their lives and to 
re-distribute the labour within the household. The production team was not 
in charge of distribution any more. Instead, peasants are able to dispose of 
their incomes freely. In terms of the agricultural timing, taking one crop of 
rice as an example, normally the seeds need to be sown in May and 
harvesting would occur at the time of the middle autumn festival, i.e., in 
September or October. During the time from May to September, tasks only 
included spraying insecticide, watering and fertilising. After harvesting, a 
peasant could choose either to grow another crop of rice, or to grow cash 
crops such as rapeseeds. So the busy season normally would be May and the 
time around middle autumn festival. The time from after harvesting to 
before May in the next year and the time from after sowing in May to 
harvesting in September to October would be slack time.152 
                                                 
152 Interview 2011/12/26. 
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   In the collective era, all time, including slack times, were for the 
production team to arrange. But now, the peasants were free to decide for 
themselves what to do. Theoretically they could choose to rest during slack 
times, but the fear of starvation inculcated during the collective era impelled 
them to work even harder. Also the relative freedom to manage their lands 
stimulated their enthusiasm to produce. Mr C of Huanghe Village of 
Zhanggongmiao Township - the then Wanjiapu Village153  - remembered 
that in his village, not a single li154 of land stood empty and idle. Wherever 
was good to grow crops was fully planted. Located in the plain areas, 
Zhanggongmiao Township was good for growing cotton thanks to plentiful 
sunshine. Another plus was that the state’s monopolised purchase price for 
cotton was relatively high, so most peasants in 1st, 5th, 6th , 7th, 8th and 9th 
groups at that time chose to multi-crop with cotton or rapeseed to increase 
their incomes.155  
 
   In Mr C’s village, the area of the lands per household was around 2 mu. 
The output of the rice on this 2 mu of the land normally just enabled an 
entire household to survive. Thus cash crops like cotton and rapeseed were 
crucial. The price for rapeseed per mu at that time was around 100 yuan. 
The cotton could be only sold to the supply and marketing cooperatives and 
the price was decided by the state, based on the quality of the produce. But 
given its favourable geographical setting, the cotton from Mr C’s village 
was of very good quality and therefore sold at good prices. 
 
   In addition to multi-cropping, a second source of extra money was 
running speciality businesses. Most of these were then still closely related to 
agriculture: breeding pigs, cattle, bees, fish, ducks, chickens, geese, and 
                                                 
153 In 2005, Wanjiapu Villlage merged with the former Huanghe Village and became the 
new Huanghe Village. 
154 Li is a Chinese measurement unit for area. One mu, equivalent 666.667 square metres, is 
equal to 10 fen and one fen is equal to 10 li. Therefore, one li equals 6.67 square metres.  
155 Cotton planting normally requires full sunshine so the plains areas in Li County are the 
main zones for cotton production. Based on the different nature of the lands, the land which 
is able to retain water on the surface is good for paddy. Otherwise, some crops such as 
cotton, peanuts and wheat can grow in the dry-lands.   
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silkworms. But specialities also included cash crops; forestry planting, and 
grain processing.156 Most specialists could earn over 10,000 yuan a year, 
which was a big increase on the collective era. The term of “households 
with the income of beyond ten thousands yuan” (wanyuanhu) was created 
and became popular around this time. These kinds of businesses were 
mainly run by women at home. As to males, given the boom of the TVEs, in 
slack times, they could choose either to go to local enterprises to work, or 
work for the neighbours as craftsmen such as bricklayers and painters.157 
The daily wage was relatively low at that time, only a few yuan per day, but 
for the peasants who had been poor, that was enough to make them happy. 
 
   Among all the groups of Mr C’s village, the 1st did best in terms of the 
development. Private houses had already begun to appear in that group. Two 
or three households were able to build their own houses at that time. 
However these houses were of poor quality.  They were theoretically two 
storied, but the practice was to use a layer of cement to separate the top and 
bottom levels, with people living in the bottom and the top being open. 
Without paint, the bricks were exposed. In spite of their ugly appearance, 
these houses were still admired by their fellow peasants at that time. 158 The 
following pictures showed a change between the collective era and the early 
stage of family farming in terms of housing. The house on the left was made 
in 1966 by Mr Y of Juhualing Village of Yiwan Township while the one on 
right was made in late 1980s by his son after he earned some money by 
going out to other cities to work.  
                                                 
156 Office of the County Party Committee, Examples of Speciality Households in 1982 in 
rural areas of Li County, 1982, printed by the Office of the County Party Committee. 
157 Interviews 2011/12/29, 2011/12/26.  
158 Ibid. 
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Picture 2.2 a & b A comparison of private houses in the collective era and 
in the early stage of family farming (taken on 17 February 2012).  
 
 Increasing Income and Its Sources 
Family farming and the development of the TVEs supplemented and 
complemented each other. While the former liberated surplus labourers, the 
latter lifted many peasants up from the traditional agriculture by providing 
them with off-farm work opportunities so as to increase their income. As Mr 
C explained above, around this time, the income of a rural household was 
normally composed of three parts – the traditional planting of grain, 
speciality businesses, and part-time jobs in TVEs nearby.  While grain 
planted was mainly for self-use, the other two elements became the main 
sources of extra income. Unlike migrant workers in the 1990s who travelled 
long distances to coastal cities, with the boom in enterprises close to home 
in the 1980s, surplus labourers from rural households could either choose to 
work in factories or enterprises nearby or could run their own businesses. 
This conformed to the then slogan of “leaving the land but not leaving the 
hometown, entering factories but not entering (distant) towns” (litu bu lijia, 
jinchang bu jincheng). This arrangement suited rural households quite well.  
Not only did they not need to give up their lands, they could also make full 
use of their slack time to earn extra money.   
 
         Table 2.7 shows the constant increases in the numbers of the 
employees in the enterprises from 1983 to 1987.  The year 1984 was 
extraordinary in that the rate of increase reached 63%. Although it would 
not be appropriate to compare the data of the years in absolute terms, due to 
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the removal of Baiyi district from the calculation after 1985, this rate of 
increase is still high enough for us to say that 1984 was the year when the 
private enterprises began to bloom. As early as 1984, the increase in the 
numbers of employees in joint and private enterprises had led to an overall 
increase of 49.98% - nearly the equal of the contribution of collectively 
owned enterprises. In 1986, which is officially cited as the year in which 
development occurred most quickly in the 1980s, employees in joint and 
private enterprises accounted for 30.6% of the total employees in the county. 
Township owned and village owned enterprises each accounted for one-
third. 
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Table 2.7 The Numbers, Employees and Value of TVEs in Li County from 
1978 to 1989  
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Source: The Annals of Township and Village Enterprises, printed by The Bureau of 
Township and Village Enterprise of Li County and archived in The Bureau of Archives of 
Li County. 
* Note: From 1986 on, since the Baiyi district was shifted to the administration of Jingshi 
county-level city, the data do not include the data from that district.  
 
           This tendency was also reflected in the increase in the per capita 
incomes of peasants. According to a research project in Li County in May 
2000 run by the National Bureau of Statistics, while the main source of 
income before the family farming came into effect was collective operations, 
during the 1980s and 1990s, household operations became the main source. 
159  The research also found that among household operations, the 
importance of traditional planting and poultry breeding was slightly reduced 
while operations in secondary and the tertiary industries in rural areas 
became the main new channels to improve incomes. In 1980, the per capita 
income from planting and poultry breeding was 121.98 yuan, accounting for 
57.6% of the per capita income that year, but by 1990, the proportion had 
shrunk by 6.4%. On the other hand, the percentage of the per capita income 
from the secondary and the tertiary industries increased from 7.3% in 1980 
to 26.9% in 1990. 160   In terms of the composition of rural household 
incomes, the 100-households survey in 1986 conducted by the Li County 
group of Rural Socio-Economic Survey Team (RSEST) revealed that while 
traditional agricultural planting still generated almost half of the income, 
speciality businesses - including forestry, animal husbandry, side-line 
production and fisheries - and the second & tertiary industries were 
gradually catching up with it as chart 2.3.1 shows.   
     
  
                                                 
159 The term “household operation” includes enterprises or workshops run by a household 
in all three industries, but excludes the work opportunities provided by collectively owned 
businesses.  
160 The research team specialising in new strategies to drive the income growth of peasants 
in Hunan in new situation, A Research on New Strategies to drive the Income Growth of 
Peasants in Hunan in New Situation, printed by The Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of 
Hunan in 2000, p.130. 
 
135 
 
Chart 2.3.1 The composition of peasant household incomes, 1986 
 
Source: The chart was created by the author based on the household survey in The 
Statistical Yearbook of Li County 1986.  
Income from collectively owned enterprises - 4.5%
Income from public welfare fund, bonus and others - 1.5%
Income from the Agriculture production - 54%
Income from forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and
fishing, and the secondary and tertiary industry - 36.3%
Income from other non-production - 3.7%
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2.3.2 The Takeover of Compulsory Grain Submissions and Agriculture 
Taxes by the Households 
 
 The Undertaking of the Compulsory Grain Submission Quota and the 
Agricultural Tax by a Production Team 
 
The Content of the Obligations to the State 
 
In addition to organise work and to distribute the income among their 
peasants, the production teams were also the units to fulfil the obligations 
for the state. There were two main obligations: agriculture tax and the 
compulsory grain submission quota. The amounts of both depended on the 
area of the land which each production team owned.161 However, as we saw 
above, there were some discrepancies between the taxed areas and the actual 
areas. 162 Informants explained that these discrepancies trace their historical 
roots back to the large-scale measurements of land from 1951 to 1954 and to 
the ‘five contracted confirmations’ from 1962 to 1965.163 The latter requires 
an explanation. In order to stabilise rural society after the Great Leap 
Forward, the Li County government set about implementing five contracted 
confirmations, which included: the output from plots of land, the amount of 
produce to be purchased by the state monopoly, the amount due in grain 
submission, the amount of production adjustments, and the amount of 
cumulative submissions for each production teams. These were evaluated 
and recorded. In practice, subsequently many changes occurred in the land 
areas that were farmed for various reasons - including the reclaiming by 
ploughing of the barren mountain tracts and the reduction of farmland in 
1977 by enlarging lakes.164 However, the data remained on the record book 
without major changes. 
 
                                                 
161 Interview 2012/01/06. 
162 On how the area of lands was measured and measurements confirmed, see this Chapter 
p.85 -87. 
163 Interview 2012/02/18c. 
164 Interview 2012/01/06. 
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        Undertaking the ‘five contracted confirmations’ was deemed necessary 
because various lands were of different quality. Thus land conditions varied 
under different production teams, so it was not fair to apply the same tax 
rate to all of them. When the five contracted confirmations were carried out, 
varied tax rates were agreed and confirmed between the state and the 
production teams. Based on these agreed areas and outputs, agriculture taxes 
and compulsory grain submission quotas were confirmed as well. While the 
agriculture tax was the fee for renting lands of the state, compulsory grain 
submission quotas were the contributions which peasants made to feed 
people who pursued careers other than agriculture, such as workers, teachers, 
and so on.165 The agriculture tax was not fulfilled in the form of cash at that 
time, but in the form of grain too. The amount of cash of the agriculture tax 
would be converted to the amount of grain according to the then price of the 
grain. 
 
        In addition, there was another portion of the grain, “the grains on the 
top of the other two” (sanchao liang). It appeared around the middle and 
late 1970s because, with improved water conservation facilities and 
technology, the output of the grain had increased.  So the state introduced 
this to collect and reserve more grains for state development. Given the state 
monopoly on purchasing, if you did not submit it to the state, there was no 
other way to sell it.166 For each production team, these three portions of 
grain were assigned as fixed amounts to be collected. The prices of the 
portions differed – that of ‘the grains on the top of the other two’ was higher 
than the other two. When Mr H of Wanxing Village of Chexi Township 
assumed the role of Party Secretary of the brigade, the price of the 
monopoly purchased grains was 9.5 yuan per 50 kilogram while ‘the grain 
on top of the other two’ was 15 per 50 kilogram. 167    
                                                 
165 Interview 2012/02/18c. 
166 Interview 2012/01/06. 
167 Ibid. The price of ‘the grains on the top of the other two’ normally was twice or even 
three times that of monopoly purchased grains. It was decided by the state each year. 
Before the grain market was opened, this price was relatively high so the peasants liked to 
sell their surplus grain then. See Yang, He, “the grain market and the difficulty to sell the 
grains”, available on: http://www.vsread.com/article-351736.html (accessed on 24 January 
2014). 
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How to fulfil obligations in the collective era?  
 
To assist in understanding how a production team’s obligations to the state 
were met, let us briefly consider three examples: the 3rd group of Qilimiao 
Village of Cengnan Township, the 5th group of Wanxing Village of Chexi 
Township, and one group of Yuntai Village of Dongshi Township.168 As the 
first two are both located in fertile plain areas, they are in the main zones of 
grain production and therefore their respective obligations were greater than 
in other areas. By contrast, in a mountainous area such as Yuntai Village of 
Dongshi Township, severe natural conditions reduced outputs, so not were 
only the tasks less onerous, but the state needed to subsidise them by 
assigning them fixed amounts of resold grains, named as ‘fanxiao liang’, to 
guarantee that the peasants did not starve. 
 
       Mr C of the 3rd group of Qilimiao explained that in the collective era, 
the 1970s, the amounts assigned to his group for the monopoly purchasing 
of grains were 31,500–32,500 kilograms, which covered both the agriculture 
tax and the compulsory submission quota. There were around 250 mu of 
lands in his group, the then production team. After harvesting and deducting 
the basic amount of grains to go to the whole group, the remainder normally 
exceeded 31,500 to 32,500 kilograms. The price of the 31,500-32,500 was 
7.5 yuan per 50 kilogram. As for the rest of the grain, the state required 
around 35,000 kilograms. This potion was ‘the grain on the top of the other 
two’ and the then price was 13.5 per 50 kilogram. So altogether, the 3rd 
group actually submitted 67,500 kilograms of grain a year. After the 
submission of these three portions of grain, the state would pay according to 
the above prices. In addition, other products of the production team, fish 
from the lakes, etc., were also sold to the state in return for cash. At that 
time, the total income of this production team would be around 20,000 yuan, 
of which it would reserved10% each for the PAF and PWF. The rest of the 
                                                 
168 The number of the group is unknown. 
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money would be distributed among the peasants according to their work 
points.169 
    
     Mr H explained his group of Wanxing Village. His production team had 
200 mu of the land. No matter what they grew, all grains including early rice, 
late rice, and yellow beans, were added up to be the output of this patch of 
land. If the output was 500 kilograms per mu, then the total output for the 
production team was 100,000 kilograms. First, the state would calculate the 
basic amount of the grain per capita with the production team. If the rate 
was 350 kilograms per capita per year and the total population was 200, 
then the basic amount of grain would be 70,000 kilogram. Then the state 
would decide the amount of grain for monopoly purchasing, which was 
20,000 kilograms. Finally, after fulfilling that, there was still 10,000 
kilograms left. This amount was eventually requested by the state as well, 
which was the ‘grain on the top of the other two’. If the next year was a bad 
year, the basic amount of the grain would be reduced but the amount of the 
‘grain on the top of the other two’, once decided, would have be provided 
by the production team.170 
 
      Mr W of Yuntai Village described a different implementation process. 
The basic concepts - three types of the compulsory grain submission - were 
the same. The monopoly purchasing of grains had to be handed in no matter 
how good the year was. If some years were bad due to the weather, first the 
production team needed to find a way to meet the payments and then the 
state would resell a fixed amount of grain to the peasants here in the form of 
tickets with which peasants were able to buy some grain to survive. 
However, in Yuntai, the ‘grain on the top of the other two’ which in plains 
areas had to be submitted, was not always compulsory.  It depended on the 
year.  In a good year, the state would demand it, but in bad years, it was not 
always required.171       
  
                                                 
169 Interview 2012/01/06. 
170 Interview 2012/02/18c. 
171 Interview 2012/02/16. 
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 The Takeover of Obligations by the Households 
 
After the lands were allocated to the households, the above obligations 
which used to be fulfilled in the production teams were accordingly divided 
and distributed to the households to assume, based on the size of the lands 
that they were assigned. In the collective era, the agriculture tax, the 
compulsory grain submission, and the ‘grain on the top of the other two’ 
were all fulfilled in the form of grain by the production teams to hand in 
them to the state-owned grain store stationed in every township. After 
allocating lands, this fulfilling method was changed. For agriculture tax, the 
newly established Township Governments in 1984 began to take the duty 
off the state-owned grain store and sent their village cadres to each 
household to collect. The form was changed from grain to cash.172 The rates 
were still calculated on the basis of land measurements from 1951 to 1954, 
and the five contracted confirmations from 1962 to 1965. The rate in 
Qilimiao Village was around 13 yuan per mu.173 
 
        At the same time, the Central Government issued a document entitled 
“The Ten Policies to Further Stimulate the Rural Economy” on 1 January 
1985, which put an end to the 31-year state monopoly for the purchase and 
marketing of agricultural products.  Instead, it heralded a new era of “dual 
track prices” (jiage shuanggui zhi), a term that refers to a system in which 
the contracted price and the negotiated market price for agricultural products 
co-existed. The compulsory grain submission from the collective era 
accordingly became the contracted amount of grain (hetong dinggou). The 
difference was that instead of being handled by the production team, each 
household was required to hand in to the state grain store. Therefore at 
harvest time, peasants flooded into the state grain store to fight for the scales 
to weigh their submitted grain.   
 
                                                 
172 The research team specialising in agriculture tax reform and the financial burdens on 
peasants in Hunan,  A Research on Agriculture Tax Reform and the Issue of the Financial 
Burdens on Peasants, printed by The Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, 1998, 
p.18-19. 
173 Interview 2012/01/06. 
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       At first, the amount owed per household depended on the area of the 
lands that they were allocated. For example, in the collective era in Wanxing 
Village of Chexi Township, the rate of the compulsory grain submission and 
the ‘grain on the top of the other two’ was 290 kilograms per mu. Therefore, 
the total amount owed by every household at that early stage obviously 
equalled the amount to be paid by the production team – but these amounts 
varied between production teams, and therefore so did the amounts owed by 
various households.  Gradually, the amounts of contracted grain reduced 
over time.  
      
         The price for the contracted grain also gradually increased. As Mr P of 
Qilimiao Village remembered, at the early stage of family farming, the price 
for such grain rose from 9.5 yuan per 50 kilograms to 11.5 yuan. The price 
for the ‘grain on the top of the other two’ also increased from 15 yuan per 
50 kilogram to 17.3. The peasants also gradually became able to sell surplus 
grains to the new grain agency at an even higher price: 18 to 19 yuan. This 
was very close to the market price.174    
 
2.4 The Beginning of Self-governance for Villagers from 1987 to 1989 
2.4.1 The Process of Producing Village Committees in Li County 
 
Although as early as 1984, the brigades throughout Li County were changed 
into village committees, democratic elections at the village committee level 
did not start until 1988.175 The legal status of the village committees was 
first confirmed in the 1982 constitution of the PRC, which simply stipulated 
that the village committees were to be directly elected by villagers.176 And 
then it was not until November 1987, that the 23rd meeting of the Standing 
                                                 
174 Ibid. 
175 The Compilation Committee of Annals of Li County (2010) , Annals of Li County 1978 - 
2002, (Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House), p. 564 
176 Liu Yabin argued that, similar to the practice of allocating the lands to the households, 
the practice of direct elections of village committees was originally the result of innovations 
by the peasants. This argument might be true in some other places such as the villages in 
Yishan and Luoshan County of Guangxi Province, but it was not the case in Li County. For 
more details on the history of the village committees, see Liu, Yabin (2011), “The Reform 
and the Development of the Electoral Institutions of the Village Committees in China”, 
2011 master’s thesis of Heilongjiang University  
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Committee of the NPC approved a document entitled “The Organic Law of 
the Village Committees of the PRC (trial)”. However, this document did not 
stipulate the detailed procedures for the elections. Starting from 1 June 1988, 
this law began be applied in practice at the village level, in Li County as 
elsewhere.177 
 
         From September 1988 to 1989, the implementation process included 
four stages: organisational preparation, propaganda, democratic elections, 
and establishing the rules. On 16 August 1988, under the supervision of the 
County Party Committee and the County Government, the leadership team 
and an office to implement “the Organic Law of the Village Committees of 
the PRC” were set up. From 7 September to 8 October, the team undertook 
an experiment with direct elections of village committees in 
Zhanggongmiao Township. The next year, starting from September 1989, 
the County Government decided to pursue this further by launching 
experiments in 63 villages.178 Based on the experiences collected through 
these experiments, this process was expanded throughout the County. By 
the end of 1989, out of 598 village committees, 3,159 members were 
directly elected, including 598 heads; 575 deputy heads; and 1,986 members 
-- with 2,644 cadres re-elected and 470 failing to be elected.179      
 
  
                                                 
177 The Compilation Committee of Annals of Li County (2010) , Annals of Li County 1978 - 
2002, (Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House), p. 122 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
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2.4.2 Implementation in Reality 
 
Mr Y has been the party secretary of Yingxi Village of Daohe Township 
since 1998. Before that, he was the head of the village committee of the 
same village. Speaking about the beginning of his political career, he 
thought that he was unlucky. He explained that initially he was educated to 
be a teacher. After he graduated from the Daohe High School in 1977, he 
spent 12 years as a citizen-managed teacher.180 He said, “Actually I enjoyed 
my career as a teacher so much because compared to the political career, it 
is simpler”.181 However, his career route changed on 19 November 1989 
when Yingxi Village began its election of the village committee. When Mr 
Y was elected as the head of the village committee, he was not immediately 
told of this. It took time for cadres to inform him.  He was at first reluctant 
to assume this role, so he did not go back to the village until 6 December. At 
that time, the citizen-managed teachers were under double supervision by 
the headmasters of schools and the Township Governments. He eventually 
made up his mind to accept the new role because Mr CX, the headmaster of 
the Daohe High School, convinced him by saying, “Since you were elected 
as the head, you have to go back as the election is valid and successful. The 
village cannot organise another election.”  
 
        Why, at first, did Mr Y not know that he was elected? That was 
because, according to the then rules, he was not a peasant working in the 
village but a teacher in the school. Therefore he did not need to take part in 
the village election. Before the election, the Township Government did 
inform him that he had been democratically nominated as a candidate. Then, 
depending on the votes cast and the number of posts to be filled, the official 
candidates would be decided. It was competitive election and, at that time, 
the number of the places on the village committees was normally 5 to 7, 
while the number of official candidates was 7 to 9. When Mr Y was 
informed, he thought the election had not started yet and that it was not 
                                                 
180  The citizen-managed teachers were teachers working in the state-managed or rural 
citizen-managed schools who did not receive the normal levels of remuneration from the 
government. 
181 Interview 2012/02/22 
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possible for him to be elected, so did not take it seriously. Unexpectedly, he 
was elected to be the head of Yingxi Village. 
 
        The roles of the village committee at that time included the head, the 
party secretary, the director of women, the director of security, the militia 
commander and so on. If the number of the roles was 7, then the number of 
the official candidates would be 9; if the number of the roles was 5, then the 
candidates 7. The member peasants were free to nominate anyone they liked 
to become candidates. According to the votes for nominations, the number 
of the official candidates was decided. Then the voters would cast ballots 
and obviously the candidates who got more votes would be elected. Finally, 
it was the Township Party Committee and the Township Government that 
appointed the elected candidates to their exact roles. Although the election 
process at this time was still in its initial stage, it is good to see that the idea 
of democracy began to take root in the mind of the peasants. To sum up, the 
procedures involved at this time included the villagers’ direct nomination on 
the candidates, competitive elections, secret ballots, with numbers of votes 
deciding who would be elected – while the township government appointed 
people to exact roles. Actually since then, the electoral process has 
undergone a lot of improvements, as we shall see in Chapter Four. 
 
2.5 Summary   
 
This chapter covers the period between 1978 and 1989, and examines three 
policies: the allocation of lands to households, the development of rural 
industry through Township and Village Enterprises, and the de-
communising and re-establishing of structures of village-level authority. 
These policies were implemented one after another. As we saw above, the 
drama opened with the allocation of lands to households. Although it did not 
pursue this reform as aggressively as many of its counterparts elsewhere, the 
County quickly grasped the opportunities which it offered, so that it 
involved every rural household. During the implementation process, the 
principle of fairness – one of the legacies from the collective era -- was still 
the priority. Local cadres therefore made great efforts to carry out the policy 
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in ways that remained faithful to this principle although some variations 
emerged in the way to allocate lands. The old mechanism to deal with 
disputes in rural communities – villagers’ congresses or public meetings of 
representatives of each household – still played a key part when important 
decisions needed to be made within a production team. Peasants explained 
that since it followed so soon upon the collective era, transparency in rural 
communities was relatively high. The collective work ethic and associated 
principles reduced the potential risk that conflicts and disputes would 
escalate.  They won high approval from the peasants. They thus helped the 
policies to be implemented in a smooth and effective way.   
 
        The main significance of the allocations of lands to households in Li 
County was not actually a marked improvement in productivity, since the 
County had always enjoyed favourable geographical conditions and an 
agriculture-friendly climate. Instead, peasants welcomed the freedom which 
this policy brought to them. Liberated from inefficient and unvaried 
agricultural labour in production teams, peasants were now at liberty to 
work for themselves. The boom in Township and Village Enterprises 
therefore emerged in response to this. As we have seen, policy support from 
various government actors stimulated the growth of rural industry in the late 
1980s.  From fiscal and tax policy to personnel management and assistance 
with market information, the local authorities followed the call from the 
higher levels of government and focused their energies on enabling the 
development of Township and Village Enterprises. Forms of businesses 
other than those collectively owned -- such as jointly and privately run 
enterprises -- emerged after the highly controlled collective era. Despite 
being low-tech and ultimately unsustainable, these raw rural enterprises 
played their part. They not only absorbed many unemployed and 
underemployed peasants by creating job opportunities, but they also 
increased their incomes. Since they were mainly based on natural resources, 
variations in development in different geographical areas could also be seen. 
Without a history of industry and trading, rural industries in Li County were 
rooted in its abundant natural resources which are mainly found in its north-
western sector of mountainous and hilly areas.  
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         Although intrusions by the party began to retreat to some degree in the 
economic sphere, the dominant position of the local cadres was still 
apparent in the implementation of the policies. Allocating lands to 
households and allowing the coexistence of two types of economic 
management (private and collective) provided rural residents with the 
potential for prosperity and with greater personal space and freedom in the 
economic sphere. These policies thus obtained their widespread support. As 
lands were allocated, the previous economic management functions of the 
production teams -- such as managing agricultural work and distributing 
income after fulfilling obligations to the state -- were transferred to each 
household. To adjust to this, the central government decided to change the 
political organisations at commune level, in two ways.  The first was the 
establishment of three tiers of administration: township, village and village 
group. The second was the introduction of a self-governance institution, by 
suggesting direct elections to village committees.  
 
          As reforms were still at an early stage, government institutions 
including the central government itself were not sure about the most 
appropriate approaches to implementing many of the new policies. So 
sometimes when the central government called for a new policy, it did not 
set out detailed plans and left local governments to make their own 
arrangements. In Li County, the approaches to the development of rural 
industry and to the implementation of direct elections at village level were 
cases in point. Amid the uncertainties, many peasants also adopted wait-
and-see attitudes. But those who were adventurous and pioneering, whether 
they were local cadres or ordinary people, stood out from their fellow 
peasants and became a potent force. Adventurism, opportunism and 
dynamics therefore characterised this period. However, just when many 
people in the County were about to jump on the bandwagon to embrace 
these new policies, the situation inside and outside China in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s caused a major change in the policy orientation of the 
central government, which dashed many peasants’ dreams of enrichment. 
Instead, the rural community entered a severe and bitter decade. 
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Chapter Three:  Stagnation, Social Disintegration and 
Confrontation from 1990 to 1999 
 
The period of the 1980s is often associated with such terms as dynamism, 
opportunism and adventurism. After all, the curtain had just been raised on 
the great drama of reform. There were uncertainties about what would 
happen which stirred both expectations and suspicions. How long would 
these favourable policies last?  Would a retreat occur, with a return to the 
highly state-controlled collective economy?  Nobody knew. Therefore it 
understandable that most people in Li County in the 1980s maintained a 
relatively conservative, wait-and-see attitude to the new reform policies.  
 
         However, there were also some persons, though very few, who were 
adventurous enough to take advantage of these new policies and to stand out 
among their fellow peasants. At that time, these people were usually called 
“opportunists”. Back then, against the background of communist ideology, 
this was a pejorative term used to refer to those who speculated and 
profiteered -- which conflicted with the communist values of honesty and 
selfless dedication. As we saw in the last chapter, examples could be found 
both in the process of allocating lands to households (such as that 
production team leader leading the allocation of lands in his team ahead of 
other teams) and in the development of TVEs (such as some owners of 
private workshops and small businesses). As a result, peasants, who used to 
be one of the two main social classes in the collective era, began to become 
differentiated in terms of economic status. This trend gathered strength in 
the 1990s, as we will see in this chapter. 
 
         Despite ambiguities, from the peasants’ perspectives, the 1980s was a 
favourable period. With the central government determined to push ahead 
with reform, up to the late 1980s, many policies – economically, 
organisationally, politically, and financially – had, like a raging fire, 
promoted the development of rural communities. The late 1980s is now 
usually described nostalgically as “golden age”, combining a relatively 
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vibrant market, an optimistically-motivated work ethic, and a morally 
edifying social ethos. There was a song called In the Field of Hope that was 
so popular that each household knew how to sing it in Li County at that time. 
It depicted a flourishing landscape in the villages after the establishment of 
the family farming, and expressed the joy of the people and their hope for a 
brighter future. However, just when many aspirants began to relax their 
caution and were about to jump on the bandwagon, a tough political and 
economic atmosphere inside and outside China and a shift in policies 
ushered in a period of austerity and financial difficulty. The gap between 
urban and rural areas deepened with the latter growing poorer. Local 
authorities were financially so hard pressed that they had to find ways to 
transfer the pressures to peasants. This resulted in severe confrontations 
between these two groups within many villages. Rural communities seemed 
to stagnate by comparison with the dynamic 1980s.   
 
3.1. The Unfavourable Economic and Political Atmosphere throughout 
the Country from 1989 to 1992 
 
From 1978 to 1986, agricultural and rural industries had experienced a few 
years of greater prosperity in Li County. Peasant incomes increased vastly. 
These achievements owed much to the support of the government and its 
favourable policies. The policies included stimuli to productivity, such as 
family farming and the distribution principle of “after fulfilling the 
country’s and the collective’s obligations, all the rest belongs to the peasants 
themselves”. In addition, the government adjusted the profits between the 
rural and the urban areas by using the levers of taxes and prices, with 
preference given to rural dwellers.182  Furthermore, priority was given to 
financing and loan policies for rural enterprises, as we saw in the last 
chapter. A leading and constructive role was played by cadres at three levels 
– the county, the townships and the villages – in raising start-up funds and 
                                                 
182 In the period since 1979, the state not only decided to reduce the amount of agricultural 
taxes in Hunan, but also increased the purchasing price of agricultural and side-line 
products by 101.1% between 1978 and 1986. For more details on the favourable policies to 
increase peasants’ income from 1978 to 1986, see: Research on New Strategies to drive the 
Income Growth of Peasants in Hunan in New Situation, printed by The Rural Socio-
economic Survey Team of Hunan in 2000, p.10. 
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ensuring the effective working of the revolving fund, in coordinating raw 
material and human resources, and in seeking to keep open channels for the 
sale of products. All of these things contributed immensely to economic 
development in the rural areas and to improving the living standards of the 
peasants during the 1980s, and stimulated the first surge of the economic 
reform.  
 
        However beginning in the late 1980s, inflation surged right across the 
country. In Beijing city alone, the rate in early 1988 was as high as 20%, 
and it even reached 30% at the end of 1988. 183  It seriously affected 
economic development in China, and after 1989, the economy entered a 
difficult phase which, according to some scholars like Wen Tiejun, 
amounted to production stagnation attended by inflation – which 
undermined economic development in the period up to 1992.184  In response, 
the central government decided to adopt austerity policies which included 
reductions in the flow of funds and in financial investments.185 Rural areas 
and TVEs were the main victims of this conservative tendency. From 1987 
to 1991, agricultural investments were reduced to less than 10% of total 
fiscal expenditures. 186  The maintenance of dangerous reservoirs and the 
construction of agricultural fields therefore nearly stagnated, and the neglect 
lowered the ability of agriculture to resist natural disasters.187  The ever-
promising rural enterprises had also gradually lost their halo as a “rider on 
the reform wave”. They were undermined both by preferential treatment 
given to state-owned enterprises in lending policies, and by severe market 
competition due to technological shortfalls.188  
 
                                                 
183 Vogel, Ezra F., Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 600 – 601.  
184 “The origin and the fate of TVEs: Is it time for TVEs to withdraw from the historical 
stage?”, People’s Daily Online, 2007,  available on:  
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1045/5657214.html (accessed on 30 December 2012). 
185 The research team specialising in new strategies to drive the income growth of peasants 
in Hunan in new situation, A Research on…, p. 11. 
186 Ibid.  
187 Ibid.  
188 “The origin and the fate of TVEs: Is it time for TVEs to withdraw from the historical 
stage?”, People’s Daily Online, 2007,  available on:  
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         Many peasants found that despite continuous increases in the output of 
agricultural products, unfavourable market conditions made it more and 
more difficult to sell products, as a result of fluctuating prices and the 
skyrocketing costs of agricultural inputs.189  Mr X of Lianhua Village of 
Matoupu Township described the severity of the fluctuating prices by giving 
an example: if he assumed that the price of a piglet was 200 yuan one 
afternoon, the price might increase to 700 yuan the next morning.190  A 
research report on peasants’ income growth shows that although the 
purchasing price of agricultural and side-line products rose by 28.5% in the 
five years from 1987 to 1991, the costs of agricultural inputs increased by 
68.4% and the price of the rural consumables by 57.3%. 191  Market 
bottlenecks in agricultural commodity circulation had come to outweigh the 
improvements in income which the peasants achieved during the early phase 
of reform in the 1980s.192  
 
         In addition, after land was allocated to households in 1984, the state 
monopoly for purchase and marketing of agricultural products was 
accordingly replaced by the contracted purchasing of grain, cotton and oil 
materials. The compulsory monopolised purchasing and sales of the 
agriculture products of the state in the collective era was gradually relaxed 
and allowed peasants to sell their products in the market at negotiated price 
after they fulfilled the submission task based on contracts with the state. 
That increased pressures which impelled peasants into a relatively free but 
unpredictable market. Most peasants lacked knowledge of competition in 
the market economy. They produced things blindly, either because they had 
no clear idea of the relationship between demand and supply, or because 
they jumped on bandwagons, which was risky and speculative. 193  With 
income growth slowing and expenses increasing, financial burdens on the 
peasants gradually overtook increases in incomes.  This, companied with the 
                                                 
189 The research team specialising in new strategies to drive the income growth of peasants 
in Hunan in new situation, A Research on …, p.10. 
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severe financial situation of the local authorities, later became one of the 
triggers for conflicts between them and the local cadres within rural 
communities. 
 
      At the same time, events in the cities also contributed to the unstable 
economic and political context throughout the country. Starting around 1985, 
state-owned enterprises in many big and medium cities began their reform 
with rights of management contracted out to individuals.194  In addition, 
some state-owned enterprises reduced or ended welfare provisions which 
workers previously enjoyed.  When this was combined with skyrocketing 
commodity prices, workers’ lives turned bitter.  Many of them could not 
even afford ordinary daily commodities. 195 Financially and psychologically, 
these life stresses caused panic among these people who had been benefited 
from the “iron rice bowls (tiefanwan)”. With the reforms going further, 
many social welfare benefits such as co-operative health care and housing 
subsidies which had earlier covered most people in the collective era were 
reduced.  But alternative methods of meeting these needs had not yet been 
put in place.  This left many disadvantaged people exposed, isolated and 
vulnerable without the protection of the collective. Disappointment and 
dissatisfaction started to spread in society.  
 
       These sentiments finally found their way into the open when the 
reformist leader, Hu Yaobang, passed away in May 1989. Hundreds of 
students from universities in Beijing assembled with the original intent of 
paying tribute to Hu. They were later joined by people from other 
backgrounds including workers and common people, and this finally 
developed into a massive political incident in Tiananmen Square. 196  An 
                                                 
194 Mao, Yuanbin, “A brief retrospect of 30 years’ reform of the state-owned enterprises”, 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
website, 2008 available on: 
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(accessed on 2 November 2014).  
195 Vogel, Deng Xiaoping …, p. 600 – 601; Wang, Hui, China’s New Order: Society, 
Politics, and Economy in Transition, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 54.  
196 Pan, Philip P., Out of Mao’s Shadow: The Struggle for the Soul of a New China, (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p. 274; Zhao, Dingxin, The Power of Tiananmen: State-
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evaluation of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident is obviously beyond our 
discussion here, but its violent, harsh end signified the beginning of a 
politically conservative period and an economic downturn which continued 
over the next few years. It is commonly argued that it was Deng Xiaoping’s 
southern tour in 1992 that reversed this situation.197 Just when the people 
were baffled about the future of reform and began to engage in fierce 
ideological arguments as a result of the Tiananmen Square incident, Deng 
Xiaoping spent 18 January to 21 February 1992 inspecting Southern China 
including Wuchang, Shenzheng, Zhuhai and Shanghai.  
 
      During this journey, he gave a series of speeches to reassure people 
about the determination of the central government to move towards free 
marketisation and to accelerate the development of private enterprise. 
Although Deng is also usually accused of borrowing some capitalism 
elements to spur the economy, China has indeed, since 1992, achieved 
another surge of economic development with growth at annual double-
digital rates. However, for the present study, the significance of Deng’s 
Southern Tour is that it indicated a major shift in policies. Thereafter, rural 
communities that had flourished in the 1980s witnessed the massive 
migration of surplus rural labours into the coastal and urban areas. The 
living standards in rural areas gradually went downhill. Increases in rural 
incomes slowed down, financial burdens on the peasants escalated, 
inequalities gradually widened, and deteriorating relationships between 
cadres and peasants even became confrontational. This complicated picture 
stood in striking contrast to the urban boom - with manufacturing in the 
                                                                                                                            
Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001), p. 149. 
197 In December 1992, Deng Xiaoping was elected by the Financial Times as man of the 
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this rate leaped to 12.8% and since then China had been kept high growth rates. For more 
details about the comments on the significance of Deng’s Southern Tour, see Perry, 
Elizabeth J., “China in 1992: An Experiment in Neo-Authoritarianism”, Asian Survey, Vol. 
33, No. 1, January. 1993; Zhao, Suisheng, “Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour: Elite Politics 
in Post-Tiananmen China”, Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1993, p. 739 – 756; and 
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coastal cities thriving, new residential estates and skyscrapers mushrooming, 
and large numbers of rural labourers flocking in to seek jobs. 
 
3.2 A Tough Period for the Development of Agriculture and Rural 
Industries from 1992 to 1998 
 
Guided by Deng’s Southern Tour Speeches, between 21 and 23 September 
1992, the Li County Party Committee convened and led the County’s 
seventh Party Congress, with 393 representatives attending.198 It reviewed 
the work of the County Party Committee and the County Government since 
the sixth Party Congress in 1988, and studied Deng’s Southern Tour 
Speeches, which helped local cadres within the county administration to 
shed their doubts about the future of the reform. It reassured them that, 
instead of ending the reforms, the Central Committee and Government were 
determined to press ahead. Centring on intensifying the reform and 
accelerating the pace towards improved living conditions, the Congress also 
laid out the aims and detailed work plans of the County for the next five 
years with regard to economic and social development. This plan and, more 
especially, its goals were referred to in brief as “the project for 12111”.199 
That figure refers to a set of numbers: the gross output value of agriculture 
and industry in one third of townships would be beyond 100 million yuan 
(hence number ‘1’), the corporate tax in one third of townships would be 
beyond 2 million yuan (the number ‘2’), the fiscal income in one third of 
townships would be beyond 1 million yuan (the number 1’), the net income 
of the collective economy in one third of villages would be beyond 100,000 
yuan (the number ‘1’), and per capita income of the courtyard economy of 
one third of rural households would be beyond 1,000 (the number ‘1’). 200  
 
      What, however, should be done to realise these aims? After all, after 
nearly ten years of reform, the economic and political environments were 
now more complicated than those in the 1980s. The market for commodities 
                                                 
198 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County (1999), Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, 
(Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 109. 
199 Ibid., p. 86. 
200 Ibid., p. 4. In Chinese terms, 100 million yuan is equal to 1 yi. 
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had gradually opened and prices were now more dependent on the relations 
between supply and demand than on plans of the state. Facing fluctuating 
prices, individual peasants lacked enough knowledge of markets to make 
prudent decisions on what and how much to cultivate. Nor could they 
respond effectively to frequent price fluctuations. Therefore the incomes of 
peasants no longer increased merely by increasing the output of traditional 
products, which in Li County’s case, were mainly grain and cotton.201 When 
we turn to rural industry, the political advantages which had enabled the 
TVEs to flourish in the 1980s no longer existed in the 1990s. With the shift 
in the bias of Central policies to the coastal and urban areas, those TVEs 
which were based on the exploitation of raw natural resources and primitive 
skills such as mining and digging lost the shelters which former policies had 
provided.  They found it hard to compete in the market. Given their lack of 
knowledge about the management of modern companies, many enterprises 
faced losses or went into bankruptcy in and after the late 1980s.202 Facing 
these challenges, and in order to realise the aims of the seventh Party 
Congress, the County Party Committee and the County Government decided 
to emphasise three things: adjusting the structure of agricultural products to 
adapt to the gradually deepening market economy; developing co-operation 
with large corporate groups in big (especially coastal) cities by way of 
outsourcing or by providing factory sites, labour, and raw materials and 
while encouraging the development of household and private enterprises; 
and greatly improving infrastructure to attract external investments.203 Let 
us consider each of these things.       
 
3.2.1 Adjusting the Structure of Agricultural Production 
 
Since as early as March 1991, the problem of agricultural commodity 
circulation and the contradiction between improved output and the slow-
down in the increase of the peasants’ incomes forced the County Party 
                                                 
201 The research team specialising in new strategies to drive the income growth of peasants 
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203 Ibid., p. 4 – 6. 
155 
 
Committee to consider the relationship between the structure of the 
traditional agricultural products and the market economy. A rough plan 
about how to adjust the structure of agricultural production to adapt to the 
market emerged. This idea, on the one hand, sought to support traditional 
agricultural production of grain and cotton, while on the other, seeking to 
improve the quality of agricultural products. 204  By 22 September 1992, 
when Mr Y Guanghong, the then deputy secretary of the County Party 
Committee, reported to the seventh Party Congress on behalf of the sixth 
Party Committee, this idea had matured and was articulated in the report, 
and then became a detailed action programme.205  
 
         Realising that it would take time to determine which agricultural 
products were suitable, given the changes in the market, the report 
emphasised the importance of respecting the will of the peasants and 
rethinking practices which had often been used in previous political 
campaigns. The practice of “being uniform”, and thus of failing to consider 
diversity, should be avoided. 206 The governments and the local cadres at 
county, township and village levels should fully respect the peasants’ own 
choices and act as messengers to provide the peasants with market 
information and input on production, technological research, processing and 
marketing.207 The report also pointed out that, since the peasants lacked 
awareness as producers of agricultural commodities, during the transition to 
a market economy, it was necessary for the governments and the local 
cadres to provide updated information and to help them to predict the 
market.  They also needed to advise peasants on optimal channels for sales, 
in order to reduce market risks and to help peasants to acquire a sense of the 
market.208 The report called on the cadres to make full use of the diverse 
conditions in plains, lake, hilly and mountainous areas and to develop the 
agricultural products suitable for local circumstances. For example, the lake 
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areas could try aquaculture, the hilly areas could continue planting such 
crops as fruit trees, the mountainous areas should take advantage of their 
mineral resources, and the plains area should continue to explore highly 
efficient ways to stabilise and to improve the traditional production of grain 
and cotton.209 
 
 In the plain areas and some parts of shallow lake areas: developing 
townships specialising in paddy rice or cotton according to specific 
conditions 
 
        Guided by this report, the period of 1992 to 1997 witnessed a difficult 
but far-reaching process of adaptation in the structure of agriculture. Given 
variations between different geographical areas, this process was composed 
of four parts. First, to guarantee the output of traditional grain and cotton, 
the plain areas and some parts of shallow lake areas including Mengxi 
Township, Linan Township, Guanyuan Township, Chexi Township, and 
Lidong Township adjusted the layout of the agriculture production from 
“being small but comprehensive” to “being big but special”.210  The old 
phrase “being small but comprehensive” refers to the fact that grain and 
cotton were planted in every township and village. It was one of the legacies 
of the old unified planned economy and played its role during the civil war 
time and the early years after the establishment of the PRC - to prevent 
shortages of grains, and to guarantee the necessities of the peasants on 
production team units. In the collective era, as agricultural production and 
distribution were based on production team units, planning irrigation and 
output on these units then made practical sense as well.211  
  
         However, after lands were allocated to individual households in the 
early 1980s, the households replaced the production teams as the units on 
which agricultural production plans were based. The large pieces of land 
which had belonged to the production teams were divided into small plots 
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and given to households. A few early years after allocating the lands, family 
farming had indeed improved the gross output, mainly by relying on the 
investment of extensive peasant labour. 212  However, as family farming 
became more institutionalised, problems gradually emerged. First, the size 
of the plots belonging to each household was relatively small and not good 
for the emergence of farms as corporates. Second, irrigation became the 
main trigger for disputes. Since agricultural production was not now 
planned in an integrated way as in the collective era, irrigation became one 
of the responsibilities which each rural household had to assume for itself. 
Unlike the agriculture in industrial societies, the rural areas in Li County 
still relied mainly on manual labour to dig irrigation canals, to channel water 
from nearby rivers or lakes to fields. This meant that many channels went 
through more than one plot of fields. As the fields were now are allocated to 
individual households, peasants - especially in the lake areas – were often 
drawn into disputes about which routes channels should take, and whether 
they would be permitted by the peasants who owned the relevant fields.213  
 
         In a response to these issues, the mode of “being big but special” was 
proposed and implemented in practice. It aimed to improve the production 
of grain and cotton on a large scale by developing some townships and 
villages specialising either in grain or cotton, based on their specific natural 
conditions. The case of Fenghuang Village of Guanyuan Township 
illuminates this strategy. Fenghuang Village was newly established in 2005, 
following an administrative practice of merging villages and village 
groups. 214  Several small villages were merged and the former Zhaojia 
Village was one of them, where Mr C was the party secretary of the village 
committee from 1985 to 2001. According to his account, the peasants in 
former Zhaojia Village used to grow rice. However, when it entered the 
1990s, they began to shift to cotton. The economic return on cotton at that 
time was higher than on rice, but irrigation was also a major problem and 
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the main reason that local peasants changed their minds. Although, located 
in the lake area, so that it is supposed not to lack water, the division of land 
into small-sized plots for household units turned out to be the obstacle  that 
blocked irrigation canals. Furthermore, without attention from collective 
production teams, the established canals dug in the 1960s and 1970s had 
fallen into disrepair.  Some were blocked with weeds so that the water could 
not flow through to the fields. Rice cannot be grown without water while 
cotton can grow in dry lands. The peasants thus changed to grow cotton. 
Following this tendency, the local governments developed Guanyuan 
Township to become a township specialising in cotton planting, the size of 
which is beyond 10,000 mu.215   
 
 In the mountainous areas: reducing the cotton areas and replacing them 
with crops such as sweet corn and sweet potato 
 
     While some areas, which lack water irrigation, changed from rice to 
cotton, others instead reduced the areas of cotton fields and changed to grow 
crops. Nine mountainous areas such as Ganxitan Township, Matoupu 
Townships, Taiqing Townships, and Huolianpo Township and so on are 
geologically characterised by dry but steep mountainous lands. Up to the 
1990s, like other rural areas in Li County, the pattern of “being small and 
comprehensive” applied to these areas so that every township and village 
grew rice or cotton. 216  However, when we consider the geological 
conditions, these areas are not good for cotton production because in spite of 
being dry lands, most are mountainous, very steep and lack sunshine which 
affects the length of the cotton fibres and accordingly their selling prices.217 
In addition, the mountainous lands are sandy so that the soils are so loose 
that the plants are not able to root.218 Thus, except for sweet corn and sweet 
potato, other economically promising crops are unlikely to grow in 
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mountainous areas.219 In the collective era, this is the main reason why those 
areas were usually the ones which lived on grains resold by the state to the 
starving production teams.220    
 
       Cotton used to be grown in 30,000 mu in those nine townships in the 
1980s, but the output per mu was only 40 kilograms and the economic 
return was so low that it badly affected the incomes of peasants living in 
those areas. In 1994 and 1995, the peasants voluntarily reduced the total to 
7,000 mu. However, as official targets for cotton were still assigned to these 
areas, although less than before, the peasants could not completely change 
to abandon cotton in favour of other crops which are able to live in the 
mountainous areas. 221 In response to this, in 1996, the County Party 
Committee and Government decided to allow the peasants to change 15,000 
mu to the intercropping of sweet corn and sweet potato. As a result, the 
output value per mu increased by 1,000 yuan, doubled the rate of the old 
cotton areas.222  
 
 In the townships near Liyang Township: reducing the cotton area and 
experimenting with growing various vegetables 
 
     The third part of the process of adjusting the structure of agriculture 
products saw the townships near Liyang Township changing from cotton to 
grow vegetables. Liyang Township is the location of the County Party 
Committee and County Government, which makes it the most urbanised and 
commercialised area within the County. The outskirts of Liyang Township 
and other neighbourhood townships thus enjoy the convenient transportation 
and easy commodity circulation. In order to enrich the residents of Liyang 
Township and to make full use of the economic potential of the lands near 
the Township, the County Party Committee and County Government in 
1996 decided to reduce the cotton areas of Lidan Township, Liyang 
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Township and Zhanggongmiao Township and instead encourage the 
peasants there to experiment with vegetable planting.223 As a result, there 
was altogether 12,000 mu of land where this change occurred. However, the 
experimental process was not easy. Mr C of Huanghe Village of 
Zhanggongmiao Township told the story of his village.224 
 
      The village was named as Wanjiapu. In 2005, it merged with the 
previous Huanghe Village to become part of a new, bigger Huanghe Village. 
From the beginning of the 1990s, in order to continue increasing the income 
of the peasants, following the call from the County Party Committee and the 
County Government, village cadres began to press the peasants to try to 
grow vegetables. They tried in turn to grow watermelon, white gourd, 
common beans, and potato. All these products were judged as failures. One 
of the reasons was the shortage of advanced technologies. The other was the 
climate and the soil condition. For example, the white gourd failed because 
excessive rain in the wet season in Li County is not suitable for it. As a 
result, the village committee provided the affected peasants with 100 to 200 
yuan per mu.  
 
       Among all the experiments to adjust the structure of agricultural 
products, only the artificial production of cotton seeds brought cash benefits 
to the peasants. This business emerged in cooperation with the Cotton 
Ginning Seed Industry of Changde City (CGSICC). CGSICC provided 
original seeds including male pollen and female pollen to the peasants. The 
peasants randomly decided to grow male pollen or female pollen. During 
the flowering season, the peasants cut off the buds before they flowered and 
exchanges occurred between peasants planting male and female pollen. 
Then the peasant picked the pollen from the buds, and artificially pollenated 
it to the stylus of his cotton flowers, so that produced seeds with high output. 
This is called hybrid cotton, the output of which per mu was four times the 
output of normal cotton. Then, according to their contract, the peasants sold 
the seeds to the CGSICC and got corresponding cash payments in return. 
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According to Mr C’s account, the price of the seeds of this hybrid cotton 
was 28 – 30 yuan per kilogram. After the GCSICC collected these seeds, 
they would pack them up and sell them to the peasants planting cotton 
throughout the country at a price of 80 – 100 yuan per kilogram.  Mr C said 
that the peasants’ income earned by producing the seeds could be four to six 
times the income earned by doing manual labour - with the former around 
6,000 yuan per year while the latter was around 1,000 yuan per year. 
Therefore the peasants preferred to sign the contracts and produce seeds for 
the GCSICC to growing the normal cotton or doing manual labour.          
 
       However, this business gradually declined in 2000s, after it had been 
run for around ten years. One reason was that adulteration appeared in the 
later stages, so as to badly affect the quality and output of the cotton after 
the seeds were sold to the peasants. Adulteration could happen because 
some peasants did not cut off the buds before flowering, so that the cotton 
was pollenated themselves, as a result of which, the purity of the seeds was 
low and so was the output. In addition, driven by the profit, both some 
peasants and even the GCSICC intentionally mixed the seeds of normal 
cotton with those from hybrid cotton. These adulterations seriously affected 
the credibility of GCSICC, and its sale performance. In the 2000s, the 
GCSICC has gradually fallen into deficit and ended up in reorganising.  
Cooperation with the peasants has stopped.  
 
     When we enter the 2000s, based on the experiences and lessons 
accumulated during the 1990s, these peasants started new experiments to 
introduce grapes and strawberries. They had learned of the dangers of 
lacking technology. Unlike the blind experiments in the 1990s, now with the 
support of the local cadres, they seek technological help from experts and 
have been successful. Gradually they found ways to integrate agricultural 
production into the market economy. Talking about this process, Mr C said 
that although the period of 1990s was really tough – producing the seeds 
was very hard and required you to work under the sun every day – “this is a 
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necessary process and looking at our success right now, it was worth it.”225 
We will consider their new story, in the 2000s, in Chapter Four.         
 
 In the lake areas: returning low-lying fields to fish ponds 
 
       As we described in the overview of Li County in Chapter One, the 
County covers some parts of lake areas as well. The townships located in 
the east of the County normally belong to the lake areas including Yongfeng 
Townships, Xiaodukou Township, Guanyuan Township and Jiuyuan 
Township.226  Due to the subtropical monsoon climate, the rainfall in Li 
County is a bit excessive for a lake area. Especially in the rainy season 
around June, July and August, continuous rainfall can cause the water level 
of the River Li to stay high for quite some time. Accordingly, flood waters 
accumulate in low-lying fields along the river, so that many crops in these 
fields were drowned. 227  In response to this problem, the township 
governments and the local peasants in this area jointly decided that fish 
ponds held more promise than crops in low-lying fields.  
 
       Between 1994 and 1995, there were 10 townships in this area including 
Rudong Township, Yongfeng Township, Xiaodukou Township, and 
Guanyuan Township which began a project of digging fish ponds on the 
sites of the low-lying fields. 20,000 mu of low-lying fields were changed 
into fish ponds. 228  The output of the fish per mu reached 200 to 350 
kilogram and the cash return per mu was beyond 1,200 yuan, which doubled 
the cash return from the days when crops were planted in these fields.229 The 
peasants did not change all of the low-lying fields into fish ponds. One 
reason was that in the 1990s, the state had not completely cancelled its 
requirements for cotton and grain.  The other was that instead of buying 
                                                 
225 Interview 2011/12/29. 
226 For more details about the geographic setting of Li County, see the Overview of the 
County in Chapter One, p. 56- 59. 
227 Interviews 2012/02/14b, 2012/02/19c, 2012/02/19d; Compilation office for chronicles of 
Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996,  (Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 
1999), p. 170. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
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grain for self-consumption, the peasants prefer growing and cotton 
themselves.230 
 
 Encouraging a resumption of the traditions of livestock-raising and 
aquaculture 
 
Traditionally, rural households in Li County have raised livestock including 
chickens, ducks, geese, pigs, cattle and goats. This practice disappeared in 
the collective era due to political constraints. After 1984 when the lands 
were allocated to individual households, as the constraints were gradually 
relaxed, many households again began to specialise in livestock-raising and 
aquaculture. 231  At the beginning of the 1990s, with the gradual 
establishment of the market economy, the County Party Committee and the 
County Government decided to seek a breakthrough in the development of 
livestock-raising and aquaculture. During the 1990s, a series of favourable 
policies were introduced to stimulate this. Up to 1996, official statistics 
shows that the output value of the livestock-raising and the aquaculture 
reached 550 million yuan, which accounted for 45.4% of the gross value of 
the agriculture.232  
 
 Summary 
 
The period from 1992 to 1997 showed that agriculture in Li County was 
moving forward although it was not easy, with the structure of the 
agricultural products gradually being adapted to the County’s natural 
conditions. This paved the road to agriculture industrialisation. The 
importance of traditional products such as grain, cotton, and rapeseed oil 
declined while the role of cash crops accordingly increased. Depending on 
different geographical locations, the agricultural specialities in the County 
diversified, with vegetables in areas near Liyang Township, large-scale 
                                                 
230 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
231 For more details about the reappearance of traditional livestock-raising in Li County in 
the 1980s, see the section of “working on household units; the division of the labour within 
a household” of Chapter Two p. 128 – 131.  
232 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, (Loudi: 
Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 170. 
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grain or cotton production in the plain areas, a courtyard economy of melons 
and fruits in hilly areas, and aquaculture in lake areas.233In response to the 
commercialised economy and led by the local governments and cadres, 
some indigenous brands of agricultural products appeared for the first time, 
such as Shuanglong watermelons, Zhanggongmiao peppers, Xiaodukou 
strawberries, the Lidong lotus and so on. 234   
 
       This was also an exploratory period, associated with innovation and 
breakthrough. This required the local cadres and peasants to be adventurous 
enough to try new things, and to be tough enough to survive doubts and 
criticisms in times of failure. What supported them to survive this hard 
period is not only the encouragement of the Central Government and other 
political superiors, but also the deep popular desire for the better life. A lot 
of stories emerged during the field research, in which experiments and 
failure seemed to be very close friends. Fortunately, the stubborn rural 
people of Li County have never given up. Later in 2000s, the little sparkles 
in that exploratory period set a great fire. The story below is just one of 
these little sparkles. 
 
A Story of Mr W Xianrong: a Specialist in Grape Planting and a Pioneer 
in Grape Industrialisation235 
 
      The story of Mr W Xianrong is an  exceptional case. He was a peasant in 
Zengjia Village of Xiaodukou Township. In his forties, he is a well-known 
grapes specialist and also has been one of the pioneers of the grape 
industrialisation in Li County. His entrepreneurial idea germinated in 
                                                 
233 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 420. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Wang’s story below is based on the reports of Changde Daily, Hunan Daily, and Annals 
of Li County 1990 - 1996. For more details about Wang’s story, see Xu, Deqing; Wen, Jin; 
and Yao, Li,  “The Road to Grapes Entrepreneurship”, Changde Daily Online, 24 July 2011, 
p. 1 (accessed on 6 November 2014); Liu, Wentao, “The stories of the Representatives of 
the Seventeenth Party Congress: Mr Wang Xianrong, a Grape Specialist”, Hunan Daily, 
2007, reprinted on Chinese Communist Party News Net on: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64104/78694/6009268.html (accessed on 7 November 
2014) and  Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 
1996, (Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 266.   
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October 1986, when he failed in the national college entrance exam and 
travelled to Sichuan for fun. In a local agricultural product market, there was 
a type of grape which was so big and tasty that it attracted his attention. As 
an educated high school graduate, he could not help asking why the grapes 
in his home village had never been as tasty as this one and how he could 
grow such grapes. With these questions in mind, he traced these grapes to a 
vineyard owned by Professor M, a grape specialist in Southwest 
Agricultural University. Mr W decided to stay and to learn the grape 
planting technology from Professor M. 
 
      He spent two years there. In the winter of 1988, he bade his teacher 
farewell and returned home, with 5,000 grapes of the special type which his 
teacher gave to him as a gift. With the support of local village cadres, Mr W 
rented seven mu of dry lands from his village committee and set up his 
vineyard. He spent days and nights on the lands carefully tending the grape 
seedlings for another two years.  In 1990 his grapes began to emerge and the 
output per mu reached 2,500 kilogram, the net profit of which was around 
50,000 yuan. In 1992 when the County Party Committee and the County 
Government called for adjustments in the structure of agricultural products, 
he decided to take a chance and to expand his grape business. He rented 20 
mu of dry lands from Zengjia Village and introduced more than 20 new 
types of grapes such as Red Sunset, Honey Juice, and Red Autumn to 
expand his business. 
 
      This was also the period when many others in the county experimented 
with new types of agricultural products. In spite of his technology, Mr W 
met some acute difficulties. In the summer of 1993, due to the heat and the 
humid climate in Li County, and also because he lacked experience with so 
many new types of grapes, 20 mu of grapes were infected by a severe grape 
disease which spread so fast that he faced a risk of a total loss. To seek 
solutions, he went to the Plant Protection Station of Li County, the Bureau 
of Economic Crops of Department of Agriculture of Hunan Province, and 
the Hunan Academy of Agriculture Science. However, apart from 
diagnosing this disease as anthracnose, no expert could give an effective 
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solution. With the recommendation of some experts in the Bureau of 
Economic Crops, he finally found Professor Shi Xuehui, a well-known 
specialist in grape planting at Hunan Agriculture University. She came up 
with seven solutions and Mr W took them with him back home. Over 15 
days and nights, Mr W tried all seven solutions and finally managed to 
control the disease. In August of that year, his grapes not only survived, but 
also, with advanced technology and careful tending, grew unprecedentedly 
red, big and tasty. The net profit reached more than 100,000 yuan.              
 
  From this experience, Mr W realised the importance of advanced 
technology. Since then, he and Professor Shi began their long term 
friendship and cooperation in the grape business. In 1994, they published a 
book named The Management Technology of the Quality Production of 
Grapes. Mr W has not yet stopped his efforts to innovate. He went to 
Shenzhen and Guangzhou to observe the grape market and found the 
Eurasian raisin grape was in demand. He wanted to introduce this type to Li 
County, but the Eurasian raisin grape had never grown in South China due 
to the geological and climate conditions. One after another, he went to see 
the experts in Hunan Agriculture University and Beijing for guidance on 
growing that grape. However all of the experts concluded that this was 
impossible. Once again, stubbornness drove Mr W to go on. In 1993, he 
spent 130,000 yuan and asked the experts in Hunan Agriculture University 
to help him to buy 120 types of the Eurasian raisin grapes. 
 
   For the next two years, he spent all of his time in his fields and on a 
study of meteorological data in Li County - doing experiments, observing 
seedlings in the fields, and recording the whole growing process including 
budding, flowering and fruiting every day. There were no precedents and 
nobody could tell him how to proceed, so he could only rely on the data and 
his own experiments. In 1996, he finally concluded that the Eurasian raisin 
grape had never grown in South China because there was a timing gap 
between the South and the North in terms of blooming. Based on his own 
research conclusions, he began to graft some of his grapes. After two years, 
in 1998, his Eurasian raisin grapes fruited with a high yield. To thank the 
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experts in Hunan Agriculture University, he took the Eurasian raisin grapes 
grown in his vineyard to visit them. The experts were surprised and could 
not believe that a peasant, born and bred, had succeeded in growing the 
Eurasian raisin grapes - and in overcoming the problem of the red type of 
these grapes not developing their colour in the South, by adapting it to the 
conditions of South China. He had indeed become a specialist in grape 
planting. 
 
  For many peasants who sought for a better life, 1992 to 1998 was a 
period of exploring, experimenting, researching and re-experimenting – to 
develop attractive products for the market. Some of them finally succeeded 
like Mr W, while even more experienced failure. When they entered the 
2000s, the successful ones persisted and even integrated their neighbours 
from the same villages and townships into their businesses, so as to establish 
industrial chains. Those who failed could either join the successful ones or 
go to coastal cities to work. In both cases, the incomes of the peasants 
greatly increased and their living conditions have improved accordingly.236 
However, to return to the 1990s, agricultural industrialisation had yet not 
become a common phenomenon. That, plus the problems that are discussed 
below, meant that most peasants led bitter lives and rural society stagnated.                        
 
3.2.2 The Decline of the First Generation of the TVEs, and their 
Transformation with Birth Pangs 
 
Like the agriculture sector, the TVEs which had mushroomed in the mid-
1980s entered a tough period after the end of that decade. It was argued that 
one of the reasons was mismanagement. The other was a combination of a 
shortage of market knowledge and information which caused blind 
production, and low technology, resulting in over-production of certain 
products and ensuing losses. Without support from high technology, the 
TVEs in the 1980s had mainly relied on exploiting nearby natural resources, 
which caused serious pollution and damage to the environment. After 
                                                 
236 For more details, see Chapter Four, p. 305-312. 
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Deng’s South Tour in 1992, in response to these problems and in order to 
stimulate economic development, the Central Government shifted the 
emphasis of policy from encouraging the establishment of indigenous TVEs 
to attracting external investments in the coastal cities, to develop the 
foreign-funded enterprises. The phrase of “attracting investment in business” 
(zhaoshang yinzi) thus become one of the most popular term during this 
time. 
 
       On 22 September 1992, Mr W GH, the then deputy secretary of the 
County Party Committee, gave clear guidance in his report to the seventh 
County Party Congress, which set the direction in which the TVEs would 
develop between 1992 and 1997. 237 His comments were divided into two 
parts. First, for the established TVEs, the key point was to stop losses and to 
make profits. To achieve this, on the one hand, the government agencies 
should pursue preferential policies. Relative autonomy should be given to 
the enterprises by gradually moving from comprehensive control by 
government agencies to control via “three ones” - including one 
manager/head of the factory, one contract, and one ratio by which the profit 
would link with work performance - and a performance auditing system 
should be established to evaluate the duties and responsibilities of the heads 
of the enterprises. On the other, internally, the enterprises should become 
determined to innovate technologically, which could be realised through co-
operation with large scale, high technology enterprises.          
 
         Second, the sub-county party committees and governments were 
called upon to shift their focus and energy to attracting external fund and 
resources into local enterprises, and, through their co-operation, to stimulate 
new economic growth points.  This kind of co-operation generally was 
realised in the form of the foreign-funded enterprises and in the form of the 
“three processes and one compensation (sanlai yibu)” enterprises. The 
foreign-funded enterprises included Chinese-foreign joint ventures, 
Chinese-foreign cooperative businesses, and exclusively foreign-owned 
                                                 
237 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996,  
(Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 1-5. 
169 
 
enterprises. The enterprises of “three processes and one compensation” were 
the main form in which many rural enterprises took to make use of the 
external investments and resources, and referred to the enterprises that 
process raw materials on clients’ demands, assemble parts for the clients 
following the clients’ samples, or engage in compensation trade. 238 
Although during this time, the government still insisted on a strategy of co-
development of “four wheels”,239 the focus of the substantial support, in 
practice, gradually shifted from support for TVEs to the development of 
private enterprises.240 
 
 First Generation TVEs Going Downhill  
 
In order to illustrate the situation of the TVEs in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Mr L, who is the deputy governor of Daping Township and the 
former vice-governor of Taiqing Township in charge of the TVEs in the 
1990s, explained things in more detail. 241   Taking his township as an 
example, in the 1980s, it had a coal mine and an iron mine. At first, they 
could make good profits and many villagers rushed into the mines at slack 
time to earn extra money. However, there were no clear regulations on the 
management and the boundaries between the authority and the duties 
belonging respectively to government agencies and enterprises. This 
confusion badly affected the operations and efficiency of the enterprises. 
Sometimes the government had a hand in making decisions, especially in 
terms of personnel or finance. So in practice, in many cases, instead of 
acting as individual economic entities, these enterprises served as agencies 
of government. They assumed some of the responsibilities that were 
supposed to belong to the government, such as creating job opportunities for 
surplus rural labourers, and pooling funds for public goods like road paving 
                                                 
238 Compensation trade, also called counter trade, refers to a form of co-operation in which 
foreign businesses provide machines, equipment, tools, raw materials, technology, or staff 
training which is paid for, in whole or part, by Chinese enterprises in kind -- with produced 
goods, rather than money.    
239 For more details about the origin and the content of this strategy in 1980s, see Chapter 
Two, p.103-108. 
240 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996,  
(Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 5. 
241 Interview 2012/02/18. 
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or setting up street lamps. Even worse, the TVEs in some places provided 
shelters for shadow incomes of the persons in charge, either on the boards of 
enterprises or in the government. In addition, loans to the TVEs could be 
misappropriated for other purposes.      
 
       These problems of mismanagement actually arose as early as in 1980s. 
However, as the policy atmosphere at that time was loose, as long as they 
contributed to economic development and increased the incomes of peasants, 
governments actors would treat them with “one eye open, one eye closed” 
and concealed their internal problems. However, with deepening 
marketisation, the TVEs ultimately had to face market competition as 
individual economic entities. The problems with management and with the 
poor quality of their products reduced their ability to compete in the market 
with large high-tech enterprises. Slowly, the once promising TVEs began to 
languish. Especially in the late of 1980s, it could be seen that many TVEs 
were in deficit and their profits were far too small to cover expenses. By 
then, not only were they no longer money spinners, they became hot 
potatoes for local governments.  
 
        In addition to mismanagement and non-regulation, another reason for 
Central Government’s shift of emphasis from indigenous to foreign-funded 
enterprises was that the first generation TVEs in the 1980s were 
ecologically and environmentally unsustainable. The case of Ms M of 
Zhanggongmiao Township made this point.242 She, her husband and two 
sons are peasants, located in the low lands of Liyang Plain. In the collective 
era when most women got fewer points for a day’s work than men, she 
always got as many points as male labourers by virtue of her ability to 
perform labour. In the 1980s, relying simultaneously on hard work in their 
allotted fields and on a household brick factory, she and her husband 
became one of only a few “wanyuanhu” in their village and even stood out 
among their fellow villagers by building their own two-story house. 243 She 
                                                 
242 Interview 2011/12/29b. 
243 Wanyuan hu was a popular term around the time of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. It 
literally refers to the household with the annual income of a minimum 10,000 yuan. It was 
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also raised many chickens in a free range way and being organically fed, her 
chickens’ fresh eggs were tastier than those commercially raised in towns. 
These agricultural products were an important income sources for their 
family. Her prosperity made her generous and confident. 
 
       The bricks produced by her household workshop were made of the clay 
or soil from the surface of the fields. They were the main construction 
materials for house building in the areas along Yangtze River Valley. Before 
1978, the way to make bricks was to dry unburned bricks of clay and straw 
under the sun in an open area. It is said that houses made of such bricks 
were able to keep heat in during the winter and to cool down in the summer. 
The weakness was their ugly appearance, dark interiors and their inability to 
resist heavy rain and floods which were the main dangers in the River Li 
Valley. Therefore, in the 1980s, and especially after 1985 when the income 
of many peasant households had increased, a wave of house building began 
in Li County, with improved construction materials - red bricks - for two-
story house. This accordingly stimulated the development of many small-
scale household workshops for brick production and lime processing. 244 In 
addition to the demand, the mushrooming of these small workshops was 
also based on low requirements for technology and easy access to raw 
materials in rural areas. Ms M’s household workshop followed suit and 
helped her family to earn their first pot of gold.  
 
       However, on the other hand, most such household workshops for brick 
producing, coal mining, and lime processing were not equipped with a 
smoke processing facility, and the emissions of the unprocessed heavy 
smoke seriously polluted the environment and caused crops in the 
neighbourhood to wither and die, not to mention the negative impact on the 
health of nearby peasants. In addition, the over-exploitation of the surface of 
fertile fields destroyed the reproductive ability and quality of the agricultural 
lands which, in the long run, reduced the productivity of arable lands. This 
                                                                                                                            
commonly used to refer to households which, through diligent working, had reached that 
income. Compared with the term “opportunists with policy”, it was a relatively honourable 
title.  
244 Interviews 2011/12/29b, 2012/02/18, 2012/02/18b. 
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was only the tip of an iceberg to indicate the non-sustainability of these 
primitive rural enterprises.  A typical case seen in Li County was that the 
mining of saltpetre and coal caused a sinking of the surface of the land 
which endangered the peasants’ lives. Considering these problems, starting 
from late 1990s, the Central Government has introduced a series of 
regulations to rectify matters. 245 In terms of brick production, in around 
2000, the Central Government called upon 567 cities throughout the country 
to ban the production of the burnt red bricks. After losing the shelter of the 
old policy and sandwiched between the state-owned enterprises and the 
privileged private enterprises in the 1990s, many rural indigenous 
enterprises struggled to compete in the market.  Some even faced a severe 
situation. This doomed the TVEs in the 1990s.  
 
      Mr. Wen Tiejun, one of the renowned experts on agricultural reform 
policy who used to work in the Policy Research Office of the State Council, 
expressed similar views in an interview in 2008 when he was asked why the 
TVEs of China in the 1990s had gone into a downward spiral. 246 For him, 
although it took 1.7 million to 1.8 million rural labourers out of the fields 
every year up to 1988, the TVE boom in the early and middle 1980s could 
alternatively be read as chaotic, and characterised by non-regulation and 
environmental destruction. Due to the lack of systematic and rational 
planning for resources, and for ecological and economic development, the 
damage to the environment was severe.247 He also concluded that these were 
inevitable results in the phase of primitive accumulation towards an 
industrialised society. 248  From an ecological perspective, primitive 
accumulation was based on the abuse of national resources that was 
unbearable and unsustainable. However, for thousands of peasants who had 
                                                 
245 For example, in terms of deforestation, in 2003, the Central Government issued a lot of 
regulations and laws to protect forest resources and to ban deforestation. These regulations 
and laws include the report on the development of forestry in China, the decision of the 
Central Committee and the State Council on speeding up the development of forestry, and a 
campaign named ‘green sword’ which focused on rectifying the crime of deforestation.    
246“The origin and the fate of TVEs: is it time for TVEs to withdraw from the historical 
stage?”, People’s Daily Online, 2007, available on: 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1045/5657214.html (accessed on 30 Dec 2012). 
247 Ibid.  
248 Ibid. 
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just been released from a quasi-militarised management of collective 
economy - many of whom were illiterate and lacked scientific knowledge 
and who had suffered poverty for a long time – were not concerned with a 
proportionate and sustainable balance between the economy and nature. 
Their priority was instant monetary benefits.  
 
     The accumulation  of all these internal and external problems of non-
sustainability, including the blurred ownership, mismanagement, 
unfamiliarity with gradual marketisation, and stricter regulations on the 
environment pollution, had  a dramatic effect  on the TVEs in Li County in 
the 1990s. Some ever-prosperous industries such as coal mining and 
gypsum mining had vastly shrunk, year upon year after 1996.  At their peak, 
they had employed 10,557 with a gross production value of 273.3 million 
yuan. By 2002, only three mining enterprises, with 945 employees and a 
gross production value of 27.11 million yuan were left, a reduction of 
90.1%!249 In addition, the shift in financial policy caused many TVEs to 
lose their monetary umbrella, so that the situation was even worse. In his 
book Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the 
State, Huang Yasheng, by going through more than twenty volumes of 
detailed bank documents, directives and regulations, and a series of 
household income surveys and private-sector firm surveys,  identified a 
substantial policy shift in the 1990s in terms of rural finance. He found that 
“many of the very productive financial experiments were terminated and 
credit constraints on small-scale, low-tech, and labour-intensive rural 
entrepreneurship were tightened”. 250  The policy was reoriented from 
favouring “small-scale, low-tech, and labour-intensive rural 
entrepreneurship” to an emphasis on “technocratic development” and an 
industrial policy approach in favour of large and heavy-investment-oriented 
firms.251 This view is supported by evidence from Li County. 
 
                                                 
249 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 251. 
250 Huang, Yasheng, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the 
State, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 50 – 109. 
251 Ibid., p. 110. 
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       Table 3.1 below shows a breakdown of various loans in Li County from 
1989 to 2001.  It is clearly seen that after 1989, 1990 was the low point at 
which loans for TVEs were reduced by nearly 50%, while in 1991 there was 
a slight increase, and 1992 witnessed the start of another round of huge 
investments in the TVEs. However, it is worth noting that although the 
number of loans has kept increasing since 1992, compared to before 1989, 
priority has been given only to certain enterprises to support their scaling up 
and to improve their technologies. These enterprises have some 
characteristics in common – large-scale, high-tech, high return rates, and 
high promise to attract investments from foreign and domestic sources - and 
include, for example, Lizhou Beer Brewery, Ganxi Cement Factory, 
Matoupu Cement Factory, Thousands’ Family Coal Saving Stove of Li 
County, Xue Song Chemical Factory of Li County and so on.252 The slogan 
used then by the Agriculture Bank and the Rural Credit Co-operatives - the 
main organisations in charge of the TVEs loans - was to “compress the 
general enterprises while guaranteeing the leading ones”.253 On the other 
hand, for private and household enterprises, after a high point in 1989, loans 
began to be vastly compressed as the data below show until 1994 when, 
with the policy’s preference for private enterprises, the loans slightly 
increased. In 1997, loans for private and household enterprises reached 
14.78 million yuan, the highest point in the 1990s, but after that, due to a 
policy of further compression, it declined again.254 
 
     
                                                 
252 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p.397. 
253 Ibid., p. 398. 
254 Ibid., p. 399. 
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Table 3.1 A Statistics of various Financial Loans in Li County from 1989 – 
2001  
 
Sources: Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p.402.              
 
       By using such macro-control levers, governments have successfully 
concentrated money, materials and human resources on the leading 
enterprises while they left other low-tech, low tax return and labour-
intensive enterprises in a bad situation, some even facing bankruptcy. In 
1998, one year after the Law of Township and Village Enterprises of the 
PRC was put into effect, Li County began publicly and systematically to 
tackle the ownership issue of the TVEs.255 By being privatised or by having 
the right of management sold off, the township-owned and village-owned 
enterprises were transformed into private undertakings. By 2002, the total 
                                                 
255 Ibid., p. 253. 
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1989 447.72 90.45 194.36 62.01 61.90 8.45 7.49 23.06 
1990 540.15 114.36 318.48 55.80 31.03 7.23 0.18 13.07 
1991 641.97 150.50 367.20 59.31 41.49 10.94 0.18 12.35 
1992 814.36 140.86 454.90 84.46 86.89 27.28 0.17 19.80 
1993 920.97 155.11 501.87 96.36 99.44 48.97 0.37 18.85 
1994 1,249.51 161.28 598.82 91.17 139.39 78.04 3.89 176.92 
1995 1,561.40 165.72 777.05 120.68 171.64 113.57 4.75 207.99 
1996 1,828.24 189.64 930.46 158.76 167.16 172.10 7.22 202.90 
1997 2,215.44 202.42 1,185.24 153.13 194.19 219.05 14.78 246.63 
1998 2,169.67 214.21 1,099.31 182.18 201.59 193.26 2.64 276.48 
1999 2,247.75 198.05 1,263.90 185.06 106.79 146.30 1.34 234.16 
2000 2,149.94 179.49 1,316.12 123.02 146.86 175.33 1.19 207.93 
2001 2,349.53 168.14 1,461.40 122.06 151.51 227.09 1.16 218.17 
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number of TVEs was 14,570, of which 6 % were collectively-owned while 
94% were privately owned. 256  The following three sub-sections of this 
chapter, represent three steps in which the County Party Committee and the 
County Government rectified the TVEs and stimulated continuous 
economic development. This explains in more detail the transformation of 
the TVEs and the establishment of the second generation of new rural 
enterprises in the 1990s.  
 
 The transformation of the established TVEs  
 
In an article published in the Journal of Internal Reference of the Changde 
prefecture city Party Committee, Mr Wan Zhongtan, the then deputy party 
secretary of Li County, concluded that for the established TVEs, there were 
six methods which could revive the TVEs.257 The first was to rectify some 
TVEs which were in deficit by transferring property rights. This method 
was used mainly for enterprises which were too financially burdened to 
keep operating. By transferring parts of the property, these enterprises could 
get some money to maintain operations and gain an opportunity to repay 
debts or even make profits through later improvements in technology. The 
cement factory of Matoupu Township was a typical case. Due to 
mismanagement, this factory had a deficit of 45 million yuan, which forced 
it to stop operation in 1997. The next year, with the guidance of the 
government, it took action to divide its property into different parts and 
transferred two production lines with a producing capacity of 88,000 tons to 
the rural credit co-operative of Li County at a price of 15.85 million yuan. 
Although it was not enough to pay off the debts, at least this amount enabled 
                                                 
256 Ibid.  
257 The tradition of the Journal of Internal Reference comes from the Internal Reference of 
Xinhua News Agency. It is a confidential document which is only circulated within the 
Xinhua News Agency and the top level of the CCP. The content is mainly about important 
political information, including political attitudes, the direction of decision-making of the 
leadership and so on. The party committees below the Central government follow suit and 
circulate their own journals of Internal Reference. The one mentioned here was issued by 
the Party Committee of Changde prefecture city. It was reprinted in Compilation office for 
chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, (Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong 
Geological Press, 1999), p. 77 – 78.  
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the factory to start operating and bought time for continuous transformation, 
aiming to make a profit.258 
 
      The second method was to change the structure of property rights. In 
addition to transferring some parts of the property rights at a price to 
financial institutions, this method focused on changing the structure of the 
ownership from a mainly unitary structure of township or village owners to 
a private-orientated structure through several forms such as shareholding, 
renting in contract, or selling off. After 1998, the TVEs in Li County began 
to reform property rights through privatisation with the township-owned 
units turning to share-holding, and the village-owned units to renting the 
right to manage by contract.259 This coincided with the encouragement of 
the Central Government during this period on the development of private 
enterprises. By 2002 when the reform was nearly done, the structure of the 
TVEs in Li County became a diverse combination of share-holding, share-
cooperation, private enterprises and the private household businesses.260 
Among 14,570 TVEs in 2002, the collectively-owned only accounted for 6% 
while the privately-owned accounted for 94% with the latter contributing 79% 
of the gross output value.261 The label ‘TVEs’ gradually disappeared from 
use and was replaced by ‘private enterprises’.   
 
      To some degree, the privatisation of the property rights of the 
enterprises strengthened the sense of the ownership of the heads and the 
share-holders so as to hold them responsible for the performance of the 
enterprises. For example, the township-owned cement factory and coal mine 
in Zhakou Township were sold off due to the bankruptcy, caused by severe 
deficit. 262  For most village-owned enterprises, this township decided to 
adopt shareholding or renting in contract, to pool funds for operations. By 
the end of 1996, private enterprises accounted for 82.7 % of the total 
                                                 
258 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, (Loudi: 
Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 77. 
259 Ibid., p. 13. 
260 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p.249. 
261 Ibid., p. 253. 
262 Ibid,. p. 273. 
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number of enterprises within the township.263 The glazed roof tile factory of 
Mengxi Township had been in deficit as high as 800,000 yuan since it was 
established in 1996. In July 1998, the factory followed the suggestion of the 
government and sold its shares to four shareholders at a price of 1.18 
million yuan, which not only helped the factory to pay off debts, but also 
injected funds to stimulate its operation.264Also, the change in the ownership 
structure held shareholders responsible for efficiency and profit, improving 
the performance of the enterprises.  
 
      The third method was aimed at enterprises the products of which were 
promising, competitive, and integrated high technology, but which stopped 
operations due to a break in the liquidity chain. To help them to survive this 
difficulty, the County Government helped the township governments to 
strengthen attractiveness to external investors, to obtain loans from financial 
institutions, and to encourage internal fundraising via a form of 
shareholding, by which 148 million yuan were raised in 1998, to enable 130 
enterprises within the County to operate fully. 265 In addition, some of these 
funds were used to sustain the daily operations of the enterprises, while 
others contributed to renovations of technology or to the development of the 
new products so as to improve the competitive capacity of the enterprises in 
the market. This is the fourth method.  
 
        Centred on the circulation of goods, the fifth method fully 
demonstrated the great effort made by local governments. The circulation 
stage is one of the most important in the market economy. In order to help 
the enterprises find selling channels, between 1990 and 1996, the County 
Party Committee and the County Government called up the business 
enterprises and relevant functional departments of government to take part 
in Investment and Trade Fairs which took place in Shenzhen and Hong 
Kong in August 1990, March 1993, and September of 1992, 1993 and 1996; 
Trade Fairs in Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Changde and Changsha in March 
                                                 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid., p. 77. 
265 Ibid. 
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1992 and September 1996; and others in Changde, Shanghai and Changsha. 
266 At these fairs, Li County received the representatives of 120 foreign 
enterprises and promoted 100 of its products and projects. In addition, 
various enterprises also actively took part in the trade fairs in their own 
areas. For example, the Hunan Guoren Brewery Co. Ltd made great efforts 
to expand its selling channels and to develop new markets by taking part in 
the China sugar and wine trade fairs every year. In one in October 1998, 
they sealed a contract to supply 60,000 tons of goods.267  
 
      Finally, in terms of personnel selection, the County Government 
encouraged the enterprises not to trap themselves into an old framework of 
always following superiors’ orders. Instead, personnel, especially at the 
management level, should be selected on their talents. Take Gengshan 
Cement Factory as an example. Its previous head had been in this role for 
many years. He was appointed on political orders from the government. 
However, with the deepening market economy, his approach to management 
could not keep the pace with changes. In 1997, this factory, with a 
producing ability of 88,000 tons could only produce 23,000 tons of cement 
and only earned a few thousand yuan in revenue, with a deficit of 1.6 
million yuan. The factory had to stop operating in October 1997. Through a 
public vote, Mr H, the then chief finance officer, was elected to take the lead. 
The township government rented the factory to him, and just in the first half 
of 1998, it produced 35,000 tons. It earned revenue of 300,000 yuan, 10 
times of the amount before it was rented. 268                
 
 The entry of foreign-funded enterprises:  
 
Foreign-funded enterprises were still new for Li County at the beginning of 
the 1990s. The first Chinese-foreign joint enterprise was established there in 
July 1992. Called the Hunan Quansheng Clothes Limited Company, this 
                                                 
266 Ibid., p. 97. 
267 Ibid., p. 77. 
268 Ibid., p. 78. 
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enterprise focused on garment processing. 269  Between 1990 and1999, 
following the call by the Central Government for a shift of development 
strategy from the indigenous TVEs to the foreign-funded enterprises, the Li 
County Party Committee and the County Government integrated this 
strategy into their agenda and attracted many external investments. This 
strategy had two elements, to address both soft and hard environments. 
 
      Consider the soft environment first. In order to provide efficient service, 
at the end of 1995, the County Party Committee and the County 
Government decided to establish a new governmental department in charge 
of examining and approving the establishment of new enterprises, called the 
Business Promotion Bureau of Li County (lixian zhaoshangju).270 It had 
seven employees. Functioning as an agency of the County Government, it 
was in charge of international business and economic links, including the 
promotion trade, liaisons between potential clients and foreign entrepreneurs, 
and the coordination of the foreign-funded projects. It was the first 
government department to offer a one-stop facility to collect fees and 
approve applications, by speeding things up. 271  
 
      Furthermore, in 1996, the County Party Committee and the County 
Government issued a series of favourable policies to attract foreign 
entrepreneurs - either to cooperate with local enterprises or to set up new 
enterprises, and to stimulate local cadres to make full use of their social 
networks and various resources to introduce foreign funds into Li County.272 
With the focus on resource-intensive and labour-intensive industries, highly 
efficient agricultural industries, and the tourism industry, these policies not 
only strengthened the leadership role of governments at county and 
township levels, but also gave administrative privileges to foreign-funded 
enterprises.  It also set up a reward fund to stimulate local cadres.  
 
                                                 
269 Ibid., p. 189. 
270 Ibid., p. 97. 
271 Ibid. 
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      The County Party Committee and the County Government set up a 
leadership group in charge of attracting external investment and 
enterprises.273  Headed by the Secretary of the County Party Committee, 
with the Governor of the County Government as the deputy group leader, it 
was composed of the persons in charge, respectively, of the Commission of 
Discipline Inspection, Supervision Bureau, Planning Bureau, Commodity 
Price Bureau, Land and Resource Bureau, Labour Bureau, Industry and 
Commerce Bureau, State Taxation Bureau, Local Taxation Bureau, 
Municipal and Construction Bureau, Environment Protection Bureau, 
Electricity Power Administration and other functional departments such as 
police, procurators, courts, etc.    
 
       In order to hold local cadres responsible specifically for the foreign 
trade and economy, the County Party Committee and the County 
Government authorised the Business Promotion Bureau to divide the annual 
tasks into small portions and distribute them among governmental 
departments and bureaus. These tasks were further integrated into the ‘post 
responsibility evaluation system’ (gangwei zerenzhi kaopingzhi), in which 
the performance of each relevant department and bureau would be assessed 
and graded twice a year. Poor performances, those which scored below 80%, 
would entail the disqualification of a cadre from promotion. 274 Combined 
with a leadership group full of the heads of important administrative 
departments, this method, which was known as ‘one veto power’ (yipiao 
foujue) and was applied to the task of one child policy of family planning in 
1980s, plainly shows that the County concentrated its strength behind the 
push to attract foreign-funded enterprises.  This was a priority on its agenda 
in the 1990s. In the long run, this strategy had the potential to benefit the 
county economy. However, the over-heated infrastructure building which 
this strategy required actually caused many problems in rural areas in the 
1990s.   
                                                 
273  The County Party Committee and the County Government, “A decision on greatly 
Developing the export-orientated economy”, 1996, reprinted in Compilation office for 
chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, (Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong 
Geological Press 1999), p. 287. 
274 Ibid.  
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        In addition, a series of preferential policies and rewards were put in 
place. A decision  to encourage an export-orientated economy by the County 
Committee and the County Government stipulated that the foreign-funded 
enterprises in Li County were eligible to enjoy maximum privileges at the 
discretion of the County Government - in land acquisition, approval 
procedures, and fee collections.275 People who introduced foreign funds and 
contributed greatly to the development of an export-oriented economy, were 
not only  amply rewarded, but also given  priority in terms of the issues such 
as changes of family members from rural to urban residents, and being 
recruited as workers. For the townships and organisations which succeeded 
in attracting funds beyond 2 million US dollars, and in attracting 10 million 
yuan worth of projects, the persons in charge would be rewarded by 
promotion or recorded merits. The County Government even used some of 
its increased tax revenues to set up a reward fund.276 
   
        The two issues mentioned above – change from rural residents to urban 
residents and recruitment to become workers - were attractive for rural 
cadres and the ordinary  people because at that time, the urban-oriented 
strategy of the 1990s left a big gap between the rural areas and the urban 
areas in terms of living conditions and social status. Becoming an urban 
resident was a dream for most rural residents since in the mid-1990s the 
financial burdens on peasants soared. In order to improve their living 
conditions and to escape serious financial burdens, many rural residents 
sought energetically to change their status as rural residents. Being recruited 
to become workers was one way. This topic will be discussing in more 
detail in the next section.  
 
       The other part of the strategy dealt with hard environments - that is, 
infrastructure building, to improve transport, electricity supplies, 
telecommunications, etc.  As early as September 1992 when the seventh 
County Party Congress was convened, Mr Y Guanghong proposed an 
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infrastructure building plan including ten projects to create a good 
investment environment to attracting foreign funds. These included Lizhou 
economic development area, Yanzhou power plant, Yanghukou electrical 
discharge project, Dinggongqiao shopping mall, Lizhou trade market, a 
trunk road connecting Jinshi county-level City and 207 national roads, one 
main road in Liyang Township, one square, and one telecommunications 
building. By June 1997 when the eighth County Party Congress was 
convened, the County had invested 600 million yuan in infrastructure and 
had finished 80% of ten proposed projects with the first phase of Yanzhou 
power plant being completed.277  
 
       On the one hand, much improvement occurred and helped to attract 
foreign funds. Up to 2002, 45 foreign-funded enterprises were established in 
Li County, among which 23 enterprises were Chinese-foreign joint 
enterprises; two were Chinese-foreign cooperatives; and 17 were 
exclusively foreign-owned.278 Among them were Wangcheng Real Estate 
Limited Company established in December 1993 (Taiwanese-owned), 
Xiangbei Werierman Pharmaceutic Company established in May 1995 
(Hongkong-owned), Yiqiao Pharmaceutic Company in May 1996, the 
Ronglong Clothes Limited Company in July 1998, and Yingsheng Textile 
Limited in December 2000 - all involving investments beyond 1 million US 
dollars. They became the leading foreign-funded enterprises in Li County.279 
To some degree, these enterprises increased job opportunities for surplus 
peasant labourers, some of whom failed to run their own indigenous 
workshops like Ms M mentioned above. Also, as most of these enterprises 
involved high technology, working for them gave many illiterate peasants 
opportunities to learn new skills.280 
 
       However, on the other hand, the drive to improve infrastructure took 
place at a time when agriculture and the industry experienced testing 
                                                 
277 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, (Loudi: 
Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 12. 
278 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House. 2012), p.277. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Interview 2013/01/11. 
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transformations and did not reach a level at which high revenues could be 
guaranteed. Meanwhile, not only did the Central Government shift their 
policy focus from the rural areas to the urban and coastal, but also in 1994, 
the Central Government began to introduce a new taxation system, ‘taxation 
sharing’, which led local governments into severe financial difficulty. 
Sandwiched between the pressure from above to develop foreign-funded 
enterprises and pressure to perform tasks such as the provision of public 
goods, while local industry and agriculture were experiencing 
transformation and could not supply enough revenues, local governments 
had to pass these pressures on to the peasants. The soaring financial burdens 
on peasants and the heavy debts of township government and village 
authorities were by-products of the over-heated pursuit of an export-oriented 
economy.281                 
 
 The development of private enterprises 
 
At the beginning of 1990, Li County had 8751 private household businesses 
(geti gongshanghu) and six private enterprises. 6,397 households were 
doing commerce and catering; 793 were doing handicrafts, four were doing 
construction, 562 transportation, and 74 doing other businesses.282 These 
enterprises had 18,683 employees, which accounted for 1.8% of the 
population of the County. 283   Following the call from the Central 
Government, encouraging the development of private enterprises and their 
management became one of the tasks for the County Party Committee and 
the County Government. With the support of the County authorities, 
household businesses and private enterprises mushroomed over the next few 
years. By the end of 1996, private household businesses had increased to 
26,147 and private enterprises to 362, which had a total of 67,223 
                                                 
281 Interviews 2011/12/30, 2012/02/11, 2012/02/14b, 2012/02/18, 2012/02/19.    
282  According to the Company Law and Partnership Law of PRC, private household 
businesses and private enterprises both are in the private economy. The difference between 
them only exists in the number of employees. An enterprise that has less than twenty 
employees would be registered in the Industry and Commerce Bureau as a private 
household business while otherwise an enterprise would be registered as a private 
enterprise.    
283 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, (Loudi: 
Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 191. 
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employees, or 7.9% of the county’s population. 284  Outstanding cases 
included Mr W Changqing’s canvas cloth factory, Mr You Congping’s 
Longfeng coal mine, and Mr L Xianchuan’s Chunlan mattress and furniture 
limited company.  
 
          In 1996, the County Party Committee sent groups respectively to 
Laiyang City of Shandong Province to study share holding companies and 
to Yulin City of Guangxi Province to study private household businesses. 
After hearing the reports from these groups, the County Party Committee 
decided to encourage both types of undertakings. 285 After 1998, the existing 
collectively-owned TVEs began to transform themselves, either into share-
holding enterprises, or were sold off. This greatly increased the ratio of the 
private enterprises to TVEs in Li County. By 2002, private enterprises 
accounted for 94% of all TVEs there, and increased diversity - in terms of 
forms of share-holding, share-cooperation, private household business, and 
privately owned enterprises.286 The term of TVEs has gradually disappeared 
from the daily language of county people and is replaced by private 
enterprises.287 
 
 Summary 
 
In order to revive the TVEs that had been going downhill, following the call 
from the Central Government, the County Party Committee and the County 
Government adopted several methods to stimulate the development of the 
TVEs, as we saw above. Instead of the chaotic model of the TVEs in the 
1980s, the County authority concentrated their efforts on enterprises which 
were resources-intensive, labourer-intensive, equipped with high technology 
and with potential for high revenues.  It gradually encouraged some leading 
enterprises to integrate other medium and small scale businesses into their 
industrial chains. In the long run, based on local resources, this model was 
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285 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, (Loudi: 
Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 92. 
286 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 253. 
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deemed to be sustainable. These leading enterprises not only increased the 
fiscal revenues of government agencies, but also provided opportunities for 
the surplus labourers to work and to learn new skills.   
   
        However, these measures could also be double-edged swords. First, the 
preference for enterprises which were labour-intensive, with high revenue 
returns and high-technology left many indigenous low-tech household 
workshops or small factories behind in a helpless situation. As Ms M 
mentioned above, many peasants at that time were uneducated, illiterate and 
unskilled. Except for exploiting natural resources with primitive skills, they 
did not have other ways to make extra money. In addition, when it entered 
1990s, the whole political environment was conservative and the financial 
regulations became rigorous, as Professor Huang Yasheng argued in his 
book Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the 
State..288 It was hard to get loans for these basic enterprises. So it can be 
argued that enterprises of this kind died out because of uncongenial policies, 
even though they had boomed in 1980s because of earlier preferential 
policies.  
 
       Second, extensive infrastructure building overloaded local governments. 
This forced them to transfer fiscal burdens to the peasants.  These overtook 
income growth and the peasants’ situation deteriorated.  This was one of the 
main reasons that many peasants decided to go to the coastal cities to 
work. 289  Things even became harder after the decentralisation of fiscal 
authority to the township level after 1993 and the introduction of the tax 
sharing system after 1995. Although fiscal discretion had been expanded, 
the duties which township governments had to absorb increased accordingly. 
As agriculture and rural industry were not functioning well at that time, and 
expenditures continued to increase for infrastructure building, the income of 
the sub-county governments usually failed to cover their expenses, and the 
gap between these two things tended to be greatly expanded.  Although the 
                                                 
288 Huang, Yasheng, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the 
State, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 50 – 109. 
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introduction of the tax sharing system in 1995 guaranteed part of the income 
of the county government, it also made the financial situation of the sub-
county areas worse. The fiscal authority that they obtained became the only 
way to channel their funds to provide public goods, to improve the 
infrastructure, and to cover other expenses. Most of these tasks finally were 
paid for via fundraising from the peasants to cover education, health care 
and other administrative functions.      
 
      This interpretation of events was corroborated by Mr. Liao, the head of 
the Business Promotion Bureau of Li County. When he was asked if there 
were any new sources of energy or clean natural resources in the county, he 
said, “Except the coal, lime, gypsum, and saltpetre, we do not have other 
natural resources in Li County. Unlike the areas of Zhejiang or Jiangsu 
which have a long history of such light industries as textile weaving and 
garment production, Li County historically relies on grain, cotton and 
cooking oil production. Our enterprises have to be based on what we have 
and are related either to agriculture or to our natural resources.” When the 
policy began to promote high technology enterprises in the 1990s, an 
agricultural county like Li County was placed at a disadvantage. While this 
strategy stimulated the overall economy of China, it accelerated the further 
differentiation of rural society.  Economic elites emerged while peasants 
became cheap migrant workers.  Rural society suffered disintegration, 
stagnation and some confrontation. 
 
3.3 The Decentralisation of Fiscal Authority and the Imbalance between 
Revenues and Expenditures during the 1990s 
 
3.3.1 Fiscal structure and the composition of revenues and expenditures 
in Li County before 1994 
 
The fiscal structure and the division of revenues and expenses between the 
central and the sub-central levels of government underwent many changes 
after 1949 when the PRC was established. Independent fiscal management 
at the Li County level was not set up until in 1953. Before that, the system 
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was highly centralised.  All revenue was collected and handed in to the 
central government while expenses were then allocated hierarchically 
downward - from the centre to the provinces, from the provinces to the 
counties. 290  Although a finance department was set up in the County 
Government, it mainly acted as an agency to implement the fiscal policy of 
the central government, to inspect the implementation of that policy on 
behalf of the central government, and compile fiscal budgets.291  
 
       After 1953, a three-level structure of fiscal management emerged - 
composed of the central, provincial and county levels - and it remained in 
use until in June 1984 when township fiscal level management was fully 
established. 292  During the period between 1953 and 1983, although the 
three-level hierarchical character of the system did not change, the formulas 
by which revenues have been divided among the three levels, and the ways 
in which expenditures attach to revenues have been changed many times. 
For example, from 1953 to 1957, the division of revenues was fixed and the 
three levels were self-financing for their respective expenses. From 1959 to 
1970, the division of revenues was discussed and agreed in advance once a 
year. In addition, from its extra revenues at the end of each year, the county 
could reserve 20% and had to pass the rest to the province and the central 
government. 293  If the revenues could not cover expenses, the province 
would subsidise the county at a certain ratio. The practice in the period from 
1971 to 1979 was similar, in that the division of revenues was agreed in 
advance. But the portion of extra revenues which the county was able to 
reserve increased year after year from 45% to 80% between 1971 and 1976, 
and then even to 100% in 1977. However, at the same time, the county got 
no subsidies from the province for the expenditure exceeding budgets, and 
that portion of expenditures had to be self-financed. 
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    In the 1980s, with the application of a responsibility system to 
agricultural production and distribution in rural areas, a fiscal responsibility 
system was introduced. As a result, fiscal authority was gradually 
decentralised to give more freedom to the county level, in order to stimulate 
economic development. In March 1980, Li County Finance Bureau and Tax 
Bureau merged to be the Bureau of Finance and Tax and followed the call of 
the central government to introduce a new fiscal system, nicknamed as 
“serving meals to different diners from different pots (fenzao chifan)”.294 In 
addition to a routine division of revenues, obviously, this system 
emphasised full responsibility at various fiscal levels for their respective 
budgets. This system was in use during the period from 1980 to 1984, with 
an adjustment in the way to divide revenue in 1983 from based on the 
scopes of different revenues to a division ratio of gross revenue. Li County 
was entitled to enjoy 62% of gross revenue in 1983. 295  
 
   In May 1984, Bureau of Finance and Tax was separated again into 
Finance Bureau and Tax Bureau. In the next month, with the establishment 
of township administration,  Li County set up 47 township finance offices in 
total to be in charge of the fiscal issues at township level.296 After 1985, the 
fiscal policy became more rigid and after 1987, the county not only needed 
to submit its revenue to the province at a fixed level, but its contribution 
increased at an annual rate of 5%. However, the county had the authority to 
reserve all the extra revenue, while it was fully responsible for its outlays, 
including over-expenditure. 297  This practice was used until 1994.298  The 
revenue of the County was broken down into two parts: budgetary revenue 
and extra-budgetary revenue. The sources of the budgetary revenue were 
mainly from enterprises’ income, industrial and commercial taxes, 
agriculture taxes, subsidies from the higher levels of government, and other 
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income.  The extra-budgetary revenue mainly came from administrative fees 
and government funds, including the funds which the township governments 
raised themselves and fees paid by peasants for township planning.299   
 
    There is very little literature on fiscal management at the commune 
level in Li County before June of 1984 when the People’s Communes were 
replaced by the township governments and finance offices were 
correspondingly set up at township level.300  Forty-seven township finance 
offices were set up in Li County with the establishment of the township 
governments in 1984. These offices mainly acted as agencies of the Li 
County Finance Bureau and were in charge of collecting taxes and fees, and 
planning the fiscal budget at township level. The taxes that they collected 
included agriculture tax, title deed tax (qishui), occupied farmland tax 
(gengdi zhanyong shui), tax on agriculture and forestry speciality (nonglin 
techan shui), value added tax (zengzhi shui), business tax (yingye shui), 
water bills (xianji shuifei), a surtax for education expenses (jiaoyu fujia fei) 
in which the rural areas and the urban areas paid different rates, fundraising 
for capital construction (jiben jianshe jizi) and so on. 301  
 
   The rate of the agriculture tax was decided by two sets of data. One is a 
land survey conducted in the early 1950s and the other is an activity of five 
contract-based confirmations (wuding dabaogan) in the early 1960s. While 
the former decided the size and fertility ability of the lands, the latter, 
through discussion among different levels of authorities, confirmed the 
annual output, the grain submission amount, the agriculture tax rate, etc. 302 
The agriculture tax had a history of more than 3,000 years in China.303 In 
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peasants in Hunan,  A Research on Agriculture Tax Reform and the Issue of the Financial 
Burdens on Peasants, printed by The Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, 1998, 
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history, it had been paid by peasants, either in cash or in grain.304 During the 
time of high collectivisation between 1958 and 1983, this type of tax was 
paid by the production teams in the form of a compulsory grain 
submission. 305  After 1983, the lands were allocated to the individual 
households. In November of 1985, the State Council decided that the form 
of payment of the agriculture tax should be changed from grain to cash. The 
amounts of the grain formerly submitted were converted to amounts in cash 
- at a rate which was calculated by averaging 30% of the state-planned price 
and 70% of the market price. 306  Collections of cash payments were 
undertaken by village cadres who went to each household.307  
 
  On top of the agriculture tax, surtaxes were added in rural areas after 
1985 at rates of 2% of the agriculture tax for the townships, 7% for the 
county, 3% for the prefecture city, and 2% for the province.308 Legitimacy 
for the surtaxes was provided by article 14 of section three of the 
Regulations for the Agriculture Tax of the People’s Republic of China 
(1958), with the aim of government agencies to cover the provision of 
public goods. 309 In addition, taxes for agriculture and forestry speciality 
were not levied in Li County until 1986, with a rate of 5%-8% of the income 
from these products (and an additional surtax was levied at a rate of 14% of 
this tax). After 1987, a tax for farmland occupied for other use than 
agriculture began to be levied as well, at a rate of 4.5–6 yuan per square 
meter.310 Also, a surtax for education expenses in rural areas started to be 
collected in Li County after 1985, at a rate of 5.14 yuan per capita from 
1986 to 1987.  After 1988, the rate was changed to 1.5% of the previous 
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annual income per capita.311 Furthermore, according to interviewees from 
mountainous areas, the rate of the slaughter tax was 3.8 yuan per pig.312    
 
    It was the duty of the township governments to organise the village 
cadres within their jurisdiction to go to each households to collect these 
taxes.313 The taxes and fees would then be handed in full to the agriculture 
finance department of the County Finance Bureau.314 Extra revenues would 
be divided by the County and the townships, based on a fixed and agreed 
ratio.  If the actual revenue of the townships could not meet their budgets, 
the County would subsidise them at a fixed rate as well. To cover 
expenditures, the County Finance Bureau would then directly allocate 
relevant funds on a monthly basis to cover the payroll of the local cadres of 
the township governments, office expenses, and operating costs for culture-
education (wen jiao shiye fei), agriculture-forestry-irrigation (nong lin shui 
shiye fei), and police-justice (gongan sifa shiye fei).  The amounts of these 
specific items were discussed and agreed in advance at the beginning of the 
fiscal year, no matter whether the actual expenses turned out to be more or 
less than those planned. 315  If the allocation was more than the actual 
expenses, the townships had discretion to decide how to use the surplus. 
After 1987, with a yearly increase in the revenues that the county had to 
submit to the province, the amounts which the townships had to pass to the 
county also tended to increase. 316  During this time, the township 
governments had very little freedom to dispose their revenues. This 
centralised control of the county was the practice until 1993.  
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3.3.2 The Decentralisation of fiscal authority and the Introduction of the 
Tax Sharing System in 1994 
 
The years between 1993 and 1995 were crucial since the reform of township 
fiscal management started in 1993 in Li County, the tax sharing system 
between the county and higher levels of government was introduced in 1994 
and in 1995, the fiscal relationship between the county and the sub-county 
followed suit. The combination of these reforms has had a far-reaching 
influence on the financial condition of the sub-county governments and on 
rural communities as well. Starting from 1993, based on the documents 
titled “the way for Li County to manage the township budget system” and 
“the way for Li County to manage township finance”, the county began to 
reform township fiscal structure - which was intended to decentralise fiscal 
powers to the township level by giving it authority over personnel, finances, 
and administration.317 This gave the township governments more discretion, 
but this came at a price since those governments also had to take more 
responsibility for the revenue submitted to the County and for their own 
expenditures.  
 
       Under this new financial structure, the County allocated industry and 
commerce taxes, the agriculture tax, the tax for agriculture and forestry 
speciality, the title deed tax, the tax for occupied farmland for other use, 
administrative fees and others to the township governments to manage.318 
These covered most sources of the budgetary revenue and the extra-
budgetary revenue of the County. However, unlike the highly centralised 
system in the hand of County in the 1980s in which the townships were only 
agencies to collect and hand all of the revenue to the County, a fixed quota 
was discussed and agreed between the townships and the county. This fixed 
quota was discussed once a year and became a compulsory task for the 
townships, so that no matter how much revenue the township had, the quota 
had to be met.319In addition, for extra expenses, the township governments 
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had to take full responsibility and find ways to cover them on their own. At 
a time when agriculture and rural industry were experiencing further reform 
and little profit was made, this fiscal structure in practice made the financial 
situation of the townships even worse. 
 
         After September 1994, a new tax sharing system was introduced.320 
The main feature was the separation of taxes which are collected for the 
central government’s finances and for county finances. The taxes for the 
central government were collected by the National Tax Bureau of Li County 
and taxes for the county by the Local Tax Bureau of Li County, both of 
which were set up in September 1994. The former included valued add tax, 
a consumption tax, the portion of corporate income tax destined for the 
central government, income tax on foreign-funded enterprises and the 
foreign companies, an interest income tax on personal savings, a business 
tax on financial and insurance industries, and a vehicle purchase tax.321The 
latter included the portion of corporate income tax for the local authority, an 
individual income tax, a business tax, a resources tax, an increment tax on 
land value, a tax on house properties, an urban land use tax, a stamp tax, an 
urban maintenance and construction tax, a fixed asset investment redirection 
tax, and the surtax for education expenditures.322  
 
      Compared to the previous system in which sub-central governments 
might delay or evade their duties so as to cause a severe deficit for the 
central government in the 1980s, this new system guaranteed those 
payments by setting up two clear and non-overlapping methods to collect 
taxes.323 However, the county’s share of revenue swiftly began to lag behind 
its expenditures after 1994, and a vicious cycle of imbalances between 
revenues and expenses ensued, as the table 3.2 below shows.  One 
explanation for this was that over-heated infrastructure building - on roads, 
electricity facilities, water conservancy facilities including irrigation 
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equipment, and building to attract foreign investment - and gradually 
increased administrative functions, such as the provision for nine years’ 
compulsory education and health care, contributed to this problem.324 After 
the introduction of the tax sharing system, not only could sub-central 
governments not find excuses for evading their duties, but they also had to 
find ways to cover excessively high expenses on their own. As the head of 
the Education Bureau of Li County said, the budget meeting at the 
beginning of every year was like a war as heads of the different bureaus 
fought for their areas. With little financial support from the central 
government, it was very hard for local governments and their cadres to 
perform well and to serve for local residents.325                
Table 3.2 Statistics of revenues and expenses in Li County from 1990 to 
1996 
 
Source: Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, 
(Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 214. 
 Note:  
1. The unit of money is in million yuan. 
2. The data from 1990 to 1993 were from the era before the tax sharing system was 
introduced. 
 
       This system was pushed further to embrace the financial relationship 
between the County and its townships in Li County in 1995.326 Under this 
new system, the sources of income at township level only included 25% of 
the value added tax, a small part of the corporate income tax, the agriculture 
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Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Revenues 45.22 45.07 49.75 61.89 63.83 85.90 100.83 
Expenses 45.97 56.07 56.30 66.79 87.42 113.04 131.90 
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tax, other administrative fees, etc.327 The County also had to return some of 
the taxes to the township at a fixed rate as agreed after the submission of the 
townships. The County was responsible for expenditures related to tax 
administration, industry and commerce administration, hygiene, the police 
station, courts, and agricultural administration, while other administrative 
expenses were the responsibility of the township governments. Based on 
growth targets set by the central government, the County would accordingly 
allocate targets to the townships. If the township met the target at the end of 
the tax year, the County would return the full amount of tax at an agreed rate. 
Otherwise, the return would be reduced proportionally. 
 
       Since the agriculture tax rate was fixed, enterprises were the main 
potential source of increased revenues for township governments. However, 
during the 1990s when rural industry and agriculture were both performing 
poorly in Li County (as we saw earlier in this chapter), after paying for basic 
administrative operations and the salaries of local cadres, the townships 
were not able to afford to fund the provision of public goods, never mind 
development. 328  Since the income from taxes was at a dead end, the 
pressure to fulfil the allocated task of increasing revenue growth every year 
and the pressure to perform well politically in order to get promotions 
forced cadres and the township governments to seek income from sources 
other than taxes. Thus fees under various names emerged to extract extra-
budgetary revenues. This is why the financial burdens on the peasants 
soared in the middle 1990s. And collecting by coercion caused 
confrontations between the village cadres and the peasants. And yet the 
heavy exploitation of the peasants still did not cover the high expenditures 
by the townships and villages - the accumulation of which, over time, 
became an insurmountable problem.         
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      The tendency to look for extra income was facilitated by the reform of 
the township authority structure from 1995 to 1996, which was entitled 
“Cancelling the establishment of districts and merging smaller townships 
(chequ bingxiang jianzheng)”. It was intended to streamline the 
administration and to decentralise authority to the township level.329 As a 
result, a great deal of authority - to appoint personnel, to dispose of financial 
and physical resources, to make decisions independently - was decentralised.  
Township governments obtained more discretion to arrange their work, but 
their administrative functions increased, which correspondingly required 
more funds. For the townships where the rural industry performed poorly, 
this gave their governments excuses to misappropriate funds for purposes 
that they saw as priorities. Take the salaries of teachers in sub-county arenas 
as an example. In 1996, following the provincial government’s call for the 
reform of the township authority structure, the authority to manage the 
salaries of teachers in rural schools was devolved in most counties from the 
Education Bureau to the township governments. This led to delays in paying 
salaries in many rural schools, or even to non-payment – in for example, 
Shimen County which borders Li County.330 This created acute difficulties 
for many rural teachers whose salaries were slender in the first place.  In Li 
County’s, since the head of the Education Bureau took a strong stance 
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during meetings to discuss and negotiate this reform, the authority to 
disburse funds for education was not decentralised.  It was retained by the 
Education Bureau which guaranteed the allocation of salaries to the rural 
teachers.331        
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 3.3.3 The Financial Operations of Township Governments and Village 
 Committees, in Practice, and their Accumulating Debts  
 
 The composition of the income of the townships and villages 
 
The finance office (caizheng suo) and the rural business management station 
(jingying guanli zhan) are the two main organs used by township 
governments in managing finance and expenditures.332 The finance office 
mainly managed the various revenues which were collected by the tax office; 
the profits and the management fees from rural enterprises were submitted 
to the township enterprises office; while the funds in the name of township 
planning (xiang tongchou) were managed by the rural business management 
station. 333As we saw above, these three sources were the main sources of 
income for the township governments. However, the introduction of the tax 
sharing system in 1994 left the county and the townships with some taxes 
that were unstable, had less potential to grow, and cost more to collect.334 
For an agricultural county like Li County which had a severe shortage of 
enterprises paying high tax rates, this, combined with the decline of rural 
industry, greatly reduced the income and taxes from enterprises.335 Using 
the funds for township planning therefore became the only possible way to 
expand townships’ income.  
 
       Technically, the funds in the name of township planning included five 
items: running expenses for education at township and village levels, family 
planning, special care for entitled groups including disabled veterans and 
their families, militia training, and the paving and maintenance of village 
roads.336 In addition, attached to the funds for the township planning were 
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village reserves. This arrangement had existed since the collective era and 
included three items: the public accumulation fund (gongji jin), the public 
welfare fund (gongyi jin), and management fees, which were mainly 
intended to cover the provision of public goods and welfare expenses within 
the village community.337 However, in practice, starting from the late 1980s, 
not only had the amounts of the funds for township planning and village 
reserves been expanding, but also many arbitrary and illegitimate items had 
been added.  This was done in the name of enhancing fundraising – for 
education, hygiene, roads and other unnamed but sometimes dubious items, 
such as a water conservancy building fund, the salaries of the village cadres 
and of the staff in the agencies which the various higher levels of 
governmental departments set up at township governments - including the 
family planning station, the water and electricity station, the power station, 
the animal husbandry station, the urban construction station, the national 
land station, the forestry management station, and the ‘re-education through 
labour’ station.338  
 
        As the administrative functions expanded, the numbers of agencies had 
also increased accordingly. Some of them relied fully on fiscal allocations 
from higher levels - for example, the finance office, the state land office, the 
police office, and the civil affairs office.  Some could only partly rely on 
such fiscal allocations, mainly for basic salaries, but they needed to sort out 
bonuses and other subsidises on their own.  This applied to the rural 
business management station, the ‘re-education through labour’ office, the 
security and inspection office, the family planning office, and the family 
planning service station.  Others were fully self-financing and paid the 
salaries of their staff – for example, the enterprise office, the culture office, 
and the construction management station etc.339 The staff working for these 
agencies were either recruited locally through personal networks or filled in 
by former village cades such as the heads of village committees and party 
committees after they had retired from their positions as a special reward for 
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serving the Communist Party for many years. Mr C of Zhangshuyan Village 
of Leigongta Township was just such a case.  He was selected to work for 
the water and electricity agency in the township government after he had 
retired as the head of the village in 1990.340 The operational fees of these 
half- and fully self-supporting agencies, and the salaries of their staff, were 
actually paid by the money collected from the local peasants.341  
 
       In addition, from the middle of 1990, infrastructure building had 
gradually heated up – undertakings such as capital construction on farmland, 
irrigation building and maintenance, flood protection works and dam 
building in lake areas. 342  As the central government allocated very few 
funds for this and tax revenues did little to cover these expenses, township 
governments had to mainly rely on fundraising from the peasants to afford 
these things.343 Even worse, gradually the way to raise funds changed from 
so-called voluntary to compulsory, and some of that money was not used for 
infrastructure but misappropriated for personnel funds to pay the expanding 
administrative staff.344 As Mr X of Lianhua Village of Matoupu Township 
said, in the end, you could never figure out which money was for the 
township and which was for the village because cadres would only give you 
a list and collect the money without any explanation.345                     
 
   At the village level, at the beginning of each fiscal year and after the 
townships had been assigned their fiscal tasks, township governments would 
divide this package into several parts and distribute them among the villages 
that they administered. Then it would be the duty of the village cadres to 
visit each peasant household to collect the money. In the 1990s, there were 
three main sources of income for villages.346 One was the money collected 
from the peasants, which provided the main portion of village income. 
Based on an agreed rate (which the interviewee could not remember), the 
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village was able to retain some part of this money before handing the rest to 
the township. The second source consisted of management fees from 
village-owned enterprises and rent for lands or factory sites. The raised 
amounts depended on contracts between the village and the enterprises. 
However, the tax which these enterprises needed to pay had to go the 
enterprises office of the township. Finally, some villages still had 
collectively-owned resources at that time, such as woodlands in 
mountainous villages or fish ponds in lake villages, and the profits belonged 
to the village collective, although they were not very profitable at that time.  
 
    The annual average salary for a village cadre was around 2,500 yuan, 
even though most villages could not afford these salaries so they wrote them 
down in the record book as debts. 347  Mr W, who had been a village 
accountant until 2005, said that not only had his salary been at a very low 
grade at less than 3,000 yuan per year before he resigned, but also the 
village still owed him more than 10,000 yuan when he resigned. 348 
Fortunately, over recent years, the village then gradually repaid him so that 
by 2012 when he was interviewed, the debts were cleared.     
 
 How to collect fees in practice? 
 
For many cadres at the township and village levels, the period of the 1990s, 
especially the years 1994 to 1996, was the hardest time. They were 
sandwiched between the pressures from higher levels to deliver revenues 
and engage in administrative management on the one hand, and on the other, 
pressures from the peasants who did not want money taken from their 
pockets.  The heads of village committees thus had three responsibilities – 
family planning, funds for township planning and village reserves, and flood 
protection. 349 As Mr C of Fenghuang Village of Guanyuan Township said, 
these tasks kept cadres busy day and night. It was also during this period 
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that village cadres and the peasants came into confrontation most often.350  
In order to illustrate how cadres went about collecting fees, here are several 
accounts from different geographical areas. 
 
Section A: From the Plains Area  
 
1. Yucheng Village of Daping Township: all taxes were collected on a per 
capita basis including the taxes which only applied to the specialities351 
 
     Mr L, the deputy head of Daping Township, explained that at the 
beginning of each fiscal year, based on the goals which the central and 
provincial governments had set for it, the County would calculate a growth 
goal for the revenue from the townships and allocate it to the townships in 
the form of package.  The requirement was, quite simply mandatory – 
townships needed to fulfil this task no matter what. After the township 
government received this, it would distribute this package of tasks among 
the villages within its administration.  The agriculture tax, the tax on 
speciality products and the slaughter tax were distributed down to the 
villages. Taxes on speciality products were only levied where the peasants 
cultivated products like oranges and pears, or raised fish or poultry.  The 
slaughter tax was only applied where peasants killed pigs or other livestock.  
 
      However, since the tasks were allocated to the villages and since many 
villages did not have profitable rural enterprises, delivering up the revenue 
forced village committees to collect money on a per capita basis. Therefore, 
in practice, no matter whether you dealt in speciality products, you still had 
to hand in the taxes on them; and no matter whether you killed livestock, 
you had to pay the slaughter tax as well. The amounts of fees payable 
increased year after year. In addition to cash, the peasants had to perform 
fixed amounts of ‘voluntary’ work each year. Furthermore, as the incomes 
of township governments could not cover their expenses, additional fees 
were often collected multiple times within a year, even if the routine 
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collection had been done in spring after the early harvest. For example, in 
1996, the fees were collected for three times in Yucheng Village. The third 
time was to cover the cost of water conservancy work at the very high rate 
of 200 yuan per capita!  As a result, much discontent and many complaints 
arose among peasants about taxes  and the repeatedly collected fees.                  
 
2. Shuisi Village of Dayandang Township: Connecting the salaries of some 
rural teachers to fees to be paid; Connecting the salaries of cadres to their 
family members with rural household registrations352 
 
      Mr H was appointed as the accountant of Shuisi Village of Dayandang 
Township in 1993 and then was promoted to be party secretary of the 
village committee, a post which he retains. He explained that the period 
from 1994 to 2000 was the peak time for financial burdens in his village. 
Before the reform started in 1978, although the brigade was not wealthy, at 
least it was not in deficit. The village fell into debt after lands were allocated 
to households and the household responsibility system was introduced in 
1983. In the first year of family farming, that is 1983, in addition to the 
agriculture tax, the rate of which was 50 yuan per mu, the fees which the 
peasants needed to pay were only 9.8 yuan per capita. The salaries of village 
cadres were based on their work points before 1983. After the introduction 
of family farming, this portion of the money was integrated into and paid off 
by the fees for township planning and village reserve.  
 
      The financial burdens on the peasants soared after 1994 and remained 
high until 2000. There were two reasons for this. Fees had increased year 
after year, and the central government contributed little to the gradually 
expanding administrative operations and infrastructure building. For 
example, portions of the educational expenses for rural schools and of the 
salaries of rural teachers were paid for by the peasants.353 The buildings and 
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operational expenses of the township-run schools were also mainly paid for 
by fundraising from the peasants.354 At that time, it was very difficult for 
every village to collect sufficient money. In this situation, the township first 
calculated the salary of each rural teacher and issued an invoice to the 
teachers. With the invoice, the teachers had to go to village to ask for funds 
to cover their salaries. 
 
       Another method to collect money was to connect the salaries of the 
cadres on financial payroll of the state to their family members by way of 
rural household registrations. In order to get peasant households to pay, the 
County Party Committee and Government first had township governments 
sort out a list of the cadres at county and township level who had family 
members with rural household registrations, to see if the cadres’ families 
had paid the fees. If they had not, the unpaid fees would be deducted from 
the payroll. In addition, most cadres at county and township levels moved 
through every village to urge peasants to pay and to monitor their responses.      
 
Section B: From the Mountainous Area – Lianhua Village of Matoupu 
Township: Substituting a surtax on the agriculture tax to pay for tuition 
in rural schools355 
 
      Mr X is a peasant in Lianhua Village of Matoupu Township. When he 
talked about the burdens of taxes and fees in the 1990s, he had many 
complaints. From his experience, while the agriculture tax was not 
ridiculously high, the fees were far beyond what peasants could afford - 
including the water fee, the electricity fee, various other fees, and even 
voluntary work service. The average burden including taxes and fees in this 
village was around 500 yuan per capita per year. A family composed of a 
couple and a child like Mr X’s, normally needed to hand in 1,500 yuan per 
year if all three family members were registered as rural residents. In order 
                                                                                                                            
funded by one or several villages and managed by the township. For more details, see 
Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, (Beijing: 
Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 614.  
354 Ibid.  
355 Interview 2012/02/11. 
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to avoid paying such heavy fees, some better off rural families paid to 
change their rural household registrations to urban. To succeed in obtaining 
an urban registration, money was needed (the price for a registration as a 
Nanning City resident was thousands of yuan), as well as strong ties to 
someone in a key government post.356 Some families in that period begged 
everywhere to buy an urban registration.357 Mr X was one of them, but he 
only succeeded in changing his daughter’s status, as a result of which, the 
burden on his family was reduced by around 500 yuan. 
 
       Even so, the township governments still could find ways to compel the 
peasant households to pay their dues by linking tuition in rural schools to 
the payable fees. They connected tuition charges to the surtax on the 
agriculture tax. First, peasant households needed to hand in the surtax. In 
return they would get a receipt. The child of this household could then 
substitute this receipt for part of their tuition and take classes. Otherwise, 
the schools would ask the children to go back and to urge their parents to 
pay the surtax. This gave peasants no escape since they could not risk their 
children’s schooling. As we saw earlier, the surtax on the agriculture tax 
started to be levied in 1985 in Li County at a rate of 2% of the agriculture 
tax for townships, 7% for county, 3% for city, and 2% for province.358 This 
surtax mainly went into the accounts of the township and the county as they 
together levied 9% of the agriculture tax.  That explains why townships tried 
so hard to get peasants to pay this part of the surtax. 
 
Section C: From the Lake Area – Fenghuang Village of Guanyuan 
Township: A combination of Persuasion and Coercion; the deteriorating 
relationship between local cadres and peasants359 
 
   As an old party secretary of a village committee for 16 years from 1985 
to 2001, Mr C had experienced the period that many rural people regarded 
                                                 
356 Interview 2012/02/14b. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 381. 
359 Interview 2012/02/14b. 
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as the toughest time for both local cadres and peasants. When he recalled 
this, he still felt guilty about the ways in which cadres in his village 
extracted money from the peasants. Not only did the peasants there have to 
bear the same heavy fees as their counterparts elsewhere, but as a result of 
the difficult geography of the lake areas, their burdens were more like 
catastrophes because they could only obtain modest incomes. The cadres 
were also trapped in an excruciating situation. They faced heavy pressure 
from their superiors to provide the allocated amount of taxes and fees to the 
township government, without any excuses. But since they were also 
members of the rural community, they knew exactly how hard it was for 
peasants to pay the taxes and fees. As he explained, persuasion and coercion 
were the main ways to collect the money.  
 
    Generally, the local cadres in the villages were sent to each household 
to explain the tax rates and to persuade them to pay. However, sometimes 
either peasants avoided meeting them or households had too little income to 
meet the demands.  The cadres would deploy coercion - taking away 
anything that was valuable including pigs, cows, duvets, rice threshers and 
even grain which had been kept for family use.  This combination of 
persuasion and coercion was also used in mountainous areas, such as Yushi 
Village of Taiqing Township and Banqiaorong Village of Wangjiachang 
Township. 360  To enable coercive actions, cadres of the villages and 
townships were sometimes even accompanied by police from the townships.  
 
    In Fenghuang Village, the then Zhaojia Village before 2005, after the 
lands were finally allocated to the households in 1988, the financial burdens 
increased year after year until in 1994 when they reached the peak in which 
the rate of fees was 110 yuan per capita and the rate of tax on the land was 
180 yuan per mu. The land size in this village was relatively big, with 4,000 
mu of land and a population 1,800, its burden was heavier than other 
villages. The whole village averagely needed to hand in 500,000-700,000 
yuan to the township every year. These amounts included all taxes, fees and 
                                                 
360 Interviews 2011/12/30, 2012/02/16f. 
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additional fundraising. Mr C explained that the taxes were relatively light, 
but the fees and fundraising had soared rapidly, mainly to plug holes in the 
budgets of the township and county governments. The fees and fundraising 
were  ridiculous and unregulated, as  the county and the township could 
arbitrarily allocate a task to the village at will . For example, in order to 
extract industry and commerce management fees, the township required 
payments at a rate of 3,000 yuan per shop regardless of its size and turnover. 
At that time, although there were around ten shops in the village, they were 
all small, selling groceries. The management fees far exceeded their 
revenues. However, without accepting any excuses, the party secretary of 
the village had to perform this task, collecting 30,000 yuan altogether. 
These mandatory requirements created massive difficulties for local cadres. 
 
  The situation became even worse in Fenghuang Village between 1995 
and 1997 since it had experienced severe flooding so that the cotton crop 
was drowned and the peasants had no income apart from small amounts 
from the production of rapeseeds in the spring.361 However, its financial 
burden was not reduced. Conditions became so harsh that some peasants 
committed suicide by drinking pesticide. The relationships between local 
cadres and peasants deteriorated so much that peasants sought ways to resist 
fee collections.  When they saw cadres coming, they would flee. 
 
    In July 1998, Li County had the most catastrophic flood in hundreds of 
years and 14 dykes were flooded, inundating Linan Township and 
Guanyuan Township, with 13,125 houses collapsed and 80,000 peasants 
losing their homes.362 Fenghuang Village is located in this area. Even under 
these harsh conditions, Mr C led his village to collect the full payments that 
were due, as early as the spring of that year – before the floods - based on 
the above rate of 110 yuan per person and 180 per mu. How was this 
                                                 
361 Lake areas where Fenghuang Village is located were likely to suffer from flooding 
disaster. That is caused by its geography. Along the bank of the River Li, the altitude of 
these areas is low. The continuous rain increases the danger of both flooding from the River 
Li and accumulated water in the low lands. Either would endanger the agricultural 
production of the peasants here. 
362 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 214. 
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possible? Part of this amount was collected from the peasants by using 
persuasion and coercion, while for the rest, the village committee 
encouraged cadres to borrow funds from every possible source: their 
relatives, friends and rich businessmen in their personal networks, etc., with 
interest rates of 1%, 2% or 3%. With 50,000 to 60,000 yuan of borrowed 
money, the total which the village committee submitted to the township was 
as high as 500,000!     
 
    On 24 July 1998, the dyke was flooded and all the fields of the village 
including the houses were drowned. Then in order to reduce the burdens on 
peasants in the disaster area, higher levels of government decided to reduce 
fees payable by half. This meant that the village committee needed to find 
enough money to return 50% of the funds to the peasants. However, the 
payments had already been made to the township and some of those funds 
had already been spent. In this situation, the finance office of the township 
had to borrow money from the Finance Bureau of Li County and the give it 
to the village. With 100,000 yuan borrowed money, the village committee 
returned 50% to the peasants who paid the fees in full. For the peasants who 
still could not afford this 50% reduced fees, the village committee applied a 
fixed interest rate to the amount they owed. Sometimes, some households 
were really poor and could not clear the debts which they owed to the 
village. Their debts were accumulated year after year in village’s account. 
This is one reason to cause the accumulating debts at village level. Another 
reason is from the money which village cadres borrowed with various 
interest rates to fulfil their tasks. Those debts were recorded in village’s 
account and many of them become dead accounts now. 
 
  It is worth noting that even in such a harsh situation, the village 
committee still managed to maintain the operations of the village including 
the provision of social welfare for the ‘five guarantee households’ and the 
salaries of the retired cadres - mainly by relying on borrowed money.363 
                                                 
363 The term ‘five guarantees households’ refers to the households which are so disabled 
that the state guarantees them proper food, clothing, medical care, housing and funeral 
expenses. These residents normally include the elderly, disabled and children under 16 in 
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However, the situation in 1999 was even worse. One reason was that the 
peasants had not yet recovered from the disaster in 1998.  The other was that 
after taking loans in 1998, it was hard to continue borrowing. The total 
amount to be paid by the village was around 600,000 yuan.  The village 
committee tried its best to pay 40% of that in the spring. Working to the 
slogan “to fulfil the tasks of the state first, the tasks of the collective second, 
and to consider personal needs in the end”, all village cadres made 
enormous efforts to pay the full amount due to the township, in whatever 
form: cash or kind, such as grain, cotton etc.  But this left the village unable 
to pay the salaries of its cadres as Chinese New Year approached. In this 
situation and in consideration of the huge contribution that the village 
committee made to the township and the state, the township party secretary 
and the head of the finance office of the township visited Mr C seven days 
before Chinese New Year and gave him 7,000 yuan.  
 
    With this money, Mr C paid for all the operations in the village, 
including social welfare for the ‘five guarantee households’, salaries for 
rural teachers and two cooks in the village-run nursery. After those, he could 
only afford to give village cadres 300 yuan each. The rest of salaries owed 
to the cadres were covered by IOU (‘I Own You’) notes. This situation 
continued until 2001 when, following the call from the central government 
on “resettling displaced residents in newly built towns (yimin jianzhen)”, the 
County and township governments organised the peasants who had lost their 
homes in the flood to resettle in new towns on higher land.364 Moving there 
eased the threat of natural disasters, and combined with the reform of taxes 
and fees starting from 2000, their financial situation gradually improved.365 
                                                                                                                            
rural areas, who do not have family members to support them. Such people are eligible to 
receive financial aid from the state to cover the five above mentioned things. This system 
was established in 1956. For more details about the definition of this term, see the 
explanation of China Daily, available on: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/2008-03/11/content_6526068.htm (accessed 
on 20 November 2014).     
364 The call was launched on 9-10 September, 1998 when Zhu Rongji, the then premier, 
visited disaster hit areas in Hunan Province after the catastrophic floods. For more details, 
see Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 214.      
365 Interview 2012/02/22. 
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Section D: From the Hilly Area – Gutang Village of Shuanglong 
Township: the accumulation of the debts of the village366 
 
       Mr L, party secretary of Gutang Village, explained the rise of debts at 
the village level. This was again related to the burdens imposed by higher 
levels of government on the village. They included not only the taxes and 
fees described above, but also demands for the submission of grain and 
cotton by each household.367 Grain and cotton had to be handed over in 
fixed amounts to the designated stores every year. If peasants could not 
meet these targets, they had to substitute cash. If an individual peasant could 
not meet the target, the village committee was responsible for getting the 
task done, no matter what approach was used. For example, the total 
submission task of agriculture products on all peasants in Gutang Village 
was 5,000 kilograms of cotton. In the end, the peasants only produced 2,500. 
For the other half, they needed to provide cash, which according to the price, 
was 5,000 yuan. If they could not afford that, the village committee had to 
pay it for them. If it also could not afford it, then, village cadres were urged 
to borrow the money. In order to succeed in borrowing it, they had to pay 
high interest rates such as 5%. If the committee borrowed 1,000 yuan in a 
given year, it would have to repay 1,600 yuan the next year. However, it 
was very common in 1995 and 1996, when the debts reached their peak, that 
village committees were unable to repay such amounts. So these debts 
accumulated year after year, and became so huge that they have not been 
paid even today.   
 
      Another reason for the mounting debts of villages was that rural 
enterprises were in deficit. In the mid-1990s, as we saw in an earlier section 
of this Chapter, rural enterprises experienced severe challenges.  First 
                                                 
366 Interview 2012/02/19. 
367 The submission tasks of agricultural products had existed since the collective era. While 
it was a state monopoly of purchasing and sales of agricultural products in Mao’s era, the 
submission tasks were divided and allocated to each household based on the size of their 
allocated lands after land allocating in 1983. These burdens not only were gradually 
reduced, but the price at which the state bought produce was also increased. For more 
details about the transition from the production team to the households, see Chapter Two, 
140-141.  
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generation enterprises – for example, a brink and tile factory - were 
normally owned by the village, so that the village had to take responsibility 
for the industry and commerce management fee at a rate of 2,000 yuan per 
enterprise. As most of them were not profitable, the village not only had to 
cover those fees, but also needed to find funds to pay for their operations. 
Only very limited funds could be collected from the peasants, so borrowing 
became necessary. Almost every village had huge debts. Over time, this 
issue became the main headache for rural cadres and communities. 
 
 Summary  
 
The acute financial problems of rural areas in the 1990s are not a secret any 
more. From various newspapers and academic studies, it is clear that Li 
County was definitely not an isolated case. There is no doubt that the 
peasants, at the bottom of society, were tragic victims of the process of 
transferring financial burdens downward from the central government. 
However, in most of the literature, local cadres of the village committees are 
usually ignored.368  Sandwiched between higher levels of government and 
the villagers, they were often viewed as greedy by the peasants who suffered 
from their coercive acts, but they were also punching bags in the hands of 
political superiors when they could not fulfil their allocated tasks. When 
peasants were asked in interviews to evaluate the policies of that era, they 
almost unanimously said that, “the central policies were good but things 
changed when they came down to the village to be implemented”. Local 
cadres always are the peasants’ first contacts, whether policies are beneficial 
or harmful.   
 
       The unreasonable fiscal arrangements in the 1990s made township and 
the county governments take more responsibility for administrative 
functions, but they were not yet given the financial resources to manage 
those functions adequately. They were unfunded, or severely underfunded, 
                                                 
368  Two books are the most well-known when talking about financial burdens on peasants 
in the 1990s. For more details, see Chen, Guidi and Wu, Chuntao, Will The Boat Sink the 
Water? (London: Perseus Books, 2006), Translated by Zhu, Hong; Li, Changping, I Tell the 
Premier the Truth, (Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 2002). 
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mandates.  This imbalance led to the devolution of financial burdens 
downward, one level after one level, until they reached the villages which 
were forced to accumulate huge debts.  It also triggered sharp confrontations 
between local cadres and peasants in the 1990s.  The accounts from 
interviewees above also suggest that in some cases, the less economically 
favourable the areas were, the greater their financial burdens. Such areas 
also saw the most serious confrontations between cadres and peasants – 
especially in mountainous and lake areas. Despite this - and in contrast to 
other parts of Hunan Province such as Hengyang County which was said to 
be a hotbed of contention - there is no evidence from the field research that 
the organised collective resistance existed in Li County. We mainly see 
individual and isolated confrontations. 369                   
 
       The tensions between the village cadres and peasants also had an impact 
on land use and on economic strategy. Heavy financial burdens forced many 
peasants to abandon their allocated lands and to migrate to urban centres to 
find work. However, the central government policy prohibiting the 
abandonment of farmland unintentionally resulted in the excessive 
concentration of land in the hands of certain peasant households. Instead of 
distributing lands equitably among the peasants, the renewal of land 
contracts in 1995 only certified the size of the lands which households 
actually occupied at that time. This action eventually triggered conflicts 
over land which would take place in the 2000s when more constructive 
policies for rural areas were introduced.  In time, the migrations to cities for 
work became a major source of income for rural households. Some scholars 
have complained about the bad working environment and the exploitation of 
cheap labour, but some  migrant workers found migration to be an 
opportunity to improve their living standards, and to experience the wider 
world which was quite vibrant.370              
                                                 
369 For more details on the rightful resistance in rural China, see O’Brien, Kevin J. and Li, 
Lianjiang (2006), Rightful Resistance in Rural China, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006).   
370 For more details on the topic of migrant workers, see Li, Zhang (2002), Strangers in the 
City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks within China’s Floating 
Population, (USA: Stanford University Press, 2002); Chang, Leslie T., Factory Girls: 
Voices from the Heart of Modern China, (London: Picador, 2008). 
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3.4 The Soaring Financial Burdens on the Peasants in Quantitative 
Terms 
 
       The 1990s left many peasants in the County with bitter memories. Their 
sentiments made them subconsciously to relate these miserable fates to the 
leadership of the central governments, with the local cadres being the first 
targets to attack. When they were asked their opinions about the Hu-Wen 
leadership, interviewees almost unanimously express approval, and some 
explicitly compared it favourably to the leadership in the 1990s. Their 
explanations focused almost entirely on the financial burdens on the 
peasants in that earlier decade. Those burdens ranged from 300–500 yuan 
per capita, with the mountainous and lake areas at the upper end of that 
range. Since per capita incomes in 1995, 1996 and 1997 were respectively 
1,507 yuan, 1,750 yuan, and 2,015 yuan, the burdens accounted for one-
third of their income.371  They also found the methods used by local cadres 
to extract money from them quite shocking, as we saw above.    
 
     In the collective era, the duties of taxes and fees were submitted by a 
production team to its higher level of governments. While the production 
teams were the units to organise the production, to distribute, and to assume 
the submission duties, the individual peasants rarely directly dealt with taxes 
and fees. After land was allocated in 1983 in Li County, the previous 
submission duties including taxes, fees and agriculture products, had been 
accordingly shifted proportionally from the production teams to the shoulder 
of peasants since 1985. 372  The peasants began to have a better idea of what 
was submitted and how much each year. As many interviewees recalled, the 
burdens started growing since then and became out of control in the 
                                                 
371 The Statistical Bureau of Li County, the Statistical Yearbook of Li County 1995, (Jiangxi: 
Yichun Printing Service, 1996), p.9; the Statistical Yearbook of Li County 1996, (Xiantao: 
Jiangxia Printing Service, 1997) p.10; the Statistical Yearbook of Li County 1997, (Xiantao: 
Jiangxia Printing Service, 1998) p.10. 
372 Interview 2012/02/18; He, Zhidong, (ed. et al), The Tax system in China, (Beijing: 
Qinghua University Press, 2005), p. 367. 
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1990s.373 The pioneering ways used by some cadres reminded peasants of 
stories that they had heard from parents and grandparents of the methods 
used by the Nanjing National Government half a century ago and the 
imperial courts before them. This increased their disgust.   
 
        The stories above of interviewees describe the ways that taxes and fees 
were collected in actual practice. Let us now consider the issue of the 
peasants’ financial burdens in quantitative terms. As early as 1984-1985, 
their payments had gradually become onerous, but they did not go madly 
out of control until 1993. 374  This becomes apparent from research on 
agriculture tax reform in Li County conducted by its group of the Rural 
Socio-Economic Survey Team (RSEST) in 1998. This study covers several 
phases. From 1979 to 1984, peasants’ incomes had increased markedly, 
owing to the efficiency of the newly implemented family farming system 
and the gradual opening up of the market for agricultural products. Because 
incomes increased faster than the tax and fee burdens, the latter were not yet 
a serious problem. However, the period 1984 and 1992 witnessed a rapid 
escalation in the tax burdens while increases in the incomes of peasants 
slowed down.375 After 1993, the situation became even worse, as taxes and 
fees soared and eventually went out of control.  Then from 1996 the burdens 
slowly eased. 376  During 1997 and 1998, although the taxes and fees 
gradually increased, the total amount to be paid declined because 
unregulated and arbitrary fundraising was reduced. 377 
 
       Based on a survey of 300 households in 16 townships in the county, 
RSEST tracked the financial burdens on the peasants in the period from 
1990 to 1998. It found that although, compared to 1990, the gross value of 
agriculture had increased by 1.5% up to 1997 and per capita incomes had 
                                                 
373  Interviews 2011/12/30, 2012/01/06, 2012/02/11, 2012/02/14b, 2012/02/16f, 
2012/02/17d, 2012/02/18, 2012/02/19.  
374 Interviews 2012/02/14b, 2012/02/17d, 2012/02/18, 2012/02/19.  
375 The research team specialising in agriculture tax reform and the financial burdens on 
peasants in Hunan, A Research on Agriculture Tax Reform and the Issue of the Financial 
Burdens on Peasants, printed by The Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, 1998, 
p10. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid. 
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increased by 2.4%, agricultural taxes increased at a much faster rate than 
incomes after 1993.378 The data collected in the survey shows that the taxes 
which each peasant assumed reached 70.26 yuan per person in 1997, 2.62% 
higher than the figures in 1990, the time when the agricultural tax was 54.07 
yuan, agriculture speciality tax was 7.38 yuan, and the slaughter tax was 
5.10 yuan. These three types of taxes rose respectively by 2.39 %, 4.72 % 
and 3.08 % between 1990 and 1997.379 The fees paid by the peasants for 
township planning and village reserves were as high as 155.56 yuan per 
person in 1997 - a 3.04 % increase rate over the figures for 1990. 
Unregulated and arbitrary fundraising reached 50.07 yuan per capita, an 
increase of 2.73% over 1990. 380   The cumulative effect of all of these 
increases was difficult to bear. 
 
        Table 3.3 shows the composition of the burdens on the peasants at the 
county level from 1990 to 1996.  It is obvious that while the agricultural 
population declined over those years, the amounts of the taxes and fees 
increased - especially in 1992-1993 when the total amount reached 60.14 
million yuan, an increase rate of a nearly 15 million yuan in a year. The 
agriculture tax only increased 0.157 million yuan, while fees for village 
reserves increased 8.5341 million yuan and fees for township planning 
increased 6.8708 million yuan.  In 1995, a further increase in the total taxes 
was 48.939 million yuan - the highest rate of increase throughout the whole 
of the 1990s - and the total increase in fees in 1996 was 28.63 million.  
 
  
                                                 
378 Ibid. p. 77. 
379 Ibid.  
380 Ibid.  
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Table 3.3 The Burdens on the Peasants in Li County from 1990 to 1996 
 
 
Source: Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, 
(Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 176 
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3.5 Domino Effects in the Rural Communities: Huge Debts at Village 
Level; Going out to work; The Excessive Concentration and Imbalances 
of Land Holdings  
 
3.5.1 Going out to work and the excessive concentration of Lands 
 
       The severe financial burdens which peasants faced produced three 
outcomes: huge debts at the village level; the excessive concentration of 
lands, resulting in an imbalance in land holdings; and migrations to find 
work. 381   The last two of these things were inter-related. They were 
consequences of voluntary actions by peasants to deal with their financial 
difficulties. As profits from cultivating fields declined while taxes and fees 
soared, some peasants gave up farming without leaving their villages, while 
many others left their lands and moved to cities for work. For example, up 
to 1996, around 8,000 peasants from Cengnan Township migrated to 
cities.382  Both actions left lands abandoned.383 
 
      It is illegal to abandon farmlands.384 Therefore, local cadres either had to 
persuade peasants who remained in the villages to take over lands by 
offering them inducements such as reduced fees or voluntary work 
responsibilities, or they took the lands over themselves.385  In the process, 
lands began to become concentrated in the hands of certain peasants and 
inequalities in land ownership developed. Mr L of Dazhou Village of 
Yongfeng Township explained his case.386 As party secretary of the village, 
he not only had to collect taxes and fees, but also to guarantee effective 
usage of the farmland. Under these pressures, he had no choice but to 
instruct his team of cadres and other party members to take on the 
                                                 
381 Interview 2012/02/19e. 
382 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1990 - 1996, (Loudi: 
Loudi Xiangzhong Geological Press, 1999), p. 260. 
383  Interviews 2012/02/16, 2012/02/14b, 2012/02/15, 2012/02/16c, 2012/02/16d, 
2012/02/16e, 2012/02/16f, 2012/02/17, 2012/02/17b, 2012/02/19c, 2012/02/19e. 
384 This regulation was the Law of Land Administration, put in effect on 1 January 1987.  
385 Interview 2012/02/19d. 
386 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
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abandoned lands. He himself took around 70 mu. They were too extensive 
for him to cultivate, so he had to ask his brother-in-law to help.  
 
        Imbalances thus emerged. Some peasants occupied tens of mu while 
others no longer had lands.  Inequalities in land holdings also resulted from 
another set of changes - in the populations of various households since lands 
had originally been allocated in 1984. The government urged that existing 
patterns of land control should for the most part be maintained, but small 
adjustments were permitted.  Some villages carried out such adjustments - 
Banqiaorong Village of Wangjiachang Township, Xindu Village of Lidong 
Township, and Dazhou Village of Yongfeng Township are examples. They 
transferred some land held by households whose populations had declined 
to others whose numbers had grown.  However, almost every village 
accepted the practice that lands had been abandoned and were then taken 
over by others. To complicate matters, it was at this time that land contracts 
were due for renewal.  
 
3.5.2 The renewal of land contracts 
 
      When land management certificates were renewed and reissued, villages 
officially confirmed the land holdings of each household. Instead of starting 
again from scratch, the renewal of land contracts retained the status quo in 
1994. This process ratified the unequal distribution of land and contradicted 
the principle of equality in land distribution, but in the circumstances, it was 
impossible to do anything else.  As Mr L of Dazhou Village said, at that 
time the financial burdens were heavy that even if the village had sought to 
allocate lands equally, many peasants did not want it because the more lands 
they had, the more taxes and fees they had to pay.387 This made sense when 
we consider the situation in 1994. However, in the 2000s, when a series of 
policies beneficial to land owners were introduced, it caused many conflicts 
in rural communities.  
 
                                                 
387 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
220 
 
      During the earlier exercise in 1984 to provide certificates, most villagers 
had had no idea of what was taking place. This later exercise was different. 
Most of the peasants who were interviewed were well aware of it, and saw 
that the new certificates contained detailed information including the term of 
the contracts - from 1994 until 2024.388 In response to the tendency of rural 
land-use right transfers between peasants  through  private oral agreements -
- with or without rent being paid – the new certificates included a section in 
which to record the rental or legal subcontracting of lands (although still 
very few peasants chose to use it). The government also came up with a new 
guiding principle that reversed its earlier policy: during the contract period 
from 1994 to 2024, “lands would not be added for the households with 
increased populations; and lands would not be reduced for households 
whose populations decline”.  Over time, this gradually contributed to still 
greater inequality and – once again – would fuel many conflicts among the 
peasants.389  
 
3.6 Summary 
 
The story of the 1990s, which this chapter covers, stands in striking contrast 
to the one for the 1980s. This owed much to a major change in the policy 
orientation of the central government. As we saw here, the international and 
national political situations became chaotic between the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s. The importance of maintaining political stability and 
continuing to stimulate economic development convinced the new 
leadership of Jiang and Li to adopt an urban-oriented posture, and shifted 
policy preferences from rural in the 1980s to the coastal and urban areas in 
the 1990s. Although the overall picture was still of an energetic economy 
making things and selling them to foreigners, this policy change impinged 
on Li County in three ways. 
 
        First, the indigenous TVEs, which had been promising in the 1980s, 
went into marked decline -- mainly because favourable policies from higher 
                                                 
388 For more details about the permit for land use, see Chpater Two, p. 97-100. 
389 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
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levels of government were greatly curtailed. Local governments reoriented 
their limited resources and focused on a few hi-tech enterprises to guarantee 
economic and revenue growth. This left many low-tech rural enterprises, 
which were mainly based on the exploitation of raw materials, in a hopeless 
situation. In response, on the one hand, local governments in Li County 
decided to build on its historical agricultural strength and to encourage 
peasants to try new types of high-yielding products. On the other, they 
followed the trend in the coastal cities and transformed their TVEs – 
variously turning to share-holdings, share-cooperatives, and foreign 
enterprises. This period was experimental and full of failure. A few 
entrepreneurs succeeded and became the leading figures in the development 
of agricultural industries and private enterprises later, in the 2000s. But 
during the 1990s, agriculture and rural industry in Li County generally did 
not perform well. 
 
        Second, the decentralisation of financial authority and the introduction 
of a tax sharing system in 1994 caused the fiscal situation of the County to 
deteriorate further, and increased the financial burdens on peasants. In an 
effort to grant township governments some freedom to control their 
financial resources, the County decided to decentralise authority over 
personnel, finances and administration to township level in 1993. However, 
in practice, this became a way to transfer financial burdens of County and 
township governments to peasants after the tax sharing system was 
introduced between 1994 and 1995. The financial burdens were the result of 
several things.  Agriculture and rural industry did not do well and that badly 
affected the revenue of the County. Over-heated infrastructure building in 
that period, undertaken to attract external investment, increased 
expenditures in the County. Furthermore, the introduction of the tax sharing 
system extracted substantial sums from limited incomes in localities, and the 
central government did not provide much for public goods.  
 
 The new policies triggered a third change: growing hostility in rural 
communities. The requirement to raise revenues each year forced sub-
county cadres to obtain funds by every means possible -- including 
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persuasion, coercion and borrowing at high interests rates. Coercion 
seriously worsened the relationship between village cadres and peasants. 
Therefore, many types of confrontations occurred between these two groups. 
In the teeth of heavy burdens in taxes and fees, many peasants began to 
move to nearby urban centres and coastal cities for work. Field 
investigations for this thesis found this to be the main reason behind 
migrations from Li County. To some degree, in local cadres’ words, 
migration eased the deteriorating relations between cadres the peasants, and 
reduced the risk of organised opposition to the local authority. Migration 
also resulted in growing imbalances in land holdings, which later spurred 
conflicts in the 2000s. Despite cadres’ efforts, the debts at village level 
accumulated year after year, and remain an insoluble problem even today. 
Stagnation in the economy, disintegration in society, and confrontation 
within rural communities thus became the three key words to characterise 
the 1990s. 
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Chapter Four:  Rehabilitation, Integration and Diversity 
from 2000 to 2013 
 
The period from 1990 to 1998 was a difficult time, not only for the peasants 
but also for government institutions and actors at village, township and 
county level. As we saw in the previous chapter, this was mainly caused by 
the imbalance between expanding administrative functions and the 
deteriorating finances of government institutions at lower levels.  The 
problem was compounded by gradual increases in corruption and free riders,  
but those issues are beyond the present discussion.390  To maintain their 
operations and to fulfil compulsory fiscal commitments, government 
institutions, beginning at the provincial level, transferred fiscal burdens 
downward from level to level until they reached the village committees, the 
lowest rung on the ladder. This placed village-level cadres in an invidious 
situation.  They had a dual identity -- as administrators at the lowest level in 
the system, but also as members of rural communities. On the one hand, the 
fiscal targets imposed from above were rigid and had to be fulfilled.  On the 
other, they fully understood the meagre returns which their fellow peasants 
gained from agriculture.391  This awkward position forced them either to 
squeeze money out of peasants’ wallets by using a combination of 
persuasion and coercion, or to borrow money at high interest rates if the 
peasants could provide inadequate funds.  
 
       As the burdens mounted year after year, the debts of local governments 
accumulated accordingly, until they posed impossible difficulties.  Consider 
some examples of the problems that ensued.  Payments to higher levels were 
sometimes met from local officials’ own funds. In 2012, Dazhou Village of 
Yongfeng Township owed its party secretary around 200,000 yuan, the head 
and the accountant 30,000 yuan each, and the women’s officer around 
20,000.392  These officials obtained such funds either by borrowing or by 
                                                 
390  Göbel, Christian, The Politics of Rural Reform in China: State Policy and Village 
Predicament in the early 2000s, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 1. 
391 Interview 2012/02/18. 
392 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
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from their own salaries, sometimes over several years. At times, local 
government bodies had to borrow from the peasants, a problem which even 
afflicted better off villages. Qunle Village of Daping Township is just such a 
case.393 Thanks to a few profitable village-owned enterprises such as a paper 
mill, two quality rice processing mills, etc., this village had had surplus 
funds since 1993. However, government institutions at the next level up – 
Daping Township – had not done so well, mainly because there were few 
profitable township-owned enterprises. By 2012, the accumulated debts of 
the township had risen to more than 2 million yuan. The township 
government therefore had to borrow money from Qunle Village to meet 
fiscal targets imposed on it from above.  This sometimes forced that village 
to borrow money from the peasants – so that debts owed to the peasants 
became substantial. At the end of 2010, the amount owed to the peasants in 
Qunle Village was 12,988 yuan. The money borrowed by the township 
government reached 969,186 yuan and it was unable to repay this.       
 
      The huge debts of local governments and the heavy financial burdens 
imposed on the peasants became major themes during the 1990s, and they 
took a toll on things like community building initiatives, the provision of 
social welfare, etc. During this period, government actors at county, 
township and village level encouraged peasants to tend to infrastructure -- 
such as the power grid and poles in remote rural areas, maintaining the 
dykes and dams, school buildings, etc.  They managed some achievements, 
but these projects were actually mainly funded through the arbitrary 
deployment of coercive power, which the peasants could rarely resist. As 
Mr P of Yushi Village of Taiqing Township said, the power poles and grid 
in his township were all paid for by the peasants, at a rate of 280 yuan per 
person, with repetitive additional payments on top of that.394 This explains 
why, despite the fact that per capita incomes of peasants kept increasing in 
absolute terms (according to the investigation of the Li County group of the 
                                                 
393 Interviews 2012/02/18, 2012/02/18b.  
394 Interview 2011/12/30. 
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Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan), rural households still faced 
hardships.395  
 
      Also in that period, the central government’s urban bias had heated up 
manufacturing industries in the coastal cities. That, together with the heavy 
burdens in villages noted above, persuaded many peasants to join the tide of 
migrants to urban areas to find work. Meanwhile, a few rural dwellers who 
were either educated or had powerful social networks took advantage of the 
privatisation of the first generation of TVEs in the 1990s and became 
successful entrepreneurs. Their economic gains not only enhanced their 
political influence, but also accelerated differentiations among peasants, in 
terms of both wealth and political power. All of these elements contribute to 
making Li County a place with stagnation, greater inequality and a degree of 
social disintegration. As studies of other localities have noted, protests and 
collective resistance even occurred in some places. This brought pressure to 
bear on the central government.  In order to reduce the burdens on peasants 
and to maintain the social stability in the rural areas, in September 1998, the 
Finance Ministry, the Agriculture Ministry and the leadership office for 
agriculture work in Beijing (zhongyang nongcun gongzuo lingdao 
bangongshi) jointly organised a work team to consider reforms.  This raised 
the curtain on another major drama in rural China -- the reform of taxes and 
fees in rural areas.396  
 
       Optimists have praised this reform as “the third revolution in the 
Countryside” after the land reform from 1927 to 1937 and the allocation of 
lands to the households in 1984.  Pessimists have seen it as an excess of 
caution.397  Let us set that debate aside.  The aim of this chapter is to 
                                                 
395 Interview 2012/02/11. 
396 Xie, Xuncheng, “To Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Reform on the Taxes 
and Fees in the Rural Areas: Bringing us not only Immediate Interests, but also the benefits 
for generations”, Qiushi online, 2011 (4), available on 
http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2011/201104/201102/t20110214_67950.htm (accessed on 24 
November, 2014). 
397 For more details about optimists’ opinions, see Zhang, Deyuan, “My Viewpoint on the 
‘Third Revolution in the Rural Areas”, Social Science Front, 2003 (2), p. 167 – 170, and 
Zhang, Yang, “The Reform on the Taxes and Fees in the Rural Areas: Another Institutional 
Renovation after Allocating the Lands to the Households”, Rural Economy of China, 2001 
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examine its implementation and its impact on rural communities in the years 
after it was initiated in 2005. The reform of rural taxes and fees in the 2000s 
was no less complicated than the earlier process of allocating lands to 
households from 1984.  It took considerable time since it required pilot 
experiments in some specific areas, feedback from them, the development of 
a detailed plan based on the feedback, and then full implementation. The 
content of this reform and related enabling reforms required change in 
several different but interacting spheres – in financial management 
institutions at township and village levels; in fiscal distribution methods 
between villages, townships and higher levels of government; in 
governmental structures at the township and village levels; in political 
transparency; and in other areas that were beneficial to agriculture such as 
various subsidies. 
  
        As a result, the peasants who were targets of exploitation in the 1990s 
finally got some relief.  They now not only do not need to pay huge amounts 
of money, but they are also entitled to receive certain subsidies to 
supplement their household incomes. The field research for this thesis found 
that these policies indeed succeeded in eliciting support from the peasants 
for the central governments. However, while the elimination of the 
agricultural tax and other fees eased the peasants’ burdens and accelerated 
the industrialisation of agriculture, certain features of this reform 
unexpectedly radicalised conflicts over excessive land concentration.  That 
became one of two vexing issues for local cadres’ and it has endangered the 
stability of rural communities even until today.398 Based on the reform of 
taxes and fees in rural areas, in 2006, the Hu-Wen leadership began a 
comprehensive campaign termed as building a new socialist countryside 
(jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun).399 Led by this slogan, a set of reform 
policies covered a diversity of themes: improving rural infrastructure such 
                                                                                                                            
(6), p. 45 – 51. For more details about pessimists’ opinions, see Qin, Hui, “The Reform of 
Merging Fees into Taxes and ‘Huang Zongxi’s Law’”, Management and Administration on 
Rural Cooperative, 2002 (3), and Zhu, Zuihong, “Several Questions on the Ongoing 
Reform on Taxes and Fees in Our Country”, Finance and Economics, 2004 (3).  
398 Interviews 2012/02/14b, 2012/02/19, 2012/02/16f, 2012/02/22 . The other issue is the 
debts at village level. 
399 Göbel, The Politics of …, p. 2. 
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as road paving and agricultural mechanisation; spreading the cover of a 
social security system in rural areas including the new social endowment 
insurance for rural residents (nongcun yanglao baoxian), the new rural co-
operative medical care (nongcun xinxing hezuo yiliao), a rural minimum 
subsistence allowance (nongcun dibao) and so on; and developing direct 
elections at village level and enhancing political transparency. This 
campaign aimed to narrow the great gap between urban and rural areas 
caused by the urban bias of the policies in the 1990s, and to integrate the 
rural and the urban development.400  
 
        Although the implementation of these reforms has proceeded, and has 
encountered inevitable problems, it is undeniable that they and the enabling 
reforms that attended them have had a far-reaching influence on the lives of 
peasants and rural communities. This point is strongly substantiated by 
statements of interviewees. At the same time, urban-rural integration also 
impinges on relatively traditional rural areas.  It accelerates their 
modernisation, and compels them – like it or not -- to deal with modern 
technology and values attached to modern society. . On the one hand, it 
makes peasants’ lives more convenient and better informed by connecting 
them to the outside world. But on the other, they are confronted by novel 
modern values such as freedom, self-responsibility, a sense of rights, the 
rule of law, democracy, and political participation. Those rural residents 
who are accustomed to paternalistic power dynamics sometimes feel lost. 
Some of them turn down traditional paths such as Confucianism, Buddhism 
and Taoism. Some have accepted imported Christianity while still others, 
despite some awkward moments, are learning to adjust and to integrate 
themselves. But rural communities in Li County which used to be rather 
homogeneous and unified have become increasingly diverse.                
  
  
                                                 
400 Ibid. 
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4.1 Reducing Peasant Burdens: The Reform of Taxes and Fees in Rural 
Areas and the Agricultural Subsidies System from 2000 to 2005 
 
It took some time for the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas to make the 
transition from an idea within the Beijing government to an implementable 
practice at lower levels. At the central government level, the process began 
in September 1998 when persons from the Finance Ministry, the Agriculture 
Ministry and the leadership office for agricultural work organised a work 
team on the reform within the state council.401 Then on 14 October of 1998, 
the Third Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Party Congress of the CCP 
approved a document entitled “decisions of the central party committee on 
several important issues in terms of agriculture and rural works”, which 
incorporated “reducing the peasant burdens” into the article no. 7 of ten 
articles. After one and a half years, on 2 March 2000, the State Council 
issued document No.7 entitled “a notice on the conduct of experiments with 
the reform of taxes and fees in the rural areas” [zhongfa (2000) No. 7] and 
authorised Anhui province to carry out experiments across the whole 
province.402 
 
     This document later became the main source of authority and guidance 
for detailed plans and implementation in each province and sub-provincial 
areas. 403 It set up a framework for the reform, and in brief stipulates the 
following.404 
 
                                                 
401 Xie, Xuncheng, “To Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Reform on the Taxes 
and Fees in the Rural Areas: Bringing us not only Immediate Interests, but also the benefits 
for generations”, Qiushi online, 2011 (4), available on 
http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2011/201104/201102/t20110214_67950.htm (accessed on 24 
November , 2014). 
402 Ibid. 
403  The notices of Hunan Province Government and of Changde prefecture-city 
Government to implement the reform of the taxes and fees in rural areas are both based on 
this document No. 7.   
404 “A notice of the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council on the conduct of 
experiments with the reform of taxes and fees in the rural areas” [zhongfa (2000) No. 7]”, 
CPC News, available on:  http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66689/4494510.html 
(accessed on 25 November, 2014). 
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- Regarding taxes:  the slaughter tax will be eliminated; the rate of taxes on 
agricultural speciality products will be adjusted so as to avoid overlapping 
with the agriculture tax; and the agriculture tax will be adjusted as well to 
incorporate the pre-existing surtax into a new agriculture tax with a rate of 
up to 7%, and a new agriculture surtax will be introduced with a rate of up 
to 20% of the agriculture tax. 
- Regarding fees: The fees for township planning will be completely 
eliminated. Accordingly, administrative functions which were mainly 
funded by those fees, including the educational expenses of townships and 
villages – to run schools, family planning, militia training, special care for 
veterans, and to pave roads beyond village boundaries but within the 
township -- will be incorporated into the financial budgets of governments 
at various levels. The fees for village reserves will be adjusted so that the 
public accumulation fund -- which used to cover the provision of public 
goods to disadvantaged groups in the village community such as providing 
special care for the five guarantee households -- and the management fee 
which used to cover the salaries of village cadres and other office expenses, 
will both be paid by a new surtax on the agriculture tax, while the public 
welfare fund will be decided upon by democratic discussions in village 
assemblies.   
- Regarding voluntary work services: the two pre-existing types of voluntary 
work service -- i.e., labour accumulative work service and voluntary rural 
work service -- which had been used to provide the labourers for the public 
welfare in a village community (including irrigation maintenance, paving 
roads within the village, forestation, etc.) will be eliminated.  
- The villagers’ assembly (cunmin dahui) and a programme of “one project 
one discussion (yishi yiyi)”: The villagers’ assemblies and democratic 
discussions had once been used to give villagers some say on key issues in 
the collective era and even during the allocation of lands to the 
households. 405  The arbitrary and unregulated behaviour of government 
actors had made the assemblies dysfunctional in the 1990s. They were now 
re-introduced by the central government, to promote democracy within 
                                                 
405 Interview 2012/02/11. 
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village communities. The approach to democratic discussions is relabelled 
as “one project one discussion” and was to be used to decide issues related 
to fundraising for activities to serve the public good in villages such as 
paving the roads, etc. 
      In addition to the main stipulations above, document No. 7 also 
suggested other enabling and supporting reforms.  These included regulating 
the method of levying administrative surcharges in rural areas; downsizing 
township governmental organisations and their personnel; improving 
financial management institutions at the county, township and village level; 
and establishing institutions to monitor peasant burdens, and to publicise the 
full set of surcharges and their rates. Furthermore, it stressed the need to 
institutionalise and to legalise all these reforms, by passing relevant 
regulations and legislation though relevant procedures. As for 
implementation -- the adoption of procedures for pilot experiments, 
feedback and expanding the practices -- Document No. 7 authorised Anhui 
Province to undertake province-wide pilot experiments.  It also gave other 
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly administered by 
the central government options to choose a few counties for pilot projects if 
their conditions permitted. 406 
 
      Against this background, in May 2000, two months after document No. 
7 was issued, and after obtaining central government approval, Hunan 
Province decided that Jinshi county-level city, Yongxing County and 
Changsha County should be experimental sites.  It started an incremental 
reform of taxes and fees in rural areas.407 In 2001, Jiangsu province joined 
Anhui by beginning pilot experiments. Based on the lessons accumulated in 
the pilots, on 27 March 2002, the State Council decided to expand them to 
                                                 
406  For more details about the CCP’s policy implementation procedures for pilot 
experiments – feedback – expanding the practice, see Heilmann, Sebastian and Perry, 
Elizabeth J. (ed.), Mao’s invisible hand: the political foundation of adaptive governance in 
China, (Harvard: HUP, 2011); and Heilmann, Sebastian, “Policy Experimentation in 
China’s Economic Rise”, St Comp Int’l Dev (2008) 43 p. 1- 26. 
407 Hu, Zuohua and Duan, Xianju, “The Reform of the Taxes and Fees in the Rural Areas 
reduced the Peasant Burdens of 3 billion yuan”, Xinhua News, 7 November 2002, available 
on http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/37/20021107/861091.html  (accessed on 25 
November, 2014). 
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another sixteen provinces. By the end of 2002, 20 provinces had begun the 
reform.408 Hunan province belonged to this group.  
 
     Based on experiences in the three pilot counties, the provincial party 
committee and provincial government convened a work meeting in Jinshi 
county-level city on 3–4 April 2002 on the full implementation of the 
reform throughout the province.409  Then on 23 April 2002, in a written 
document, the provincial party committee and government officially issued 
“a notice on fully pushing ahead with the reform of taxes and fees in rural 
areas” [xiangfa (2002) No 5], plus an implementation plan, to its 
subordinate cities and counties’ party committees and governments. Over 
the next two months, various plans for the main reform and for supporting 
reforms were formulated and issued one after another, based on the 
conditions in Hunan as a whole. These plans included the new way to levy 
the agricultural tax and the tax on agricultural speciality products; a way to 
modify the management of township and village finances; and a method for 
intergovernmental transfers. Meanwhile, taking these provincial plans as 
guidance, various subordinate party committees and governments also 
began to discuss and to work out detailed plans which would be 
implemented within their jurisdictions.  
 
      The implementation in Changde prefecture city followed  suit, 
incrementally. The whole process included four stages.410 The first was to 
propagandise and to mobilise from the end of March to the end of April. 
During this phase, the main tasks included publicising the significance, 
principles and main content of the reform; working out plans; and 
calculating the fiscal data before and after the reform, which would be the 
                                                 
408 Xie, Xuncheng, “To Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Reform on the Taxes 
and Fees in the Rural Areas: Bringing us not only Immediate Interests, but also the benefits 
for generations”, Qiushi online, 2011 (4), available on 
http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2011/201104/201102/t20110214_67950.htm (accessed on 24 
November , 2014). 
409 “The Chronicle of Major Events in Changde prefecture city from 1949 – 2008”, Red Net, 
5 July 2011, available on http://hn.rednet.cn/c/2011/07/05/2306068_8.htm (accessed on 25 
November, 2014). 
410 “The General Plan on the Reform of the Taxes and Fees in Changde prefecture city”, 
Changde Rural Economy Web, available on http://www.cdnj.gov.cn/cnht/sfg%20g/gzzt.htm 
(accessed on 30 March 2012). 
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starting point to decide on the amount of the new agriculture tax and surtax. 
The second stage lasted from the beginning to the end of May. The main 
tasks included the city government evaluating and approving the plans of 
each county. Then, after approval, each of the counties was responsible for 
publicising and implementing the plans down to the townships, villages, 
groups and households. The period from the beginning of June to the end of 
October was the third stage, focused on supporting reforms including reform 
of township governmental organisations and of rural education. Finally, 
from the beginning of November to the end of December, inspections were 
to be carried out to check on the implementation and to summarise 
experiences and lessons. 
 
      At county level, based on a series of documents, plans, and advice from 
the central, provincial and city governments, Li County worked out its own 
detailed plan and started to implement the reform as early as April 2002. 
411It undertook “three eliminations”: eliminating fees for township planning 
and fundraising for rural education expenses; eliminating the slaughter tax; 
and over three years, gradually reducing two types of voluntary work 
services until they were eliminated. It also made “two adjustments”: of the 
agriculture tax and the taxes on agricultural speciality products.  It 
undertook “one reform” too, in the method of levying fees for the village 
reserve. Although most contents in this plan actually coincided with the 
stipulations in document No. 7 of the central government, instead of 
eliminating voluntary work service all at once, on the advice of the 
provincial government and with later approval from the central 
government, 412  this exercise followed the detailed plan of Changde 
                                                 
411 “The City Government Approved the Plans on the Reform of Taxes and Fees from Each 
Counties”, Changde Daily, 15 July 2002, reprinted on Changde Rural Economy Web, 
available on http://www.cdnj.gov.cn/cnht/sfgg/detail.php?id=1026723055 (accessed on 21 
March 2014). 
412 After Hunan Province submitted its plan to the central government, the general office of 
the State Council replied and emphasised that it should not take more than three years until 
the two types of voluntary work services were completely eliminated, and that the plan 
should clearly state that the amount of these two types of voluntary work would be 
gradually reduced during the transition.  For more details, see the general office of the State 
Council, “Response to the Implementation Plan of Hunan on the Reform of Taxes and Fees 
in Rural Areas [guobanhan, (2002) No. 51]”, Central Government Web, available on: 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61616.htm (accessed on 20 March 2014). 
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prefecture city government and used a step by step approach to eliminate the 
two types of voluntary work service within three years – since the county is 
located in a flood-prone area and this faces serious tasks in maintaining 
dams and dykes, and irrigation systems.413  
 
        On top of reducing peasant burdens by eliminating a series of taxes, 
fees and voluntary work services, the Hunan provincial government did a 
few other things. First, before the reform of taxes and fees started, with its 
Finance Department, it suggested that government offices at subordinate 
levels carry out a campaign labelled as “eliminating deficits and reducing 
debts (xiaochi jianzhai)” in 2002 to prepare for the upcoming reform. 
Second, in order to strengthen and to stabilise the achievements over the 
longer time after the reform was finished, it also suggested that its 
subordinates further improve the management system for township finances, 
downsize the township organisations and reform rural education. 414 In the 
following sections, starting from the campaign of “eliminating deficits and 
reducing debts” in 2002, we will discuss the implementation of these pre- 
and post-reform programmes and their impacts. The reform on rural 
education will not be discussed due to lack of data and its diminished 
importance compared with other programmes. 
  
4.1.1 Eliminating Deficits and Reducing Debts (xiaochi jianzhai) in 2002 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, the debts and the deficits at the township and 
village levels in the middle and late 1990s stayed extremely high. According 
to the Li County annals, at the end of the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, the 
total deficits and debts of all township governments were respectively 70.25 
                                                 
413 “The Implementation Plan on the Reform of Taxes and Fees in Changde prefecture city”, 
Changde Rural Economy Web, available on http://www.cdnj.gov.cn/cnht/sfg%20g/gzzt.htm 
(accessed on 30 March 2012). 
414 “A notice of the general office of Hunan provincial government on forwarding the three 
documents of the provincial finance department and the provincial office of the reform of 
taxes and fees in rural areas including the advice on the way to levy the agriculture tax and 
tax on the agricultural speciality products after the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas, 
and on further improving the management system for township finance [xiangzhengbanfa 
(2002) No. 21]”, Law Time Web, available on http://law.lawtime.cn/d421087426181.html 
(accessed on 20 January 2014). 
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million yuan, 55.32 million yuan and 47.05 million yuan.415 In June 2002, in 
order to open the way for the forthcoming reform, and in a response to the 
call from the Hunan provincial party committee and the government in “a 
notice on fully pushing ahead the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas” 
[xiangfa (2002) No 5], the county and its township governments began to 
carry out a campaign to “sort out the debts and dissolve the risk to township 
finance”. 416 
 
        The county, township and village authorities mainly relied on selling 
off fixed assets to revitalise the collective resources. According to the 
statistics in the annals, up to the end of 2002, the whole county resolved the 
debts at the village level in the amount of 132.11 million yuan, with 345 
villages clearing their debts out of a total of 588. 417 Among 32 townships, 
two, i.e., Yanjing Township and Zhongwu Township, cleared all deficits 
and debts; 22 cleared deficits but still had debts; while there were still eight 
townships which still had deficits and debts.418 In order to understand this 
campaign better, we must put it in context, to see how it impinged upon 
rural communities. When we consider methods, the 53 villages where 
interviews were conducted can be divided into three groups: one focusing 
on the selling off all fixed assets; another which retained some collective 
enterprises; and a third which, while selling off all fixed assets, fabricated 
excuses to collect money from the peasants.  
 
 The group selling off all fixed assets  
 
Most villages belonged to this group. During field research, 51 of 53 used 
this approach. The fixed assets collectively owned by the villages included 
such things as the office buildings of the village committee, village-owned 
                                                 
415 Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, Annals of Li County 1978 – 2002, 
(Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2012), p. 381. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid. 
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schools which were mainly primary schools419 , and some village-owned 
enterprises like two quality rice processing mills in Qunle Village of Daping 
Township. Some villages had sold off some of them in the middle and late 
1990s, in the process of transforming the established TVEs.420 In 2002, the 
rest were completely sold off to whoever could afford them. A second set of 
fixed assets included mountainous lands, forests, and lake lands. One might 
ask why these lands were still dealt with by the village collectives if they 
had been allocated to the households. Actually, when assigning lands to 
households in 1984, arable lands were completely allocated, but 
mountainous lands were divided into two types: those which were barren 
and those covered by forests or on which agriculture products like fruits 
were grown.421 
 
       Barren mountain lands were allocated to households, technically as 
places to provide firewood for rural households – “firewood mountains 
(chaihuo shan)”.  If peasants wished to, they could reclaim such lands to 
grow crops. However, mountainous lands covered with forests or fruits were 
still managed by the collectives and were not allocated to each household as 
arable lands were in 1984. During the period from 1984 to 2002, these 
collectively-owned forest lands or lake lands were normally contracted out 
to whoever wanted to manage therm. In return, based on agreements or 
contracts, village collectives would get certain fees on a yearly basis. During 
the campaign to eliminate deficits and reduce debts in 2002, these lands 
including products on them were all assigned for 20 or 30 years to whoever 
could afford to provide in lump-sum payments. It is worth noting that, since 
lands are owned by the collective according to Chinese Land law, it was 
only possible to sell off management rights for fixed periods of time. This 
applied to the mountainous lands in mountainous areas and hilly areas, and 
lake lands in lake areas. 
 
                                                 
419 For more details about the three levels of system to run schools in Li County, see 
footnote no. 356. 
420 Interviews 2012/02/11, 2012/02/15. For more details about the process of transforming 
the established TVEs, see Chapter Three p. 176-180. 
421 Interview 2012/02/19b. 
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        However, in some villages which faced real hardship, the village 
collective could still arbitrarily decide to sell off barren mountains which 
had been allocated to households in 1984.  They relied on the fact that, after 
all, the ownership of all lands belonged to the villagers’ group and the 
village committee. For example, in some villages of Fuxing Township, they 
first informed the peasants to which barren mountainous plots were 
allocated in 1984 that these plots were going to be sold at a certain price. 
The peasant contractor in situ had priority in buying the management rights 
to this patch of land. If s/he did not want to buy, then this land would be 
sold off to other people. Mr W of Shuangyan Village of Fuxing Township 
told us that normally if the peasants had invested their labour to grow 
anything on this land, they would want to buy management rights for a fixed 
number of years, but if they had planted nothing, they tended not to buy it. 
However this method was not applied in all villages, even within the same 
township. In some, barren mountainous lands previously allocated to 
households on a per capita basis were left unchanged in 2002 and only 
collectively-owned and lands which were covered with oranges were sold 
off.  
 
       In some areas, many peasants faced such heavy burdens with taxes that 
they preferred to abandon them rather than planting them. For example, in 
Shuanglong Township, there was around 20 thousand mu of taxed arable 
lands in total but abandoned lands reached 6,000 mu in 2001, full of wild 
trees and grass.422 However, various taxes and fees still had to be paid. 
Around 1.4 million yuan of taxes and fees were due for the whole township 
in the peak period, of which around 600,000 were owed in agriculture tax, 
300,000 in taxes on agricultural speciality products, and 180,000 in the 
slaughter tax. Peasants chose to abandon the lands to avoid these heavy 
charges, so the village had to meet these payments by selling off the 
abandoned lands at cheap prices to whoever would buy them.423 Land had 
also been abandoned in Fenghuang Village of Guanyuan Township, but for 
                                                 
422 Interview 2012/02/19. 
423 Ibid. 
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different reasons. 424  After catastrophic floods in 1998, two-thirds of 
households there were resettled in newly built towns in 2001, but their 
allocated lands in their former villages remained, although they were rather 
far away from where they were resettled.425 That, and the fact that the rate of 
return on those old lands was very low, persuaded peasants to abandon them. 
In order to pay off their heavy debts, the governments at township and 
village level there decided to sell off these lands.  
 
        Arable lands could be as cheap as 50–60 yuan per mu and they could 
be taken over for as long as 30 years, the length of land contracts with the 
state.426 Since it was very inexpensive, some better off people bought 50 or 
100 mu in Fenghuang Village of Guanyuan Township. The buyers could be 
anyone, from within or outside the village. Mountainous lands could be as 
cheap as 5-10 yuan per mu per year and were normally sold off for up to 30 
years as well, while forested land could be obtained for up to 70 years as its 
contract length is longer than the other two.427 They were all sold off via 
lump-sum payments. The agricultural products from these lands were sold 
off too. For example, Shuangyan Village of Fuxing Township not only sold 
its collectively-owned and managed mountainous lands, but also the orange 
trees on them -- at a price of 35 yuan per tree. 428 
 
 These sales helped village collectives to clear parts of their deficits 
and debts. For example, Shuangyan Village of Fuxing Township obtained 
more than 100,000 yuan by selling off the collectively owned and managed 
orange garden and mountainous lands. This amount, combined with other 
compensation to the village such as the land requisition for the National 
Road No. 207 and a grade-2 road,429  paid off its debts and even left a 
                                                 
424 Interview 2012/02/14b. 
425 For more details about resettling the displaced residents to a newly built towns, see 
footnote no. 367. 
426 Interview 2012/02/14b. 
427 Interview 2012/02/19, 2012/02/22. The certificate of the forest and woodland tenure has 
not been issued until 2010. The new certificate issued in 2010 states that the contracted 
length of the forestry will be valid for 70 years and it will expire on 31 December 2053. 
428 Interview 2012/02/19b. 
429 According to the interview 2012/02/19b, the rates of the compensations for the land 
requisition were 30,000 yuan per mu for the arable land and 10,000 per mu for the 
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surplus in the period up to 2012.430  Mr Y of Yingxi Village of Daohe 
Township stated that the debts in his village were around one million yuan 
before 2002. The selling off of collectively owned fixed assets -- including 
mountainous and lake lands, schools and so on -- at low prices in 2002, 
reduced the debts almost by half. It was around 510,000 to 520,000 yuan in 
2012. 431  However, these asset sales did not offer an adequate or a 
sustainable solution. As Mr. Y said of the other half of the village debts, 
“we have to wait for the policy from the higher levels of governments.  
Without a policy, we cannot survive.” Without its fixed assets, and given the 
prohibition on levying surcharges on the peasants, the village collective had 
lost nearly all of its sources of income, so that it had to await transfers from 
higher levels.  
 
        Furthermore, during these sales, some villages even violated contracted 
rights which had supposedly been given to the peasants when they sold off 
allocated barren mountainous lands or even arable lands. Although some of 
these allocated lands were abandoned voluntarily, others were sold off by 
the collectives arbitrarily, and peasants continue to complain about it even 
now. The firewood mountain of the 7th group of Lianhua Village of 
Matoupu Township is just such a case.432 It consisted of around 200 mu and 
was originally reserved for the peasants there, for their private use. Later, 
without the consent of the peasants, the township government decided to 
develop collective forestry on this land. The returns from that went to the 
township government and the ousted peasants only received compensation 
of 3 yuan per mu.  
 
      Up to in the middle of the 1990s, due to mismanagement, forested lands 
were in deep deficit. In response, again without the consent of the peasants, 
the township government unilaterally sold it off to four people as co-
shareholders at a price of 200 thousand yuan for a fixed period until 2015. 
                                                                                                                            
mountainous land. After the village extracted 15% of these compensations, the rest were 
given to the peasants whose lands were requisitioned.   
430 Interview 2012/02/19b. 
431 Interview 2012/02/22. 
432 Interview 2012/02/11. 
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Those peasants got no compensation. The aggrieved peasants, led by the 
previous party secretary of the Lianhua Village, reported this case to the 
county government in 2010. The county government ordered the township 
government to give the land back to the 7th villagers’ group. However, as the 
four co-shareholders had paid the township government to use the land, 
breaking the contract unilaterally would result in substantial compensation 
to the shareholders. The township government did not have the money to 
pay the compensation.  This case was still not resolved in 2012 when the 
peasants were interviewed.  
 
        As a result of this large-scale sell off, almost all villages no longer have 
any collectively-owned assets. This was true in 98 % of all interviewed 
villages. Both legitimate and illegitimate sales of lands by the township and 
village authorities, combined with the private transfer of some lands in the 
1990s due to the heavy tax burdens, accelerated the concentration of 
lands.433 Some peasants have no land at all while others occupied tens or 
even hundreds of plots. 434  Although land contracts were renewed in Li 
County in 1994-95 for another 30 years, because the tax burdens stayed high 
after that, many peasants did not want to take on much land. Therefore, in 
many villages, newly printed management certificates to lands piled up in 
village committee offices and could not be distributed to rural households. 
This eventually led to conflicts in rural communities on the land issue when 
later, new subsidy policies were introduced that were beneficial to 
agriculturalists -- mainly based on the size of lands. 
 
 The village which kept its collective enterprises435 
Located in the plains area, Yucheng Village of Daping Township is the only 
village out of 53 where interviews were conducted which still keeps its 
village-owned enterprises, although it actually only has one brick factory. 
Mr Y, the party secretary of Yucheng Village explained that this factory 
                                                 
433 For more details about the private transfer behaviours of the lands in the 1990s, see 
Chapter Three, p. 218-220. 
434 Interview 2012/02/14b. 
435 Interview 2012/02/18. 
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started running in 1987 and has been owned by the village collective. 
During the campaign to eliminate deficits and reduce debts in 2002, in spite 
of the debts of the village, Yucheng Village still did not sell it off.  It has 
been contracted out on a yearly basis. In 2005, the central government 
completed eliminated the agriculture tax, which provided a big cushion for 
the debts of the village. In the following few years, with the effective 
management by local cadres, this factory yielded contract fees of 510,000 
yuan for each of the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. This income, combined 
with funds which the local cadres raised from the successful entrepreneurs 
born in the village, not only helped it to clear its debts, but also -- up to 2012 
– the village ran an annual surplus of around 300,000 yuan.  
 
       Thus, the peasants in this village greatly benefited from this form of 
management. After 2005, although the central government eliminated the 
agriculture tax and other fees, the water fee could still be collected. While 
other villages had great difficulties collecting this fee, the Yucheng Village 
committee used its collective income to cover the water fees for all of its 
peasants -- in 2011 an expenditure of around 30,000 yuan. The village 
income also enabled it to improve provisions to serve the public welfare: 
paving roads, maintaining ditches and irrigation channels, etc. For example, 
in 2011, the village committee invested 200,000 yuan to pave two roads.    
 
 The village which, on top of selling off all fixed assets, fabricated excuses 
to collect money from the peasants to reduce debts436 
 
Among all the 53 villages, only Banqiaorong Village of Wangjiachang 
Township belonged to this group. Its accumulated debts up to 2002 
exceeded 700,000 yuan. With the approval of the township government, in 
order to pay off the debts, the village committee first decided to sell off all 
fixed assets of value, including its office building, village-owned schools, 
village-owned enterprise and mines, and even the office of the power station. 
However, the amount realised was still not sufficient to clear the debts. The 
                                                 
436 Interview 2012/02/16f. 
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village committee therefore decided to fabricate excuses related to allocated 
lands to collect money from the peasants. It used the concentration of lands 
during the late 1990s, as a pretext to re-measure the size of all land holdings. 
In this exercise, they integrated lands which were not supposed to be taxed - 
including plots of 0.2 mu per capita for private household use and plots for 
private residence – with taxed lands.437 Then, all of these re-measured lands 
were allocated among peasants in the village on a per capita basis. Each 
peasant was allocated 1.7 mu as a result. As the issue of land concentration 
had triggered popular concern at that time, this exercise easily obtained the 
support of most peasants in the village. 
 
        As it integrated untaxed and taxed lands, the village committee 
fabricated a concept of “basic land” – a unit of 0.2 mu per capita. For this 
“basic land”, the village committee would levy 100 yuan/0.1 mu - as a one-
off payment. They used some attractive words to persuade the peasants to 
pay by stating that after this one-off payment, this part of 0.2 mu would no 
longer be levied. In addition, plots which were given to the peasants for 
their residences would be taxed at a rate of 180 yuan per mu. Finally, taxed 
lands – that is, all other lands -- the village committee levied taxes at a rate 
of 100 yuan per mu. Take the household of Mr R, the party secretary of 
Banqiaorong Village, as an example. His household included three full 
adults and one half adult (i.e., an elderly person). Based on the rate of 1.7 
mu per capita, his household was allocated 5.1 mu land. To understand the 
taxes that he had to pay, let us use this equation: the total = basic land (0.2 
mu per capita x 100 yuan per 0.1 mu x 3.5 persons) + plots for residence 
(1.2 mu x 180 yuan per mu) + taxed lands (5.1 mu x 100 yuan per mu).  
Thus Mr R had to pay a total of 700 + 216 + 510 = 1416 yuan in order to 
help the village to reduce its debts.   
 
                                                 
437 Since the collective era, peasants have been eligible to reserve some lands: mountainous 
land for private collections of firewood; plots near their houses used to grow vegetables, 
and plots for private residences. These types of lands are untaxed. Allocating lands to 
households in 1984 was based on the areas of the lands measured and recorded in 1951 and 
some adjustments could be made, if needed, after public meetings with all peasants. For 
more details about how lands were allocated in 1984, see the section on the rules for 
ranking lands in Chapter Two, p. 85-87. 
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        It should be apparent from the above equation that the “basic land” tax 
was not only illegitimately levied, but it was levied twice. And the plots for 
residences were also illegitimately taxed. One might ask why this 
fabrication could be carried out with little resistance from the peasants. 
According to Mr R, the village committee first followed legal procedures to 
inform, persuade and mobilise the peasants by convening the meetings with 
the heads of each household.  Then they took advantage of conflicts over 
land concentration to distract peasants from the fabrication. Finally, they 
promised that after a one-off payment, “basic land” would never be taxed 
again – an idea that sounded attractive to the peasants. In Mr R’s word, “the 
burdens at that time averaged 300-500 yuan per mu per year. If this 0.2 mu 
land was exempted, a peasant could save 60 yuan per year and that would 
amount to 300 yuan in five years’ time. How could they not agree?”438  By 
using this method, Banqiaorong village cleared all of its debts of 700,000 
yuan, and in 2012, it still had a surplus of 50,000. In Mr R’s words, 
although these methods were illegitimate, if they had not used them, the 
high debt could not have been cleared.   
 
 Summary 
To sum up, following the call to eliminate deficits and reduce debts, the 
authorities at the township and village levels were permitted to sell off 
collective-owned fixed assets. However, the methods used varied. Some 
better off villages were still able to retain elements of the collective 
economy while others not only had to sell off all of their collective-owned 
assets, but also went beyond that to deal in lands over which they were not 
supposed to have that authority. This happened because the contracted rights 
were either not that clearly set out in documents to support the villagers, as 
with the arrangements for firewood in mountainous areas in Lianhua 
Village,439 or tricks were played to circumvent written contracts, as with the 
introduction of “basic land” in Banqiaorong Village. Generally, villages in 
plains areas were least likely to violate the contracted rights of peasants; the 
                                                 
438 Interview 2012/02/16f. 
439 Interview 2012/02/19, 2012/02/22. The certificate of the forest and woodland tenure has 
not been issued until 2010.  
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hilly areas stood witnessed a combination of selling off collective-owned 
and contracted assets; and mountainous and lake areas were most likely to 
see violations of peasants’ contracted rights.  
 
      These variations were partly the result of different economic 
development in various areas. But they were also a result of a weak 
commitment to and understanding of the rule by law, not only among local 
cadres, but also among the peasants. After thousands of years under 
authoritarian regimes, rural dwellers had grown accustomed to hierarchical, 
top-down orders. Not only did the local cadres take it for granted that they 
could dispose of assets which were supposed to belong to the peasants 
without their consent, but the peasants tended towards submissive 
acceptance. Mr X in the 7th group of Lianhua Village of Matoupu Township 
stated, “Finally, the issue of our firewood is still unresolved… What can we 
do? They are the government. The county government has the authority to 
sell the things of the township government, and the township government 
also has the authority to sell the things of the village!”440  
 
      Fortunately, this situation seems to have been changing. With reference 
to contracted rights to the lands, the state has pressed ahead with an effort to 
foster a sense of the rule of law among ordinary people, and to protect the 
peasants’ legal rights by strengthening land contracts, procedurally and 
practically. And the development of telecommunications infrastructure in 
the middle and late 2000s has not only helped to link rural communities to 
the outside world, but also introduces and promotes new concepts in the 
minds of the peasants -- such as violations of rights (qinquan), protections 
for rights (weiquan), contracted rights (hetong quan), democratic votes 
(minzhu toupiao), justice, etc. So peasants now know more about how to 
protect their rights and to challenge illegitimate behaviour by local 
governments, by using the governmental and social monitoring routes. We 
will discuss these in later sections. 
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4.1.2 The Reform of Taxes and Fees in the Rural Areas from 2002 to 2005 
 
The reform of taxes and fees in the rural areas and the campaign to eliminate 
deficits and reduce debts went hand in hand in Li County. While the former 
was called and started preparing as early as April 2002, the latter was 
carried out in full swing two months later as the former’s preparatory 
procedure to facilitate its following full implementation.441  The drive to 
eliminate deficits and reduce debts was almost finished at the end of 2002, 
and then the focus shifted to the reform of taxes and fees. Li County’s 
implementation, like that of Changde prefecture city at a higher level, 
proceeded in four stages: policy propaganda and publicity, measurement and 
calculations, discussing and confirming the plan, and finally 
implementation. 442  Guided by the principle of “two eliminations, one 
elimination gradually, two adjustments, and one reform”, and aimed at 
reducing peasant burdens, Li County gradually changed the way that taxes 
and fees were levied, and the methods used to raise funds for the public 
welfare. 443 
 
 Two eliminations444       
As explained in an earlier section, ‘two eliminations’ meant the complete 
elimination of fees for township planning and of fundraising for rural 
education. The township administrative functions which used to be funded 
by the fees -- including nine years of compulsory education, family planning, 
militia training, and special care for veterans - were now incorporated into 
the governmental budgets at various levels. The funds which used to be for 
the road building to connect villages within one township were now 
managed by the township government while funds for road building within 
individual villages were now discussed democratically in meetings of 
                                                 
441 Wang, Zhigang, “Li County has achieved four successes in the reform of taxes and fees 
in the rural areas”, Changde Rural Economy Web, 26 September 2002, available on 
http://www.cdnj.gov.cn/cnht/sfgg/detail.php?id=1033006742 (accessed on 21 March 2014). 
442 Ibid. 
443 Ibid. 
444 “The Implementation Plan on the Reform of Taxes and Fees in Changde prefecture city”, 
Changde Rural Economy Web, available on http://www.cdnj.gov.cn/cnht/sfg%20g/gzzt.htm 
(accessed on 30 March 2014). 
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village assemblies. Health care in rural areas would gradually become 
commercialised, with part subsidies by the township government if 
appropriate. The funds to repair dangerous school buildings in rural areas 
were incorporated into the governmental budgets at various levels. The 
second elimination completely ended the slaughter tax and all surcharges 
attached to it. These two eliminations were completed without exceptions.    
 
 One elimination, gradually445 
Unlike the two complete eliminations, the treatment to two types of 
voluntary work service – cumulative labour and voluntary work – were only 
gradually eliminated. It is explained by the fact that most areas in Hunan are 
located along big rivers and the tasks of building and maintaining dams and 
dykes are so heavy that they require a certain amount of labour. The 
requirements for such labour were gradually reduced over three years, and 
meanwhile an upper limit on the amount of such work was set.  The total 
amounts of these two types of work per labourer per year in lake, plain and 
mountainous (including hilly) areas were respectively up to 20 units, 15 
units and 10 units in 2002; up to 15 units, 12 units and 8 units in 2003; and 
up to 10 units, 8 units and 5 units in 2004.446 Since 2005, they have been 
completely eliminated. For some large-scale water conservancy construction 
projects which continued to need labour, work was permitted under an 
upper limit after reports to the government at county level for approval. The 
upper limits on the total amount of such work per labourer in lake, plain and 
mountainous (including hilly) areas were respectively 6 units, 3 units and 2 
units in 2002 and 2003; and in 2004 reduced to 5 units, 2 units and 1 units. 
During the transition, with mutual consent, these two types of work could be 
replaced by arrangements for labour to be paid for in cash. The government 
plan also suggested that some mountainous areas could choose to eliminate 
these two voluntary works within an even shorter time, considering that not 
much labour was required to maintain the public facilities as in the lake 
areas.   
                                                 
445 Ibid. 
446 A unit is a measurement to record the work amount. A standard unit is equal to an eight-
hour working day for a normal worker.  
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       After these two types of work were eliminated, irrigation construction 
and maintenance of farmlands, depending on differences in scale, were 
integrated into the government investment plans at various levels. The large 
and medium scale water conservancy construction along Dongting Lake, 
River Yuan and River Li will instead be funded by the investment plans of 
the state and the province, while the small scale irrigation infrastructure of 
farmland of the prefecture city and the county. In addition, following a rule 
of “who build and who fund”, other public facility projects, such as road 
paving and agricultural infrastructure building etc., would be funded by the 
relevant governmental organisations. Furthermore, a programme of “one 
project one discussion” was introduced and used to source the funds for 
public facility projects within a village community, including irrigation 
building, roads and bridge building, infectious diseases preventions etc.. We 
will discuss this programme in detail below.   
 
 Two adjustments 
The term ‘two adjustments’ refers to adjustments in two types of taxes -- 
agricultural taxes and taxes on agricultural speciality products. In the case of 
the former, the size and output of taxed land were re-checked by a 
government department. Based on that, the rate of the agricultural tax was 
recalculated and tended gradually to be lowered. It ranged from 6.5% to 7% 
of normal output, depending on different geographical areas. In brief, after 
re-calculating, the taxed land in Changde prefecture city administration was 
4.8 million mu and the normal annual output was 757 kilogram per mu. 
According to the unified price -- 51 yuan per 50 kilograms -- which was 
decided by the provincial government, the total amount of the agricultural 
tax in Changde prefecture city was 25,772 yuan after 2002. 447 A Hunan 
Province procedure for implementation became the authoritative guide if 
any disputes arose. In the case of the tax on agricultural speciality products, 
adjustments were made in the content, tax rates and procedure for levying 
the taxes.  After re-calculations, the total amount of the tax on speciality 
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products was estimated to be 13.34 million yuan. When questions about 
matters of detail arose during implementation, people could refer to another 
provincial government document which set out the methods to be used. 448     
 
       On 31 December 2003, the Central Party Committee and the State 
Council jointly issued a document entitled “several opinions of the Central 
Party Committee and the State Council on policies to stimulate the income 
growth of the peasants” as guidance for work in 2004, and called for the 
gradual reduction of the agricultural tax rate.449 Following this, in order to 
build on the achievements of the reform of taxes and fees and to reduce 
further the peasants’ burdens, the rate of the agricultural tax would be 
reduced generally by 1%. Meanwhile the tax on speciality products, except 
the tobacco leaves, was completely eliminated in 2004.450 Article 18 of this 
central document also encouraged areas where conditions permitted to 
reduce further the rate of the agricultural tax, and experiments were even 
undertaken to completely eliminate it.  The Ministry of Finance authorised 
Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces to carry out these experiments. It also 
permitted another eleven major grain producing provinces -- including 
Hunan -- to further reduce it by 3 %, while the rest reduced it by 1 %.451 As 
a result, by 29 September 2004, the peasant burdens had been reduced by 
over 50%.452   
 
                                                 
448 Ibid. 
449 The Central Party Committee and the State Council, “several opinions of the Central 
Party Committee and the State Council on policies to stimulate the income growth of the 
peasants”, Central Government of PRC Web, 31 December, 2003, available on 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/22/content_207415.htm (accessed on 2 December 2014).  
450 Ibid. 
451 The Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, “The notice of the Ministry 
of Finance, the Agriculture Ministry and the General Bureau of Tax on several questions 
about reducing the rate of the agricultural tax and carrying out the experiments of the 
reform on the agricultural tax in some major grain producing areas  in 2004 [caishui (2004) 
No. 77] ”, Ministry of Finance of the PRC Web, 6 April 2004, available on 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/caizhengbuwengao2004/caizhengb
uwengao20044/200805/t20080519_20170.html  (accessed on 2 December 2014). 
452 Changsha Evening News, “The peasant burdens were reduced by over 4 billion yuan and 
hopefully the agricultural tax will be completely eliminated in 5 years,” China Web, 29 
September 2004, available on http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/difang/670554.htm 
(accessed on 2 December 2014). 
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        There was more to follow. By New Year’s Day 2005, some provinces 
including Guangdong, Jiangsu, Henan, Zhejiang, and Sichuan had 
announced the complete elimination of the agricultural tax. Within sixteen 
days, three more provinces – Hunan, Jiangxi, and Qinghai – followed 
suit.453 The agricultural tax, which had been imposed for thousands of years 
on peasants in Hunan, became a thing of the past. In 2004, Li County 
reduced the agricultural tax by 24.13 million yuan -- a great reduction from 
30.33 million in 2001, the year before the reform of taxes and fees started.454 
The fiscal shortfall at the township and county levels would be filled by 
transfers from the provincial and central governments.455  
 
        On top of these actions on taxes, this central document issued on 31 
December 2003 also stipulated a series of agricultural subsidies policies 
including direct subsidies to grain producers (liangshi zhibu), plus subsidies 
for growing superior grain (liangzhong butie) and for purchasing large-scale 
agricultural machinery and tools in the major grain producing areas 
(nongjiju gouzhi butie).  These will be discussed below.456 To signal its 
crucial importance to rural areas and to the peasants, the main decree was 
entitled “the No.1 document”.457 By the end of 2005, the provinces which 
had completely eliminated the agricultural tax numbered 28 – along with 
210 counties in three other provinces – Hebei, Shangdong, and Yunnan.458 
This massive exercise was approved and legalised by the nineteenth meeting 
                                                 
453 Yang, Xiaohong and Jiang, Guocheng, “Twenty-two provinces including Hunan and 
Jiangxi announced to completely eliminate the agricultural tax”, Xinhua News, 17 January 
2005, available on http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-01-17/10504857814s.shtml (accessed on 
2 December 2014). 
454  Dongtingzhizi, “A investigation report on Li County: taking an opportunity of 
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People’s Daily Blog, 3 January 2008, available on 
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455 Ibid. 
456 The General Office of the State Council, “The elimination of the agricultural tax brings 
benefits to the peasants”, the Central Government of PRC Web, 1 January 2006, available 
on http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-01/01/content_145112.htm (accessed on 2 December 
2014). 
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People’s Daily Blog, 3 January 2008, available on 
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Web, available on http://www.reformdata.org/special/134/about.html (accessed on 2 
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of the tenth standing committee of the National People’s Congress in 2006 
where the old regulations for the agricultural tax (1958) were abolished.459      
 
 One reform: a programme of “one project one discussion”(yishi yiyi) and 
transfer payments (zhuanyi zhifu) 
The approach to the collection and use of fees for the village reserve was 
also changed. These fees were used for three things: the Public 
Accumulation Fund (PAF), the Public Welfare Fund (PWF), and a 
management fee.  It was thus referred as the “three reserves (san tiliu)”. The 
PAF would fund projects which were beneficial to everyone living in the 
village - paving roads to connect the rural households, building small 
bridges, irrigation maintenance, lighting in the village and so on.  The PWF 
would provide social welfare for peasants within the village - special care 
for the five guarantee households, etc. The management fee covered the 
administrative expenses and salaries of the cadres of the village 
committees.460  This mode of self-reliance had worked reasonably well in 
the collective era when the economic condition of the country was not 
good.461 However, from the end of 1980 until the beginning of 2000, as the 
number of local projects increased, as did the number of administration 
personnel, this approach increasingly became a device to extract money 
from the peasants to support various administrative functions of local and 
higher levels of government. In the process, the “three reserves” were added 
to the heavy burdens which caused severe suffering among the peasants.  
 
       During the reform of taxes and fees in the rural areas from 2002 to 2005, 
action was taken to prevent blurring the boundaries between sub-categories 
within the “three reserves” which had enabled arbitrary abuses by higher 
levels of government.  The several sub-categories were clearly segmented – 
salaries of the cadres of the village committees, special care for the five 
guarantee households and other disadvantaged groups, the administration 
expenses, and public welfare projects. Then, the sources of funding were 
                                                 
459 Ibid. 
460 Interviews 2012/02/11, 2012/02/15. 
461 Ibid. 
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specified for each category, and the peasants’ voice was integrated into the 
decision-making process – through the introduction of the programme of 
“one project one discussion”. And for the first three sub-categories, the parts 
funded by the “three reserves” were now provided out of a new surtax on 
the agricultural tax and on the tax on speciality products.462  
 
        The payments of fees for public welfare projects also ceased to be 
compulsory. This would be discussed and decided in villager assemblies or 
in meetings of the representatives of the villagers on a “one project one 
discussion” basis.463 More precisely, at the beginning of the year, the village 
committee would propose the budget plan for a specific project in which a 
fundraising among peasants up to 15 yuan per capita per year applied.464 
This plan would then be submitted to the village assembly or a meeting of 
villagers’ representatives for discussion and a vote. If approved locally, the 
plan would then be passed to the township government to be checked, and 
then a report would go to the county government for approval. If approved 
there, the village committee needed to fill in a monitoring card printed by 
the provincial management and monitoring office, including the information 
of detailed plan and of steps to raise funds and labour, and copies would be 
delivered to each household. This way is for the provincial government to 
keep a watch of the burdens of the peasants and for peasants to have a better 
sense of fees submitted to the village. Details on the levying, management 
and use of the funds and the labour for the approved projects would also be 
posted on a public board to enable the peasants to monitor matters. Any 
disputes would follow the detailed implementation regulations of Changde 
prefecture city administration. 465 
  
                                                 
462 “The implementation plan for the reform of taxes and fees in Changde prefecture city”, 
Changde Rural Economy Web, available on: 
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       This arrangement continued to be used for almost three years until the 
beginning of 2005 when Hunan decided to eliminate completely the 
agricultural tax and the tax on the speciality products, except tobacco leaves. 
Since 2005, while funding for public welfare projects has stayed the same, 
the salaries of the village cadres and the administration expenses -- which 
were funded by the surtax on the newly reformed agricultural tax and the tax 
on the speciality products from 2002 to 2005 – were now incorporated into a 
transfer payment.466 The salaries of cadres were thus issued by the county 
finance bureau after September 2005.467  Fiscal transfers were originally 
introduced during the implementation of the tax sharing system in 1994. 
Since 2002, in order to facilitate the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas, 
the amounts of the transfer payment from above had been increased to 
compensate for the shortfall caused by the eliminating some taxes and 
fees.468 Meanwhile, the central governmental also called upon the provincial 
government to contribute to the transfer payments as well.  If some city and 
county governments were able, they were also encouraged to channel some 
funds to support the governments at township and village level.469 
 
       The amounts transferred by the central government were calculated on a 
fixed equation, based on estimates of (i) fees paid for township planning and 
                                                 
466 The Ministry of Finance, “The work team office of the rural comprehensive reform of 
the state council: aiming at the agricultural development and fulfilling the promised 
responsibility,” Ministry of Finance Web, available on 
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village reserves to cover militia training, rural education at township and 
village levels, family planning, special care for veterans, and road repairs; (ii) 
the fiscal gap caused by the reduction in the tax on speciality products and 
by the elimination of the slaughter tax; (iii) the number of people involved 
in agriculture, the size of taxed lands, and so on.470 There is a shortage of 
data on the overall amount of transfer payments from the Hunan provincial 
government. We can, however, arrive at a reasonably reliable estimate by 
aggregating the amounts of funds transferred for specific purposes.  Thus 
the aggregate amount = the amounts for rural education + family planning + 
special care for veterans + paving township roads + militia training + 
fundraising for educational expenses + the fund to supplement the village 
resources + the income gap caused by reducing the tax on the speciality 
products + the income gap caused by eliminating slaughter tax.471 The final 
amount is then equal to this aggregate amount multiplied by transfer 
payment parameters.472       
 
        After 2005 when the agricultural tax and the tax of speciality products 
were completely eliminated, transfer payments from various higher levels of 
government were further increased to cover the functions formerly funded 
by those taxes.473 As a result, the township and village authorities came to 
rely heavily on funds from higher levels.  That strengthened the authority of 
political superiors over cadres at the local level, and undermined cadres’ 
leverage over ordinary people over whom they no longer had tax-raising 
powers. In addition, the power to decide on use of the fund of public welfare 
projects was given to the village assembly or to meetings of villagers’ 
representatives, and that further eroded the power of township and village 
officials. (The complexities of how that worked in practice are discussed 
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later in this chapter.)  To sum up, by the end of 2005, the changes which had 
been made during the three transition years, 2002 to 2005, were as follows.  
 
Table 4.1 A list of changes in taxes and fees in Li County from 2002 to 
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Notes:  
1. This table was created by the author based on the field research and analyses of relevant 
governmental documents; 
2. General sources of legitimacy from 2002 are as follows: 
from the central government including – “a notice of the Central Party Committee and the 
State Council on the conduct of experiments with the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas 
[zhongfa (2000) No. 7]”; “a notice of the State Council on further pushing ahead the reform 
of taxes and fees in rural areas [guofa (2001) No. 5]”; “a notice of the general office of the 
State Council on extending experiments on the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas 
[guobanfa (2002) No 25]”;  
from the provincial government including – “a notice on fully pushing ahead with the 
reform of taxes and fees in rural areas [xiangfa (2002) No 5]”; from Changde prefecture 
city Government including – “the Implementation Plan of Changde prefecture city on the 
reform of taxes and fees”. 
3. The symbol of   refers to a complete elimination. 
 
4.1.3 The Agricultural Subsidies System from 2004 onwards 
 
 The initial establishment of the agricultural subsidies system centring on 
the direct grain subsidy (liangshi zhibu) from 2000 to 2004     
 
The introduction of subsidies beneficial to agriculture occurred at the same 
time as the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas. Taken together, these two 
policies sought to repair the damage which the heavy burdens had caused 
within rural communities, and to stimulate the development of agriculture. 
Their focuses actually are different, with the former in supplementing the 
peasants’ income and the latter in reducing the burdens. As early as the 
second half of 2000, the Ministry of Finance had begun to consider a plan 
for a direct grain subsidy.474 After a few months of careful investigation and 
research, it submitted a document on 24 March 2001 to the State Council 
and suggesting changes which would channel subsidies not through the 
circulation process but directly to peasants. 475 This was finally approved in 
                                                 
474 Wang, Jiazhu, “Photo record in ten years: one photo recording ‘the agricultural benefit 
policies’”, CCTV News, 5 September 2012, available on 
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December 2014). 
475 Ibid; for more details about the transition in the agricultural subsidies policy in China, 
see Hou, Lingling, Mu, Yueying, and Zhang, Chunhui, “An Analysis on the Agricultural 
Subsidies Policy in China and its influences”, Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin, Vol. 
23, 2007 (10), p.289 – 294. 
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2001 by the State Council in the form of No. 28 document, and experiments 
were arranged to start in 2002. 476 
 
      A total of thirteen major grain producing provinces carried out the 
experiments with direct grain subsidies. Depending on conditions (which 
varied across provinces), they adopted one of four different methods.  Hebei, 
Xinjiang, Hubei, Zhejiang, Sichuan, and Guizhou based the subsidies on the 
amount of grain which the peasants had previously sold to the state-owned 
grain purchasing and selling agency; Jiangsu, Guangdong and Hunan chose 
to issue subsidies to the peasants based on the size of plots on which they 
grew grain; Hebei calculated the subsidies on the contracted-grain 
submission amounts and agriculture taxes due from peasants; and Inner 
Mongolia, Jiangxi, and Anhui based on the size of taxed lands and their 
normal output.477 Hunan was in this first batch to experiment. Its provincial 
finance authorities appropriated 72 million yuan out of the grain risk fund 
and chose four prefecture city administrations -- Changde, Yiyang, Yueyang, 
and Hengyang -- as experimental sites to receive the direct grain subsidy in 
2002.478 In the other three cities, subsidises were implemented when the 
peasants sold the grain to the state-owned grain purchasing enterprises - by 
giving them an extra 0.03 yuan per 0.5 kilogram on top of the purchasing 
price.  By contrast, Changde prefecture city administration (including Li 
County) raised more than 19 million yuan to provide subsidies based on the 
actual size of plots cultivated, at a rate of 6 yuan per mu.  (The total area in 
Changde was 3.167 million mu.)479  
 
      The approach used in Changde proved a potent stimulus to encourage 
peasants to grow grain. The next year (2003), the other three cities followed 
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Changde and based their subsidies on the actual size of the productive plots, 
instead of the grain purchasing price.480 Subsidies were placed in a special 
bank account called the “protective production subsidy account” by the 
provincial finance authority, and then would be delivered to township 
finance offices to hand to the relevant rural households.481 At the same time, 
Anhui province expanded the experiments province wide. 482 Based on these 
different forms of experiments, on 28 October 2003, the State Council 
convened a work meeting on agriculture and grain production, and decided 
to withdraw at least 10 billion out of the grain risk fund to push through the 
implementation of the direct grain subsidy through the whole country 
beginning in 2004.483  
 
       This decision was formalised in a document jointly issued by the 
Central Party Committee and the State Council on 31 December 2003, 
entitled “several opinions of the Central Party Committee and the State 
Council on policies to stimulate income growth among the peasants” as 
guidance for the work in 2004. This document, shortened as the No. 1 
Central document, was significant for the peasants and the development of 
the agriculture because it not only authorised the general implementation of 
the direct grain subsidy, but also increased the coverage of the subsidies for 
growing superior grain (articles two and four) and for purchasing large-scale 
agricultural machinery and tools in the major grain producing areas (article 
one).484 In addition, it has authorised the complete marketisation of grain 
circulation, as a result of which, the contracted-grain submission which had 
existed since 1985, as a replacement of state monopoly of grain products 
purchasing and selling in the collective era, was eliminated completely and a 
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new minimum protective price for grain was introduced to guarantee the 
basic profits of peasants growing grain. Finally, as we saw in an earlier 
section, this document signalled the intention to eliminate agricultural taxes 
and taxes on speciality products, except tobacco leaves.485    
 
         Hunan, in addition to following the general guidance of the No.1 
Central document, decided to adjust its approach to the direct grain subsidy 
– no longer focusing on the actual growing areas, in favour of taxing land at 
a rate of 10 yuan per mu, beginning in 2004. 486 This has been the practice 
until today.487 Thus in 2004 alone, Li County reduced the total agricultural 
tax by 24.13 million yuan. Meanwhile, the amount of the direct grain 
subsidy and the subsidy for growing superior grain totalled 18.45 million 
yuan, an average of 59 yuan per peasant.488 Based on that, at the beginning 
of 2005, Hunan joined other pioneering provinces such as Guangdong and 
Jiangsu to completely eliminate the agricultural tax. 489 A new set of policies 
supporting agricultural development and benefiting the peasants had been 
roughly established. It included two elements – regulating the financial 
authorities at township and village levels to reduce peasant burdens (the 
reform of taxes and fees in rural areas), and increasing subsidies to the 
peasants and to agriculture to stimulate production (the agricultural 
subsidies system). These policies have relieved the peasants of the 
extremely heavy burdens that they faced in the middle and late 1990s, and 
have given rural communities some breathing space.    
 
 Further improving the subsidies system to benefit agriculture from 2006 
onwards 
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Between 2006 and 2009, as the financial resources of the central 
government increased, the amount of existing subsidies were raised and new 
subsidies were introduced to support the development of agriculture and 
rural areas.490  This was part of a larger effort to encourage harmonious 
development between urban and the rural areas, and between humanity and 
the environment.  In Li County, under the administration of Hunan Province, 
two new subsidies emerged: one for restoring farmland to forest (tuigeng 
huanlin) and a second for agricultural production materials (nongzi zonghe 
butie). While the latter started in 2006 and aims to offset the negative 
influences which inflation in the cost of agricultural production materials 
has brought to the peasants, 491  the former focused on protecting the 
environment – after experiments had been conducted in Sichuan, Shanxi and 
Ganxu as early as 1999.492  
 
        By the end of 2001, 21 provinces and areas had experimented with 
restoring farmland to forests. Based on these experiments, on 10 January 
2002, the office of the western development program (xibu dakaifa) of the 
State Council convened a teleconference on such work and officially 
decided to launch this project throughout the country. According to Mr P of 
Yushi Village of Taiqing Township, this policy began to be implemented in 
his village in the second half of 2002, and the peasants started to receive the 
subsidy in 2003.493 This coincided with information provided by the forestry 
bureau of Li County.494 In the first year, i.e., 2003, Li County issued a total 
of 6.9 million yuan in subsidies at a rate of 210 yuan per mu per year, 
including grain compensation and a living allowance for the peasants who 
                                                 
490 Xu, Lianyu, “To recall ‘the direct grain subsidy’”, Changde Daily Online, 27 December 
2008, available on: http://cdrb.cdyee.com/html/2008-12/27/content_70415.htm (accessed 
on 23 March 2014). 
491 Ibid. 
492 The general office of the State Council, “A notice of the State Council on improving the 
policy of restoring farmland to forest [guofa (2007) No.25]”, Central Government Web, 
available on: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-08/14/content_716617.htm (accessed on 21 
March 2014). 
493 Interview 2011/12/30. 
494 The forestry bureau of Li County, “The implementation on delivery of the subsidy for 
restoring farmland to forest in Li County in 2014”, Forestry Bureau of Li County Web, 31 
March 2014, available on: http://hnlx.forestry.gov.cn/24287/24290/24298/113489.html 
(accessed on 4 December 2014). 
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responded to the call for restoring farmland to forest.495 However, since 
2004, the living allowance of 20 yuan per year has not reached the peasants.  
This will be discussed below.496  
 
       The restored forests could be two types – ecological forests, such as 
maple and pine, and economic forests, such as oranges in most areas of Li 
County.497 The subsidies rate is the same for both, but it covers different 
periods – ecological forests for eight years and economic forests five years. 
In addition, there are some small areas to restore farmland to grassland, 
which is covered for two years.498 Five years are considered to be enough 
for economic forests to produce fruit to make profits, while ecological 
forests need more time for the trees to grow to make profits.499 During the 
years covered by subsidies, the forests are not allowed to be cut down or 
sold off. After that, the peasants can either choose to cut down the trees in 
order to sell them, after approval from the relevant governmental 
department, or continue to plant with the subsidy reduced by half to 105 
yuan per mu beginning in the ninth year.500 Up to 2012 when field research 
for this thesis was carried out, ecological forests which were restored from 
farmland in Li County had finished their first term of eights year from 2002 
to 2010 and started their second term in 2011.501  
 
       In addition to the subsidy for restoring farmland to forest, the No.1 
Central documents in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 continued to urge 
increases in the coverage of various beneficial subsides.502 For example, in 
2006, article 13 of its No.1 Central document encouraged major grain 
producing areas to increase the percentage of the direct grain subsidy by up 
to 50% of the grain risk fund. Then the document for 2007 not only urged 
                                                 
495 Interview 2011/12/30. 
496 See this Chapter, p. 275-276. 
497 Interview 2011/12/30. 
498 Ibid. 
499 Interview 2012/02/16. 
500 Interview 2011/12/30. 
501 Interview 2012/02/16. 
502 Like the No. 1 Central document in 2005, these No.1 Central documents are literally the 
first documents which the Central Party Committee of CCP issued every year. They 
became a code for the emphasis of the Central Government on agricultural work and the 
term of “No. 1” implies their significance for the work in the year ahead.  
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the extension of this practice to other non-major grain producing areas, but 
also called for an increase in the amount and the content of other subsidies 
such as those for growing superior grain and for purchasing large-scale 
agricultural machinery and tools (article two). Based on that, while the No.1 
Central document of 2008 continued to increase the amount of the four 
existing subsidies (article two) – the direct grain subsidy, the subsidy for 
growing superior grain and for purchasing large-scale agricultural 
machinery and tools, and the direct comprehensive subsidy for agricultural 
production materials, the document in 2009 greatly extended the subsidy for 
growing superior grain to cover rice, wheat and cotton (article two). 503 
Details of the various main beneficial subsidies in Li County up to 2011 are 
shown in table 4.2 below. 
                 
  
                                                 
503 The No.1 Central documents in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 are “several opinions on 
pushing ahead building a new socialist village [zhongfa (2006) No.1]”, “several opinions on 
actively developing modern agriculture and continuing to push ahead  building a new 
socialist village [zhongfa (2007) No.1]”, “several opinions on strengthening agricultural 
infrastructure building and further stimulating the development of agriculture and income 
growth of peasants [zhongfa (2008) No.1]”, and “several opinions on stimulating the 
constant development of agriculture and the continuous growth of income of peasants 
[zhongfa (2009) No.1]”. They are available on Central Government web on 
http://www.gov.cn/ (accessed on 4December 2014). 
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Table 4.2 A list of the various agricultural subsidies including rates and 
amounts in Li County up to 20111 
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Notes: 1.This table was created by the author based on the data accumulated in the field 
research. The agriculture office of the Finance Bureau of Li County provided the data for 
the subsidies for growing superior grain including cotton and rapeseed, and the data for the 
subsidies for raising the brood sows and superior breeds of pigs. The economic construction 
office of the Finance Bureau provided the data for the direct grain subsidy and the data for 
the direct comprehensive subsidy for agricultural production materials. The Bureau of 
Agricultural Machinery provided the data for the subsidy for purchasing large-scale 
agricultural machinery and tools, and the Bureau of Forestry provided the data for the 
subsidy for restoring farmland to forests. 
2. Rice here included sweet corn and wheat. 
3. The starting time here means the time when the state officially called on the whole 
country to generalise the introduction of some certain subsidies. Actually since the 
implementing process of the various subsidies involved sporadic experiments and gradual 
steps forward, some subsidies might be implemented earlier in Li County than the official 
generalised time -- if the county or Changde prefecture city of which it is a part was chosen 
to be an experimental site. However, depending on local conditions, the times for the 
implementation of some other subsidies might be later than that intended by the central 
government. 
4. According to the policy, the subsidies for restoring farmland to forests are supposed to 
include two parts: grain compensation at a rate of 150 kilogram per mu and a living 
allowance at a rate of 20 yuan per mu per year. In practice, the grain compensation was 
converted to 210 yuan in cash while the living allowance was intercepted, so that peasants 
in Li County actually only got 210 yuan per mu. This is discussed in the following section.   
 
        Furthermore, according to the publicity of township governments in Li 
County in 2012, in addition to the above subsidies which are common, there 
are 22 other policies which either benefit governments at county level -- 
incentivising them to support agricultural production -- or are given to the 
agricultural services department to improve its support for the development 
of agriculture.504 These outlays cover increases in the minimum purchasing 
price of wheat and rice; a diesel subsidy for fishing; a policy to eliminate 
VAT on the vegetable circulation process; a policy to promote agricultural 
technology in rural areas; another to strengthen training for modern 
agriculture; a policy to protect property rights including peasants’ land; a 
policy to improve agricultural insurance; and so on. 505  
 
        On average, a peasant who grows a single crop of rice can get subsidies 
at a rate of 109.1 yuan per mu, and one who grows double crops at a rate of 
182.91 yuan per mu.506 According to interviewees, these subsidies are in 
place in most villages, although the field research also uncovered some 
                                                 
504 The Guanyuan Township Government, “A list of the agricultural beneficial policies of 
the state in 2012”, Guanyuan Township Government Web, 19th November 2012, available 
on: http://gyx.lx-gov.cn/news_show.asp?id=250 (accessed on 22 March 2014) 
505 Ibid. 
506 Interviews 2012/01/06, 2012/02/24.  
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problems such as impostors and the interception of some payments owed to 
peasants.507  The items covered by these subsidies have tended to be more 
and more comprehensive and complicated in recent years.  In order to avoid 
interceptions and misappropriations before they reach the relevant rural 
households, the state decided to use bank books to issue various subsidies. 
According to the Finance Bureau of Li County, the Bureau of the Township 
Fiscal Management -- the subordinate of the Finance Bureau -- is in charge 
of logging the information of various subsidies. After recording the 
information, the Bureau authorises the Postal Saving Bank in each township 
to open a special account for each relevant household and to transfer money 
to this account. Finally, after the finance office delivers the bank books to 
each household, they can go to the Postal Saving Bank to get their money 
with the bank book and their ID card.508 As this bank book includes almost 
all subsidies related to the peasants, it has been called the “all-purpose card” 
(yikatong).   
 
4.2 The follow-up practices  to respond to the problems in the 
implementation of a series of policies from 2002 to 2005 
 
The period from 2002 to 2005 was significant for the peasants and the rural 
community. As discussed above, as the central government shifted their 
concerns from the urban areas to the rural areas, it not only proposed a 
series of policies which are beneficial to the peasants and the governance in 
rural areas, but it has also substantially increased investments in agriculture 
and related infrastructure. The rural community has gradually been 
rehabilitated from the exploitation and the damage suffered since the middle 
1990s. The elimination of several taxes and fees, and the delivery of the 
various beneficial subsidies, have greatly reduced the gaps between, and 
promoted integration between, urban and the rural areas. This point emerges 
from three recent phenomena in the villages.  
                                                 
507 For more details, see this Chapter, p. 275-281.  
508  The Bureau of the Township Fiscal Management, “Implementing five principles to 
guarantee the delivery of the bank note of the agricultural subsidies”, Finance Bureau of Li 
Count Web, 18 December 2013, available on: http://www.lxczj.gov.cn/Item/2401.aspx 
(accessed on 6 December 2014). 
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      First, the burdens on peasants have been dramatically reduced. During 
field research, almost every peasant interviewed gave high praise to these 
beneficial policies. Instead of using the elaborate words, most of them gave 
thumbs up and said straightforwardly, “the policies now are really good as 
we not only do not need to pay much, but also are able to receive a lot of 
subsidies. In which period did we peasants enjoy such good policies?”509 Mr 
Qu in Linan Township compared the amounts of taxes and fees which his 
household had to pay in 1990s and in 2000s. 510 Before 1998, he and his 
wife only cultivated 4 mu contracted land, and every year they needed to 
pay on average taxes and fees at a rate of 330 yuan per mu. In the peak year 
his household paid more than 1,300 yuan in total. In 2008, his household 
cultivated 20 mu, seven of which were given over to early grain and the total 
subsidies were 696.5 yuan. The total taxes and fees were 428.4 yuan, in 
which water fee was 19.92 yuan per mu and the funds raised through the 
programme of “one project one discussion” was 15 yuan per capita. This is 
to say that he actually earned 268.1 yuan. According to the previous rate of 
taxes and fees, the payments on 20 mu were 6,000 yuan. However, now his 
household not only does not need to pay this sum, but the state gives him a 
net income of 268.1 yuan.  
 
       Second, household incomes have greatly been increased so that living 
standards have improved. According to an investigation in Linan Township 
by the Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of 
Hunan, the average income of rural households reached 100 thousand yuan, 
with some reaching 300 thousand.511 The elimination of most taxes and fees 
and the delivery of the subsidies have relieved the peasants of heavy 
burdens, so as to give them enough energy and time to make money. As the 
lands now are not subject to heavy taxes and fees, some households which 
have surplus labourers would like to cultivate more lands than before by 
                                                 
509 Interview 2012/01/06. 
510  The Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, “The 
peasants’ happiness, worries and hopes which are needed to be concerned”,  Li County 
Information, 2008, issue no. 37, printed by the Li County group of the Rural Socio-
economic Survey Team of Hunan.  
511 Ibid. 
266 
 
renting the lands off other households who have slack lands because their 
members go out to work. After the re-confirmation of the contracted land 
right in 2007, transfers of contracted land have changed from casual private 
actions to officially legalised actions. 512  The unilateral abandonment of 
lands is also reduced as a result of the receipt of subsidies. Traditional 
agriculture tends to be developing towards industrialisation not only in 
terms of the scale, but also in terms of the types of products. The income of 
big farm owners thus has dramatically increased. Mr Z of Dayan Village of 
Linan Township planted 40 mu of Eurasian raisin grapes in 2008 and the 
annual income has reached as high as 500 thousands yuan.513 The increasing 
income has transformed the living conditions of rural residents. A great 
variety of food appears on the table of rural households not only on special 
occasions, but also on a daily basis.514 In terms of clothes, rural dwellers are 
able to follow urban fashions. The expenditure on clothes of a rural 
household averages around 1,000 yuan, with 400 yuan per capita.515 Self-
built houses with modern design have become commonplace – with various 
facilities including running water, electricity, telephones and cable 
television. Some better-off households can even afford motorbikes or cars. 
516 
 
       Third, the reform of taxes and fees in the rural areas has also eased the 
pressure of work faced by the local cadres at the township and village levels, 
so as to improve relationships between the cadres and peasants. As Mr C of 
the previous Zhaojia Village of Guanyuan Township said, the three big 
tasks for the party secretary of the village committee in the 1990s were 
family planning, flood protection and the collection of the taxes and fees. 
They were hard pressed, busy day and night without any breaks, and they 
                                                 
512 For more details about the re-confirmation of the contracted land right, see the following 
section. 
513 For more details about the origin of the Eurasian raisin grapes planting in Li County, see 
Chapter Three, p. 164-167. For more details about its industrialisation, see this Chapter p. 
309 – 311.  
514  The Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, “The 
peasants’ happiness, worries and hopes which are needed to be concerned”,  Li County 
Information, 2008, issue no. 37, printed by the Li County group of the Rural Socio-
economic Survey Team of Hunan. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid. 
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used some coercive methods to extract money from peasants. 517  A 
combination of persuasion and coercion when collecting the taxes and fees 
had made peasants hostile to the local cadres, as we saw in Chapter 
Three.518 The reform of taxes and fees has liberated the local cadres from 
the onerous task of collecting them, so that they are able to spend more time 
and energy on enabling income growth of the peasants and on providing 
public goods – their two main remaining tasks.   
 
       While these beneficial policies have relieved some problems of the 
1990s, they have created a few new problems as well. The over-
concentration of lands which started in the mid-1990s has become more 
pronounced via the selling off the lands.  This occurred during the process 
of eliminating deficits and reducing debts in 2002, and as a result of 
arbitrary actions to occupy peasant lands in the heat of infrastructure 
building. Since various subsidies based on the land size have been 
introduced, many peasants who lost their lands either voluntarily or 
passively have sought to claim them back. However, as all the lands were 
either contracted to the peasants or were sold off for long fixed periods, 
village committees have neither the available lands to ease conflicts, nor the 
money to repay the buyers. In order to mediate in these conflicts and to 
protect the contracted rights of the lands, in 2008, the Hunan provincial 
government set about re-confirming the contracted rights of the lands, 
intending to resolve conflicts by legally confirming the contracted rights of 
the lands in the form of a new version of land certificates. The results of this 
practice actually vary (see just below). 
 
       Although the reform of taxes and fees has greatly eased peasant burdens, 
the reformed fiscal system makes the authorities at township and village 
levels financially more reliant on transfer payments from higher levels of 
government. Since these transfers are too limited to cover most 
administrative functions at township and village levels, and since the 
capacity to reproduce financing varies in different places, their ability to 
                                                 
517 Interview 2012/02/14b. 
518 For more details, see Chapter Three, p. 216 – 221. 
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provide public goods therefore varies as well. Furthermore, in spite of the 
campaign to eliminate deficits and to reduce debts in 2002, many villages 
and townships still have high debts. New monitoring methods since 2004 
have meant that any actions that increase peasants’ burdens are strictly dealt 
with. This has persuaded many local cadres of the impossibility of 
collecting funds from peasants to clear debts, and has turned their attention 
to the various subsidies as a possible source of money. As a result, my field 
research has uncovered new practices such as continuing to collect money 
furtively, intercepting subsidies, or even creating impostors to extract 
money from the state. These problems are discussed in details in the 
following section. Up to 2012 when the field research was carried out, a 
series of subtle changes had been made to respond to these problems. 
 
4.2.1 Strengthening the contracted land rights of peasants in 2007 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, in order to stabilise further the contracted land 
rights of peasants, the state called for a renewal of the land contract in 1994, 
and Li County completed this work by the spring of 1995. However, this 
practice did not achieve the expected result. After 1994, it triggered many 
land disputes, either between private persons or between local governments 
and peasants - which in the words of the provincial government, severely 
endangered the stability of the management institution for land contracts 
and obstructed the development of agriculture.519 As we saw above, these 
disputes had numerous causes, including the voluntary abandonment of 
lands by peasants, arbitrary occupations by the government, and other 
violations of the contracted rights to lands. In response to this situation, in 
2007, the provincial party committee and the provincial government 
instructed local governments to deal with severe land conflicts and to 
confirm further the contracted rights of peasants.  
 
                                                 
519 The General Office of Hunan Provincial Party Committee, “The Advice of the General 
Offices of Hunan Provincial Party Committee and of Hunan Provincial Government on 
Further Stabilising and Improving the Management Institution of the Land Contract 
[xiangbanfa (2006) No. 2]”, on 18 January 2006, included in a document compilation on re-
confirming the contracted land right edited by the rural management office of Dayandang 
Township in September 2007. 
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        In pursuit of this goal, Dayandang Township of Li County was chosen 
by the Changde prefecture city government to carry out policy experiments 
from the end of May to the beginning of August of 2007. The experiments 
mainly focused on three issues.520 One was the legal and practical principles 
for defining the contracted rights and the content of lands. The second was 
to develop criteria to judge the contracted rights and the content of the lands 
for several special groups, including households that had moved out of 
villages and abandoned their lands, households which personally transferred 
their lands to other peasants, households whose lands were requested by 
governments, and so on. The third issue was the written evidence required 
for contracted rights.  It was decided that after checking on practicalities, the 
1994 version of the management certificate of the land (see Chapter Three) 
would be replaced by a new version, called “the management right 
certificate of the contracted land of the People’s Republic of China”, 
produced by the Agriculture Ministry, printed by the office on the rural 
affairs of the Hunan Provincial Government, certified by the Li County 
Government, and filled in by the rural management bureau of Li County. 
Those who had not received the 1994 version would be issued with this new 
version too. According to the investigation in Dayandang Township before 
the re-confirming activity, only 15 villages out of 22 villages signed the 
contract, among which, still some villages did not provide peasants with 
management certificates as evidence of the contract.521  
 
        Based on experiences during the experiments, Dayandang Township 
worked out a series of criteria to deal with land conflicts and to strengthen 
contracted relationships between peasants and the state, which have since 
been spread throughout the county. First, a few legal and political principles 
were clarified to define contracted rights when dealing with the disputes in 
                                                 
520 Dayandang Township Government, “The Work Plan on the Experiments on the Further 
Stabilising and Improving the Management Institution of the Land Contract ”, on 10 June 
2007, included in a document compilation on re-confirming the contracted land right edited 
by the rural management office of Dayandang Township in September 2007. 
521  The Rural Management Station of Dayandang Township, “The Report on the 
Investigation on the archive materials of the land contract of Dayandang Township”, on 8 
May 2007, included in a document compilation on re-confirming the contracted land right 
edited by the rural management office of Dayandang Township in September 2007. 
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Li County. The hierarchy of authority is in turn Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Contracting of Rural Land (LPRCCRL), the 
Implementation Plan of Hunan province of LPRCCRL, the emergent notice 
of the General Office of the State Council on properly dealing with the rural 
land contract disputes [guobanfamingdian (2004) No. 21], and the joint 
advice of the General Offices of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and 
of the Hunan Provincial Government on further stabilising and improving 
the management institutions of contracting rural lands [xiangbanfa (2006) 
No. 2]. Second, details of the methods to confirm the content and the size of 
the contracted land would be discussed either in a villagers’ group unit or in 
a village unit, depending on the practical conditions of various villages. For 
the villages or the groups which did not carry out the practice of renewing 
the land contract in 1994 or which had renewed contracts in 1994 but in a 
manner that triggered many disputes, the criteria to confirm the size of the 
lands would be the allocation standards for households used in 1984. 
Otherwise, the data used when renewing land contracts in 1994 would be 
the criteria to certify the new version of the management right certificate. 522 
Actually, in practice, most villages assessed during field research followed 
the data used in 1994.523 
 
        As evidence for claims to property rights, when compared to the other 
two certificates of 1984 and of 1994, this new certificate has evolved to 
become more solid in terms of its content and the issuing organisations. It 
implies that the action of contracting land between the state and peasants 
which used to be based on political authority now is shifting to be more 
legalised and normalised. In addition, as one kind of civil contract, it clearly 
and definitely dates the valid term, for which the lands are contracted, that is, 
from 1 October 2007 to 31 December 2024.524  This term starts from the 
date when this new certificate is issued and ends in 30 years since 1994 
when the work of renewing land contract was supposed to be done. Once 
                                                 
522 The Li County leadership team of the follow-up work of renewing rural land contracts, 
“the advice on dealing with several land disputes in the follow-up work of renewing rural 
land contracts”, included in a document compilation on re-confirming the contracted land 
right edited by the rural management office of Dayandang Township in September 2007. 
523 Interviews 2012/02/18, 2012/02/19c, 2012/02/19. 
524 Interview 2012/02/11. 
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issued, this right is protected by LPRCCRL and no one, including the local 
cadres, has authority arbitrarily to dispose of it or to adjust the contracted 
land of any peasant525 - no matter what changes occur in a household’s 
population or its residence, nobody but the rights claimant can dispose the 
contracted land.  
 
         Technically, this provides sound protection for peasants’ property 
rights. However, my field work found that since in practice, most villages in 
Li County chose the 1994 status quo to be the standard to decide the size of 
the contracted land (which featured land over-concentration in the hands of 
a few peasants), many peasants have a lot of complaints. In addition, 
although the legalisation has prohibited the arbitrary disposal of the lands of 
the village committees, it also limited the village committee to have 
reasonable minor adjustments due to the changes on population of a 
household, so that both local cadres and the peasants think that it is unfair if 
it is not allocated equally, considering that land is the only resource for each 
peasant in China to guarantee their living allowance from cradle to grave. 
As Mr L of Dazhou Village of Yongfeng Township said, “If a household 
gives birth to a son and we cannot allocate the lands to this boy anymore, 
how can he make a living as a peasant when he grows up?” Owing to this 
dissatisfaction, the re-confirmation of contracted rights in many villages has 
still not been completed yet.526 Many new certificates thus have been held 
still in the hands of village cadres and cannot be delivered to the relevant 
rural households when they were interviewed in 2012.527 
 
4.2.2 The reformed fiscal system at the township and village levels 
 
Before the reform of taxes and fees in the rural areas started in 2002, as we 
saw in Chapter Three, the stable income sources at the township level 
mainly included a) taxes and management fees from township-owned 
                                                 
525 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
526 Interviews 2012/02/19, 2012/02/19c. 
527 Ibid. 
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enterprises and b) fees for township planning.528  As an agrarian county, 
actually item a) in Li County provided very limited resources, and therefore 
item b) became the main income source at township level. In addition, 
sometimes township governments sought investments from higher levels of 
government to fund some projects. 529 After the reform, item a) remained, 
but the  more important item b) was replaced by a transfer payment from 
higher levels. As an area along large rivers, the Changde prefecture city 
region was also allowed to charge for electricity used in drainage and for 
water used in irrigation, at a rate of 30 yuan per mu in lake areas, 20 yuan 
per mu in hilly areas, and 15 yuan per mu in mountainous areas.530 The 
average water charge in Li County was 15–15.5 yuan per mu.  It is harder to 
extract transfer payments from higher levels than to collect money at the 
village level. Therefore, the income at the township level has fallen. Some 
investigations show that revenue in Liyang Township declined by an 
average of around 900,000 yuan per year.531  
 
         However, the various administrative functions have still been 
performed. As one study showed, in Yongfeng Township, the normal 
financial expenses included “a) the wages of the cadres, around 300,000 
yuan, b) office expenses, around 150,000 yuan, c) expenses for government 
cars and hospitality, around 50,000 yuan, d) business trips and training, 
around 50,000 yuan, e) subscriptions of party newspapers and magazines, 
around 60,000 yuan, f) other administrative functions including family 
planning, maintaining public order, promoting agricultural technology, 
maintaining roads, militia training, recruiting new soldiers, managing the 
economy etc., around 400,000 yuan, and g) expenses on flood prevention 
                                                 
528 For more details on the income sources at the township level, see Chapter Three, p. 199 -
202. 
529  Dongtingzhizi, “An investigation report on Li County: taking an opportunity of 
eliminating the agricultural tax to push ahead the rural comprehensive supporting reform”, 
People’s Daily Blog, 3 January 2008, available on 
http://blog.people.com.cn/article/1336945120547.html (accessed on 20 March 2014). 
530 “The way to manage the water charge and the fee for drainage in Changde”, Changde 
Rural Economy Web, available on: http://www.cdnj.gov.cn/cnht/sfg%20g/gzzt.htm 
(accessed on 30 March 2014). 
531  Dongtingzhizi, “An investigation report on Li County: taking an opportunity of 
eliminating the agricultural tax to push ahead the rural comprehensive supporting reform”, 
People’s Daily Blog, 3 January 2008, available on 
http://blog.people.com.cn/article/1336945120547.html (accessed on 20 March 2014). 
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and drainage, around 200,000 – 600,000 yuan.” 532  The total expenses 
ranged from 1.2 million to 1.6 million yuan. The gap between those figures 
and the reduced revenues has caused debts. Mr L of Daping Township told 
us, up to 2012, the debts of his township ranged from 2 million to 3 million 
yuan.533  The accumulating debts forced his township to keep borrowing 
money from one of its subordinate better-off villages.534 By 2012, Daping 
Township owed its Qunle Village more than 900,000 yuan. 535   
 
         At the village level, before the reform, revenues mainly came from a) 
money collected from the peasants in the name of fees for township 
planning and village reserves, which would be retained by the village based 
on an agreed ratio between the township and the village, b) income and 
management fees from the village-owned enterprises, and c) income from 
the collectively-owned resources such as woodlands and fish ponds. 536 
During the campaign to eliminate deficits and reduce debts in 2002, most 
villages in Li County chose to sell off their village-owned enterprises and 
resources, so that after 2002, income from b) and c) disappeared. The 
income from item a) was replaced by a transfer payment, which became the 
only stable revenue source at the village level. Since this sum must be 
shared with the township government on an agreed ratio, what village 
committees can get from this source is actually very limited. They barely 
cover normal administrative functions, never mind providing public goods.  
 
         In order to find financial cover for their expanding administrative 
functions and personnel, the decentralised authorities in 1993 gave the 
governments at township and village levels chances to transfer this fiscal 
pressure to the peasants.537 After the 2005 reform, although government 
                                                 
532 Ibid. 
533 Interview 2012/02/18. 
534 Interview 2012/02/18b. 
535 Ibid. 
536 For more details on the income source at the village level, see Chapter Three, p. 199 – 
202. 
537 For more details on the decentralisation of the fiscal authority in 1993, see this Chapter, 
p. 290 – 291. 
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organs had been relatively downsized,538 the administrative functions had 
not yet been reduced much.  They have sometimes even increased, since 
social problems have become more complicated as economic reform has 
gone further. These functions still need to be financially supported. In 
addition, there are still many villages and townships which have not cleared 
their accumulated debts. Therefore, looking for income sources is still one 
of the important tasks for the local cadres. However, collecting money from 
ordinary people in the name of compulsory taxes or fees is not as easy today 
as in 1990s after the 2005 reform eliminated most taxes and fees. 
Accordingly, township and village authorities could obtain funds through 
three main channels: by lobbying for investment from higher levels; by 
fundraising among the peasants living within the village in the programme 
of “one project one discussion”; and other voluntary donations from 
successful persons.539  
 
         Yet, in practice, as the local cadres have little authority to pursue the 
first and third sources, fundraising in the name of “one project one 
discussion” has become the most likely source to plug fiscal holes, and it 
thus was usually abused. As Mr C of Qilimiao Village of Cengnan 
Township recalled, although it has declined somewhat, the arbitrary 
collection of money still took place in his village from 2005 to 2009.540 
According to the relevant regulations from Hunan provincial government 
and Changde prefecture city government, only two charges may be levied 
after 2005 reform: a) a water charge with a upper limit of 30 yuan per mu 
per year for embankment area, 20 yuan for water lifting irrigation area, and 
15 yuan for gravity water flowing irrigation area (most areas in Li County 
belong to gravity water flowing irrigation area and my research found the 
average charge in Li County is 15–15.5 yuan per mu), and b) project 
fundraising in programme of “one project one discussion” up to a limit of 15 
                                                 
538 For more details on downsizing of administrative personnel at township level, see this 
Chapter, p. 290 – 291. 
539 Interviews 2012/02/15, 2012/02/18b, 2012/01/06, 2011/12/30. 
540 Interview 2012/01/06. 
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yuan per capita.541 However, in 2007 and 2008, the peasants in Qilimiao 
Village of Cengnan Township still paid as much as 50 yuan per capita and 
in 2009 it even reached 60 yuan.542 These amounts were mainly collected in 
the name of “one project one discussion”. In addition, agricultural subsidies 
from higher levels also became targets for seekers of revenue. My field 
research found that this is done mainly through two types of interception: 
direct deductions in the name of administration fees, and the creation of the 
impostors either to intercept extra money from higher levels or subsidies 
due to the peasants.  Let us consider each.  
 
 (I) Direct deductions in the name of administration fees543 
 
According to a rate list of various subsidies, the subsidy for restoring 
farmland to forest actually is supposed to include two parts – the grain 
compensation and the living allowance.544 In practice, the peasants in Yuntai 
Village of Dongshi Township, one of the two townships that have the 
greatest restoration of farmland to forest (and the other is Wangjiachang 
Township), told us that in 2003, the first year of this subsidy, the grain 
compensation was fulfilled in the form of grain at a rate of 150 kilogram 
grain per mu and the living allowance was realised in cash at a rate of 20 
yuan per year.545 These two payments were indeed handed to peasants in 
that first year. However, from the second year on, while the grain 
compensation was converted to cash form in a rate of 210 yuan per mu per 
year based on the minimum protective grain price (70 yuan per 50 
                                                 
541 “The way to manage the water charge and the fee for drainage in Changde”  and “The 
detailed regulations of Changde prefecture city administration to implement a Hunan 
provincial management way on fundraising and labour-raising for public welfare projects 
within a village”, Changde Rural Economy Web, available on: 
http://www.cdnj.gov.cn/cnht/sfg%20g/gzzt.htm (accessed on 30 March 2014) 
542 Interview 2012/01/06. 
543 Interviews 2011/12/30, 2012/02/16, 2012/02/16f. 
544 The rate and the content of each subsidy is from “The list of the rates for various 
agricultural subsidies in Hunan in 2010”, which was compiled by the Li County group of 
the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan to investigate on implementing various 
subsidies policy in Li County in 2011.   
545 Interviews 2011/12/30, 2012/02/16. 
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kilograms), the 20-yuan living allowance per year was deducted by the 
forest office at township level and the forest bureau of the county.546  
 
        Since fellow peasants in the neighbouring counties, such as Shimen, 
obtained 230 yuan per mu in total for restoring farmland to forests, many 
peasants in Wangjiachang felt unfairly treated and reported this to higher 
levels of government. The explanation from the county was that Shimen 
County specifically appropriated 300,000 yuan for operational expenses to 
cover the administrative functions of the forest bureau while the Li County 
government did not appropriate this amount.  So the forest bureau of Li 
County and the forest office at township levels had to deduct this 20-yuan 
living allowance to cover this part of expenses. From a legal perspective, 
this action is inappropriate as it is unilateral action of local governments.547 
It is worth noting that instead hiding, local cadres actually explained to the 
peasants when they deducted this 20-yuan living allowance. Most peasants 
chose to tolerate it, although some reported it. As Mr W of Yuntai Village 
said, it is understandable that the forest bureau needed to cover its personnel 
to operate this subsidy. The grain compensation of 210 yuan per mu actually 
is credited into the relevant accounts of the peasants though.    
 
(II) Creating impostors to intercept subsidies for peasants, either to 
supplement the expenses of the villages or to cover the unmet water 
charge  
 
Respondents gave two main reasons for creating impostors to intercept the 
subsidies. First, in some areas such as around lakes (as opposed to plains, 
hilly and mountainous areas), neither do they have rich natural resources to 
develop industries, nor does agriculture develop well due to the unpromising 
geographical location.548 Economic conditions in these areas have therefore 
been difficult. During the 1990s when the burdens on peasants were heavy 
                                                 
546 Ibid. 
547 Interview 2011/12/30. 
548 For more details about the geographic settings in Li County, see Chapter One, p.55 – 58. 
The altitude in lake areas is usually so low that they are more likely to be threatened with 
flood than other areas.  
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in Li County, the situation in these areas was even worse than elsewhere.549 
After the 2005 reform when the revenue of the villages was reduced, again 
the situation in lake areas was much worse than in other areas. Since 
collecting money from the peasants was strictly prohibited after 2005, 
subsidies became the target to obtain money to cover the village expenses. 
To prevent local cadres from cheating peasants, the central government took 
many steps, such as directly crediting subsidies into special accounts, 
enabling withdrawals with ID cards, and publicising information about 
subsidies and their beneficiaries so as to monitor and to report.550 However, 
although all these steps are implemented locally, cheating persisted. This is 
just as a saying circulated among the peasants goes, “the higher authority 
has measures, and the localities have countermeasures (shang you zhengce, 
xia you duice)”.   
 
        So how did this happen despite these monitoring methods? Let us put it 
in context and consider the case of Fenghuang Village of Guanyuan 
Township, a typical village in lake area.551 The calculation and delivery of 
the subsidies are based on household units, and one household has one 
special account with the husband being the head. The information on the 
relevant households would be investigated and be reported by the villages 
upward through the governmental hierarchy. Thus, the subsidies, after 
checks and approvals by the Finance of Ministry, were issued through that 
hierarchical system downwards to the township and credited into the special 
account of each household. Meanwhile, the state requested village 
committees to publicise the list of the names and amounts of subsidies for 
all beneficiaries. Following this procedure, the village committee of 
Fenghang Village indeed posted the list on its announcement board. 
However, to the peasants’ surprise, instead of one account per household, 
some households were included twice by setting up the husband and wife as 
two individual accounts on the list. Mr C of Fenghuang Village told us that 
                                                 
549 For more details about the burdens on peasants in context, see Chapter Three, p. 202 – 
214.  
550 Interview 2012/02/14b. 
551 Ibid. 
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four such households were found in the list on his village announcement 
board. 
 
        Actually, it was the village committee that played this trick when it 
collected and recorded the information of potential beneficiary households. 
In order to let the state issue extra money, the village committee created 
more accounts by including one household twice and by setting up non-
eligible household members as the heads for the accounts. The subsidies 
issued by the state were based on the information the village submitted. 
Once the money was credited, the village committee would pay a small 
amount of money, such as 100 yuan or 200 yuan, or use other methods, such 
as treating them to free meals or buying them cigarettes, to ask the 
impostors to withdraw the money with ID cards, which are not that easy to 
fake. The withdrawn money was then taken by the village committee to 
cover expenses. One might ask why some villagers would agree to help the 
village committee in this swindle. Some peasants, who had suffered poverty 
for a long time, would rather accept the benefits before their eyes than obey 
other abstract political or moral values. Besides, other peasants, as a 
disadvantaged group, still often feel intimidated by authority. But there were 
still some villagers who found this unacceptable and reported it to the 
township government. However, for unknown reasons, this case was still 
unresolved when Mr C was interviewed in 2012. 
 
          The second ploy was to intercept peasants’ subsidies that were 
intended to cover their water charges. As noted above, after the 2005 reform, 
one item to be collected is a water charge of 15–15.5 yuan per mu and 
fundraising of up to 15 yuan per capita in the programme of “one project 
one discussion”. 552  While the latter was optional, the former was 
compulsory. Since the coercive methods used in the 1990s were absolutely 
prohibited, almost all interviewed village officials found it very hard to 
collect this water charge because of the general reluctance of peasants. 
Shuisi Village of Dayandang Township only collected 50% and even some 
                                                 
552 Interview 2012/01/06. 
279 
 
rich villages like Xindu Village of Lidong Township could only collect 80%. 
If the peasants did not pay, a village in turn would have to assume this 
responsibility for them and find the money, which contributed to their 
existing debts. In some villages, in order to collect the water charge and to 
minimise debts, the local cadres chose to intercept peasants’ subsidies, if 
they did not pay, to cover their water charge. Banqiaorong Village of 
Wangjiachang Township is a typical case.553 
 
          Banqiaorong Village is one of the few villages under Wangjiachang 
Township which fully covered the water charge. Without using force, like 
seizing valuables as in the 1990s, how could it do that? It was not because 
all the peasants there were obedient. Some were reluctant to pay the charge. 
For example, a peasant named RJ cultivated more than 6 mu land in 2011 
and therefore needed to pay around 100 yuan in water charges. The 
economic condition of his household was good enough to afford a two-story 
house and according to official policy, his household could also get 
subsidies of 5,000 to 6,000 yuan per year.  But he refused to pay his 15.5 
yuan per mu of water charges. As the party secretary of the village 
committee, Mr R thought that this action was very unfair for the peasants 
who obediently paid their charges. So in order to maintain equality among 
the peasants, the next year (2012), he organised meetings of local cadres of 
the village committee and the representatives of the villagers to discuss how 
to deal with the peasants who refused to pay the water charge.   
 
        In the end, participants at the meetings passed a resolution, in which 
intercepting the subsidies of uncooperative peasants was approved. This 
solution was recorded in a written document signed by every attendant. But 
how were their subsidies intercepted? The state had adopted a series of strict 
methods to avoid interceptions, so this was not an easy task.  Unlike the 
above case of Fenghuang Village which set up overlapping accounts, the 
cadres in Banqiaorong Village replaced the relevant peasants’ accounts with 
fake names when they submitted the list of beneficiaries. Therefore, the 
                                                 
553 Interview 2012/02/16f. 
280 
 
relevant peasant’s account became invalid and he could not get subsidies. 
The new bank book with a fake name was delivered to the village collective. 
In order to withdraw money, a real ID card was needed. Since a fake name 
does not have a real ID card and faking an ID card would be serious crime, 
the village committee tried to network with the bank to see if there is any 
chance to withdraw money. This scenario might be impossible to understand 
for the westerners, but as Chinese rural society is still based on personal 
relations, sometimes those relations can win the upper hand over any legal 
or political regulations.   
 
          However, just when the village committee was arranging personal 
links with the bank to obtain the money, this peasant rang the hotline of the 
Governor of the County and reported that he did not get his subsidies. As in 
the 2000s, maintaining social stability is the priority and intercepting 
subsidies of the peasants is a sensitive issue for local governments. So the 
County Government immediately called the Party Secretary of the 
Township, and then he instructed the head of the township government, the 
director of the economic management office of the township, and the 
director of the finance office of the township to come to talk to Mr R, the 
Party secretary of the village, and instructed him to return the subsidies to 
the peasants. Even though the village committee had the written document 
passed and signed in the meetings of the cadres and the representatives of 
the villagers, the township government still ordered Mr R to return the bank 
book and the subsidies to RJ, no matter whether he paid the water charge or 
not.  
 
        There are several ways to look at this.  From the perspective of the 
peasant involved, the action of the village committee to intercept his 
subsidies was illegal based on the regulations of the state and had violated 
his rights. However, Mr R (the party secretary of the village), on behalf of 
the village authority, thinks that although replacing the peasant with a fake 
name entails cheating, this solution was discussed and passed by a 
democratic procedure. In addition, the peasant did not fulfil his duty to pay 
his water charge, which triggered the whole process, and therefore he should 
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not have the right to enjoy his benefits. Most villagers who regularly pay 
their water charges stand with Mr R.  Some even think that returning the 
subsidies to this peasant was not fair to them.  A small section of villagers 
are happy to see that the peasant won against the village committee, since it 
provides an excuse for them not to fulfil their community duties as well.   
 
         When disputes happen, there is not a logically consistent benchmark to 
evaluate the different arguments of the parties involved. The rights cited by 
the peasant and the principle of equality and duty used by the village 
committee both make sense from their own perspectives, but there is not a 
law to decide this issue. Although there have been various regulations and 
orders over time from the central government, they point in different 
directions at different times. As Mr L of Dazhou Village said, they were too 
far right in the 1990s, but now are too far left – and in both cases, this 
increased the difficulties for the local cadres to carry out their work.554 
Therefore, in the political battle between the local cadres and the peasants, 
winning mostly depends on the wind direction of the central government. 
The 1990s witnessed the strong empowerment of the authorities at various 
levels, but now the wind has turned and peasants have gained the upper 
hand.   
 
         Second, both parties involved did not appeal to an independent third 
party to solve the dispute but to the superior political authorities. This 
conforms to time honoured traditional methods in Chinese rural society to 
solve disputes.555 The magistrate’s office in imperial times, equivalent to the 
present County government, was usually the place to which the peasants and 
the heads of organisations based on kinship, work, religion, etc. turned when 
disputes arose. 556  Despite obvious changes, this tendency to appeal to 
superiors has been inherited. It is also interesting to see that a democratic 
procedure was involved when deciding how to deal with peasants in 
disputes. This was one of the legacies of the Communist period, in which 
                                                 
554 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
555 Schumann, Franz , Ideology and Organisation in Communist China, (California: UCP, 
1968) p. 407. 
556 Ibid. 
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collective authority replaced the individual authority of magistrates in the 
imperial era.557 As an agrarian county in transition, such battles between 
established and imposed new institutions occur at village level almost every 
day.   
 
4.2.3 Continuously improving the programme of “one project one 
discussion” since 2009, and regulating fiscal management at village level 
since 2011 
 
Starting from 2002, the programme of “one project one discussion” has 
incorporated democratic discussions into decision-making related to the 
public welfare, and replaced the previously compulsory fundraising from the 
peasants in the 1990s.558 The key element in this method is that instead of 
raising funds arbitrarily as before, the project plan needed to be discussed 
and passed by 60% of attendants in the meetings of village assemblies or the 
representatives of the villagers.559 However, during the period from 2005 -- 
when the reform of taxes and fees was roughly finished -- to 2009, despite 
of this seemingly democratic procedure, many villages in Li County still 
imposed the 15 yuan maximum onto all villagers in the name of “one 
project one discussion”, whether they had a real project or not.560  Even 
worse, some villages imposed more charges on the peasants.561 Considering 
these problems, the state and the provincial government decided to further 
improve the programme of “one project one discussion”, and to strictly 
regulate the fiscal management at village level by centralising financial 
authority at township level. 
         In February of 2008, a work team from the State Council on 
comprehensive rural reform, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Agriculture jointly issued a notice calling for experiments of improved 
version of “one project one discussion”, in which the state finance would 
                                                 
557 Interview 2012/02/11. 
558 For more details on the initial version of the programme of “one project one discussion”, 
see this Chapter, p. 249 – 255. 
559 Interview 2011/12/30. 
560 Ibid. 
561 Interview 2012/01/06, also see this Chapter, p. 275. 
283 
 
provide a subsidy on top of the approved fundraising by the village 
assemblies. This new version is termed as “one project one discussion with 
fiscal subsidies” (yishiyiyi caizheng jiangbu) in propaganda. Hunan 
province started its experiments immediately and chose five areas – 
Yuanjiang prefecture city, Xiangtan prefecture city, Ningxiang County, 
Taoyuan County and Linxiang County -- as the experimental sites.562 Based 
on the experiences accumulated in the experiments, at the beginning of 2009, 
the Hunan provincial government and its Financial Department jointly 
reported to the central government and successfully obtained approval to 
incorporate Hunan into the ten provinces which would push ahead with the 
improved version of “one project one discussion” province-wide.563 In 2009, 
the central government provided 350 million yuan to Hunan to support its 
experiments. There were 123 counties and county-level cities throughout the 
province which applied to participate in the experiment, and Li County was 
one of them.564 
 
          This modified form of “one project one discussion” originally sought 
to help village collectives to solve the difficulties that some big public 
welfare projects are too expensive to be afforded by the raised funds among 
villagers. But in practice, it also operated as a mechanism to check and to 
monitor the implementation of the initial version of “one project one 
discussion”. 565  Unlike the period from 2005 to 2009, this improved 
approach does not permit projects to be carried out unless the proposed 
project was approved not only by the village assembly or meetings of 
representatives of the villagers, but also by the township government and by 
some relevant office of the County government. If a project was not 
                                                 
562 The office of the leadership team on monitoring and managing the peasant burdens in 
Hunan, “The summary of the work in 2009 and the work plan in 2010”, China Agriculture 
Economic Information Web, 7 January 2010, available on: 
http://wz2.2000y.net/114005/index.asp?xAction=xReadNews&NewsID=50496 (accessed 
on 20 March 2014). 
563 Ibid. 
564 Ibid, The office of the Li County Government, “the implementing plan of Li County on 
carrying out the experiment of ‘one project one discussion with fiscal subsidies’ 
[lizhengbanfa, (2009) No.71]”, China Agriculture Economic Information Web, 18 
September 2009, available on : 
http://wz2.2000y.net/114005/index.asp?xAction=xReadNews&NewsID=50496 (accessed 
on 20 March 2014). 
565 Interview 2012/01/06. 
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approved by these checking procedures, the fund of 15 yuan per capita 
could not be levied.566  In practice, it worked quite well to regulate the 
implementation of the initial version of “one project one discussion”. 
According to Mr C of Qilimiao Village of Cengnan Township, since 2010, 
the fees collected by his village have only been a water charge of 15.5 yuan 
per mu.567 Even if some villages approved a project, the fees which they 
collected from the peasants could not exceed 30.5 yuan per capita – that is, a 
combination of a 15.5-yuan water charge and a 15 – yuan fundraising for 
public welfare.568  
 
         In addition, this improved version enables a village to gain more if its 
project is approved. Following its rule, the fund raised among the villagers 
would be subsidised (by a multiple of three) by the state finance. This 
enables the village collective to afford large-scale public welfare projects. 
Certainly, this brings with it stricter inspection procedures by relevant 
government departments before the project starts and after it is finished, to 
ensure that the amounts provided are actually used for the proposed 
project.569 Besides, if the total amount of funds raised among villagers and 
subsidised by the state, is still not able to cover the proposed project, village 
cadres can call upon prosperous persons for donations to make up the 
shortfall. Up to 2011, Li County carried out 827 public welfare projects, in 
which 149 million yuan were invested, with 46.01 million yuan subsidised 
from the state and the county government, and 103 million yuan coming 
from fund raising among villagers and additional donations. 570  These 
projects benefited 720,000 peasants.571 
                                                 
566 Interview 2011/12/30; The office of the Li County Government, “the implementing plan 
of Li County on carrying out the experiment on the fiscal subsidised reward on the basic 
form of one project one discussion [lizhengbanfa, (2009) No.71]”, China Agriculture 
Economic Information Net 18, September 2009, available  on 
http://wz2.2000y.net/114005/index.asp?xAction=xReadNews&NewsID=50496 (accessed 
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570 Ren, Jiadi; Tan, Jieming; and Hao, Ming, “Li County solved the investment difficulty on 
building a new socialist village”, Hunan Daily online, 22 February 2012, on 
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          On top of that, in 2012, this improved version has developed again. Li 
County was chosen to be the first batch of the experimental counties in 
Hunan to carry out another new practice to cover some public welfare 
projects which extend beyond the border of one single village but would 
benefit all villagers living within multiple villages nearby. Upon approvals 
of the County Government, the proposed projects target road maintenance 
and small-scale irrigation equipment maintenance within an area of 
continuous ten villages. The county finance will subsidise 300,000 to 
500,000 yuan per village on top of fundraising among the villagers and 
subsidies from state finance.572 Experiments in Li County took place in the 
area of ten continuous villages of Lidong Township. This not only 
reconnected the road between villages, and cleaned and maintained the 
canals, but also integrated the irrigation facilities which had been abandoned 
due to unclear ownership between villages.573 Up to 2012 when the field 
research was carried out, this practice was still ongoing.  
 
         All of these fiscal subsidies are based on the condition that the 
proposed projects in the villages are approved. For villages which do not 
have approved projects, there are only two ways to raise funds to address the 
public welfare. They can strive for the investments from higher levels of 
government which, as local cadres explained, is the main source for these 
villages; and they can seek voluntary donations. 574 Both sources actually 
depend on the human resources of the villages – on whether local cadres are 
capable enough to obtain investments from above, or on links between 
wealthy persons and the village. Personal relationships, which used to play 
an important part in politics in the imperial era, have thus now returned. 
                                                 
572 The Li County office of leader team of rural comprehensive reform, “The Answers to 
General Questions related to the programme of ‘One project One Discussion’ in Li County”, 
Li County Government Web, 18 July 2013, available on http://www.li-
xian.gov.cn/zwgg/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=16654 (accessed on 20 March 2014).  
573 Lei, Yuan; Ren, Jiadi; Xiang, Feng; and Hu, Qingshan, “‘One project one discussion 
with fiscal subsidies’ benefited 720,000 of peasants in Li County”, China Net, 10 May 
2013, available on: http://finance.china.com.cn/roll/20130510/1457926.shtml (accessed on 
21 March 2014). 
574 Interviews 2012/02/18b, 2012/02/15. 
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This factor largely explains the varied appearance of different villages. Mr C 
of Zhangshuyan Village of Leigongta Township said that this is the reason 
why the canals in his village are still blocked while some villages in their 
neighbouring township have been able to re-dig their ponds and canals – 
because a senior cadre working in the Bureau of Water Conservancy and 
Hydroelectric Power of Changde prefecture city was born there.             
 
       As donations became one of the important revenue sources at village 
level, in order to regulate this part of money to avoid the corruption of 
village and township cadres, in March of 2011, Li County began to 
centralise the financial authority and placed township governments in 
charge of village finances.575 As a result, the village no longer appointed the 
accountant and cashier. Instead, accounts would be recorded and managed 
by the finance office and the economy management office of the township 
government.  The village only sets up an account booker.576 This was a 
centralisation of financial authority in the hands of the township government, 
with the hope to regulate the financial behaviours of the village cadres.  
 
         This policy is theoretically good for governance, but according to 
village cadres, it is not practical. After implementation, village committees 
have to perform a broad array of administrative functions. They are also the 
first point of contact for the peasants. They must implement various policies, 
collect all kinds of information, maintain social stability, mediate disputes, 
raise funds for public goods, and provide for the public welfare. According 
to the interim plan for the financial management of the village collectives in 
Li County, they must also deal with management income, contract income, 
transfer payments and other fiscal subsidies, the funds raised through “one 
project one discussion”, other voluntary donations, etc. – all these are 
credited into one special bank account which is managed by the township.577 
                                                 
575 The office of the County Government, “A notice on printing the implementing plan on 
the agency service of the village finance [lizhengbanfa (2011) No.36], Li County 
Government Web, 5 May 2011, available on: http://www.li-
xian.gov.cn/zwgg/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=7146 (accessed on 20 March 2014).  
576 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
577 The Agriculture Bureau and the Finance Bureau, “A notice on printing the interim plan 
on the finance management of the village collective and the post responsibility system of 
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The village committees are called to consider strictly their expenses based 
on their income.578  
 
          However, as the financial situation in most villages is not that good, 
this rigid financial management from above has actually further limited the 
ability of the village community to govern and to provide public goods.  
 
4.3 Other Comprehensive Supporting Reforms after 2005 
 
After the agriculture tax was completely eliminated in 2005, in response to 
various problems in the reform process from 2002 to 2005, and in order to 
tackle the established institutional weaknesses which had mainly caused 
rural problems since 1990s, the central government adopted a series of other 
comprehensive supporting reforms (zonghe peitao gaige) and chose a few 
areas to carry out experiments after 2005. 579  Centring on governing 
institutions, these reforms cover political, fiscal, social, and cultural areas. 
580  Hunan province was chosen to be among the first batch to have 
experiments. 581  Following a slogan of “pushing forward three reforms, 
actively carrying out two experiments, and strictly obeying one red alert line 
(tuijin sanxiang gaige, jiji kaizhan liangxiang shidian, jinjin shouzhu yitiao 
hongxian)”, during the past few years, Hunan province has gradually carried 
out the organisational reform of township government, institutional reform 
of compulsory rural education, and continued to reform on the fiscal 
management of the township and the village.582 Meanwhile, it also pushed 
forward the experiments to dissolve debts caused by the campaign to expand 
                                                                                                                            
the agency service of the village finance in Li County [linongjingfa (2011) No.8]”, Li 
County Government Web, 14 October 2011, available on: http://www.li-
xian.gov.cn/zwgg/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=9065 (accessed on 21 March 2014).  
578 Ibid. 
579 Zhang, Shaochun, “The vice minister of the Finance Ministry: from the reform of taxes 
and fees to the rural comprehensive reform”, Central Government Web, 21 February 2011, 
available on: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-02/21/content_1807231.htm (accessed on 10 
December 2014). 
580 Ibid. 
581 Wu, Kongfan, “The research and the consideration on further pushing forward the rural 
comprehensive reform in China”, Institution of China Rural Comprehensive Reform Web, 
29 October 2014, available on: http://210.43.24.225/Html/?22035.html (accessed on 10 
December 2014). 
582 Ibid.  
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the coverage of nine years’ compulsory education in rural areas in 1990s, 
and extended the coverage of the modified version of the programme of 
“one project one discussion”.583  
 
         Those reforms, attended by a later calling of the central government to 
build a new socialist village in 2005, have revamped conditions in rural 
areas. The call to build a new socialist countryside  was proposed by the 
CCP in the fifth plenary session of the 16th Central Committee in 2005. 
Aimed at a coordinated development between urban and rural areas and 
between economy and society, this call makes requests in five aspects of 
rural society including economic development, living conditions, civil social 
ethos, tidy village appearance, and democratic governance. After 2005, 
various government works have almost been incorporated into this 
framework and, led by these five principles, many  policies have begun 
being widely implemented. In the section above, we discussed re-
confirming contracted land rights, the reformed fiscal management at 
township and village level, and the programme of “one project one 
discussion” which is still in development, as follow-up practices to tackle 
the problems appeared in the implementation of reforms of agriculture tax 
and fees. This section will look into the comprehensive reforms targeting 
other parts of rural society rather than economy. As it is not possible to 
discuss every programme in detail, only three key practices of them are 
chosen to be elaborated here – the new developments on direct election at 
village level and on political transparency, extensively improving rural 
infrastructure, and building a rural social security system.       
 
4.3.1 The New Developments for Direct Election at Village Level and for 
Political Transparency since 2005 
 
We have already discussed the establishment of self-governance institutions 
at village level by introducing direct election to the village committees in 
                                                 
583 Ibid. 
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the period between 1988 and 1989 in Li County.584 Actually neither the then 
Constitution nor the 1988 Organic Law of the Village Committees of the 
PRC laid out the detailed procedures about how direct elections should be 
carried out. This therefore led to variations in practice in various places 
throughout the country from 1988 to 1998. 585  Instead of dictating 
procedures, higher level agencies observed changes and got feedback. In 
order to analyse the mass of data that came in, the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
cooperated with the Carter Center from the U.S. and established a system 
aimed at collecting and analysing information on elections in March of 
1998.586 This system was first put to use in July of 1998 in nine counties of 
three provinces including three in Hunan Province: Linli County (which 
neighbours Li County), Shuangfeng County and Xiangtan County.587 One 
year later, after the 1988 Organic Law of the Village Committees of the 
PRC was modified and then implemented in November of 1999, this system 
was used again to investigate election information from village committees 
in 40 counties of Hunan. 588  This analysis was later cross-checked by 
students recruited by the department for grass-roots government and 
community construction of the Ministry of the Civil Affairs and the 
Department of the Civil Affairs of the Hunan provincial government.589 The 
cross-checking of results proved the effectiveness of this analytical system. 
 
        All these experiments, analyses, feedback and cross-checking helped to 
make gradual improvements in the electoral process. The 1999 modification 
of the 1988 trial version of the Organic Law of the Village Committee 
generated many detailed procedures, such as competitive elections (cha’e 
                                                 
584 For more details on the introduction of direct election to the village committees, see 
Chapter Two, p. 141 – 144. 
585 “The evaluation on the election information system of the village committees and the 
analysis on the data of the nine counties of three provinces”, Rural Resident Self-
governance Information Web, 25 October 2002, available on: 
http://cmzz.mca.gov.cn/article/tjfx/fxbg/201201/20120100057366.shtml (accessed on 18 
April 2014). 
586 Ibid. 
587 Ibid. 
588 “The analysis on the election information of the village committees in 40 counties of 
Hunan”, Rural Resident Self-governance Information Web, 15 October 2002, available on: 
http://cmzz.mca.gov.cn/article/tjfx/fxbg/201201/20120100057366.shtml (accessed on 18 
April 2014). 
589 Ibid. 
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xuanju), direct nominations of villagers as candidates (cunmin zhijie timing 
houxuanren), secret ballot (bujiming toupiao), and the public counting votes 
(gongkai jipiao). When it entered the 2000s, the far-reaching reform of taxes 
and fees in the rural areas and the following comprehensive reform have 
been fully carried out. During this period, the organisational institutions at 
the township and the village level have been reformed as well after 2005, 
which accordingly caused the electoral procedures of the village committee 
to be changed. We consider below how the elections of village committees 
and the party committees are carried out in practice after organisations at 
township and village levels were reformed further in 2005. 
 
 The elections of village committees and the party committees, in practice, 
after the 2005 reform        
 
As explained in Chapter Two, the initial procedures included direct 
nominations, competitive elections, and secret ballots with the township 
government identifying the exact roles for elected candidates. 590  This 
procedure had been in use until the 2005 reform of taxes and fees. 591 As the 
work load of the village cadres was reduced after the 2005 elimination of 
agricultural taxes, in order to reduce further the expenses of village-level 
collective organisations, the rural areas of Changde prefecture 
administration began to downsize its administrative team. As a result, some 
small villages merged into large ones and villagers’ groups were completed 
eliminated. The number of the local cadres at village and sub-village level is 
accordingly shrunken with the role of villagers’ group leader being 
cancelled and the roles at village committees being reduced from 5 - 7 
before 2005 to less than four.592  As Mr Y of Yingxi Village of Daohe 
Township said, only three roles in his village committee remain – one being 
both party secretary and the head, one being the accountant, one being the 
                                                 
590 See Chapter Two, p. 136 – 144. 
591 Interview 2012/02/22. 
592 Zeng, Xiangwen, “Li County of Hunan: to cultivate and to select part-time deputy party 
secretaries of village party organisations out of economic talents”, Theory Channel of 
People’s Daily Online, 30 November 2010, available on: 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/208149/208853/13356833.html (accessed on 8 
September 2014). 
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officer for women’s affair.593 This model of three roles had been in practice 
for three terms from 2005 to 2012 when he was interviewed.594  
 
        Correspondingly, there were also changes in electoral procedures. 
Earlier, voters only chose which candidates would be elected, but they did 
not decide on their exact roles. The changes are now evident from the eighth 
term (2011 - 2014) of Yingxi Village Committee and the Party Committee. 
According to the principle of “the party leading everything”, the party 
committee needs to be elected first. Since the party committee includes three 
roles – one party secretary and two party committee members, all party 
members in the village get together and vote for three persons, with the top 
three being elected. Then these three persons are reported to the township 
party committee and government who decide which of these three persons 
will be the party secretary. The township party committee and government 
do some investigation and hold interviews with the peasants in this village 
before the election to obtain basic information about the various abilities of 
the potential candidates, including their work ability, their ability to get 
along with peasants, etc., to avoid severe conflicts between their chosen 
party secretary and peasants’ will.   
 
        After this is confirmed, this new party committee then organises the 
election of the village committee. Unlike the party election which is only 
attended by party members, all eligible peasant voters who are at least 18 
years old cast votes. Before 2005, the agency votes existed and were 
reluctantly accepted considering the fact that more and more peasants 
moved far away to seek jobs since the mid-1990s. However, it was 
prohibited after 2005 because factions were likely to emerge. 595  The 
modified form adjusted the criteria for valid villager assemblies. For 
example, Yingxi Village has 820 eligible voters and 300 are absent 
throughout the year. Instead of requiring half of all eligible voters to attend, 
                                                 
593 Interview 2012/02/22. 
594 According to the modified Organic Law of the Village Committee, the term of the 
village committee is three years. So the period from 2005 to 2012 actually experienced 
three terms of elections: 2005 – 2008, 2008 – 2011, and 2011 – 2014. 
595 Interview 2012/02/22. 
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the village assembly will be valid now as long as at least half of the rest of 
the 520 voters attended. What of candidate nominations? The eligible voters 
are free to nominate anyone they like for two types of committee roles – the 
head and the members. The two nominees who receive the most support are 
nominated to be the head, while the top three nominees among the rest 
would be finalists for the following ballots to decide committee members. 
The total number of the finalists would be the total sum of the roles of the 
village committees plus one. 596 
 
         The next step is then the secret ballot among the eligible voters. It is 
composed of two parts. First, the head of the village committee is chosen 
out of two decided nominees, and the loser in that contest joins three other 
nominees for members’ posts. Voters are able to choose three of the four 
candidates. It is worth noting that the modified Organic Law urges that the 
party secretary and the head of the village committee to be the same person, 
in order to reduce the conflicts between the holders of these two posts and to 
reduce the number of the cadres so as to reduce the peasants’ burdens, while 
strengthening the leadership of the party in the village. 597  However, 
sometimes the reality does not coincide with this expectation of the ruling 
party. Changmu Village of Daohe Township is just such a case. There, the 
party secretary whom the township party committee appointed and the head 
of the village committee elected by the eligible voters are different persons. 
 
 
 Political transparency since 2008                 
For over 30 years, government transparency has also been developing 
slowly -- from some sporadic and temporary practices to a well-established 
footing. This evolution took a long time and is still ongoing. Briefly 
speaking, this process entails two things – publicising governmental affairs 
and strengthening social supervision. Like direct elections at the village 
                                                 
596 Ibid. 
597 Ibid. 
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level, greater transparency was first proposed in 1987.598 Initially, it was 
labelled as “the social negotiation dialogue institution (shehui xieshang 
duihua zhidu)” in the report of the thirteenth Party Congress. That was 
mainly a response to conflicts and clashes caused by many social 
phenomena at that time, such as economic disparity, the privileges of elite 
groups, corruption etc. 599  Although it lacked detailed procedures and 
regulations at that time, this process of social negotiation clearly indicated 
that the transparency mechanisms should include such dimensions as 
people’s supervision and democratic participation.600  
 
        Based on these principles, a year later, in March of 1988, the second 
plenary session of the thirteenth Central Committee of the CCP further 
proposed publicising governmental affairs (zhengwu gongkai) and called 
upon sub-central authorities to carry out experiments to achieve this and to 
build a clean work ethic in the Party.601 Following this, some local areas 
began their experiments. Among these, the practice of “two publicising and 
one supervision (lianggongkai yijiandu)” in the rural areas of Gaocheng 
prefecture city of Hebei province attracted a lot of attention and was even 
advocated by the People’s Daily on 20 November of that year. 602  This 
practice entails publicising the procedures for handling village committees’ 
affairs and  their results, with both being put under the supervision of 
people. 603  Meanwhile, although the trial version of the organic law of 
village committees was put into effect in the same year -- in which 
publicising the fiscal affairs of the village was stipulated.  The general 
concept of “publicising village affairs” was not incorporated into central 
government documents until 1991 when the central committee of the CCP 
                                                 
598 Tian, Longfei, “The legal construction of the governmental transparency in China: 
history, type and the institutional innovation”, in Du, Gangjian and Zhao, Xiangru (ed.), 
Hunan ruled by law and the research on the regional governance, volume 11, (Shanghai: 
World Book Publishing Company, 2013). 
599 Ibid. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Ibid. 
602 Ibid. 
603 Ibid. 
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and the State Council finally decided to push the institutionalisation of 
publicising village affairs (cunwu gongkai).604  
 
       Although Hunan province did not initially mount experiments as did 
Gaocheng prefecture city of Hebei province, it began this process in early 
1993 by applying the principle of “two publicising and one supervision” to 
its provincial Agriculture Bank, to restrict the authority to issue mortgages 
throughout the province.605 In 1994, the provincial party committee and the 
provincial government jointly issued a document calling on subordinate 
levels of governments to experiment actively with the practice of “two 
publicising and one supervision”. This was a major step towards publicising 
governmental affairs in Hunan.606 Between 1994 and 1998, the province 
focused on its own experiments and on formalising relevant regulations 
based on these experiments.607 Meanwhile, in 1998 when the trial version of 
the organic law of village committees was modified, the central government 
officially incorporated the content of publicising the village affairs into the 
new version of the organic law and applied to the promotion of self-
governance at the village level.608  
 
        From then on, Hunan began gradually to push ahead with publicising 
governmental affairs throughout its jurisdiction “from point to area, and 
from top to bottom (cong dian dao mian, you shang er xia)”. 609  In 
December 2000, the general office of the central party committee and of the 
State Council jointly issued a notice on fully carrying out this practice at the 
township level throughout the country and since then, it has been officially 
                                                 
604 Ibid. 
605 “Hunan province has achieved noticeable success on anti-corruptions”, People’s Daily 
Online, 28 July 2004, available on: 
http://look.people.com.cn/GB/22220/32837/32850/2672222.html (accessed on 4 May 
2014). 
606 Ibid. 
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608  Tian, Longfei, “The legal construction of the governmental transparency in China: 
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World Book Publishing Company, 2013). 
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Online, 28 July 2004, available on: 
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extended to the township level.610 The work in Hunan mainly focused on 
building service centres of the administrative affairs at the township and 
county level. By 2002, Hunan had established these centres in 122 counties 
and 14 prefecture cities.611 It is worth noting that the Red Net (hongwang), a 
renowned local news website, was established in 2001 as well, and it has 
developed into an important propaganda and supervisory organ for the 
Hunan provincial party committee and the provincial government. 
 
        The year 2008 was a landmark in terms of the institutionalisation of 
governmental information transparency. On 1 May, publicising 
governmental information was formally acknowledged in legal regulations, 
and officially became the duty of administrative organs at various levels 
including the village level. 612  Since then, facilitated by the spread of 
telecommunications infrastructure to remote rural areas, the work now goes 
further -- from building service centres towards e-government (dianzi 
zhengwu) at county and sub-county level. In this vein, the Li County 
government not only organised a leadership work team on publicising 
governmental information, and set up a special office dealing with the 
applications from ordinary people for some government information, but it 
has also built up a digital reading room and an archive room for official 
information.613 Meanwhile, it has developed its official websites and has 
urged subordinate township governments to establish theirs as soon as 
possible.614Although these facilities are still being improved, by 2012 when 
                                                 
610  Tian, Longfei, “The legal construction of the governmental transparency in China: 
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field research was carried out, the County government had finished building 
its website, on which the annual reports and various information covering 
2008 to 2014 were available for reference. 615  Township government 
websites were initially established by the end of December 2008, and then 
revised completely in August of 2010. The versions which are available 
now started to be used in that month, and the available information cover 
the period from 2011 to 2014. 616 In addition, township governments have 
also created announcement boards to make some information open to public. 
It is surprising to note that all villages visited during field research had their 
announcement boards available as well, either in the form of painting on a 
black board or in the form of a printed board. 
 
       Thus citizens in Li County are able to obtain relevant governmental 
information by two means: information publicised on the announcement 
boards or the official websites, and the information obtained through 
application procedures. 617  The information publicised voluntarily by the 
government includes the layout, functions, and work procedures of 
governmental organs; various administrative regulations and relevant 
policies at five levels of the governmental hierarchy; statistical data on the 
economy and social development and on fiscal budgets and plans; the 
contents and standards of administrative charges; relevant policies on anti-
poverty work, education, health care, social security, and employment, etc.; 
precautions and responses to public emergencies; the supervision and 
inspection of environmental protection, public hygiene, production safety, 
the quality of the food, medicine and other products; the public welfare 
building, and so on.618 At township and village levels, in addition to the 
                                                 
615  For more details, see the County Government Website on http://www.li-
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616 Li County People’s Government, “The annual report of Li County Government in 2010 
on publicising the governmental information”, Li County Government Web, 2011, available 
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general information about various policies, they also need to give notice of 
the list of the beneficiaries who have been evaluated by the villagers’ 
assemblies for various subsidies.  
 
        In addition to voluntarily publicising government information, social 
supervision has also been developed in parallel to help build the transparent 
government. With the development of telecommunication technology, that 
has gradually become an effective tool to supervise and to restrict the 
authority of sub-central governments. So far, on top of the traditional 
petitioning system (xinfang zhidu), citizens are able to complain and to 
report on the actions of local governments and cadres through the leadership 
hotlines (lingdao rexian) and media disclosure. 619  Media disclosure in 
Hunan started as early as on 9 August 2005 when the programme of 
“people’s hotline (renmin rexian)” was launched by the News channel of 
Hunan People’s broadcasting. 620 After that, media programmes to disclose 
the administrative work and ethics have mushroomed in Hunan, through 
channels such as “Speaking for the People” at the Hunan Economic TV 
station, the “Voice against Corruption” at the radio channel of 
Xingshazhisheng, the “Work Ethics” at the Changsha Public Channel, and 
so on.621 Furthermore, leadership hotlines were opened so as to narrow the 
distance between leadership cadres and peasants, which helps to hold the 
former accountable. The hotlines system includes not only the hotlines of 
the governors at the provincial, the prefecture city and the county level, but 
also their email boxes. In addition, all government official websites 
                                                 
619 For more details on the petitioning system in China, see Minzner, Carl F., “Xinfang: An 
Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions”, 42 Stan. J.Int’l. 103 (2006), available at: 
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including Red Net have opened special channels for immediate mutual-
communications between senior cadres in charge and common citizens.622  
 
         In practice, the development of social supervision helps to restrict the 
authority of the local cadres, and has become one of the effective weapons 
for citizens to fight for their rights and benefits. Examples have been 
discussed above in the section of intercepting agricultural subsidies, in 
which a peasant in Banqiaorong Village of Wangjiachang Township fought 
for his agricultural subsidies by calling the county governor’s hotline to stop 
the village committee from intercepting his subsidies to offset his unpaid 
water charge. 623  However, since neither hotlines nor media disclosure 
involve any independent third party in the dispute resolution procedure, the 
effectiveness still mainly depends on the hierarchical supervision within the 
internal authority system. So an imbalance of power survives. Results 
depend on the policy orientation of the central government. As the priority 
of the central government in the 2000s has been to maintain social stability, 
the methods of social supervision have thus been manipulated and 
sometimes even abused by some peasants to achieve personal aims. That 
has increased the difficulties for local cadres. 
 
           This is exactly the agony which Mr L of Dazhou Village of Dazhou 
Township felt when he talked about his work as party secretary of the 
village. As the boundaries between the duties and rights of the authorities on 
the one hand and common citizens on the other are still blurred – and the 
policy of maintaining social stability is a priority -- local cadres seldom 
function well. Take the programme of “one project one discussion” to 
provide public welfare as an example. The initial intention of this practice 
was to provide a platform on which the government, the collective and the 
peasants share the responsibilities of providing public welfare, with the 
peasants paying 15 yuan per capita, the government investing three times of 
the total amount raised by all villagers, and the village collective covering 
                                                 
622  For more details on the immediate mutual-communication section of Li County 
Government Website, see http://www.li-xian.gov.cn/guestbook/zixun.asp?id=6789 
(accessed on 15December 2014). 
623 Interview 2012/02/16f; also see this Chapter, p. 276 – 281. 
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the rest. Since some peasants did not like paying even a portion of 15 yuan 
per capita, they took advantage of the hotlines and media outlets to report 
dishonestly that the village committee had increased the peasant burdens. 
Most officials at higher level only care about their reputations, so that they 
have tended to respond by ordering village officials to comfort the peasants 
by meeting any requests they made, without careful investigations. This is 
the reason why the project of setting up the electricity poles was abolished 
in Dazhou Village.624  
 
        This has gone to the extent of becoming a method used by some 
peasants to make money. Another peasant in Dazhou Village, named TY, 
often succeeded in extracting funds by threatening the village committee 
with petitions to the higher-level government institutions. At first, in order 
to comfort him, with the consent of their superiors, the village committee 
gave him 200 yuan. After a few days, he threatened the committee again by 
continually visiting the bureau of civil affairs of the County. That bureau 
eventually became irritated and ordered the village committee to find ways 
to draw TY back. The committee had no choice but to agree to give him 500 
yuan this time. In 2011, TY did it again, but this time, he went to the 
Finance Bureau of Li County. The Bureau called on the township 
government to solve this dispute. The party secretary of the township 
committee finally called the party secretary of the village, and ordered him 
to comfort TY by using any means. This time, TY got 2,000 yuan. Dazhou 
Village actually is not an isolated case. Mr Z of Hucheng Village told 
similar story. As there is still no independent dispute resolution procedure in 
place to deal with the disputes between the government and the peasants.  
Resolutions depend on the reactions of actors at higher level.       
 
4.3.2 Extensively Improving Rural Infrastructure 
 
During the 2000s, as reforms have been carried out quite fully in a 
comprehensive effort at rural transformation, living conditions in rural areas 
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have greatly improved. Infrastructure construction has been extensively 
pushed to remote rural areas. Under the label of “extending coverage to 
every village” (cuncun tong), this effort covers roads, electricity, running 
water, telephone and the internet, aimed at extending the infrastructure 
coverage to every village. Although they all belong to one comprehensive 
project, the various sub-projects actually did not start at the same time. 
While electricity, running water and the radio/broadcasting access were 
begun as early as 1998, roads and the telephone links only started in 2004. 
A complementary drive to “build a new socialist village” since 2006 has 
further facilitated the development of this effort, especially rural road 
building. In 2006, the central government launched a plan to invest “one 
hundred billion (yuan) in five years”, aiming to enable rural roads to cover 
every administrative village by 2010. 625 
 
        The roads in rural areas are categorised as township roads and village 
roads. Instead of simply being state-funded, resources for these two types of 
roads are actually raised in cooperative exercises among the state, the 
village collectives and peasants. Depending on their size, functions, and 
locations, roads within a village territory which are less than 3.5 meters 
wide and for the daily use of villagers are deemed “village” roads, while the 
“township” roads need to reach minimum width of 3.5 meters and to reach 
beyond a single village territory but within a single township, according to 
Mr C of Qilimiao Village of Cengnan Township. 626  There are clear 
divisions in terms of who invests in which. The maintenance and building of 
township roads are the responsibility of township governments and receive 
state investment at a rate of 140,000 yuan per kilometre. If the state’s 
appropriation is insufficient, the rest must be raised by the township 
government. 627  Since 2009 when the programme of “one project one 
                                                 
625 Xiao, Bo, “the village road building enters into the horizon of the central government 
and ‘cuncun tong’ benefits hundreds of millions of common people”, Xinhua Net, 23 
August, 2005, available on: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-
08/23/content_3391116.htm (accessed on 16 May 2014).  
626 Interview 2012/01/06. 
627 Ibid; and Xiao, Bo, “the village road building enters into the horizon of the central 
government and ‘cuncun tong’ benefits hundreds of millions of common people”, Xinhua 
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discussion” was modified, township authorities have been strictly prohibited 
from raising money forcefully by taking advantage of “one project one 
discussion”, so township governments mostly rely on the donations from the 
prosperous persons born in the township. 
  
         Village roads are the responsibility of village committees, which must 
raise most of the funds themselves. Since 2009, only villages whose projects 
are approved by the County government are eligible to raise the money 
among villagers through the programme of “one project one discussion” at a 
rate of up to 15 yuan per capita. But since that process yields limited 
resources, the donations from prosperous persons born in the villages has 
become the main source of funds for village roads. Given the importance of 
lobbying for donations, local cadres are under pressure to maintain personal 
relationships with such donors. It is thus understandable that the roads in 
many villages of Matoupu Township, which is home to many senior cadres 
in the county and prefecture city governments and to many members of the 
new economic elite (due to its rich natural resources), are much better and 
reach more remote areas than the roads in Xiaodukou Township, which has 
not produced many successful persons yet.628 One of the village roads which 
the party secretary of Lianhua Village of Matoupu Township is said to have 
been built because the daughter of the family living in the house by the road 
is married to a senior cadre in charge of the Transportation Bureau of 
Changde prefecture city. That personal connection helped the village 
committee to lobby to obtain funding for the road.629 
 
          In addition to roads, many villages in Li County have improved other 
infrastructure facilities to make the daily life of the peasants easier. 
Examples include increasing the voltage of electricity, setting up running 
water, installing modern toilet equipment, etc. Other improvements can be 
seen in cleansing of canals in the fields, setting up the public reading rooms 
and outdoor fitness facilities. By 2011, safe and clean running water had 
                                                                                                                            
Net, 23 August, 2005, available on: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-
08/23/content_3391116.htm (accessed on 16 May 2014). 
628 Interview 2012/02/14. 
629 Interview 2011/12/24. 
302 
 
become available to a rural population of 201,000 in Li County. 630  The 
funds for these public welfare projects were once again raised through a 
combination of state appropriations, fundraising by the peasants either 
through the programme of “one project one discussion” or through 
voluntary donations, and donations from prosperous individuals. These 
modern facilities, which used to be enjoyed only by urban residents, have 
greatly improved the living conditions in the rural areas, and have narrowed 
the gap between rural and urban areas. 
 
4.3.3 Gradually Expanding the Coverage of a Social Security System in 
Rural Areas 
 
The period since 2006 is important for the development of a social security 
system in the rural areas. Based on the experiences accumulated in the 
experiments in various local places in the 1980s, 1990s and the beginning of 
the 2000s, the sixth plenary session of the sixteenth committee of the CCP 
in 2006 aimed to build a harmonious socialist society and proposed to 
establish a social security system covering all citizens by 2020.631 In 2007, 
the central committee of the CCP again proposed in a report to the 
seventeenth Congress to speed up the establishment of such a system 
covering both urban and rural citizens. 632  This massive project is still 
gradually expanding its coverage. Up to 2012, the sub-projects under the 
social security system which began to be implemented, partly or fully, in Li 
County include the new social endowment insurance for rural residents 
(nongcun yanglao baoxian) and the new rural co-operative medical care 
(nongcun xinxing hezuo yiliao) under the category of social insurance; a 
rural minimum subsistence allowance (nongcun dibao) under social relief; a 
five guarantee household provision (wubaohu), elderly homes, and the low-
                                                 
630 Hu, Zongjun and Liu, Qianming, “The safe running water covers 200 thousand peasants 
in Li County”, Hunan Daily Online,  4 March of 2011.  
631 Zheng, Bingwen and Sun, Shouji, “The 30 years’ review on the social security system in 
China”, excerpted in Zou, Dongtao (ed.), Report on China’s Economic Development and 
Institutional Reform No.1: China: 30 Years of Reform and Opening-up (1978-2008), 
(Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2008), Chapter 22. 
632 Ibid. 
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rent housing (lianzu fang) under social welfare; and special care for veterans. 
633 
 
         While some items, such as the five guarantee households and special 
veterans’ care have been in place since the collective era, other items have 
been newly implemented. For example, Li County started fully 
implementing rural co-operative medical care in 2005, and by 2010, it 
covered 92.87% of the rural population. 634  On 28 December 2009, the 
County was incorporated into the first batch experimental sites in Hunan 
province to start implementing the new social endowment insurance for 
rural residents. With a threshold of 55 yuan per month per capita to the 
over-60s, Li County issued pension payments totalling 92.81 million yuan 
in 2010 and 178.93 million yuan in 2011.635 These two social insurance 
items are co-operative in form - the state and the rural residents share the 
insurance charges, based either on a certain ratio in terms of the rural co-
operative medical care, or according to six different grades in the case of the 
new social endowment insurance for rural residents: the more expensive the 
grade a rural resident chooses to pay, the greater the pension s/he can get 
later.636  
 
                                                 
633 The Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, “The list of 
the rates for various agricultural subsidies in Hunan in 2010”, compiled for investigations 
on implementing various subsidies policy in Li County in 2011.   
634 Zhou, Yongjun, “The social security system in Li County benefits common people”, 
Hunan Daily, 3 October 2008; The management office of the rural co-operative medical 
care in Li County, “A notice on implementing the rural co-operative medical care 
throughout the County in 2010”, Li County Government Web, 2010, available on: www.li-
xian.gov.cn/zwgg/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=6049 (accessed on 25 November 2013). 
635 The Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, “The list of 
the rates for various agricultural subsidies in Hunan in 2010”, compiled for investigations 
into implementing various subsidies policy in Li County in 2011. The data on the pension 
are from interviews with the Labour Bureau of Li County. Hunan fully started its 
experiments on the new social endowment insurance for rural residents on 20 November 
and 14 counties including Li County were incorporated into the first batch experimental 
sites. Since then, the coverage has been expanded year after year and it aims to cover 
almost all eligible residents by 2020. For more details, see Ma, Bowen, “The experiments 
on the new social endowment insurance for the rural residents started to fully implement”, 
Hunan Daily, 21 November 2009. 
636 “The Interim plan on implementing the new social endowment insurance for the rural 
residents in Li County”, Li County Government Web, 24 December 2009, available on: 
www.li-xian.gov.cn/zwgg/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=4320 (accessed on 25 November 
2013). 
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         While the two above items aim to cover peasants generally, other 
items -- including the rural minimum subsistence allowance, the five 
guarantee households, the elderly homes, low-rent housing and special care 
for veterans -- are designed to help specific groups which face hardship. 
Instead of applying directly on their own, the beneficiaries covered by these 
policies are selected after a democratic evaluation by the villagers’ assembly 
or the meetings of the representatives of the villagers.637 The persons who 
obtained the most votes are not only named on the announcement board in 
the village, but are also reported to the office of civil affairs of the township 
government for checking. The final list which survives the checking is 
submitted to the Bureau of Civil Affairs of Li County for approval. Only the 
persons who are approved will enjoy these benefits.638 Similarly, since no 
independent evaluation organs and universal standards are involved in this 
process, cases arise in which some persons who are not in hardship enjoy 
the subsidies while others who are in need of help cannot get them.639        
 
        It is worth elaborating on the five guarantee households. Traditionally, 
Chinese people prefer that families look after the elderly while for old 
people who do not have families, the village collectives would look after 
them by drawing upon the Public Welfare Fund.  This system is called the 
“five guarantee households”. In recent years, homes for the elderly have 
been created. Up to 2013, Li County had 74 homes for the elderly, among 
which 32 are owned by the township while 42 are owned by the villages. 
They are funded by the Bureau of Civil Affairs of Changde prefecture city 
and other donations for which the township government lobbies. 640  In 
addition, homes for the elderly also can get subsidies from the state if they 
accommodate the five guarantee households, and in 2013 the rate was 
increased to 4,200 yuan per capita per year. 641  Beneficiaries of the five 
                                                 
637 Interviews 2012/02/18b, 2012/02/19c. 
638 Ibid. 
639 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
640 Interview 2012/02/22. 
641 Chen, Zhangming, “Pushing forward ‘four security projects’ to look after the elderly and 
care about the youth”, Changde Tongxun, 2013, 9th issue, available on: 
http://zys.changde.gov.cn/art/2013/10/12/art_71734_1406772.html (accessed on 5 April 
2014).  
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guarantee households system therefore technically are able to choose to live 
in the home for the elderly, or stay at home to be looked after by the village 
committee. If they choose to stay at home, the state gives them subsidies at 
a rate of 2,400 yuan per capita per year in 2013.642 
 
        However, in practice, even if township collectives own these homes for 
the elderly, the five guarantee households are not always accepted. Mr L of 
Dazhou Village of Yongfeng Township provided an example. There are 
several five guarantee households in his village, and the village committee 
sent them to the home for the elderly. However, three persons were sent 
back.  The reason the home for the elderly gave was that these people are 
too disabled to move around. The village committee had no choice but to 
call upon party members in the village to look after them, with every party 
member on duty for ten days at a time. This continued for one year. 
However, relying on the consciences of the party members was not a long 
term solution and gradually, party members grew tired and stopped. One of 
these disabled five guarantee households eventually perished from cold and 
hunger.643 
 
4.4 The Lifestyle of the Peasants Today 
 
After the 2005 reform of taxes and fees and other subsequent reforms, the 
peasants commonly reflected that living conditions in rural areas today were 
getting better and better. They spoke of improvements in the physical life of 
the peasants, in terms of better clothes, food, housing and transport.644 In the 
1990s, most of the money that they earned had to go to fulfil heavy taxes 
and fees, but since 2005, peasants have been able to spend their income on 
improving their living conditions -- houses, all kinds of indoor facilities, 
motorbikes, private cars, telephones, mobiles, computers, the internet, etc. 
Compared to the monolithic character of their incomes before 1978, the 
income structure of the peasants today is quite diverse, and depends on the 
                                                 
642 Ibid; Interviews 2012/02/16, 2012/02/19c. 
643 Interview 2012/02/19c. 
644 For more details on improvements on the living standards of  peasants, see this Chapter, 
p. 265 – 266 and p. 301 – 304.  
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natural resources of the area in which they reside. Their incomes mainly 
come from the following sources. 
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- Traditional planting   
      After the 2005 reform, traditional planting actually has gradually been 
reduced. This is firstly because the market for grain has been completely 
opened since 2004 and the old compulsory task of submitting grain has been 
eliminated so that peasants are free to arrange their planting plans and to 
decide how much they would like to grow. Secondly, other non-agricultural 
ways to make money have grown popular and profits from them are indeed 
better than traditional planting. Compared to the heavy labour of traditional 
planting, the peasants thus prefer to spend more time and effort on the non-
agricultural ways to increase their income.645 Still many rural households 
cultivate traditional crops, but this is mainly self-consumed. This has 
contributed to changes in the division of the labour within rural households. 
 
         The people who stay at home to do the traditional planting normally 
come from three groups: elderly people over 60 years old, women who are 
less able than male adults, and children who are old enough to help with 
some simple agricultural work. Since women’s day is 8 March and 
children’s day is 1 June in the Chinese public holiday calendar, these three 
groups of people who stay to do the traditional planting are nicknamed as 
“603861 team”.646 An investigation conducted in 2013 by the Li County 
group of the Rural Socio-Economic Survey Team of Hunan substantiates 
this point. In this investigation, the group investigated ten rural households 
in Yushi Village of Taiqing Township and found that among the 19 
labourers working on the traditional planting out of the total 36 labours, 13 
are older than 60 years old while the rest all are beyond 45 years old.647  
 
       The rest of labourers either choose to produce agricultural specialities, 
such as cash crops on a large scale or fruit gardens, or to develop fish ponds, 
                                                 
645 Interview 2011/12/30, 2012/01/06, 2012/02/16, 2012/02/16b, 2012/02/17b, 2012/02/17f. 
646 Ibid. 
647  The Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, “The 
analysis on the rural economic development  for the first half year of 2013 in Li County”, 
Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan website, 14 August 
2013, available on: 
http://www.hndc.gov.cn/xlxgdd/dczl/dcfx/201308/t20130814_29052.html (accessed on 5 
March 2014). 
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or decide to go to urbanised areas to become migrant workers. As fewer 
labourers work on traditional planting, some rural households either reduced 
the areas planted or changed the mode of planting from double-cropped to 
single-cropped, including some areas which used to be the major grain 
producing areas such as Cengnan Township and Daping Township.648 This 
further contributes to the reduction in the grain output. The grain issue has 
recently attracted the attention of the central government and during the 
period when the field research was conducted, the local township 
governments were meeting with the peasants to work out practical plans to 
deal with the problem of returning to double-cropping despite the shortage 
of labourers.649 
 
- Producing other agricultural specialities based on natural resources  
      In addition to traditional planting, some peasants who stayed at home 
have produced other agricultural speciality products. This depends on where 
they are.  The field research shows that peasants in mountainous areas 
mainly raise livestock, such as cattle, pigs, or poultry like chickens, ducks 
and geese; some peasants in the lake areas are able to raise fish or prawns; 
and hilly areas are suitable for fruit gardens, to grow oranges, apples, 
grapefruit and so on. Among all these specialities, what deserves to be 
emphasised is the grape industry in the plains area of Li County, which 
started in Xiaodukou Township in the 1990s, and has gradually expanded to 
several townships nearby. We talked in Chapter Three about the 
experiments which Mr W Xianrong, the grape specialist, had conducted in 
the 1990s, introducing traditional and new types of grapes to Li County.650 
His persistence paid off after 2000 and not only brought him wealth, but 
also provided a platform for other peasants nearby to make similar gains.   
 
          Based on his successful experiments, since 2000, W Xianrong has 
rented 108 mu of land in Yangjia Village of Xiaodukou Township, and has 
                                                 
648 Interviews 2012/01/06, 2012/02/18. 
649 Ibid. 
650 For more details on the beginning of the grapes industry of Mr. Wang Xianrong, see 
Chapter Three, p. 164 – 167. 
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introduced new types of grapes and new technology in planting.651 W has 
been working together with the grapes team of Hunan Agriculture 
University to overcome many difficulties with grape planting. In 2005, he 
rented another 218 mu of land in Xinnian Village of Zhanggongmiao 
Township and started a new research project on this base. His researches 
have had a revolutionary effect on the agriculture of Li County. Led by his 
technological guidance, the net income of a rural household planting grape 
has reached 10,000 yuan per mu. 652 Seeing his success, many peasants have 
started to grow grapes, so that the output of grapes in Li County has 
increased year after year.  In 2007 a grape industry zone has established to 
cover 13 townships with an annual output of 20 million kilograms and a 
total annual value of 90 million yuan. 653 
 
         In order to expand the grape industry effectively and to help peasant 
growers, Mr Z Yexiang, the director of the Bureau of the Rural Economic 
Management of Changde prefecture city visited W in 2009 and suggested 
that he organise grape producers to establish a professional co-operative 
agency.654 After careful consideration, W decided to take up this challenge 
and organised the Hunan Nongkang professional co-operative agency for 
grapes in 2009. It integrated scientific research, the breeding of good quality 
seeds, planting, technological training, the delivery of the produce, the sale 
of the grapes and the brewing of the wine.  This co-operative agency has 
established a complete industrial chain, which has linked 1,373 peasants not 
only within but also beyond Li County.655 At present, the industry is still 
developing. In addition to the grape co-operative agency, other co-operative 
agencies have also appeared in Li County recently: a cotton co-operative 
                                                 
651 Liu, Wenta, “The stories of the Representatives of the Seventeenth Party Congress: Mr 
Wang Xianrong, the Grape Specialist”, Hunan Daily, 2007, reprinted by Chinese 
Communist Party News Net on 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64104/78694/6009268.html (accessed on 7 November 
2014). 
652 Ibid. 
653 Ibid. 
654  Xu, Deqing; Wen, Jin; and Yao, Li, “The Road to the Grapes Entrepreneurship”, 
Changde Daily Online, 24 July 2011, p. 1 (accessed on 6 November 2014). 
655 Ibid. 
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agency in Huanghe Village of Zhanggongmiao Township, a grain co-
operative agency in Chengtoushan Village of Daping Township, etc.656 
 
           According to Mr C of Huanghe Village of Zhanggongmiao Township, 
instead of a governmental organisation, this kind of co-operative agency is 
normally initiated by the village committee, led by successful rural 
households or peasants (such as Mr W Xianrong in the grape co-operative), 
and expanded by accepting voluntary applications from peasants after they 
pay a small membership fee (such as 10 yuan per household for the cotton 
co-operative). 657  After peasant households join the agency, it provides 
services covering periods before and after production, including 
technological training, precautions against disease, the provision of the good 
seeds, sales etc.658 As co-operative agencies are still new, some are running 
better than others.        
 
- Other non-agricultural businesses: part-time manual labour, craftsmen 
and migrant workers 
      Although the agricultural speciality industry chain is very promising, it 
is still at an early stage and has not yet gained wide acceptance. It is also 
normally associated with high technology, which intimidates many peasants 
who do not have a good education. Therefore, many of them would prefer 
low-technology jobs rather than taking a risk on high-tech new agricultural 
specialities. Peasants in the suburban areas near Liyang Township where the 
County government is located have advantages in travelling into that 
Township to work. Many peasants go there to do part-time manual labour  
during agricultural slack times -- as porters, cleaners, baby-sitters, brick 
layers, etc. Some of them have special crafts, and are able to run small 
workshops and work independently in sewing shops, snack shops, dry 
cleaning shops, etc. The income is accordingly higher from this type of 
work.  
 
                                                 
656 Interview 2011/12/29. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Ibid. 
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       Lidan Township is a typical suburban area of Liyang Township. Mr W 
of Xindu Village there told us that some peasants in his village who work as 
labour contractors can earn hundreds of thousands yuan a year. 659  His 
daughter and son-in-law, one doing sewing shop work and the other as a 
welder, can earn a combined net income of 40,000 yuan a year. His three 
neighbours are all running snack shops, one in Jinshi (a neighbouring 
county-level city of Li County), one in Liyang Township, and one in 
Guangzhou, and their income averages hundreds of thousand yuan per 
year.660 Mr W’s net income is about 8,000 yuan per year.  
 
         While such part-time work as labourers or craftsmen is confined to 
those close to urban areas, all able peasants may travel further as migrant 
labourers. That has become the main source of supplementary income for 
most peasants. In a rural household composed of three generations, 
normally the older generation beyond 45 years of age will stay behind to 
work in their contracted fields.  They look after the young generation of 
children, while the middle generation from 17 to 45 years of age tend to 
become migrant workers. Young people prefer going out to work, because 
they are curious and attracted by the urban areas. They are also preferred by 
manufacturing industries in big cities. 661  In some areas such as Chexi 
Township and Lidan Township, the peasants have teamed together to follow 
their fellow-villagers once some migrant workers have migrated and 
become established in work. For example, Mr W Lifei, born in Wanxing 
Village of Chexi Township, initially went to Xinjiang province to work on 
his own. After he succeeded in establishing his own construction company, 
he took 120 peasants from his home village to Xinjiang to work in his 
company. 662  Conservatively speaking, those migrant workers can earn 
30,000 yuan per capita per year.663  
 
                                                 
659 Interview 2012/02/17e. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Ibid. 
662 Interview 2012/02/18c. 
663 Ibid. 
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       From the above analysis, it should be clear that there are two factors 
that affect the economic situation of a rural household. The first is the 
structure of the household. Normally a rural household in a mode of 2 + 2 + 
1 is better off than a household with more members but fewer able labourers. 
The mode of 2 + 2 + 1 means two grandparents who can work in the fields, 
look after one child, and meanwhile do some part-time low-technology 
work in slack periods; two younger adults who can go out to become 
migrant workers; and one child who stays with his/her grandparents (as the 
family planning policy is being relaxed, the number of one may become two 
or three in the future). This household structure also exemplifies the 
traditional idea in China that once women are married, they become 
members of their husbands’ households. That is why this mode only has two 
grandparents instead four.  
 
        The second factor is geographical location. The peasants living in the 
mountainous area are normally more disadvantaged than those living in 
suburban areas since the latter are closer to the urban areas which are full of 
work opportunities. Those convenient locations also save money for the 
peasants living nearby if they travel to the town to work since they are able 
to commute, while if peasants in the mountainous areas want to get jobs in 
urban centres, they face greater expenses for transport and accommodation.   
 
4. 5 Summary 
 
This chapter begins with the year 2000, three years before the new Hu-Wen 
leadership took office in Beijing. That is because one of the important 
reforms during their reign – the reform of taxes and fees in rural areas – had 
already begun developing as early as 2000. Spanning the whole period of 
Hun-Wen leadership, this chapter examines three sets of significant reforms 
in Li County – the reform of taxes and fees from 2002 to 2005; the 
agricultural subsidies system from 2004; and other comprehensive 
supporting reforms after 2005 including the development of rural political 
institutions, improvements in rural infrastructure, and the construction of a 
social security system in rural areas. Enabling reforms have also been 
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discussed to show how the new practices were adjusted in response to 
problems that emerged from implementation at the local level.  
 
         These reforms enabled the Hu-Wen leadership to obtain broad support 
from rural dwellers. By relieving peasants of heavy taxes and fees, and by 
facilitating the mobility of labour, the changes eroded old dependence of 
peasants on rural collective authority – which normally meant village 
committees and their cadres. With the elimination of various fees and 
charges on the one hand, and the delivery of subsidies and diversified 
income sources on the other, rural dwellers began to enjoy life as never 
before. Furthermore, from the later 2000s, a new market-oriented social 
security system was gradually expanded to cover rural areas. Although this 
system is not yet complete and is still under development, it signals an effort 
by the state to promote development which is balanced in urban/rural terms, 
and to integrate the groups which were marginalised amid the reforms into a 
comprehensive national system of social provisions.   
 
       By contrast, collective organisations at the village level faced numerous 
difficulties. After a campaign to eliminate deficits and to reduce debts in 
2002, almost all of the County’s villages lost control of collective-owned 
assets, which severely affected their capacity to sustain themselves. Various 
monitoring methods were introduced at the central government’s behest that 
nearly put an end to devices to extract money from the peasants, which rural 
authorities had used in the 1990s. After the 2005 reform of taxes and fees 
and its enabling reforms, the incomes of village collective organisations 
came mainly from three sources: appropriations from higher levels of 
government, fundraising among the villagers, and social donations. As the 
second was now strictly regulated by the modified programme of “one 
project one discussion”, village collective organisations had to rely on their 
relationships both with higher levels of government and with the new 
economic elites who might make donations. That became the main cause of 
variations in the performance of various village committees.  It also created 
acute stresses for many cadres at village level -- which, together with their 
diminished powers, has made the role of village cadres less attractive. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
This thesis takes readers chronologically through analyses of the 
implementation of reform policies and their corresponding impacts in Li 
County from 1978 to 2013. China has undergone transitions through three 
generations of central leadership, so the recent history of Li County 
presented here is divided into three phases covered by three chapters. 
Special attention has been paid to certain key reforms: the allocation of 
lands to households, the development of Township and Village Enterprises, 
and self-governance for villagers during Deng’s reign from 1978 to 1989; 
the arduous development of agriculture and rural industry in Li County after 
a shift in the central political wind in 1989, the decentralisation of fiscal 
authority, and the tax sharing system during most of the term of Jiang, Li 
and Zhu from 1990 to 1999; and the reforms of taxes and fees, the 
agricultural subsidy policy, and other supporting reforms targeting social 
development, such as massive infrastructure construction and extended 
coverage of social security in rural areas, during the latter years of the Jiang 
and Zhu era from 2000 to 2002 and of Hu-Wen leadership from 2003 to 
2013. By assessing the implementation of these policies in one 
predominantly agrarian county in central China – in which 81.5% of the 
population was rural in 2010 -- the thesis attempts to present a picture of 
what has been happening in China, and to chart the path that China has 
followed to become what it is now. The thesis also seeks to contribute to an 
understanding of the diversity of the impacts of the reforms. 
 
        Our account starts from 1978, the year which is commonly recognised 
-- officially and in academic analyses -- as a watershed in the history of the 
PRC. That year clearly separates two eras in the reign of the CCP which 
stand in marked contrast to each other. The first three decades of the PRC 
before 1978 witnessed the reclaiming of political authority over society. 
This was realised mainly through a series of political campaigns such as 
land reform, socialist transformation, communisation, socialist education, 
and the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the major economic, cultural, and 
educational activities in society were brought under government 
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management. The conduct of these campaigns (apart from the Cultural 
Revolution) had mainly relied upon, and meanwhile extended, strengthened 
and expanded administrative agencies and the party’s organisation.664 The 
massive army of its cadres, activists and party members penetrated so 
deeply into society that the CCP’s authority not only integrated the private 
lives of citizens into its political undertakings, but they also – via various 
meetings, discussions within all kinds of groups, and public assemblies – 
enabled the party to implement its various policies and campaigns 
nationwide.665  
 
          As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the implementation of 
various reform policies after 1978 is still led by this army of local cadres 
and party members. They have inherited the work methods of their 
predecessors before 1978 and responded to orders from superiors by 
organising meetings, carrying out the experiments at some sites, collecting 
feedback from the experiments, and then, based on the feedback, extending 
the coverage of new policies within their administrative territories. There 
have been no major changes to the party’s political institutions so far. A 
hierarchical system still exists to ensure that orders from the central 
government are conveyed to remote rural areas.  
 
          But in spite of these continuities, between 1978 and 2013, the 
Communists have achieved fundamental economic change, and indeed, a 
breakthrough. Instead of penetrating into almost all sections of society, and 
integrating them into the process of political management as in the era 
before 1978, the priority of the government since 1978 has shifted to the 
promotion of economic development. This shift has not only solved the 
problems of malnutrition and starvation, which loomed large before 1978.  
It has also lifted vast numbers of people out of poverty. Its success has 
mainly relied on gradually giving back freedoms to society and releasing 
                                                 
664 Vogel, Ezra F. Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial 
Capital, 1949 – 1968, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 351. 
665 Ibid. and Vogel, Ezra F. “From Friendship to Comradeship: The Change in Personal 
Relations in Communist China,” The China Quarterly, 1965, No.21 (Jan. – Mar., 1965), p. 
46 – 60. 
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individuals from their earlier duties to the state – thereby galvanising and 
stimulating the enthusiasm and energies of the people in order to enhance 
their own material well-being and to strengthen the economy.  This 
approach – the reduction in the pervasive controls over society which the 
party-state exercised before 1978, and the efforts to enhance the economic 
well being of ordinary people – has helped mightily to ensure the resilience 
(amid change) of the political order.  It has also, we shall see in more detail 
below, offered society sufficient benefits to ensure the resilience of the 
social order.   
 
         Much of what the Communists have done from 1978 to 2013 in Li 
County follows logically from this general trend. Whatever the specific aims 
of the reform policies described in the preceding chapters were – allocating 
lands to households, developing Township and Village Enterprises, de-
communising and re-establishing village-level authority, decentralising 
fiscal authority, reforming the tax system between the central and sub-
central governments, expanding agriculture subsidies, and other supportive 
reforms – all contributed to easing political control over society. As an 
agrarian County, the changes in Li County started with the reform of land 
policy. Although it did not at first pursue reforms as aggressively as some 
provinces such as Anhui, Hunan and Li County within it quickly grasped the 
opportunities which the reforms offered and joined in the allocation of lands 
to households. As we have seen in Chapter Two, this was an activity in 
which almost every peasant actively took part. Since Li County has long 
been famous for abundant agriculture production, the peasants were satisfied 
with this policy  not because of the improvements to productivity, but 
because it released them from inefficient and unvaried agricultural labour in 
production teams, so that they gained some freedom to work for themselves.  
 
        This opened up opportunities for variegated types of labour and 
enterprise that were essential for the development of rural industries. The 
boom experienced by Township and Village Enterprises duly ensued and, 
led by the local authorities, mushroomed impressively. We have seen that 
the government agencies at county, township and village levels shifted their 
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focus from political control to economic development, and concentrated 
their efforts on lending strong support to the development of rural industries. 
This not only increased the revenues of those government agencies, it also 
created job opportunities for underemployed rural labourers. It is worth 
noting that whether it is allocating lands to households or developing 
Township and Village Enterprises, unlike the monolithic implementations of 
political campaigns before 1978, local conditions were taken into account.  
As a result, variations in economic development also emerged even within 
this single County. As an agrarian County without a long history of industry 
and trading, the rural industries in Li County were rooted in its abundant 
natural resources, which are mainly found in its north-western sector of 
mountainous and hilly areas. These therefore became the main source of 
economic stimulus of Li County in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Several 
townships there, such as Huolianpo and Matoupu, obtained the rank and 
designation of ‘Zhen’ – Xiang and Zhen are both equivalent to townships, 
but the latter are more urbanised.  
  
        Due to a shortage of technology and to low levels of education among 
rural labourers, most rural industries of that first generation mainly entailed 
low technology, such as raw materials processing, mining and conveying. 
Although they were later criticised for their chaotic development and for 
contributing to environmental pollution, these early industries benefited the 
peasants, as is demonstrated by the chart on the composition of peasant 
incomes in Chapter Two. The peasant workers in those rural industries can 
now be regarded as the first generation of migrant workers, who left the 
fields and moved into nearby industries to work. In that period, the 
government also relaxed restrictions on the management of individual 
businesses, and began to contract out the management of some collective-
owned businesses to individuals. The developing “dual track” (collective 
and private ownership) and “four wheels” (township, villages, joint and 
individual) strategies in rural industries in Li County showed the flexibility 
and creativity of the local cadres as they interpreted Communist and Maoist 
ideology. They did not lock themselves into traditional Communist 
doctrines and instead, when necessary, were ready to embrace new 
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challenges.  In that period, they shook off the ideological constraints that 
had been implanted in the minds of people by political campaigns before 
1978. During this period, many peasants adopted wait-and-see attitudes. But 
those who were adventurous and pioneering, whether they were local cadres 
or ordinary people, stood out and became a potent force.  
 
         All of these dynamics during this period owed much to the favourable 
policy environment which the central government provided to rural areas in 
the 1980s. But when it entered the 1990s, everything seemed to plummet 
into stagnation. The international political situation and the social chaos in 
China caused by some reforms reached a climax in the period between 1989 
and 1992.  It convinced the new leadership of Jiang and Li, who were urban-
oriented, to adopt a relatively conservative posture towards the rural areas 
and to shift policy priorities from rural to coastal and urban areas. Whether 
or not it was intentional, this change produced complicated impacts in Li 
County during the 1990s. First, in order to guarantee improvements in 
economic output and annual revenues, local governments reoriented their 
limited resources and focused on a few hi-tech enterprises. This worsened 
the situation of many raw material producers and low-tech rural businesses 
and workshops, and forced them either to reorganise or to declare 
bankruptcy. The Township and Village Enterprises, which had previously 
been effective at absorbing underemployed rural labourers and at increasing 
the incomes of peasants, gradually went into decline.  
 
        Two responses to this situation ensued.  On the one hand, based on the 
county’s agriculture advantages, local government agencies in Li County 
actively encouraged peasants to try new types of high-yielding agriculture 
products. On the other, the boom in manufacturing industries in the coastal 
cities, which were promoted by the central government at that time, replaced 
the Township and Village Enterprises as the main entities accommodating 
slack rural labour. The trend of moving to urban and coastal cities for work 
intensified after a tax sharing system was put in place in 1994. One 
motivation was to make money but another specific reason, as most 
peasants said, was to meet the heavy financial burdens assigned to each 
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household, as by-products of the tax sharing system and the decentralisation 
of financial authority. That decentralisation was originally intended to grant 
localities some freedom to control their financial resources, but in effect, it 
ended up increasing the financial burdens of local governments and peasants. 
In the late 1990s, more and more peasants chose to go to distant urban and 
coastal areas to work.  As one informant said, the reasons for this included 
those financial burdens in the villages and the fact that their earnings from 
selling their labour in rural areas could scarcely offset soaring financial 
charges and fees imposed by cash-strapped local authorities. The migration 
to the cities contributed indirectly to an over-concentration of rural lands in 
fewer hands, and foreshadowed another type of chaos after 2000, in the 
delivery of agricultural subsidies and the certification of management rights 
over of the lands of peasant households.  
 
         During this period, the relationship between the cadres and the 
peasants rapidly deteriorated. The task of fulfilling demands from higher 
levels of government for revenues, in the form of financial charges and fees, 
was passed down from one level after another until it reached the peasants. 
As the last level in the administrative hierarchy, village communities thus 
witnessed confrontations between two groups – village cadres and peasants. 
It has been seen in Chapter Three that in many villages of Li County, the 
cadres normally used persuasion to extract money from the peasants, but 
they also held coercive powers in reserve when needed. The use of force 
usually included arbitrary confiscations of possessions, and the deployment 
of police to pursue peasants who tried to evade payments. In addition to 
squeezing peasants for money, the village authorities also began to sell off 
their collectively-owned assets. This was the beginning of the privatisation 
of village-owned assets, although it was not the result of top-down orders to 
do so. Even after they had used all possible means, many villages in Li 
County could still not meet financial demands from above. Their debts 
accumulated year after year and reached such high levels that some villages 
still have not paid off all of their debts today. Soaring debts of village 
committees, an exodus of migrant workers, and an over-concentration of 
lands in a few hands therefore became three important features in Li County 
320 
 
during the 1990s.  The events of that decade undermined popular faith in the 
political order and generated tensions within society.  Action from the apex 
of power to address these problems was urgently required – and soon 
emerged.   
 
         Those sufferings of rural communities were gradually eased after 2003 
when the new Hu-Wen leadership took office in Beijing. That generation of 
leadership therefore obtained broad support from rural dwellers. The 
peasants mainly benefited from three specific policies which were put into 
full-scale effect under Hu and Wen: a reform of taxes and fees, the provision 
of agricultural subsidies, and other supporting reforms condensed in the 
slogan of building a new socialist countryside . It signalled an effort to 
improve infrastructure and the social ethos in rural areas, and to extend the 
coverage of a new market-oriented social security system to villages. During 
this period, we saw the redistribution of the benefits of economic 
development from urban to rural areas through the reform of administrative 
fees and surcharges, and the allocation of agricultural subsidies to 
compensate for the excessive exploitation of the peasants in the 1990s.  
Furthermore a new market-oriented social security system was gradually 
extended to the rural areas, in an effort to integrate marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups into a comprehensive national system of social 
provisions. Although this system has still not yet matured, as some 
informants explained in Chapter Four, many peasants are nonetheless 
satisfied with what they have gained from it. In the eyes of the peasants, if 
Hu and Wen had not changed the policies from the Jiang era (with their 
urban bias), the party and the government might have lost legitimacy. That 
could have destabilised China. Since there is only one party, if that party 
loses legitimacy, there is no opposition party to turn to and the whole 
system is in danger of crashing. 
 
         In contrast to the improved situation of the peasants, the problems of 
the collective organisations at the village level -- the village committees and 
their cadres -- have not diminished. First, a campaign to eliminate deficits 
and reduce debts in 2002, aiming to pave the way for the subsequent reform 
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of taxes and fees, started a second wave of sell-offs of the collectives’ assets. 
As a result, almost all the villages but one (Yucheng Residential 
Community of Daping Township) which were studied for this thesis lost 
control of collectively-owned assets, including natural resources, enterprises 
and even office buildings. This measure has not only failed to help villages 
to pay off debts – many still are in serious arrears - but it has also weakened 
the ability of many collective organisations to sustain themselves. As one 
cadre said, the debts cannot be cleared now if there is no policy to address 
them. In addition, the subsequent reform of taxes and fees since 2005 has 
gradually ended the control of the village organisations over the peasants by 
eliminating various agriculture-related taxes and two voluntary labour 
schemes. With the marketization of agricultural production and the 
phenomenon of migrant workers, peasants rely financially less and less on 
village organisations and therefore do not obey their orders as much as they 
used to do. This trend is further intensified by the popularisation of media 
monitoring via the internet, newspapers, television news, and government 
hotlines. Examples in Chapter Four showed how peasants use these hi-tech 
tools to protect their benefits.  
 
        The funds for village collective organisations now therefore come from 
three sources. The first is appropriations from higher levels of government; 
the second consists of social donations; and the third is fundraising among 
the villagers. While the third source is strictly regulated by the rules implied 
in the phrase “one project one discussion”, the other two mainly rely on the 
ability of cadres to lobby and to network. Thus, much depends on not only 
the personal charm of the cadres but also on the human resources of each 
village. That is why we see variations in the performance of the village 
committees in terms of infrastructure building.  While roads are beautifully 
extended to the doorsteps of each villager in the remote mountainous areas, 
such as Matoupu township, some localities in the lake areas even cannot 
manage to create essential roads. With their power diminished on the one 
hand, and increased pressure to raise funds on the other, the role of village 
cadres has thus become less attractive to villagers (and potential cadres) 
than it was before 1978. Unlike their elders, young people prefer migrating 
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to cities to staying in the rural areas. So the problem of recruiting new blood, 
both for the administration and the party at the village level, has worsened.  
 
        In response, many provinces including Hunan have begun to try a new 
practice named “college-graduate village official” (daxuesheng cunguan) 
since 2005 -- based on the experiences in provinces such as Jiangsu and 
Hainan – the aim of which is to train a reserve army of young cadres for 
rural governance. However, the field work for this thesis has established that 
this has not produced the desired effect. As one informant stated, these 
young college graduates might have modern knowledge, but many of them 
lack practical experience in communicating with peasants. Chinese peasants’ 
long experience with authoritarianism has taught them to be cautious, so 
that they do not easily trust outsiders until they have spent a long time living 
and working together. In addition, most young people who were born after 
1978 were single children, and excessive spoiling by their families makes 
them unable to endure the hardships and living conditions in the rural areas. 
The college-graduate village official in this informant’s village chose to 
leave after working there for a year, and left the informant behind to assume 
the dual role of village governor and accountant. This undermines the self-
governance of villagers, based on direct elections, since older peasants in a 
village do not qualify for selection and the younger ones are not interested 
in staying.       
 
         The control of the state over rural communities was further eroded 
after the activity of “merging villages and cancelling villagers’ groups” was 
implemented in the rural areas under the Changde prefecture administration 
in 2005. In effect, this completely ended the roles of villagers’ groups as one 
level of sub-village administration, and merged some small villages into 
bigger ones. As a result, the number of the cadres at village level in Li 
County was reduced by 34.2%, and the number of roles that they play at the 
village level was reduced to an average maximum of four.666 The political 
                                                 
666 Zeng, Xiangwen, “Li County of Hunan: to cultivate and to select part-time deputy party 
secretaries of village party organisations out of economic talents”, Theory Channel of 
People’s Daily Online [Electronic], 30 November 2010, available on: 
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system before 1978 gave priority to developing administrative structures so 
as to bring almost every aspect of social life within the scope of 
governmental management.  By contrast, the political system now tends to 
turn governance and development over to society by reducing administrative 
structures.    
 
       It is also worth noting that, following the call from the central 
government, Hunan province started to implement the reform of direct 
financial management of counties by provinces -- by abandoning the level 
of prefectural-city administration on 1st January 2010 -- and Li County was 
lucky to be in the first batch of twenty experimental counties. After a few 
years, support has grown for the fusion of Li County and Jingshi, its 
neighbouring county-level city -- to extend direct financial and 
administrative management of the province over this newly established 
Jinshi-Li County administration. By early 2015, reports suggested that 
preparations are being made to effect this change. If it occurs, it would, by 
reducing the administrative hierarchy from four levels to three, contribute to 
improved administrative efficiency and to a further relaxation of political 
control over society.  
 
         The reduction in the control of the administration over rural society 
and the expanding territory of the rural administrative organisations give 
room for a revival of some traditional organisations, such as patriarchal 
clans and religious groups. This trend gains momentum from the fact that 
communist ideology is not as strictly emphasised as it used to be. Rural 
residents thus tend either to turn to traditional Confucian values or to 
traditional religions to provide spiritual sustenance.  In recent years, it has 
become more popular for patriarchal clans to re-establish ancestral halls and 
to re-edit genealogies, which were abandoned during the campaign of 
“doing away with the four olds” (po sijiu) in the 1960s. The propaganda of 
the central government to re-promote traditional Chinese values reinforces 
this tendency. For example, since 2007, three traditional Chinese festivals – 
                                                                                                                            
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/208149/208853/13356833.html (accessed on 8 
September 2014). 
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Qingming, Duanwu, and Zhongqiu – have been integrated into the public 
holiday calendar, and citizens are eligible to have one day off at each of 
these festivals. Traditionally, Qingming and Zhongqiu emphasise the 
significance of family bonds via the worship of ancestors and family 
reunions. Duanwu, also called the Dragon Boat Festival, is shared by almost 
all Chinese throughout the world and is likely to stimulate patriotism and 
cultural solidarity among Chinese. Confucian and Buddhist temples are 
attended by many worshippers again. According to the director of the 
Buddhist Association in Li County, there were almost 100,000 Buddhists 
there by early 2015.     
 
         As we have seen above, whether in terms of economic management, 
administrative management and the number of local cadres, or in terms of 
the religion and ideology of rural residents, there is a clear trend towards 
greater freedom and diversity. This has, for the present, reduced both the 
burdens upon and popular discontent with the political order.  It has also 
eased strains within society. The infrastructure building of recent years, such 
as high speed train and road links to Li County, enhances the mobility of 
people between rural and urban areas. The increasing contact with modern 
urban areas helps rural dwellers gradually to cultivate an awareness of 
themselves as individuals rather than as members of certain collectives. In 
theory, this could help rural residents to become conscious legal or political 
actors, capable of asserting their rights, and of organising associations based 
on the shared concerns which can lodge requests or achieve group ends on 
their own. However, while it has gradually retreated from many aspects of 
social life, the CCP reserves the right and still carefully exerts the power to 
restrict freedom of association. Consider an example from Li County.  
 
         In response to the interception of agricultural subsidies at county and 
sub-county levels, Mr S, a veteran, was thinking of organising fellow 
veterans in this and other neighbouring areas to establish an office to 
monitor the behaviour of government actors and to report on the proper 
implementation at county and sub-county level to the provincial government. 
When he was asked if the office was finally established in 2012 -- a few 
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years after he first aired the idea -- he replied with disappointment that he 
was afraid that it had been aborted because he faced too many procedures to 
gain approval for it. This is explained in part by the possibility that the 
increasing power of civil society might generate more than one party, which 
would challenge the monopoly power of the CCP.  With old collective 
organisations gradually disappearing, rural dwellers have become 
individuals with considerable freedom. However, before new organisations 
are established to integrate individuals, society appears somewhat chaotic. 
This can be seen in the number of complaints from informants about their 
safety, and in increasing crimes. In addition, the combination of a 
representational void and increased mobility – which has exposed migrant 
peasant workers to unfair treatment in big cities – has undermined the power 
of people instead of strengthening them. 
 
        In March of 2013, another new generation of leadership, led by Xi 
Jinping and Li Keqiang, took office in China. In its first two years, apart 
from the anti-corruption campaign which is nationwide and overwhelming, 
few new changes have yet been seen in rural areas. Instead, as the anti-
corruption campaign created a tense atmosphere, visitors to the villages of 
Li County could easily sense certain stagnation within rural communities. 
The appearance of villages remained the same or seemed even worse 
because the anti-corruption campaign promotes austerity. Some areas were 
not as tidy as a few years ago because the interest of the cadres in 
conducting inspections has diminished. It is still too early to evaluate this 
generation of leadership since it normally takes time in China for policies to 
be formulated at the central level and then to make an impact at county and 
sub-county levels. However, significant problems need to be addressed: 
rising inequality, the deceleration of economic development, etc.  It is also 
unclear how the anti-corruption campaign will end. These things present 
new challenges to President Xi and Premier Li, and their approach to rural 
areas where most Chinese still live is especially important.  Will they follow 
the pro-rural policies of Hu and Wen and speed up the establishment of 
harmonious communities, or will they give urban areas priority again over 
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rural society?  The choice will matter greatly to vast numbers of rural 
residents and to the realisation of their stated aim – the “Chinese Dream”. 
 
 Since 1979, China and Li County within it have witnessed 
considerable social change, but despite many new stresses, the social order 
has not broken down.  It has bent without breaking.  Nor, despite many 
changes and mounting collective protests in recent years, has the political 
order broken down, as it did in some other Communist systems.  The 
Chinese Communist Party controls much less than it did in earlier times, but 
it remains a dominant force.  This thesis has sought to deepen our 
understanding of this social and political resilience.   
 
 At times – especially in the period between 1989 and 2003 -- social 
tensions became acute amid increasing inequality and changes in 
government policy which generated antipathy between social groups, 
especially in rural areas.  But despite this, and despite much social 
dislocation, a breakdown of the social order has never appeared likely.  This 
is explained by a diversity of things: the coercive potential of the party-state; 
and much more importantly after 2003, its ameliorative revision of policies 
to ease social tensions and discontent – again, especially in rural areas.  But 
the adaptability and durability of social institutions – and of ties within and 
between households – also played a role. 
 
 The acute distress suffered between 1989 and 2003 by rural dwellers 
-- the result of the government’s policies and it urban bias – raised more 
serious questions about the survival of the political order.  But the party-
state proved resilient, again for a number of reasons.  Discontents were 
largely confined within local arenas and tended to be directed at local cadres 
rather than higher-level leaders.  So in the absence of an aggregation of such 
discontents, the political system in general felt only rather limited pressure.  
The coercive power of the party-state intimidated some from expressing 
their anger, but its use in that era by party cadres whom policies had placed 
in invidious positions also intensified popular resentments.  Crucially, 
however, the party-state’s resilience is explained by its ability after 2003 to 
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understand the plight of rural dwellers (and indeed, of local cadres) and to 
take effective remedial action.  That, more than the threat or use of coercion, 
lay at the heart of the resilience of the political order. 
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APPENDIX I: PROFILES OF THE INTERVIEWEES IN LI 
COUNTY 
 
Date of 
Interviews667 
Interviewees and 
position668 
Locations669 
2011/12/01 
Mr Y, 
Former head of 
township 
finance office 
Dongshi Township 
2011/12/26 
Mr H, 
Retired rural teacher 
Ximochi Residential Community, 
Liyang Township 
2011/12/29 
Group 
interview 
Mr X, 
Head of village 
committee 
Huanghe Village, Zhanggongmiao 
Township 
Ms H, 
Officer for women’s 
affair of 
village committee 
Ibid 
Mr C, 
Former accountant 
of village 
committee and now 
retired 
Former Wanjiapu Village, now 
merged into the new 
Huanghe Village, Zhanggongmiao 
Township 
2011/12/29b Ms M, Peasant Zhanggongmiao Township 
2011/12/30 
Group 
interview 
Mr P, 
Former accountant 
of village 
committee and now 
investigator 
of RSEST 
Yushi Village, Taiqing Township 
Mr L, 
Staff of RSEST 
County Governmental Staff 
2012/01/06 
Group 
interview 
Mr C, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Qilimiao Village, Cengnan Township 
Mr P, 
Head of village 
committee 
Ms L, 
Officer of women’s 
affair of 
village committee 
                                                 
667 The interviews are indexed in chronological order when they were conducted in the form 
of year/month/date. For the interviews conducted on the same date, English letters are 
applied alphabetically to denote ones in different time.   
668 All interviewees are guaranteed to be anonymous for reasons of privacy and ethical 
protection. 
669 The locations refer to villages/residential communities where the interviewees are from 
and their affiliated townships. 
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2012/01/12 
Mr Z, 
Party secretary of 
residential 
community 
Hucheng Residential Commity, 
Liyang Township 
2012/02/11 
Group 
interview 
 
Mr X, 
Former party 
secretary of 
Village and now 
retired Lianhua Village, Matoupu Township 
Mr X, Peasant 
Mr X, Peasant 
Ms X Peasant 
2012/02/14 
Mr Z, 
Former cadres in 
village and 
now retired 
Hongxing Village, Xiaodukou 
Township 
2012/02/14b 
Mr C, 
Former party 
secretary of 
Village and now 
retired 
Former Zhaojia Village, now merged 
into the new 
Fenghuang Village, Guanxuan 
Township 
2012/02/15 
Mr C, 
Former head of 
village 
Committee and now 
retired 
 
Zhangshuyan Village, Leigongta 
Township 
2012/02/16 
Mr W, 
Accountant of 
village 
committee 
Yuntai Village, Dongshi Township 
2012/02/16b 
Mr G, 
Former accountant 
of village 
committee and now 
retired 
Ganxi Village, Ganxitan Township 
2012/02/16c 
Mr S, 
Former accountant 
of village 
committee and now 
retired 
Former Songzhu Village, now 
merged into the new 
Huangxi Village, Huolianpo 
Township 
2012/02/16d 
Group 
interview 
Mr T, 
Former party 
secretary of village 
Laomu Village, Zhakou Township 
Ms H, 
Staff of township 
government 
Zhakou Township 
2012/02/16e Mr H, Shuimi Village, Zhakou Township 
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Accountant of 
village committee 
2012/02/16f 
Mr R, 
Party secretary of 
Village 
Banqiaorong Village, Wangjiachang 
Township 
2012/02/17 
Mr C, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Former Baihe Village, now merged 
into the new 
Baihelin Village, Mengqi Township 
2012/02/17b 
Mr Y, 
Former deputy head 
of village 
committee 
Juhualing Village, Yiwan Township 
2012/02/17c 
Group 
interview 
Mr M, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Shigong Village 
Zhongwu 
Township 
Mr Y, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
 
Changgangling 
Village 
 
Mr Z, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Hualing Village 
Mr L, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Caoyan Village 
Mr L, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
 
Ibid 
Mr Y, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Tongche Village 
2012/02/17d 
Mr H, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Shuisi Village, Dayandang Township 
2012/02/17f 
Mr W, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Xindu Village, Lidong Township 
2012/02/18 
Group 
Interview 
Mr Y, 
Party secretary of 
residential 
community 
Yucheng Residential Community, 
Daping Township 
Mr L, 
Staff of township 
government 
Daping Township 
2012/02/18b 
Mr G, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Qunle Village, Daping Township 
2012/0218c 
Group 
Mr D, 
Accountant of 
Balihe Village 
Chexi 
Township 
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Interview village committee 
Mr H, 
Former party 
secretary of village 
and now retired 
Wanxing Village 
Mr Z, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Chengtoushan 
Village 
Mr Z, 
Accountant of 
residential 
community 
Chexi Residential 
Community 
Mr L, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Chexi Village 
Mr Z, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Chenggong Village 
2012/02/18d 
Mr T, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Guanshantu Village, Yanjing 
Township 
2012/02/18e 
Mr L, 
Accountant of 
residential 
community 
Yanggu Residential Community, 
Lidan Township 
2012/02/19 
Group 
Interview 
Mr M, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Huamiao Village 
Shuanglong 
Township 
Mr L, 
Party secretary of 
village 
 
Wansheng Vilage 
 
Mr C, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Zengjia Village 
Mr C, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Gutang Village 
Mr Z, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Tianhua Village 
Mr W, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Sanlian Village 
2012/02/19b 
Mr W, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
 
Shuangyan Village, Fuxing Township 
 
2012/02/19c 
Group 
interview 
Mr L, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Dazhou Village, Yongfeng Township 
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Mr W, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
2012/02/19d 
Mr L, 
Party secretary of 
village 
Chimagang Village, Rudong 
Township 
2012/02/19e 
Group 
interview 
Mr C, Peasant Bichen Village 
Jiuyuan 
Township 
Mr L, Peasant Ibid 
Mr C, Peasant Shaling Village 
2012/02/22 
Group 
Interview 
 
Mr Y, 
Party secretary of 
village 
 
Yingxi Village 
Daohe 
Township 
Mr M, 
Party secretary of 
Residential 
Community 
Tianzishan 
Residential 
Community 
Mr G, 
Accountant of 
Residential 
Community 
Ibid 
2012/02/22b 
Group 
interview 
Mr H, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Shuanghe Village 
Linan 
Township 
Mr W, 
Head of village 
committee 
Ibid 
Mr L, 
Party secretary of 
village 
 
Fengping Village 
 
Mr X, 
Party secretary of 
village 
 
Laogang Village 
Mr W, 
Accountant of 
village committee 
Xinglong Village 
2012/02/24 
Group 
interview 
Ms W, Peasant 
Zongyang Village, Fangshiping 
Township 
Mr S, Peasant 
Mr W, Peasant 
2013/01/11 
Mr Z, 
Former director of 
Bureau of 
Township 
Enterprises and now 
retired 
Former County Governmental Staff 
Total 
53 Villages and RCs 
(47 Villages and 6 
30 Townships 
(16 Xiangs and 14 Zhens) 
333 
 
Residential 
Communities) 
 
  
334 
 
       
APPENDIX II: ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION IN LI 
COUNTY670 
 
                                                 
670 By 2009, Li County governed 32 townships (15 Zheng and 17 Xiang), 478 villages and 
residents’ communities (427 villages and 51 residential communities). For more 
information, refer to The Statistics Bureau of Li County (2009), the yearbook of Li County 
2009, (Xiantao of Hubei: Jiangxia Publishing Company), p. 35.  
671 For the difference between Xiang and Zhen, please refer to footnote 12 in the section of 
an overview of Li County in Chapter One. 
           672 For the difference between village and residential community, please refer to footnote 
12 in the section of an overview of Li County in Chapter One. In this section, the astronoid 
* denotes residents’ community. The name in red denotes the ones that were visited in field 
work. 
Townships671 Villages/Residential Communities672 Remark 
Liyang 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Gaoqiao, Xingaoyan, Shuilian, Shifu, 
Chengping, Pingyang, Xiangyang, 
Danping, Huangshan, Mengjiagang, 
Ronglong, Lujia, Liyang, Huangni, Sima, 
Baimi, Zhujiagang, Qunxing, Xinhe*, 
Huangqiao*, Guanxin*, Hucheng*, 
Xiangyang*,Danyang*, Zhenzhu*, 
Duoanqiao*, Yongxingsi*, Shuidemiao*, 
Fensijie*, Pengchangjie*, 
Wanshougong*, Ximochi*, Xiao Xi Men* 
18 Villages, 
15 
Residential 
Communities 
Lidong 
Township 
(Xiang) 
 
Tuanjie, Wanjiaping, Lidong, Xindu, 
Banzhu, Shihui, Minyan, Tiechi, Xindian, 
Shuanglin, Qingshui, Yongchang, 
Furong, Changqing, Chejiaxi, Shili 
16 Villages 
Lidan Township 
(Xiang) 
Sanxian, Baota, Yanhe, Sangcan, 
Renjiaxiang, Pengjia, Liujia, Zhangliu, 
Renhe, Baiyang, Xindi, Jiadi, Yonggu, 
Yongxian, Shangfu, Sanjia, Yuhuang, 
Caijing, Dongzhou, Yanggu*, 
Daxiangkou* 
19 Villages, 
2 Residential 
Communities 
Linan Township 
(Zhen) 
Gaohu, Fengping, Dayan, Xuhu, 
Guangfu, Huilong, Xinduhe, Changhu, 
Zhonghu, Qianjin, Xinglong, Shuanghu, 
17 Villages, 
2 Residential 
Communities 
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Xingshi, Zhangjiatan, Laogang, Limu, 
Nanping, Qiaojiahe*, Liushi* 
Daohe 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Hushan, Jinya, Xiangong, Maoping, 
Baima, Liaoping, Yingxi, Qingshan, 
Changmu, Songlin, Fenshui, Xinjian, 
Gaoyan, Tianzishan* 
13 Villages 
1 Residential 
Communities 
Zhanggongmiao 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Tuzikou, Huanghe, Tongxing, Xinlian, 
Gaolupu, Panshan, Baihe, Hequn, 
Liuying, Guofu, Lianhe, Huguo, Jiankou, 
Gaochao, Xinmiao, Shitang, Jiuyan, 
Xingfu, Zhanggong*, Rongjiahe* 
18 Villages 
2 Residential 
Communities 
Daping 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Hongxing, Damiao, Qunle, Daxin, 
Baitang, Dayang, Xinsheng, Daping, 
Xinyan, Dongyue, Mengping, 
Zhongceng, Yucheng* 
12 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Cengnan 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Zengjiahe, Zidong, Zinan, Shanghe, 
Lanyan, Dongtian, Xincun, Xinping, 
Lingguan, Wujia, Tanjiapu, Qilimiao, 
Jijiaocheng, Wenjia, Yongfeng, Ceng 
Zeng* 
15 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Xiaodukou 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Maojiacha, Jianxin, Dongfeng, 
Renheyuan, Wangjia, Dingdi, Dongdi, 
Nanpan, Taipingyuan, Donggang, 
Dawei, Shahe, Zhongyuan, Huangsi, 
Jiangwan, Dongjia, Wugong, Zuojia, 
Zengjiawan, Hongxing, Taixing, Yangjia, 
Xujiapu, Xiaodukou* 
23 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Guanyuan 
Township 
(Xiang) 
 
Yujiatai, Gongweihu, Niao’erzhou, 
Xiazidang, Xingfuqiao, Qili, Xiantao, 
Shifa, Fenghuang, Guanyuan Matou* 
9 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Jiuyuan 
Township 
Ganjia, Chucaopo, Tudizhou, Kanghu, 
Zhangshijiao, Yongfu, Hexing, Heping, 
14 Villages 
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(Xiang) Yunai, Jizhong, Shaling, Bicheng, 
Shouma, Lianyutou 
Yongfeng 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Zengjiagang, Yongxing, Xinhekou, 
Yongzheng, Fuxing, Dazhou, 
Zhangjiawan, Pailougang, Donghong, 
Tongfu, Qinglongjiao, Sanling, Tianping, 
Meijiagang* 
13 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Rudong 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Yangjiadang, Fengling, Jianshe, Yunong, 
Gaochong, Qiujia, Chuanxun, Lujia, 
Huangfugang, Changfu, Niuzhang, 
Chimagang, Guangxing, Painan, 
Rudongpu* 
14 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Dayandang 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Yongsun, Xingxing, Handong, Huapu, 
Zhujin, Songjiatai, Mashu, Shenjiaba, 
Anhe, Ganhe, Tangqiao, Daijiahe, 
Qingyun, Xiongjiawan, Shuisi, Lianfu, 
Lianghu, Lilin, Cengnan, Baiyunsi*, 
Dongjie*, Xijie*, Wenchangge* 
19 Villages 
4 Residential 
Communities 
Wangjiachang 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Changle, Tangjiayu, Huangmu, 
Shuangqing, Daxing, Sifang, 
Banqiaorong, Datuan, Wanhong, 
Baimamiao, Yangquewan, Huayuan, 
Liujing, Jiangxi, Qingshiling, 
Shengchangjie*, Jianshejie* 
15 Villages 
2 Residential 
Communities 
Jinluo Township 
(Zhen) 
Xiangshian, Jiexihe, Shiguishan, 
Wujiapu, Taoyuan, Xingyuan, Yuxi, 
Tongfuqiao, Xinyan, Gaojia, Gaonong, 
Lianmeng, Zhangshunqiao, Fushen, Nuli, 
Chaoyangsi, Weixing, Bayi, Jinjiling*, 
Xingfuqiao* 
18 Villages 
2 Residential 
Communities 
Chexi Township 
(Xiang) 
Balihe, Chengtoushan, Chenggong, 
Wangping, Jiaotianyan, Pailou, Zhanjia, 
Dahekou, Huayuanqiao, Taci, Wanxing, 
16 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
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Nanyang, Taojia, Sunjia, Chexi, 
Qunying, Chexihe* 
Zhakou 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Xinqiao, Shizhuang, Shuimidong, 
Baizhuang, Luqiao, Yang’ershan, 
Dagong, Yanxi, Guchenggang, Laomu, 
Yajiao, Huayuanwan*, Yangmei* 
11 Villages 
2 Residential 
Communities 
Zhongwu 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Hengshan, Hualing, Caoyan, Guanyan, 
Lantian, Tongche, Yupu, Changlinggang, 
Guanjialing, Shigong, Chenguan, 
Yushan, Zhongwuqiao* 
12 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Mengxi 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Mengjiangqiao, Baiheling, Heyan, Wufu, 
Xiaoheqiao, Lijia, Baisheng, Tuanyan, 
Fanjia, Sanyuangong, Yongxiang, 
Lianhu, Zongbao, Dahong, Bagensong, 
Gaoxing, Yangyu, Shunlingyi, Mengxisi*, 
Shanghui* 
18 Villages 
2 Residential 
Communities 
Yanjing 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Wujiagang, Fenshuiling, Zhangjiachang, 
Zhangjiadang, Baimamiao, Guanshantu, 
Baoziling, Sanshengmiao, Heping* 
8 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Fuxingchang 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Wansong, Tianhe, Fujia, Shuangyan, 
Chenggang, Xindang, Tonggu, Tanjiayu, 
Youxing, Lujia, Jinpen, Wenquan, 
Weijia, Lujiawan, Lijia, Shuangqiao, 
Taohuayuan* 
16 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Leigongta 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Gaoshancun, Qixi, Zhangshuyan, 
Qianguan, Sanxing, Cenghe, Lujiadang, 
Cengbei, Xinyan, Dahe, Longdang, 
Shaheyan, Gangyao, Yantouzui* 
13 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Yiwan 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Xinhua, Hongqiao, Shuangjiaqiao, 
Caijiapo, Fuxin, Juhualing, Yiwan, 
Wanhua, Jinma* 
8 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Shuanglong 
Township 
Sanlian, Tianhua, Shuangxing, 
Wansheng, Zengjia, Huamiao, Jinhe, 
12 Villages 
1 Residential 
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(Xiang) Shanlin, Gutang, Fengxiang, Jiehu, 
Shuangtai, Shunlinqiao* 
Community 
Matoupu 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Lianhuayan, Kemushan, Shanmu, 
Sanguansi, Guandou, Tongzi, Matou* 
6 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Yangjiafang 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Huilongyu, Pinghe, Yanceng, 
Longdongyu, Guanyinyan, Qingshanyu, 
Yangjiafang 
7 Villages 
Dongshi 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Dongshi, Luoping, Wanjiagang, 
Hongyan, Lujiaoqiao, Yuntai, Shenjia, 
Changjia 
8 Villages 
Fangshiping 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Zongyang, Liushu, Qiushan, 
Longshentan, Yangjiawan, Xingzishan, 
Shuangquan* 
6 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Ganxitan 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Gubei, Gunan, Lumao, Ganxi, Tianxing, 
Maxi, Hekou, Yanmen, Jinghuasi* 
8 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Huolianpo 
Township 
(Zhen) 
Gutai, Jinshan, Lisong, Shuangxi, 
Nanmu, Huangxi, Sanyuan, Guanyinge* 
7 Villages 
1 Residential 
Community 
Taiqing 
Township 
(Xiang) 
Tanyu, Dongmen, Yushi, Shixiang, 
Changchong, Nanshan, Fengnan, 
Hengshansi, Shiban, Taiqing, Tianchong 
11 Villages 
Jiashan 
Fine Seed Farm 
Jiashan, Lujiaping 2 Villages 
Cotton Seed 
Farm 
Yanqiao, Wujia 2 Villages 
Tiangongshan 
Forestry Centre 
Xinquan 1 Village 
Shanmen 
Reservoir 
Shanmen Reservoir Team 1 Village 
Mayan 
Agricultural 
Mayan Agricultural Institute Team 1 Village 
339 
 
 
  
Research 
Institute 
Total 
32 Townships (15 Zhens and 17 Xiangs) 
and 5 collective organisations 
(427 Villages and 51 Residential 
Communities) 
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APPENDIX III: SELECT GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED 
IN TEXT 
 
Baochan daohu Contracting out the lands to the 
households and distributing on a 
contracted-output-base 
包产到户 
Caizheng suo Finance office 财政所 
Chaihuo shan  Firewood mountains 柴火山 
Chequ bingxiang 
jianzheng 
Cancelling the establishment of 
districts and merging smaller  
Townships 
撤区并乡
建镇 
Cong dian dao mian,  
you shang er xia  
From point to area, and from top to 
bottom 
从点到
面， 
由上而下 
Cuncun tong Extending coverage to every village 村村通 
Cunwu gongkai Publicising village affairs 村务公开 
Daxuesheng cunguan College-graduate village official 大学生村
官 
Dianzi zhengwu E-government 电子政务 
Fentian daohu Allocating the lands to the 
households  
分田到户 
Fenzao chifan Serving meals to different diners 
from different pots 
分灶吃饭 
Gangwei zerenzhi  
kaopingzhi 
Post responsibility evaluation 
system 
岗位责任
考评制 
Gengdi zhanyong shui Occupied farmland tax 耕地占用
税 
Geti gongshanghu Private household businesses 个体工商
户 
Gongji jin Public accumulation fund 公积金 
Gongyi jin Public welfare fund 公益金 
Hongwang Red net 红网 
Jiage shuanggui zhi dual track of price 价格双轨
制 
Jianshe shehui zhuyi xin  
nongcun 
building a new socialist countryside 建设社会
主义新农
村 
Jiaoyu fujia fei surtax for education expenses 教育附加
费 
Jiating zeren zhi household responsibility system 家庭责任
制 
Jiben jianshe jizi fundraising for capital construction 基本建设
集资 
Jingying guanli zhan rural business management station 农村经营
管理站 
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Lianchan jichou distributing on an agreed-output 
basis 
联产计酬 
Lianggai two transforming experiments 两改 
Lianggongkai yijiandu two publicising and one supervision 两公开，
一监督 
Liangshi zhibu direct grain subsidy 粮食直补 
Liangzhong butie subsidies for growing superior grain 良种补贴 
Lianzu fang low-rent housing 廉租房 
Lingdao rexian leadership hotlines 领导热线 
Litu bu lijia, jinchang bu  
jincheng 
leaving the land but not leaving the 
hometown, entering factories but 
not entering towns 
离土不离
乡， 
进厂不进
城 
Lixian zhaoshangju Business Promotion Bureau of Li 
County 
澧县招商
局 
Minzhu toupiao democratic votes 民主投票 
Nong lin shui shiye fei Fees for agriculture-forestry-
irrigation  
农林水事
业费 
Nongcun dibao rural minimum subsistence 
allowance 
农村低保 
Nongcun xinxing hezuo 
yiliao 
new rural co-operative medical care 农村新型
合作医疗 
Nongcun yanglao 
baoxian 
new social endowment insurance for 
rural residents 
农村养老
保险 
Nongjiju gouzhi butie purchasing large-scale agricultural 
machinery and tools in the  
major grain producing areas 
农机具购
置补贴 
Nonglin techan shui tax on agriculture and forestry 
speciality 
农林特产
税 
Nongzi zonghe butie agricultural production materials 农资综合
补贴 
Po sijiu doing away with four olds 破四旧 
Qinquan violations of rights 侵权 
Qishui title deed tax 契税 
Renmin rexian people’s hotline 人民热线 
San tiliu three reserves 三提留 
Sanchao liang grains on the top of the other two 三超粮 
Sanjisuoyou, 
duiweijichu 
three-level ownership is applied and 
the brigades are the basic  
unit to account, to manage and to 
distribute 
三级所
有， 
队为基础 
Sanlai yibu three processes and one 
compensation 
三来一补 
Shehui xieshang duihua  
Zhidu 
social negotiation dialogue 
institution 
社会协商
对话制度 
Tiefanwan iron rice bowls 铁饭碗 
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Tuigeng huanlin restoring farmland to forest 退耕还林 
Tuijin sanxiang gaige, 
jiji  
kaizhan liangxiang 
shidian, 
jinjin shouzhu yitiao  
hongxian 
pushing forward three reforms, 
actively carrying out two  
experiments, and strictly obeying 
one red alert line 
推进三项
改革， 
积极开展
两项试
点， 
紧紧守住
一条红线 
Wanyuanhu households with the income of 
beyond ten thousands yuan 
万元户 
Weiquan protections for rights 维权 
Wen jiao shiye fei operating costs for culture-education 文教事业
费 
Wubaohu five guarantee household provision 五保户 
Wuding dabaogan five contract-based confirmations 五定大包
干 
Xiang tongchou funds for township planning 乡统筹 
Xianji shuifei water bills 县级水费 
Xiaochi jianzhai eliminating deficits and reducing 
debts 
消赤减债 
Xinfang zhidu traditional petitioning system 信访制度 
Yimin jianzhen resettling displaced residents in 
newly built towns 
移民建镇 
Yingye shui business tax 营业税 
Yipiao foujue one veto power 一票否决 
Yishiyiyi caizheng 
jiangbu 
one project one discussion with 
fiscal subsidies 
一事一议
财政奖补 
Zengzhi shui value added tax 增值税 
Zhengwu gongkai publicising governmental affairs 政务公开 
Zhongyang nongcun 
gongzuo lingdao 
bangongshi 
leadership office for agriculture 
work in Beijing 
中央农村
工作领导 
办公室 
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Part II: Primary Sources on Li County 
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澧县乡镇企业志 [Annals of Township and Village Enterprises], printed by 
  The Bureau of Township and Village Enterprise of Li County and  
  archived in The Bureau of Archives of Li County, February,  
  1991. 
澧县大堰垱镇农村土地承包文书资料 [Document compilation on re- 
  confirming the contracted land right], compiled and printed by the  
  rural management office of Dayandang Township, September  
  2007. 
澧县农村 1982年度专业户重点户典型 [Examples of Speciality   
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  1982. 
澧县调查信息 [Li County Information], (2008, 2009, 2010), compiled and 
  printed by the Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey 
  Team of Hunan. 
澧县统计年鉴 [Statistical Yearbook of Li County] (1978, 1979, 1980,  
  1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 
  1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
  2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), compiled by The 
  Bureau of Statistics of Li County. 
Compilation office for chronicles of Li County, 澧县志 [Annals of Li  
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Compilation office for chronicles of Li County (1999), 澧县年鉴 [Annals of 
  Li County 1990 – 1996], (Loudi: Loudi Xiangzhong Geological  
  Press, 1999). 
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  湖南省澧县地图册 2010 [Maps of Li County of Hunan 2010],  
  (Changsha: Hunan Cartographic Publishing House, 2010). 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, The 2014 Statistical Yearbook of the 
  PRC on the National Economic and Social Development, available 
  on Xinhua Net on http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-  
  01/18/content_695553_2.htm  (accessed on 16, January 2016). 
The research team specialising in agriculture tax reform and the financial  
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  Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan, 2000.   
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Electronic Resources:  
 
News and Media: 
 
Changde Daily: http://cdrb.cdyee.com/ 
China Agriculture Economic Information Web, http://wz2.2000y.net/ 
China Reform Database Web, available on http://www.reformdata.org/ 
CPC News: http://cpc.people.com.cn/  
Hunan Daily: http://epaper.voc.com.cn/hnrb/  
Li County News (1980 - 1989) – paper archives 
People’s Daily: http://www.people.com.cn/  
People’s Daily Blog: http://blog.people.com.cn/ 
Red Net: http://www.rednet.cn/  
Xinhua News: http://www.xinhuanet.com/  
 
Governments and their agencies Official Websites: 
 
Changde Rural Economy Web: http://www.cdnj.gov.cn/ 
Central Government Web:http://www.gov.cn/ 
Finance Bureau of Li Count Web,  http://www.lxczj.gov.cn/Item/  
Forestry Bureau of Li County Web: http://hnlx.forestry.gov.cn/24287/ 
Guanyuan Township Government Web: http://gyx.lx-gov.cn/  
Li County Government Web, http://www.li-xian.gov.cn/  
Li County group of the Rural Socio-economic Survey Team of Hunan 
website: http://www.hndc.gov.cn/ 
Ministry of Finance of the PRC Web: http://www.mof.gov.cn/  
National Bureau of Corruption Precaution Web: http://nbcp.gov.cn/ 
Rural Resident Self-governance Information Web: http://cmzz.mca.gov.cn/ 
Sannong Information Web: http://www.sannong.gov.cn/  
 
 
  
